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INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

OCTOBER, 1894.

LUXURY.*

I HAVE chosen luxury for the subject of my address this evening, because I think that the employment of wealth, in what we should agree to call luxurious expenditure, is a source of considerable perplexity to moral persons who find themselves in the possession of an income obviously more than sufficient for the needs of their physical existence, and for the provision of the instruments necessary to their work in life. Such persons commonly wish to do what common morality regards as right; yet for the most part they cannot deny that they live in luxury; while at the same time it can hardly be denied that luxurious living is commonly thought to be in some degree censurable. We should be surprised to hear an earnest and thoughtful man say, except jocosely, that it was part of his plan of life to live in luxury; or to hear an earnest and thoughtful father, toiling to accumulate by industry adequate wealth for his children, say that he wished to enable them to live in luxury. Yet commonly there would be no doubt that the habits of his life, and the habits and expectations which he is allowing his children to form, are habits and expectations of luxurious living.

Possibly some of my hearers may think that this is only

* An Address delivered to the University Hall Guild, London, January, 1894.

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the familiar phenomenon of human frailty; that the most moral persons are continually doing many things which they know to be wrong, and that luxurious living is only one of these many things. But I submit that it would be difficult to find a parallel case in the familiar errors and shortcomings of moral persons. For these errors and shortcomings are mostly occasional deflections from the way in which they regularly walk, due to transient victories of impulse over settled purpose. Doubtless appetite, resentment, vanity, egoism, frequently lead the most earnest persons astray; but it is commonly only for a brief interval, after which they reject and repudiate the seductive impulse and return to the path of reason and duty. But the luxurious living of the high-minded and earnest among the possessors of wealth is obviously not an occasional deflection of this kind: it is a high-road on which they travel day after day and year after year, systematically and—I was going to say comfortably, but that would not be quite true; my point rather is that they travel it with a certain amount—I think at the present time a growing amount—of moral uneasiness and perplexity.

Here, perhaps, some one may think that this perplexity, if it is a perplexity, is one which interests only a very limited circle, at least from a moral point of view. It may be said that the difficulty that the rich find in trying to enter the kingdom of heaven was long ago made known to us by the highest authority; but that, fortunately for the human race, this particular obstacle affects only a few, for whose moral troubles we can hardly be called on to feel much sympathy, since to get rid of the obstacle is only too easy. I think, however, that this would be a hasty and superficial judgment. No doubt it is only a small minority of persons who are privileged to dwell in marble halls, adorned with damask hangings and surrounded by acres of park and garden-beds; who are liable to dinners costing two guineas a head, and who habitually wear whatever substitute for purple the æsthetic fashion of this modern age prescribes. But if luxurious living is morally censurable, the censure must extend far beyond the limits of the few thousand persons who enjoy

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these privileges; it must extend to all who watch this glorious profusion with mingled sympathy and envy, struggle and long to get a share of it whenever opportunity offers, and meanwhile pay it the homage of cheap imitation. Indeed, if the sin of luxurious living, like many other sins, lies mainly in the spirit and intention of expenditure, it would be easy to write an apologue that should be the reverse of the tale of the widow's mite, and show how the spirit of luxury may be fully manifested in the expenditure of sixpence on lollipops or feathers or gin.

But further, even if it were granted that the costly luxuries of the rich were really the only kind of luxuries that can possibly deserve the unfavorable judgment of the moralist, it would still be important to all classes of the community that this censure should be well considered and discriminating. For any material change in the expenditure in question would inevitably, in one way or another, have economic and social effects of a far-reaching kind, however it was brought about; and if such a change ever should be brought about, it will be largely due to the pressure of the moral opinions and sentiments of persons other than the rich.

My aim, then, this evening, will be to arrive at as clear a view as possible on the following questions: (1) What luxury is; (2) why and how far it is deserving of censure; and (3) why and how far this censure is likely to go wrong.

Let us begin by considering the definition of the term. Political economists sometimes use the term "luxury" in a wide sense, to include all forms of private consumption of wealth not necessary for the health or working efficiency of the consumer; all consumption—to put it otherwise—which is neither directly nor indirectly productive, and which, therefore, would be uneconomical, if we regarded a man merely as an industrial machine. It may seem, however, that we shall keep nearer to ordinary thought and language by recognizing one or more kinds of expenditure, intermediate between luxuries on the one hand and necessaries on the other. Certainly we commonly speak of "luxuries, comforts, and necessaries;" or, again, of "luxuries, decencies, and necessaries

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of life;" and I think we may get a clearer idea of what we mean by "luxury" if we examine its relation to each of these intermediate terms.

When we reflect on the ordinary distinction between "luxuries" and "comforts," the difference would seem to be this: "comforts" are means of protection against slight pains and annoyances such as do not materially injure health or interfere with efficiency,—such annoyances as we call "discomforts;"—"luxuries," on the other hand, are sources of positive pleasure that might be absent without discomfort. It is commonly, I think, not difficult for an individual to apply this distinction in his own case, so far as his feelings at any particular time are concerned. Thus, when I take a long railway journey on a frosty day, a thick great coat is necessary to me, because without it I am likely to catch a cold which will impair my efficiency; a railway rug is a *comfort*, because without it I shall be disagreeably cold from the knees downward; a fur cloak is a luxury. But reflection shows that the difference on which this distinction turns is very largely an affair of habit, since the privation of luxuries that have become habitual usually causes discomfort and annoyance. We are told that a famous Roman epicure—Apicius—committed suicide when he had reduced his fortune to eighty thousand pounds, feeling that life was not worth living on this meagre scale; and though this is an extreme case, it is generally recognized that a rapid fall from great to moderate wealth is liable to cause positive discomfort from the sudden break of luxurious habits that it entails. But it is not, perhaps, generally recognized how very far-reaching this effect of habit is, and how largely what we call comforts are—apart from habit—really luxuries. I suppose there can be no doubt that the vast majority of Englishmen might without discomfort dispense through life with all such nervous stimulants as tea, coffee, alcohol, and tobacco—at any rate, if they had been reared from infancy without them. I do not say this without experience. I lived myself in perfect comfort from twelve to nineteen, drinking water only at all meals; and I remember that I could not imagine why people took the trouble to

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manufacture tea, coffee, and wine. Yet the most hard-headed modern economist would not deprive an old woman of her tea in the workhouse; and I am told that whatever deterrent effect the prospect of imprisonment under present conditions has on our criminal classes depends largely on the deprivation of their habitual alcohol and tobacco.

It seems clear, then, that the line between luxuries and comforts is necessarily a shifting one. The commonest comforts might—apart from the effect of habit—be classed as luxuries; the most expensive luxuries may, through habit, become mere comforts, in the sense that they cannot be dispensed with without annoyance.

We have now to observe that often the annoyance which the loss of wealth causes to the loser arises solely from the fall in social position and reputation which it is rightly or wrongly believed to entail. This leads me to my second distinction between "luxuries" and the "decencies" of life. I here use "decencies" in a wide sense, to mean all commodities beyond necessaries which we consume to avoid not physical discomfort, but social disrepute. Perhaps I may make my distinction between "decencies" and "comforts" clear by a homely illustration. Many men, I believe, find that their coats, hats, and boots are liable to be condemned by domestic criticism as not "decent" to wear in public, just when they have become most thoroughly adapted to the peculiarities of the wearer's organism, and so most thoroughly comfortable. Half a century ago, I believe that boots were altogether a "decency" rather than a comfort for a valuable and thriving part of the population of our island; at least a political economist* of that date tells us that a "Scotch peasant wears shoes to preserve not his feet, but his station in society."

It will, therefore, be clear at once that just as the line between "luxuries" and "comforts" varies almost indefinitely with the habits of individuals, the distinction between "luxuries" and "decencies" varies similarly with the customs and opinions of classes.

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* Senior.

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Now, if we are passing judgment on an individual accused of luxury in a bad sense, or giving advice to one desirous of avoiding it, the consideration of his formed habits and the customs of his class must be taken into account. It may sometimes be even unwise in him to break habits which it would yet have been wise not to have formed; for a struggle with habit sometimes involves a material temporary decrease of efficiency, and a hard-working man reasonably objects to impair his efficiency. The principle is no doubt a dangerous one, and easily abused; but I do not think we can deny its legitimacy within strict limits. So, again, though we should usually admire an individual who breaks through a custom of useless expenditure, we should usually shrink from imposing this as an absolute duty, and sometimes should even condemn it as unwise. A fight with custom is, like other fights, inspiriting and highly favorable to the development of moral courage; but usually, like other fights, it cannot be carried on without cost and sacrifice of some kind; and it is the part of a wise man to count the cost before undertaking it, and to measure his resources against the strength of the adversary.

But at present I only mention these considerations to conclude them. I do not now wish to consider how we are to judge individuals, but rather how we are to judge habits and customs regarded as social facts. For such habits and customs are being modified continually though slowly; and if they are bad, it is desirable that the pressure of public opinion should in one way or another be brought to bear to modify them. "They may say it is the Persian fashion, but let it be changed," as Shakespeare has it.

From this point of view I think it convenient to avoid the necessarily shifting and relative definitions of decencies and comforts, and to fall back on the simpler distinction between "luxuries" and "necessaries;" extending, however, the term necessaries to include expenditure required by such habits and customs as we consider generally necessary to physical or moral well-being,—*e.g.*, habits of due cleanliness and such customs in respect of decency—in a strict sense—as we judge important, if not indispensable, to morality. This extension

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is, I think, required by ordinary usage, for no one would apply the term "luxurious" in an unfavorable meaning to expenditure of this kind And I think we shall further agree that the term is not properly applicable to expenditure that increases a man's efficiency in the performance of his industrial or social function, so long as the increase of efficiency is not obtained at a disproportionate cost. But this requirement of due proportion between increase of efficiency should be kept carefully in view; because in all kinds of work it is possible to increase efficiency really but wastefully by adding instruments which are of *some* use, but are not worth their cost. In the application of wealth by which a competent man of business *makes* his income, this proportion of efficiency to cost is easily estimated, and clearly unremunerative conveniences—*e.g.*, machines that clearly cost more labor than they save—are carefully excluded; but in the application of wealth by which an income is *spent*, this economic care is often thrown aside, and instruments are purchased which, while not absolutely useless for the purchaser's ends, are at any rate of very little use in proportion to their cost, —not unfrequently of so little use that they do not even repay the time and trouble spent in taking care of them. May I take an illustration from my own calling? I have heard of a scholar who did good work in his youth and attained fame and promotion; but then his work slackened and stopped. On inquiry this was found to be due not to laziness, but to his increasing absorption in the task of buying, housing, binding, classifying, arranging, and looking after the splendid collection of books that he had formed to aid his researches.

For this form of luxury, these inconvenient conveniences, there is no defence. But I dwell on it now because, ever since moral reflection began in Europe, there have been thoughtful persons who have held that the customary luxurious expenditure of the rich on food, clothes, houses, furniture, carriages, horses, etc., consisted mainly in conveniences that were really quite uneconomic, because one way or another they caused more trouble and annoyance than they saved to their possessor. I will quote an expression of this view from a source

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which may surprise some of my hearers,—*i.e.*, from a work* by the founder of the long line of modern political economists who are commonly supposed to exalt wealth too exclusively, and to value it unduly. Adam Smith, in 1759, wrote that "wealth and greatness are mere trinkets of frivolous utility, no more adapted for procuring ease of body or tranquillity of mind than the tweezer-cases of the lover of toys; and, like them, too, more troublesome to the person who carries them about with him than all the advantages they can afford him are commodious. . . . In ease of body and peace of mind all the different ranks of life are nearly upon a level, and the beggar who suns himself by the side of the highway, possesses that security which kings are fighting for."

I have quoted this not because I believe it to be really true, but because it is interesting to find that Adam Smith believed it, and because it was a tolerably prevalent belief in his age. There is a story told by a writer of his time which may serve as another illustration: a story of a Persian king, afflicted with a strange malady, who had been informed by a wise physician that he could be cured by wearing the shirt of a perfectly happy man. It was at first supposed that there could be no difficulty in finding such a man among the upper ten thousand of Persia; but the court was searched in vain, and the city was searched in vain; and the messengers sent to prosecute the search through the country found that land-owners and farmers had all their sorrows and anxieties. At length the searchers met a laborer, singing as he came home from work. Struck with his gayety, they questioned him as to his happiness. He professed himself perfectly happy. They probed him with minute inquiries, but no flaw in his happiness was revealed. The long-sought remedy seemed to be in their hands: but, alas, the happy man wore *no* shirt.

Well, I think this story will show how far the thought of the nineteenth century has travelled from the view of life that was prevalent in the age of Adam Smith and Rousseau. Per-

* "Theory of Moral Sentiments," Part IV., Chap. i.

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haps it has travelled a little too far. Adam Smith was—what Rousseau certainly was not—a shrewd, calm, and disengaged observer of the facts of civilized life. He sometimes, as here, gives the rein to rhetoric, but he never lets it carry him away. And I think that his view contains an important element of truth; that it signalizes a real danger of wasted effort, growing in importance as the arts of industry grow, against which civilized man has to guard. I think that every thoughtful person, in planning his expenditure, ought to keep this danger in view, and avoid the multiplication of useless or nearly useless instruments,—houses larger than he at all needs, servants whose services are not materially time-saving, a private carriage when walking is ordinarily better for his health and adequate for his business, and many minor superfluities which absorb the margin of income that would otherwise be available for results of real utility. Still, taking Adam Smith's statement in its full breadth, I cannot doubt that it contains more error than truth. I cannot doubt that the steady aim of civilized man to increase the pleasures of life by refining and complicating their means and sources—an aim which in all ages has stimulated and directed the development of industry and commerce—has been to a great extent a successful aim, so far as its immediate end is concerned.

Let us, then, putting out of sight expenditure prompted by bad habits or imposed by useless customs, and expenditure on illusory conveniences that give more trouble than they save, concentrate our attention on luxury successful in its immediate aims,—*i.e.*, consumption that increases pleasure without materially promoting health or efficiency; and let us consider how far and on what grounds this may be thought deserving of censure. Now here I must be allowed to assume my own fundamental principles of ethical judgment,—viz., that whatever tends on the whole to increase the general happiness is good and not bad. I am aware that many thoughtful persons dispute this; but I cannot argue any question of social duty on any other basis, and this is not the time for a general discussion of ethical first principles. From my utilitarian point of view, then, the relevant arguments against increasing

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an individual's pleasure by superfluous consumption are chiefly these: first, that the process usually injures his health in the long run; secondly, that it impairs his efficiency for the performance of his social function; thirdly, that the labor he causes to be spent in providing him with the means of pleasure would have produced more happiness, on the whole, if it had been spent in providing the means of pleasure for others. The first two of these considerations form the main staple of the *older* arguments against luxury; the third is more prominent in modern thought. I will briefly consider each in turn.

On the first of these heads—the effect of luxury on health—there is much need to mediate, but little for a layman to say. That persons of wealth and leisure are in danger of excess in sensual indulgences; that this excess is continually being committed; that it is not difficult to avoid it by care and self-control; that those who do not avoid it are palpably foolish; what more is there to say for one who is not a physician?

I remember that in one of the most polished and pointed poems that Pope ever wrote, he speaks of his father as having had a long life—

"Healthy by temperance and by exercise."

The line, you see, is neither polished nor pointed; and I used to wonder how Pope's fine taste ever came to admit such a platitude, until I read Trevelyan's brilliant chapter in his life of Fox, on the manners of London society in the middle of the eighteenth century. It then occurred to me that the fact of a man of means having lived to old age, "healthy by temperance and by exercise," *may* have seemed to Pope so rare and remarkable that its bare statement would be impressive without any verbal adornments. Well, I hope all this is changed in this last quarter of the nineteenth century; but I leave the question to the social historian; the philosopher may be permitted to pass on, only remarking that the folly of sacrificing health to sensual indulgence is not the distinctive privilege of

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any social class. I remember that Pope, whom I have just quoted, sneers at legislation that spares the vices of the rich

"And hurls the thunders of the laws on gin."

But the legislators might have answered, that while champagne and Burgundy were slaying their thousands, "gin" was slaying its tens of thousands.

But, secondly, it is urged that, without positively injuring health, the refinement and complication of the means of physical enjoyment tend to diminish efficiency for work. Looking closer at this argument, we find that it combines two distinct objections: one is that luxury makes men lazy, disinclined for labor; the other is that it makes them *soft*, incapable of the prolonged, strenuous exertion and the patient endurance of disagreeable incidents which most kinds of effective work require. On the point of laziness I will speak presently. As regards softness, the objection has this element of truth in it,—that the powers of sustained exertion and endurance are developed, like other powers, by practice, and that the lives of the poor provide normally an unsought training of these powers from childhood upwards, which has to be supplied artificially, if at all, in the lives of the rich. But I think experience shows that the objection is not very serious, at least for our race. Certainly, Englishmen brought up in luxury seem usually to show an adequate capacity of exertion and endurance when an adequately strong motive is supplied for the exercise of these qualities.

We come, then, to the question of laziness, meaning by laziness a disposition to work clearly less than is good for one's self and others. There can be no doubt that the luxurious tend as a class to be lazy; the possession of the means of sensual enjoyment without labor disposes average men, if not to absolute inertia, at any rate to short working hours and long holidays. On the other hand, if luxury makes men lazy, the prospect of luxury makes them work; and if we balance the two effects on motive, I think there can be no doubt that, other things remaining the same, a society

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from which luxury was effectually excluded would be lazier than a society that admitted it. If it be said that the desire of luxury is a low motive, I might answer in the manner in which one of the wisest of English moralists—Butler—speaks of resentment. I should say that "it were much to be wished that men would act from a better principle;" but that if you could suppress the desire of luxury without altering human nature in other respects, you would probably do harm, because you would diminish the general happiness by increasing laziness.

This argument is, I think, decisive from a *political* point of view, as a defence of a social order that allows great inequalities in the distribution of wealth for consumption. But when I hear it urged as conclusive from an ethical point of view, I am reminded of Lord Melbourne's answer to a friend whom he consulted, when premier, as to the bestowal of a vacant garter. His friend said, "Why not take it yourself? no one has a better claim." "Well, but," said Lord Melbourne, "I don't see what I am to gain by bribing myself." The answer is cynical in expression, but it contains a lesson for some who profess a higher moral standard than Lord Melbourne was in the habit of professing. For when we have decided that the toleration of luxury as a social fact is indispensable to the full development of human energy, the ethical question still remains for each individual, whether it is indispensable for him; whether, in order to get himself to do his duty, he requires to bribe himself by a larger share of consumable wealth than falls to the common lot. And if one answers the question in the affirmative, one must admit one's self to belong to the class of persons characterized by George Eliot as "people whose high ideals are not required to account for their actions."

Further, even from a social point of view, this argument cannot be a final answer to the moral censor of luxury; for he may rejoin that he admits the danger of repressing luxury without laziness, and is quite willing to divide his censure equally between the two. He may even grant that, of the two, more stress should be laid on the discouragement of idle-

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ness; and that the moral repression of luxury can only be safely attempted by slow degrees, so far as we succeed in substituting nobler motives for activity,—*i.e.*, so far as we can make it natural and customary for all men, whatever their means, to choose some social function and devote themselves strenuously to its excellent performance.

But if the censor takes this line,—and I think it practically a wise line,—he by implication admits the inconclusiveness of the argument *against* luxury as an inducement to idleness; for it implies that the two are separable, and that idleness, like softness and disease, is not an inevitable concomitant of luxurious living, but only a danger that may be guarded against.

I come, then, to the third argument,—viz., that a man who lives luxuriously consumes what would have produced more happiness if he had left it to be consumed by others. It is to be observed that this is an argument not against luxury itself, so far as it is successful luxury, but against its unequal distribution; it is an argument in favor of cheap luxuries for the many instead of costly luxuries for the few. And this, I think, is generally the case with the modern censures of luxurious living as contrasted with the more ancient censures; the modern attack is rather directed against inequality in the distribution of the means of enjoyment than against the general principle of heightening the pleasures of life by refining and elaborating their means and sources; or, at any rate, if this elaboration is attacked, it is only because it is, from a social point of view, a waste of labor. But though this makes a fundamental difference in the *grounds* of the attack, it does not make much difference in its objects; since it is the consumer of costly luxuries who in all ages has stood in the forefront of the controversy and borne the brunt of moral censure. Accordingly, in the little I have yet to say of luxury, I shall use the term in the special sense of costly luxury.

It must be admitted that this third objection, so far as it is valid at all, is more inevitable than the preceding ones. A man may avoid disease by care and self-control; he may avoid idleness and softness by bracing exercise of his faculties, physical and mental, while still systematically heightening his

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enjoyment of existence by elaborate and complex means of pleasure; but just as he cannot both eat his cake and have it, so he cannot both eat his cake and arrange that other men should eat it too, or that they should consume the simpler products of the baker's art which might have resulted from the same labor.

Need I say a word about the hoary fallacy that a man by eating his cake provides employment—and therefore cake, or at least bread—for the baker? "Time was," as Shakespeare says, "that when the brains were out the man would die;" and as the brains have been out of this fallacy generations ago, I shall consider it as slain, even though it still walks the earth with inextinguishable vitality, and occasionally reappears in the writings of the most superior persons. I shall venture to assume that, speaking generally, a man benefits others by rendering services to them, and not by requiring them to render services to him.

Can we accept it as a generally satisfactory defence of the costly luxuries of the few that, owing to the exquisite delicacy of the palates of certain individuals, the general happiness is best promoted by the consumption of cake being reserved to them? that they are to be regarded, in fact, as the organ of humanity for the appreciation of cake? There is some truth in this, if we are considering a *sudden* change; since experience shows that refined luxury is liable to be wasted on persons suddenly transplanted into it late in life. But the argument does not go far, since the same experience shows that the task of educating any class up to the standard of capacity for enjoying luxury which is reached on the average by the wealthiest class of the age is not a difficult task, though it requires time. It is, indeed, in most cases, an educational problem peculiarly easy of solution. Hence I do not think this consideration can weigh much against the broad fact that, even in the case of successful luxury, increase in the means of enjoyment consumed by the same individual is accompanied by increase of enjoyment in a continually diminishing ratio; so that inequality in the distribution of consumption is uneconomic from a social point of view.

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A really valid defence of luxury, then, must be found, if at all, in some service which the luxurious consumer as such renders to the non-luxurious. That is, it must be shown that so-called luxury is not really such, according to our definition, but is a provision necessary for the efficient performance of some social function.

From this point of view it is sometimes said that luxury is a kind of social insurance against disaster, as providing a store of commodity on which society can draw when wide-spread economic losses occur through war or industrial disturbance. Such disasters would no doubt cause far graver distress if they fell on a body of human beings who had among them hardly more than the necessaries of life; but though this is an argument for habitually producing a certain amount of commodities not required for health or efficiency, it is not a strong argument for distributing them unequally. The social surplus required might be nearly as well created by the cheap superfluities of the many as by the costly superfluities of the few.

Time presses; so, passing over other inadequate defences of luxury, I come to the only one to which I am disposed to attach weight,—viz., that inequality in the distribution of superfluous commodities is required for the social function of advancing culture,—enlarging the ideal of human life, and carrying it towards ever fuller perfection. Here, however, I am inclined to draw a distinction between the two main elements of culture, (1) the apprehension and advancement of knowledge, and (2) the appreciation and production of beauty, and to lay stress chiefly on the latter. No doubt, in the past, learning and science have been largely advanced by men of wealth who have pursued them as a means of refined enjoyment; no doubt, also, the scholar or researcher requires continually more elaborate provision in the way of libraries, museums, apparatus. But these we shall regard not as luxuries but as the instruments of his profession; and in most cases (I admit exceptions) there seems no reason why the pursuit of knowledge should suffer if all costly luxury were eliminated from the expenditure of the student, outside

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the instruments of his calling. Similarly, I do not see why, with an adequate provision of public libraries, museums, etc., the greater part of the needs of the educated world who are not professional students, in respect of the apprehension of knowledge, should not be supplied at a very moderate cost.

The case seems to me different with the appreciation and pursuit of beauty; and here I think we reach the node and heart of this ancient controversy. Here, however, I have to confess that personal insight and experience fail me. I only worship occasionally in the outer court of the temple of beauty, and so I do not feel competent to hold the brief for luxury on the ground of its being a necessary condition of æsthetic progress. But though I cannot hold the brief, I am prepared, as a member of the jury of educated persons, to give a verdict in favor of the defendant. I find that the study of history leads me continually to contemplate with sympathy and satisfaction the opulence and luxury of the few amid the hard lives of the many, because it presents itself as the practically necessary soil in which beauty and the love of beauty grow and develop; and because I see how, when new sources of high and refined delight have thus been produced, the best and most essential of its benefits extend from the few to the many, and become abiding possessions of the race. It is possible that in the future we may carry on artistic and æsthetic development successfully on the basis of public and collective effort, and dispense with the lavish and costly private expenditure of the few; but till we are convinced that this is likely —and I am not yet convinced—I think we should not hamper the progress of this priceless element of human life by any censure or discouragement of luxurious living, so long as it aims at the ends and keeps within the limits which I have endeavored briefly to determine.

H. Sidgwick.

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THE LIMITS OF INDIVIDUAL AND NATIONAL SELF-SACRIFICE.*

WHAT are the limits of self-sacrifice? How far and on what principle is a man or a nation to give up welfare or existence? I will try first to state the principle of self-sacrifice, I will point out next some prejudices which obscure this principle, and will then show the general mode of its application.

I shall here assume that self-sacrifice can exist and also may be right. And the question is on what principle is self-sacrifice right, and is there a limit at which it becomes wrong? The general principle is perhaps not hard to lay down. To sacrifice one's self is to destroy or diminish one's personal existence, and this by itself is not good. Mere self-destruction, whether partial or complete, is not desirable. Self-sacrifice is right if the loss is sustained with a view to a greater gain, and otherwise it is wrong. We must assume that what I forego is of value, for, if it were worth nothing, it could not be a sacrifice. Supposing, then, that I lose it for something worth no more, my action is not right, and if I lose it for something worth less, my action is wrong and may be immoral. This is the principle, and to this there will perhaps be no objection. The conflict of opinion arises in part from difficulties in the application, but it comes mainly, I think, from the interference of moral prejudices. There are one-sided points of view not subordinated to the governing principle, and we must next proceed to see what these are.

I will begin with the self-styled "Christian" party, who profess to base their morality on the New Testament. But whether it is really more Christian to follow or to ignore the teaching of the Gospels I shall not discuss.

Let us then examine this "Christian" point of view, and

* This paper was written in 1878 or 1879. Apart from abbreviation it has been left much in its original form.

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ask if there is here any limit to self-sacrifice. There is no limit whatever. The soul of every man is worth so much that they are all worth the same. They have cost the same price and their value is equal. And there is no end for the individual but to avoid the torment and to gain the bliss both for himself and others, and these two objects emphatically are not two but one. My interest is indivisible from the interest of others, for I can save myself only by seeking to save also my brother. Hence competition disappears; for if I struggled merely for myself, I should lose myself certainly.

This theory is simple, but it is fatally defective. Self-sacrifice seems unlimited, but it really is impossible. A man cannot give up his good where he has no good to give up. The temporal existence which you sacrifice you declare to be worthless; indeed, you naïvely urge that as a reason for sacrificing it. But apart from this existence you sacrifice nothing. What is the living self-development of an individual or nation? What is the beauty and the good of human being? You have made it all dross or stumbling-blocks or means of probation. The end is in the *other* world, and that means it is taken out of this world; and that means that life is worthless or immoral.

Where the self is worth nothing, self-sacrifice is surely impossible. And, again, it is only where no man has any value that all men have equal value. When there is an end and a worth in this world men become unequal, for they must realize the end in different degrees. Hence Christianity in the above sense cannot be reconciled with morality, and let us proceed to examine another false point of view. We may call it the doctrine of one-sided patriotism or national morality.

Worldly existence is here in itself desirable. The life of the individuals in the community, and of the community in the individuals, the development of humanity in the organism of the state is the end. Self-sacrifice of the member is demanded and limited by the good of the body. If the body requires it he develops himself, and if the body requires it he suppresses himself. Thus, self-sacrifice for the good of the state is right, and for any other end is wrong. Outside the state there is no

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moral self-sacrifice, because outside there is no good. And there is, of course, no international morality.

But human duties cannot be limited to the sphere of the state. And hence this view, like the "Christian" view, is one-sided and false, nor could either be consistently followed. And yet both creeds to-day own their thoughtless adherents. There is a "Christian" party and a party of "British interests." But the "Christian" politician never asks whether, if war is contrary to the gospel, politics also are not contrary. And the man who denies international right and preaches tribal morality can hardly be consistent. Neither party is in earnest with the principle on which it orders us to act.

But these doctrines are combined and confused in a third view more common than either. I must now examine this, but I confess I do not know what to call it. For the name of "Humanitarian" is too good to be more than lent for the occasion.

The elements which enter into this creed are (1) the idea of personal and national self-development, (2) the doctrine of universal love and self-sacrifice, and (3) the principle of the value of the individual. It may be said to start with the morality of the state, to widen this so as to take in humanity, and to qualify it further by the idea of unlimited self-sacrifice, adding also a notion of the infinite worth and equality of all men. And the practical conclusion is that nations, like men, all have equal rights, that they should all be governed by law, and none selfishly struggle for advantage, and that neither peoples nor individuals may be exterminated, but in any case must be respected.

This creed is identified with much that is noble; but it is inconsistent, deficient, and in part downright false. It approves of self-development, but it condemns self-assertion, the struggle of competition without which there is no development. It extends the range of state morality, but leaves out one factor of that morality, and it transplants others beyond the conditions of their existence. And, borrowing from religion the value of the individual, it seeks to use that value

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falsely elsewhere. I will go through these points, and will begin with the worth of the individual.

The equality, or, again, the absolute value of individuals, is not a principle which holds between man and man or nation and nation. On the contrary, the end being the development of human nature, those who have the force and who judge this course to be conducive to the end, may exterminate or make any use of both men and nations. For the end is superior to the individual, and it is right to act for this end to the best of one's judgment. And, if so, the conclusion must follow as above. The end *does* justify the means, and cannot fail to do so, unless either the means are not essential or the end itself not desirable or at least not paramount. But the end we are speaking of here is absolute.

There is a sense in which all men have equal and incomparable value, but this sense falls outside the world of morality. The inner moral values of men may not be comparable, but you cannot from this conclude that they are equal. It is only before God that men become equal, and even thus their equality is but partial. As ideally one with the Divine Will they all are equal, but as diverse functions of that Will they become unequal. Where there is a performance there are degrees, and where men come into relation there is an outward performance which can be compared. And religious equality is here no truth, but has become a superstition.

And leaving these abstract considerations, if we take the case of criminals within or savages without the community, it surely may be right to abolish their existence. The principle we act on no doubt can be misused by the immoral. It can furnish a pretext for blind persecution or selfish aggrandizement. And the progress of humanity being furthered by the diversity of its elements, it is desirable in general that individuals should develop their natures. And this shows a presumption against the extinction or hinderance of man or nation. But it does not prove that in some cases we are not morally bound to accomplish it.

The early Christians were right to insist on the sacredness

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of life and on the equality of all men, but for us now these ideas have a subordinate position. To the Christians men were equal because in the other world their value was infinite and in this world nothing. For the development of human nature was not to them desirable. But for us that development is a good thing and an end in itself. And, this being so, we have left the one ground on which individuals are sacred. In getting a *temporal* value they have acquired a *relative* value, and that relative value, measured by the end, may demand their suppression. It thus, for practical purposes, is wrong to maintain the equal or absolute value of individuals unless we are prepared to hold that human nature in itself is worthless. And with this we pass to the remaining elements of "Humanitarianism."

This, we saw, extends national morality to the world. The relations of states are to be those of men in a state; and here we have at once false analogy. This creed, again, ignores the principle of self-assertion which is sanctioned by the state; and here is defective analogy. And, in preaching unlimited self-sacrifice, it runs counter to sound morality.

Beginning with the false analogy, and considering the moral relations of citizens and of states, I will recall some familiar points of difference. In a nation the law is supported by force. There is a sovereign which by its executive carries out the laws and compels the unwilling. But there is no international sovereign now, and there may never be any. And a nation has courts for the settlement of differences, while international courts seem hardly possible. The absence of an executive would make them idle, and this is not all. A national court is presumed morally to represent its citizens. It stands on the common morality of the litigants, and has no selfish interests. But an international tribunal could not be presumed to be always representative or even disinterested. And it is doubtful if international law can be said really to exist.

I shall be told, no doubt, that the absence of a sovereign, and judicature, and executive, makes no difference to our duties. But surely that must depend on what our duties are. Unless we believe in some *a priori* rights of human beings as

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such, it is the conditions of our lives which make our duties and rights, and if you remove the conditions the duties are removed. To take men's goods without their consent, we are told for instance, is stealing, and stealing is stealing whether with individuals or nations, and whether you have laws or none. But this is all erroneous. Stealing is an offence against property, but there is no absolute reason why property should exist; and in a communistic state it might not exist. It is in the end the state which decides whether I am to have property, and fixes the conditions on which I am to hold it. And to say that the removal of these circumstances leaves things where they were seems really irrational. Mine is mine, no doubt, and yours is yours; but then, *what* is mine and yours, and how, where there are no laws, can that question be answered? I am not denying here the existence of right between states; but to take the moral rules we find existing between citizens, and, turning these into abstractions, to apply them recklessly everywhere and anywhere, I urge, is indefensible.

Thus we cannot argue in general from civic to international morality, and in particular we cannot transport the duty of self-sacrifice unaltered into the world at large. A man owes a debt to his country, but a nation may feel it owes nothing to some other nation. Duty to one's neighbor remains, but then who is one's neighbor? Within the community he is another representative of the same ideas, and I can believe, when I sacrifice myself, that my life survives in the whole, and that the common spirit gains by my loss. Can a state say this of a neighbor alien in race and alien in ideas? Or may not self-sacrifice bring here no advantage, and but result in fruitless waste?

In such points the analogy from citizens to nations is false. But this analogy, we have now to see, is also deficient. Within the state there is a principle opposed to self-sacrifice; and, reasoning from men to nations, we could not say that self-sacrifice is unlimited, for the self-assertion of the citizen is a moral duty.

The welfare of another, just because it is another's, is not better than mine, and the consequences which would follow

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are grossly absurd. Nor is it much less absurd to teach that self-sacrifice should stop nowhere, or that the well-being of any one is as good as that of any one else. Doubtless, the mere fact that he is he and I am I ought to make no difference, and it is foolish indeed in any one to suppose that it could. But if you mean that *the kind of man he is* should make no difference, and that he may not, because of this, get in front of another, you have passed from verbiage to falsehood. The good of the whole is the end, and the competition of the individuals is a means, for if the best do not come to the front there is general loss. And so the community sanctions self-assertion, and it lays down the limits and conditions of self-seeking. You may not kill or steal, but you may struggle against one another for existence. To empty a man's till is forbidden, but to bring him to beggary by competition may often be laudable. "Unto him that hath shall be given" and "reward for merit" are not principles of self-sacrifice, but, within limits, they are principles approved by the state.

And the rule of self-assertion must also hold between nations. Our "Christian" free-traders forbid us to take the goods of a nation by force; but to undersell it in its markets and to drive it out of its trade seems one more illustration of the precepts of the gospel. For "this is not selfish, and it will be better for all in the end. In the pacific contest of free-trade my gain or loss is still one with my neighbor's, and *we* need not raze the commandment 'Thou shalt not covet,' for coveting is impossible."

But even if competition in trade is ultimately for the good of humanity, it is hard to believe that the advantage must come to every man. Men and nations take time to find the better trade they have been compelled to seek. They suffer in the process, and they do not always survive it. And while their competitor is gaining, he surely sometimes must gain what they lose, and after all has sought his own at the expense of his neighbor.

Thus, within limits, self-seeking is desirable among nations, and the question is solely about these limits. It is easy to talk of law, and to assert that war between states is to be

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judged like violence within states; but this is merely to fall into the old false analogy. The state sanctions the principle of self-assertion, and qualifies it to suit with civic conditions. But, conditions being different, the principle of competition may have a different range. If a nation narrows that range and excludes itself from foreign commerce, why should it not do so? But if, again, it carries self-assertion beyond the limits allowed in civil life, once more, is this immoral? It may sound fine to say, "Competition is one thing and war is another," but it is not easy to draw a distinction in principle.

Selfishness is not wicked, for the state encourages its citizens to be selfish; and violence is not wicked, for the state is violent towards its citizens. War is not *illegal* violence if there is no law which condemns it, and we might even say that such a law must be founded on war. It is here that our "Humanitarians" make a terrible mistake, for if international law is ever to be real, it must have an executive. But an executive must mean force, and force between nations is war. When a majority have become agreed that on certain points they will compel refractory states, the law of nations will be a reality. And thus, if war goes out, it will surely be by way of war, by an irresistible armed consensus with force in reserve. But what, if so, shall we say to the "Humanitarian" who cries Peace at any price? Shall we answer, There is but one Humanitarian and one friend of peace—the man who is for war in the name of Humanity?

We have found that the equal value of individuals is an illusion, and that the analogy from the citizen to the nation is invalid. The end is general perfection, and for this end, certainly, self-sacrifice may be required. But duties within the state being specially determined, to extend these beyond their conditions is indefensible; for, like other general truths, the general truths of ethics are conditional. And beside this mistake we found also another. The analogy from civil life does not show that self-sacrifice is unlimited, but it shows, on the contrary, that within limits self-assertion is valid.

But our "Christian" party, I suppose, will have a word for us. "You have proved," they may say, "that self-assertion is

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recognized by worldly morality, but the morality of the Gospel is the ultimate standard." And on this point I think we should understand one another. If "Christianity" is to mean the taking the Gospels as our rule of life, then we none of us are Christians, and no matter what we say, we all know we ought not to be. If Greek morality was one-sided, that of the New Testament is still more one-sided, for it implies that the development of the individual and the state is worthless. It is not merely that it contemns victory over the forces of nature, that it scorns beauty and despises knowledge, but there is not one of our great moral institutions which it does not ignore or condemn. The rights of property are denied or suspected, the ties of the family are broken, there is no longer any nation or patriotism, and the union of the sexes becomes a second-rate means against sin. Universal love doubtless is a virtue, but tameness and baseness—to turn the cheek to every rascal who smites it, to suffer the robbery of villains and the contumely of the oppressor, to stand by idle when the helpless are violated and the land of one's birth in its death-struggle, and to leave honor and vengeance and justice to God above—are qualities that deserve some other epithet. The morality of the primitive Christians is that of a religious sect; it is homeless, sexless, and nationless. The morality of to-day rests on the family, on property, and the nation. Our duty is to be members of the world we are in; to be in the world and not of it was their type of perfection. The moral chasm between us is, in short, as wide as the intellectual; and if it has been politic to ignore this, I doubt if it is politic any longer. We have lived a long time now the professors of a creed which no one consistently can practise, and which, if practised, would be as immoral as it is unreal.

Self-assertion, we have now seen, is as right as self-sacrifice, and at this point we may notice another mistake. It is no true deduction from Mr. Darwin's views if any one maintains the morality of mere national selfishness. For the mere fact of self-assertion and the acting on the principle of self-assertion are, in the first place, not the same. And, further, in the beginnings of morality among gregarious animals this fact of

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self-assertion itself has visibly suffered a change. The struggle of the community against outsiders plainly holds a place by the struggle of the individuals within the community. And how can we consistently set up tribal morality, and a mere struggle between states as ultimate, when within tribal morality the principle of selfishness is not paramount. If there the law of self-assertion has ceased to be supreme, its supremacy, where states are concerned, is the merest assumption. The progress which has limited the struggle of the citizens will limit, we may rather suppose, the struggle of states, and self-assertion will everywhere be reduced to an element in a higher morality.

And here we may take leave of the one-sided ideas we have criticised. The end we take to be the development of human nature. This principle necessitates self-sacrifice, since its way may be through the loss of individuals. And it necessitates self-assertion, since only thus can the end be reached at all. It subordinates both, and their limits can be stated in general. It is possible that a man or a state can develop self best by serving others most, and here the question disappears. Again, a man or state, by giving up private good, may do most for the end; and here self-sacrifice becomes a duty. But if by self-assertion, to the loss or even extinction of others, a man or a state considers that it most profits humanity, there self-sacrifice is immoral.

These truths seem too obvious to require explanation, but they are so constantly misunderstood that I venture to dwell on them. Suppose, first, that we have one single nation; the perfection of human nature within that nation will be the end. The good of each man here for the most part should coincide with that of others, but wholly it cannot and should not coincide. For without competition the community grows effete through the loss of vigorous individuals. The worthless are not pushed aside, and the fittest do not come to the front. And hence, if I am the fittest to have advantage, it is my duty to take it. But on the same principle there are cases where self-sacrifice should be welcomed. Self-sacrifice is an end in general where it results in a greater gain, and it is an end to

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the loser so far as he identifies himself with that which gains. But in itself self-sacrifice is an evil, and there is always some presumption against it. To give up life or possessions or talents for the sake of others may be immoral.

And the same thing holds between nations. Each gains generally, but not always, by the gain of all. Some competition, and hence self-assertion to the loss of another may thus at times be right. And at other times, for the sake of humanity, a nation should deny itself. National self-sacrifice, as compared with civic, has a wider object but a narrower exercise. It is hard for a state to judge that its loss is balanced by general gain. And nations differ in value, and there is no organism to insure that loss of one shall advantage the others. The influence of example is weak where public spirit has hardly an existence. And (sophistic as it may sound) the readiness in a nation for self-sacrifice would be an argument in favor of its self-assertion.

The general principle seems plain, but does not carry us far. A nation must aim at the good of mankind and at peace in the end; but, as things are, this principle will in some cases justify violence, and even extermination. For, beside the principle which establishes the end, there can be no absolute law; and the means to this end cannot be fixed beforehand. And such means certainly need not always consist in abstinence from war or even from aggression. Our first hope at present is an international executive enforcing the morality of the best; but, if that is to exist, then the best must agree, and must be the strongest. And strength means war in reserve. We may look beyond this possibly to a better state of things, but the first seems the only road to the second. The meek will *not* inherit the earth, and a nation which claims morality must be ready to use force in defence of right.

It is idle to denounce this view as the trumpeting of a bellicose policy or the glorification of blood and pillage. This view necessitates the belief that a war begun thoughtlessly or selfishly is a crime. It is hostile only to the reckless application of one-sided principles. We remind the party of "British interests" that a cynical self-seeking is immoral, and that

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a nation which adopts it may lose one source of strength. To the peace-at-any-price manufacturer we remark that a thing may be worth more than what it fetches in the market; and we say to either the "Christian" politician or the covert Quaker that, while on other points he ignores the teaching of the Gospels, he is a hypocrite if he tries to teach us our duty on this. And we beg the sentimentalist to remember that, after all, force rules the world, and that self-assertion, after all, is a condition of welfare.

It would be a good day if in England we could gain some clearer ideas about selfishness and patriotism; if we could learn to abstain from insincere professions and from sickening cant. We might then, perhaps, remember that, when trade is gone and manufactures perished, the memory of a nation that has strengthened itself and dared to risk something in the cause of humanity, is not so easily lost.

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WOMEN IN THE COMMUNITY AND IN THE FAMILY.*

I.

I SHALL begin by speaking (1) of the rights of women in the community, and (2) of the claims of the community on women.

These two ideas are reciprocal. There cannot be any well-founded right attaching to any individual, or class, which is not, at the same time, the ground of a legitimate claim, on the part of the community, on that individual or class. To assert a right is to assert a fourfold relation. For a right implies a duty on the part of the person claiming or asserting the right, a duty on the part of the person or persons from whom the right is claimed, and a reciprocal claim, from that person or community, on the person who is the subject of the right.

* A lecture delivered before the East London Ethical Society.

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For instance, a child has a right to claim from his parents, or the community, the means of education. But the fact that he has such a right implies that his parents or the community owe him the duty of providing him with the means of education. Moreover, that which gives him a right to the means of education makes it, at the same time, his duty to use these means to the best of his ability, and is the ground of a claim on the part of the community that he shall do that duty. Thus we see that every right involves, we may almost say is, in a double sense, a duty, and every duty involves, or is, in a double sense, a right. What we call it depends on how we look at it, and from which side action is due, or hinderance may be expected.

Thus education is the child's right from the community, and, for the same reason, is the duty of the community towards the child, while it is equally true to say education is the child's duty towards the community, and, for the same reason, is the right of the community from the child. Both rights and duties repose ultimately on the common humanity of all members of a community. All differences of detail which may be incidental to time, place, age, sex, or capacity, must be ultimately ruled and determined by one consideration,—viz., the best contribution which it is possible to demand or to make to the common interrelated life of the community. It is only as parts of a whole that any individuals can possess any rights; it is only as enabling others to perform their parts in the common life, that we owe to any others duties.

We hear much more nowadays about women's rights than about women's duties. And that is natural. It is because women are more ready to do their duty by the community, than the community is willing to give them the chance of doing that duty. Women have a right to demand that they shall be allowed to do their duty. And it is their duty to make the very best and most of themselves possible, as part workers and part contributors to the common stock of happiness or good. This claim of women that sex shall be no disability in the doing of any kind of work which they can do for the benefit of their fellows is, unfortunately, still a claim only. There-

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fore we hear of it always as a "right." The obstruction, it will be observed, comes from the other part,—*i.e.*, the state, or the community. But when the community will have acknowledged that claim and granted that right, as it most assuredly one day will, then we shall hear of women's duties to the community. The obstruction then—if there should be any—will come from the women themselves. They may fail in performing their proper and acknowledged function in society. If they do, they will fail in doing their duty. Just now it is society that fails in acknowledging, in many instances, the rights of women.

It is probably acknowledged, or at least will not be denied, by the inhabitants of the civilized world, that women are genuine human beings. It seems, indeed, barbarous and ludicrous to think any statement of the kind necessary. Yet the denial to woman of educational, political, or social rights, on the ground of her sex alone, is undoubtedly a denial of her humanity.

It is, of course, an historical fact that the humanity of women has been again and again explicitly denied. So inevitably, so fatally, was thought about her moulded by current treatment of her, that from using her as a mere instrument to his own ends man came to regard her as having no end of her own. It was denied that she had any "soul." It became an item in the religious creed that she was created for the use of man and subservient to him in all things. In Paul Heyse's powerful story, "Die Kinder der Welt," one of the characters, who fails in the ambitions of his own life, concentrates all his hopes and transfers all his ambitions to the future of his little baby son. He shall be the "whole man" which his father failed to be. And the father continually speaks of himself as the "Durchgangspunkt" for this child; the point of entrance into life for this spirit which shall have the chance of becoming a whole man. Hitherto a woman has been literally and wholly a "Durchgangspunkt" for humanity. She never had a chance of becoming herself a "whole-human being." Her whole value was that through her instrumentality a whole-man might arise.

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This position, inadequate and therefore unjust as it is in the life of to-day, has not been without its value, and its possibilities of nobleness.

On the whole, the human economy which has sacrificed the woman to the mother, and has thrown the burden and the privilege of enterprise and control on the male, has done more for humanity than the economy of the beehives has done for the bees.* Moreover, the sacrifice of the broader humanity, of the fuller self-development, of the wider, richer life, which an individual may make in order to perform more adequately the particular function which he alone, or he best, can perform, this sacrifice, when made voluntarily and intelligently, when offered, that is, as the best contribution the individual can make to the public good, this is the noblest and sanest sacrifice a human being can make. When undertaken in that spirit, when really necessitated by the exigencies of public need, there is no sacrifice which can be demanded of man or woman which would not be equitable to demand and noble to yield.

And one rejoices to think that, however dimly in intellectual apprehension, yet brightly and purely in spirit, women have again and again evolved this humanest and divinest will out of the difficult and narrow circumstances of their lot. I remember having been much struck many years ago by the saying of a very simple and very lonely old woman: "I have served," she said, "my country well; I have borne her seven noble sons." She was content to sit alone in her old age and her feebleness, sustained by the thought of what she had done and of what they were doing.

But the need for the exclusive devotion of women to this one form of service has passed away. The necessity for the sacrifice of all her other faculties in order to secure the furtherance of her mere bodily fruitfulness no longer exists. And with the necessity for the sacrifice the nobility of the sacrifice has disappeared wholly also. To cling to the sacrifice when the necessity for it has passed away; to adore it as divine

* In the hive we find the male reduced to a mere instrument of sex, while the females become the laborers, the rulers, and the important persons generally.

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when it has ceased to be decently human; to insist upon the narrow function which it involved as "woman's sphere," when, as a human being, woman inevitably changes her sphere with every change in the life of humanity,—this is to be a slave who clings to his fetters, a cripple who despises the use of feet, a sentimentalist who, wasting his heart on his own emotions, has none left for the realities of daily life. It is to be superstitious, ignorant, stupid, dull.

The needs of the community and the best possible contribution which the individual or class can make to the common life must be ever the measure and standard of woman's service, of her rights, and of her duties. But the needs of society have changed immensely with the progress of civilization. These needs are different at different times, in different countries, and among different peoples. With us to-day the question is not how we may most rapidly increase our population, but how we may most effectively raise our common standard of life. Not soldiers for the king's army, but citizens of the commonwealth, we ask for. Women are not called upon to-day only or chiefly to provide "food for powder"; to repeople vast territories swept bare by pestilence, but to serve the community by the development of character, by the increase and spread of knowledge, by the organization of right living, so that for all classes of the community life may be wider and fuller and richer in happiness, beauty, and worth. She is called upon to help both by her protest against things are they are, and by her work to bring about things as they may be, and hasten forward that happy day, when every soul born, whether man or woman, will have a chance of becoming a whole-human, and a bigger and a worthier whole than ever hitherto. To this end we must experiment with our women. And we must not be deterred either by the fear that we shall spoil their womanhood, or by the fear of accentuating the fierce competition of men for bread.

Nothing can harm the womanhood of woman that extends her good citizenship. No rational limitation can be put upon her public service save those to which all human beings are liable, the limitation of individual capacity and public need.

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It is true—and I am the last to wish to ignore this—that in the reproduction of the species, that fundamental necessity of race-life, the part played by women is, and must ever continue to be, more onerous than that played by men. The woman's part makes a greater demand on her strength and on her time. It is the dullest folly to ignore this. It is also a blasphemy against nature and against life to suggest that women in this are cursed or degraded. It is impious and irrational to suggest that if they are to rise to their full measure of freedom and dignity as rational human beings, they must discard the folly of love, the degradation of maternity. This thought is as ignorant as it is revolting. If it were true, it would condemn at once the whole public life of woman, and not only that, but the whole course of nature which has culminated in man.

But I deny utterly that maternity and public work are incompatible. As a matter of fact, we have necessarily among us to-day many unmarried women, and the plea that these should have some chance of making for themselves a life worth living, and of rendering a social service which shall be regarded with respect, is often put forward as the sole ground and justification of women's public work. And truly the recognition of this claim is the barest humanity and justice. But such a life is not an ideal life, and it is always at the ideal life we must aim. I regard it as matter for serious regret that we have among us so many unmarried women. Whatever be the causes, economic or other, through which it has come about, we cannot, in my judgment, regard it as either a desirable condition of things or one likely to be permanent. It is not a normal condition of society, nor is it a healthy or happy condition for the women. It seems to me, then, both unscientific and inhuman to construct theories of social life which involve conditions which are neither normal nor happy.

Our ideal, therefore, of women in the community must be one which will include within it the ideal of women in the family.

The period of pregnancy in the human race is long, and it would be a serious hinderance to public work if during so

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lengthened a period public servants of any class were liable to be disabled for service. But we know that the physical disabilities, the pains and perils, of our women are largely the growth of an artificial and unbalanced life. The barbarous and impious immodesty which prevents our teaching our young men and women the facts and laws, so far as they are known, of human physical life, is answerable for much. The inane, ugly, and impure ideal which so many still cherish of weak and dependent womanhood is answerable for more. With a more rational education, physical, mental, and moral, women will escape from most of the physical inabilities under which they now labor. As it is, I know healthly women whose activity, mental and physical, is in no way impaired during the period of gestation. The care of the young infant is a much more inevitable tie to mothers. One cannot imagine how the duties in this connection can be delegated with advantage either to the mother or child. As things are in our industrial and social system, this is no doubt a most formidable difficulty. But things must not remain as they are. With shortened hours of labor for the individual, with a much lessened number of births to the individual, with a reorganized, much socialized, and much simplified family life, all mothers might devote a larger proportion of time and an infinitely more intelligent care to their babies, while at the same time they took their regular and fair share of public social work.

As to what that social work should be in detail, it is not possible for any one beforehand to determine. Women can be satisfied with nothing less than full and absolute equality of opportunity in this matter. Sex must cease to be an arbitrary disability. Women must ask of the community, as their right, that they shall be free to will and to do whatever they *can* for the public good. Women must ask it of themselves that they shall see to it that they *can* do what they will.

I spoke of our not fearing the rivalry of men and women in public works. A short time ago this was a fear very keenly felt. It has yet by no means disappeared. But surely, the most men can ask is fair play. Has not a woman a right to work for her living on equal terms with a man, even if she

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must enter the market as his rival? On what possible plea of justice or humanity can she be denied that opportunity? What she can and what she must be denied is the chance of underselling the men or of playing the part of the justly despised "Blackleg." So long as women are disorganized enough, feeble enough, and anti-social enough to do the same work as men for less pay, men must and ought to protest against their interference. The men's interests and the women's interests here are absolutely at one. There is no more crying need of the day for women than this need of their labor organization. I know women who are deliberately and persistently underselling men's work, and who hate and abhor what they are doing. But it is a case of do it or die. There is too often no organization to which such women can look for help either in striking against the low rate of women's wages, or as a controlling agency against the underselling of other women. For women not only undersell men, they undersell one another.

The organization of women, whether in trades unions or for political or social ends, is at present necessarily very difficult. Women are so unused to independent action, so unused to respond to the control of wide social ideas, that it is difficult for them to manage their own affairs, and difficult for them to be true to one another. At the same time their inclusion in men's associations has the disadvantage of being for the women enormously less educative, because less responsible, while in the case of trades unions there is besides the difficulty of allowing them to enter on equal terms with the men. For reasons which are, I trust, almost wholly within our control, women are, as they are, more liable to come upon the sick-list than men. For these reasons it seems to me that all those interested in the future of women's work should turn their earnest attention to the training of the young. Let us give girls of all classes a chance of physical development, of meeting the other sex upon equal terms, and of tasting the sweets and the seriousnesses of self-government. For this latter purpose I know of no better agency than well-organized, well-managed social clubs. A spirit of independence, business

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capacity, and *esprit de corps*, those most essential virtues in public and organized life, find in such clubs a ready and effective training-ground. The objects to be attained are easily within the comprehension and sympathy of girls; the habits gained in striving after them will be a permanent gain of the most serious value.

It is not, however, among women alone that we find this serious need of organization. The need makes itself felt everywhere. With more organization, directed more and more to the widest social ends, we shall find the spirit of competition giving place to the spirit of co-operation. We shall find laborers not rivals, but helpers one of another. We shall find labor enough for all, when all labor and no one labors too much. We shall find leisure enough for all when all have leisure, and no one has leisure too much. We shall find reward enough for labor when every laborer gets his fair share, and no one gets more than his fair share.

Now, women are for good or for evil launched into public life. We cannot recall them. We cannot move forward towards anything like complete public organization until women are up to the mark of the average masculine attainment in public spirit and skilled work.

This brings me to another point of fundamental importance for working-women. Not only are the women of to-day, broadly speaking, behind men in public spirit and in organizing capacity, but they are, in many instances, unequal to men as skilled workers. It has been stated recently by public women, who have a right to speak with authority on labor questions, that girls are more unwilling than boys to submit to the prolonged training necessary for the production of a skilled worker of the first rank. This unwillingness is attributed not to an undue dose of original sin in the feminine half of humanity, but to the effect on the minds of the girls of the anticipation of marriage. There is always the chance for each one that she may marry, and thereafter not need her trade. Why spend long trouble for short reward? She is content, during the few years she anticipates spending at her trade, to

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accept low wages, dependence at home, and a subordinate position in the labor market.

Now, so far as this is true, and so long as it is to any extent true, it will be idle for women to organize themselves in trade unions; it will be idle for them to cry aloud from trade platforms, or from any other platforms, that women should get the same wages as men when they do the same work. The work may be nominally the same, but if the workmanship is inferior, the inferior worker should not ask, and will not get, an equal wage.

Much may be hoped for from the spread of technical education. Young girls are, when they are healthy, as eager as young boys (some think they are more eager) to apply themselves to the work that is set before them, and master it, just for interest in the work itself and for the pleasure of mastery. Much, too, may be hoped for from the growth of that sturdy spirit of self-help and personal independence which shows itself among the most courageous and intelligent women to-day, and which one hopes will penetrate, as an ideal at least, all ranks and classes of women.

But I think we must all feel that the determining factor in the whole question is, and must be, the place assigned in the public consciousness to marriage in relation to women's life and women's work. Is it to be, for women, marriage at any cost? Is the unmarried woman to be regarded as a social failure? All sensible people have answered these two questions already in the negative. But there remains an immensely important question for working-women of every class. Must it always remain a choice for a woman between marriage, on the one hand, and effective public work, on the other?

Is there no chance of combining the two? Must a woman sacrifice all that is in her, else, of work and ambition, if she takes upon herself the responsibility of maternity? Must she, if she will do efficient and continuous public work, renounce marriage?

I am aware this is a very difficult question, and I do not want to assume for a moment the position either of prophet

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or seer. I speak only as a woman who feels very strong sympathy with both these ambitions of womanhood. I am convinced, in the most absolute manner, that women will give up neither of them.

The signs of the times are many. We have the disturbed literature of women writers; the dissatisfaction of unmarried women workers, whose lives hang still patchy and scrappy, spite of energetic rational work and success; the growing difficulty of housekeepers in procuring domestic servants, because of the preference of girls for the wider interests and richer sociability of factory life; and the half-comic, half-tragic revolt of married women, who continue as factory workers, even when obliged to pay away every week more than they earn as wages to other women who look after their homes and children.

II.

I turn now to the second part of my subject, which will be the more easily treated, after what I have already said.

Women have to be regarded, we are I hope agreed, both as public servants and, at the same time, as members of a family. Individual women will, I trust, more and more live, when it suits them to do so, in an independent fashion, as unmarried men do. But the public work which women claim to do, and which society has a right to claim from them, must be so organized as not to interfere with or prevent family life, when women choose to live it. Family life, on the other hand, must be so organized as not to interfere with or prevent public work on the part of those concerned in it. At present such organization seems almost utopian. But I am convinced it is what we shall achieve.

To-day a married woman has frequently the utmost difficulty in keeping in touch, even remotely, with current events and current thought. To take an active part in the making of those events and shaping of those thoughts is impossible to her. During so many, sometimes, as twenty of the best years of her life she is absorbed totally by the minutiæ of family life. Many children exhaust her physically, mentally,

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and morally. She is the most overworked, the most hopelessly exploited, of all our social slaves. The marvellous and inexhaustible passion of motherhood has sustained her. But even this tenderest loveliness of nature has, by overstimulation, turned into a curse. It has prevented such women from perceiving the true aspect of their condition, and it has tended to degrade motherhood itself. It has become too often a physical passion over the latest baby rather than a rational sympathy with and for the growing children. The tenderness and insight that can mother the growing spirits of her children is a nobler and more human thing, in a woman, than the trembling rapture with which she clasps the baby at her breast. We need both. The finer the woman the more she will be capable of both. But if motherhood is to grow adequate to growing humanity, the former must preponderate in life over the latter. We shall do a service, then, to women, a service to motherhood, a service to family life, and a service to the community, if we protest against the cruel absorption of so long a period of a woman's life, and so large a portion of her strength, in child-bearing.

Everybody knows that the excess which we permit in this matter is not merely prohibitive of the public work of the women in question, but is injurious in every way to family life. The woman is often incapable of even that every-day duty of upper servant of the household, which our present wasteful and individualistic domestic economy lays upon her, even in well-to-do middle-class homes. She cannot, by reason of her physical exhaustion, drag herself about to "see to things." Which of us has not seen bright, clever girls turned in a few years into irritable, dull women, who can talk of nothing but their own and their children's illnesses, or the delinquencies of their servants? What chance has such a victim of growing to be a "whole-human"? What chance have her children of rational sympathy and intelligent care? What chance has her husband of thinking of her with respect as his equal and companion? What chance has he of being saved from the degradation of using her merely as the "point-of-entrance" of his children into life, or of falling

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to the unspeakable depth of regarding her as the safest and most respectable means of personal gratification? These are terrible things to say. But it is more terrible that such things are.

There is great need to speak out, and special need, as I think, for women to speak out. Family life is being attacked on all sides, and no wonder. Many women are revolting against marriage. It means bondage and degradation to them. Young people, girls and boys, are revolting against the tyranny of family ties. Men are found to challenge the whole thing as a worn-out institution, reverence for which is a mere superstition. And there is much in this that is true. Marriage does mean bondage and degradation to countless women to-day; family life does tyrannize shamefully over many of its members; the institution does need radical reform, and our attitude towards family life is superstitious, sceptical, cowardly, and unloving. We are so afraid to trust humanity that we have a superstitious dread of making any alterations in what we rightly feel to be a most fundamental relation. We are so dull with custom, so cowardly in face of convention, so unloving as men and women and parents and children, that we cannot think boldly and confer freely in the hope of bettering things. Each one thinks too exclusively of his or her own side in the question. We are so stupid and ignorant that we do not see that in an organic group the good of each is *necessarily* the good of all. So we go on. Chaos spreads, superstition deepens, and a kind of numbing despair is seizing on all those who care greatly but cannot see clearly. Do let us try to understand one another. Especially let the young grown-up men and women of to-day try to see each other's points of view. Do let us put away that false shame, which is a thing to be ashamed of, which prevents people discussing openly and gravely this most grave difficulty.

As my contribution to that discussion I should like to submit some definite proposals.

It would be well, I think, that men and women should agree that a woman's child-bearing years should be very much reduced in number. It would be well that a longer period

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were permitted her between the births of her children. It would be well that in the rearing and personal tending of the child the man should take some part as well as the woman. The cleavage of work which obtains between men and women, both in the family and in public life, however suitable it may have been for a by-gone time, is unworkable with the aspirations and needs of to-day. It would surely be a more manly and suitable thing for a man occasionally to amuse his own children for an hour, or even to put them to bed, while his wife went out to whatever work or amusement outside the family round she might desire, than that the man should always take the outside work and amusement and the woman should always see to the children. Family life would be sweeter and stronger, the sympathy and understanding would be finer and wider, if the wife were refreshed by the variety of the wholesome, wider interests which are her husband's interests also, and if the husband were enlightened by the details of the care, labor, and tenderness necessary with the children. One does not very often hear a woman in any rank of life speak of "the brats" or "the kids," but the words are often on the lips of men through an astonishingly wide social area. However softened the terms are by their slang usage, they denote a spirit which we could well afford to lose. Respect for their children, as compared with fondness for them, and respect for the care of them as a serious and important part of women's work, would grow with the little interchange of civilities which I suggest.

Besides, we want to arrange the home life so that it shall not debar women from public life. And just at present her husband is about the only person who can co-operate with a married woman towards this end. This will not be always so. Things will be easier for both men and women when family life is less isolated, when it is more simple, and arranged on a more co-operative basis.

The family of the future will not, I trust, set itself down within four narrow walls and seek to be sufficient unto itself within them. We shall try, I hope, what co-operative dwellings can do. In such dwellings there might be suites of rooms,

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larger and smaller, to suit the needs of single men and women, or of married people and their children. These suites would provide their inmates with the privacy of the present home, but would avoid the exclusiveness of the present-day flat. There would be a common drawing-room, a common dining-room, managed as such rooms are managed in a good hotel to-day. The service of the whole would be managed from a common centre, cutting off at one blow the greatest domestic worry of a modern woman's life, and encouraging the organizing of the work by skilled experts, which it needs. There might be a large, airy, sunny, common nursery, presided over by trained kindergarten nurses. The skilled education of the children might go on from the earliest years. Think of the superiority of such nurseries and such care over the nurseries and the care possible to the children of the vast majority, even, of the middle classes. Think of the fine common library there might be; think of the fine solid building of good design; think how a few commonly held works of art, of the first order, might replace the trumpery decorations of the present-day individualistically arrayed establishment; think of the good and wholesome and well-cooked and varied food which might, at less cost, replace the burnt mutton-chops and muddy coffee of the suburban villa.

When the boys and girls of a family grow up, each having been educated to the best possible advantage and each having been fitted to earn his or her own livelihood, each might move out to a private set of rooms in the same building (if their work admitted of their living there), thus securing that independence and privacy which young women need as much as young men, and which both need to ask from their families as much as from the public. Think of the bigger, wholesomer family feeling that would grow up in such a community. How men and women would grow up knowing each other with an intimacy and freedom unknown to us. Think of the immense benefit to old people and to those who have the care of the aged. At present old people are often a very heavy tie and burden to their children. One sees at present often a middle-aged single woman who is a positive victim to an aged parent.

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There is not money enough to provide extra care. There is a narrow feeling of family devotion which insists upon the daughter, however unsuitable she may be, taking the whole of attendance and care, which prevents her doing any other work, no matter how suitable she may be for that. In the kind of establishment I have been sketching, old people would entertain one another. They would, moreover, grow old with a so much wider social and public spirit, that they would prefer to be looked after by persons suited by temperament and training, who were not of their physical kin, than by their own flesh and blood, who had, perhaps, neither skill nor inclination. Such a proposal does not look forward to lessening the restraints and dues of affection, but only to rationalizing and spiritualizing them.

I have throughout my paper said nothing directly as to the economic independence of women. But in a society organized as I have indicated such independence would inevitably follow. When women's public and private activities are so ordered and so limited as not to hinder one another, when to marry does not mean to a woman to sink the whole of her personal life, the whole of her personal interests and activities, in the interests and activities of her husband and children, when the daughters of a family are no longer sacrificed wholesale to the sons and parents, when women may work at what they will and can, when they no longer undersell men and no longer suffer themselves to be underpaid, when a whole life is not signed away irretrievably by a marriage ceremony, then the economic independence of women will be possible, but not till then; then love will cease to be bought and sold, but not till then; then, for the first time, woman will possess herself; then, for the first time, she can devote herself, as a free human being, to the service of her family and to the service of the community.

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ETHICS AND BIOLOGY.

I.

BIOLOGY is the science of the vital properties of organic beings. Ethics is the science of the right conduct of rational beings. Or, let us rather say, it is the attempted formulation of what constitutes right conduct for thinking, social beings, whereby they become truly rational.

Now the question is, whether in this attempted determination of what constitutes right conduct for us human beings, biological science can be of any effective help to us? We wish to ascertain whether our tentative codes of ethics can find in biological facts positive confirmation, or positive negation;—above all, whether our leading ethical intuitions are anyway grounded in biological relations?

The answer we feel forthwith prompted to give to these weighty questions will be chiefly governed by the view we are wont to take of the relation of man's rational being to his vital organization. And it is only on a correct interpretation of this perplexing relation that ethics can be scientifically grounded.

Empirical ethics—consciously or unconsciously dominated by the humanitarian or social stand-point—can make pretty good practical headway by building upon some humanistic foundation, such as pleasure, utility, justice, sympathy, benevolence, individual well-being, self-perfection, or social welfare. But such empirical ethics lacks the scientific and philosophical standing-ground, through which alone its essential principles can derive their final justification.

It is evident that such views of the relation of our rational being to our vital organization, as regard this body of ours as a mere hinderance to ethical aspiration, or as a mere passive instrument wielded by a spiritual agent, or as a mere illusion of unrationalized sense; that such ascetical, dualistic, or idealistic views cannot consistently appeal to biology for ethical enlightenment. Under their sway ethical determination must

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be held to emanate exclusively from an invisible principle in some way inhabiting and actuating our visible organism, in which case the latter could play no other than an ethically obstructive or indifferent part.*

On the other hand, it is just as evident, that, neither the mechanical view of organization and vital activity,† nor the view which takes the human body and its functions to result from the pre-concerted co-operation of innumerable elementary and autonomous lives,‡ nor any kind of primordially pre-established evolution; that none of these fatalistic views leaves any allotment of free power in us for ethical self-determination.§

Theories of human nature, involving whatever kind of original predestination and pre-ordination, inevitably exclude ethical self-determination. All theological, philosophical or scientific reasoning to the contrary, however ingenious, is clearly made up of mere sophistical subterfuges. It is incontestable

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* The view my studies have led me to form regarding the perplexing relation of body and mind I have sought on numerous occasions to explain. I will here only refer to "The Scientific Basis of Religious Intuition." Address written for the Free Religious Association. *The Index*, 1886, p. 570. "Mental Activity." *Mind*, Vol. XIV, No. 56. "Psychical Monism." *The Monist*, Vol. II., No. 3.

† See "Fatalistic Science and Human Self-determination," *The New Ideal*, 1889–90, and "Automatism and Spontaneity," *The Monist*, Vol. IV., No. 1.

‡ See "The Dependence of Quality on Specific Energies," *Mind*, Vol. V., p. 1. Also "Are we Cell-Aggregates?" *Mind*, Vol. VII., p. 100.

§ Leibnitz, as a consistent outcome of his "Monadologie," in which he sought to unify and systematize the three fatalistic views above mentioned,—the mechanical view, the building up of the organism by autonomous monads, and primordially pre-established evolution,—was forced to adopt an out-and-out necessitarian conception of human nature. "Tout est donc certain et déterminé par avance dans l'homme comme partout ailleurs, et l'âme humaine est une espèce d'automate spirituel." (Théodicée.)

Kant, who was likewise an out-and-out determinist in the physical as well as in the mental sphere, shows to what far-fetched shifts a consistent thinker has to have recourse in order to reconcile determinism in nature with ethical conduct. He was forced to advance the obviously self-contradictory assertion that actions are free or ethical only when determined by our intelligible, noumenal, supernatural self. And that these same actions, when they come to appear in the sensible world of time and space, are found, nevertheless, to be forming part of the "mechanism of nature."

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that the possibility of ethical conduct is altogether dependent on some degree of free self-determination, on some amount of free volitional control, not only over our ideas, but also over our motor or executive apparatus.

II.

Refusing to be persuaded of our ethical impotency by theological, philosophical, or biological theories of predestination, let us now turn our attention to biological conceptions which involve, as such, important ethical implications, and which, in fact, have exerted considerable influence on the ethical views of our time.

Foremost among these is the conception introduced into biology by Bichat,* and recently brought under Darwinian influence to its legitimate conclusions by George Heinrich Schneider.

Descartes had bisected human nature into two totally disparate constituents: a thinking substance and an extended substance; the former manifesting our conscious life, the latter our bodily activities. It soon became evident to himself and others, that two such incommensurable substances were incapable of entering into natural intercommunication; that their apparent interaction can therefore be only supernaturally effected. Modern philosophy is still laboring to extricate itself from this Cartesian dilemma; as yet with very doubtful results. Of course, in keeping with such an ultra-dualistic arrangement no biological knowledge of the substance of our body could possibly be of any ethical use to the thinking substance.

Bichat likewise bisected human nature, but from the standpoint of the anatomist and physiologist. He held the human body to consist of two radically distinguished sets of organs, each having its different kind of life. The internal organs,

* As proof of the philosophical and ethical importance of Bichat's biological views, I will here quote what Schopenhauer says: "Bichat's observations and my own corroborate each other; his are the physiological commentary to mine, and mine the philosophical commentary to his. Both are best understood when read together." "Die Welt als Will," Vol. II., B. 2, Chap. xx.

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heart, stomach, liver, sexual organs, and the rest, constitute what he calls the organic life, and are, according to him, the seat of the passions or appetitive cravings. The external organs, chiefly brain, sensory organs, and voluntary muscles, he distinguishes as the animal life, or the life of outside relations.

Now the central and essential conception underlying Bichat's interpretation of human nature, and of animal nature in general, consists in regarding the life of outside relations as entirely subservient to the organic life, as existing solely to minister to the cravings and desires of what he calls the passions. The organs designated by biology as those of the ectoderm, chiefly brain, sensory organs, and voluntary muscles, would thus be mere instruments elaborated for the purpose of satisfying entodermic or appetitive needs. These appetitive needs, in their turn, subserving one single end,—the preservation of the life of the individual and its kind.

The elementary passions, such as hunger, the fear of danger, sexual desire, parental affection, the fighting rage; all are found to conduce to the attainment of one and the same end: preservation of self, and propagation of the kind.

As to the life of outside relations, its movements of whatever sort are in their turn subservient to the life-preserving passions. The pursuit and prehension of prey, the flight and hiding from enemies, the seeking and wooing of mates, the tending of offspring, the offensive and defensive use of natural weapons; all these activities are exercised to accomplish what the passions are craving for; all resulting in the perpetuation of life.

Moreover, under this aspect, mental or conscious awareness, in its increasingly complex efficiency, is developed solely for more and more subtle guidance in the execution of the movements that minister to the life-preserving passions. In the beginning, lowest in the scale of development, awareness only on immediate contact through the sense of touch; then awareness at a distance through other sensory channels; then awareness of remembered occasions through

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mental representation; at last, awareness of possible occasions through thought.

The entire life of outside relations, all the organs and conscious abilities, by means of which we enter into intercommunication with the external world, seem thus to be simply implements used in the service of the organic passions; these passions being themselves only the expression of the life-craving, life-perpetuating instinct.

It must be confessed, that, contemplating animal existence in general, this interpretation of life with its alleged supremacy of entodermic organs appears hardly exaggerated. The appetitive impulsions of hunger and sexual desire seem, indeed, to constitute the motive spring of animal exertions.

This apparent state of things being accepted as philosophically correct, the eminently serious ethical question arises, whether life of this description is at all worth preserving and propagating?

No doubt, if the gratification of hunger and lust constitutes really the chief concern of existence, if our body is merely a machine cunningly contrived for the better glutting of appetites, and if it all means in essence nothing but perpetuation of such utterly sensual aims; then our present life has to be looked upon as something ethically undesirable, as something abhorrent to our ethical reason and its aspirations.

When we consider that such ethical abhorrence, and consequent abnegation of our present life forms the core, the emotive mainspring of the religions professed by the highest cultured nations, oriental and occidental, it must be conceded that, what I may biologically call the entodermic interpretation of life, has played, and is still playing, a momentous part in the guidance of our moral conduct.

And here it is interesting to notice how successfully this entodermic interpretation, which has dominated ascetic ethics, and which lies so near to whoever contemplates life as driven by its elementary instincts, has been recently elaborated by the eccentric yet eminently gifted recluse, Arthur Schopenhauer.

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The actuating power beyond the illusory world of sense, the undying "Will," presses in its craving for life with blind and fanatic zeal into the realm of sensual gratification, lured thereby from disappointment to disappointment, and from misery to misery. The intellect, no less than all bodily organs, are but tools adapted with increasing aptitude to satisfy more and more completely this frantic craving for life. In some rare instances of abnormal development, however, the intellect emancipates itself from its abject slaving in furtherance of the life-craving propensities of deluded Will. It then recognizes the utter futility, essential painfulness, and fundamental wickedness of life as such. And henceforth its total abnegation becomes the rationally prescribed ethical end. This, surely, is hedonic ethics with a vengeance.

We have now to dwell a few moments on another biological conception which has lately influenced ethical opinions. It has been pretty generally accepted that the beings now existing on our planet are those whose kind has survived all foregone vicissitudes, as the most fit to live in interaction with its present medium. And it has been ascertained that selection of the progressively fittest and weeding out of the less fit has been brought about by the merciless struggle for existence actually witnessed as still operative among living creatures.

The recognition of this undeniable state of things has introduced new puzzles for ethical solution, or rather old puzzles under a new guise. Here we have a system of mutual encroachment and carnage that from our ethical stand-point must be pronounced extremely abhorrent. Yet it has led to results that even by pessimism have to be regarded as desirable. For among the host of creatures upon, above, and under the earth, and in its waters,—creatures incessantly struggling to devour one another, or to escape being devoured, —the one being possessing the redeeming ethical consciousness has at last been developed under the sway of these very same ethically abhorrent means.

Now the question arises whether—looking back with our established moral consciousness upon the unethical means that have been instrumental in the development of organic

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life—the ethical consciousness has itself been one of the unethically developed results? Or whether consciousness in its ethical character and bearings has, on the contrary, been developed by means essentially different from those that have been instrumental in the development of animal life in general?

In trying to answer this question, we encounter difficulties still more perplexing. For, though it is clear that the fittest for their present mode of life have managed to survive by all sorts of means, which from our point of view we must deem eminently unethical, is it not possible that the creative initiation of progressively higher qualities, exposed to the struggle for existence and offered thereby for natural selection, has been from the beginning aimfully preconcerted, so as to evolve at last the moral consciousness?

Or, as an alternative, may it not be that interaction of the organism with the multifold influences of the medium has constituted the veritable means by which the organism has been progressively developed? May it not be that the functional play with external influences has led to the organic development of more and more subtly differentiated and elaborated means of interaction; that, then, the varying peculiarities in the disposition of these organic means—resulting in differentiation and specification of living forms—may have been selected as the fittest to carry on life amid the peculiarities of a specific medium; and that, consequently, interaction with the peculiar medium, in which we human beings have come to live, has given rise to our moral consciousness?

Under the first supposition, that of aimfully preconcerted evolution leading as its culmination to moral development, it is clear that ethical purpose and ethical responsibility have to be attributed to the power believed to have ordained such evolution. And, as it cannot be rightly deemed presumptuous on our part to use our ethically-developed judgment—valid for all rational beings in reference to their actions—we would then be certainly ethically justified in condemning as exorbitantly wasteful and outrageously ruthless the means employed to achieve the intended ethical result.

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Theological sophisms, however consummately twisted, are ineffective, under this supposition, to ethically exculpate an agent assumed to be unhampered in his creative power. If, on the other hand, the theory of creative all-efficiency be disputed, as creation evidently proceeds as a solidary evolutional process, it is illegitimate to conjecture with John Mill and others, and long before them with the divine Plato, that the creating agent is ethically well-intentioned, but thwarted by adverse conditions; such, for instance, as the obstinate resistance and aimless motion of an originally formless world-material; or, contrariwise, by the malignant propensities and tricks of an all too specifically formed and aimfully moving Devil.

Under the second supposition,—that of organic beings developed by dint of their own functional exertions in interaction with the agencies of their medium,—nothing that can rightly be called ethical can be discovered in our world before the moral consciousness of man actually comes into being, inaugurating through its guidance a higher mode of existence, —namely, that of obedience to the dictates of comprehensively *unified* reason, with corresponding adjustment of the aims of volition, and suitable transformation of that part of the medium over which we may gain volitional control.

Should our ethical consciousness really turn out to be thus a gradually-developed outcome of the interaction of our organism with the outside world, no alarm need be taken by those in search of inscrutable profundities, whence the manifest phenomena of our world emerge into existence. Our intellect, however deeply it may probe the present order of things, fails to reach the ultimate spring of creation. The issuing of worlds into being with all their developmental potentialities remains to us wholly enigmatical. We stand baffled before the beginning and end of creative activity, before the antinomies of time and space, and the forces that fill these seeming emptinesses with their wealth of ever-becoming things.

But, so far as ethical reason is concerned, it is surely groundless theological cosmology that can pretend to detect any trace of it in the boundless reach of condensing nebulæ and whirling

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worlds, which constitutes the sense-revealed universe. Ethical reason emerges as such solely in and through the social relations of man to man. Rational self-consciousness, which is the veritable matrix of all that can be rightly called ethical, how can it be legitimately or even plausibly ascribed to blazing suns and cooling planets, or to such like cosmic stuff as the fiery, subtle ether of Heraclitus and the Stoics, antique prototype of the all-competent interstellar *deus ex machina* of our own physicists?

We earth inhabitants, at all events, have to regard ethical consciousness as the highest revealed outcome of evolution, not to be discovered pre-existing anywhere outside ourselves. This, of course, does not exclude the possibility, even the probability, that in other solar systems self-conscious beings have likewise been developed. If so, there too ethical reason can be only the outcome of gradual development.

The prevalent notion, so persistently adhered to, the notion that effects cannot transcend in the scale of being their underlying causes, or more correctly their co-operating conditions, is glaringly contradicted in all cosmical development, nay, in every chemical combination.

Neither does utmost idealistic rarefaction of the sense-apparent world suffice to endow it with anything that can be compared with our own intelligence and its moral consciousness. On the other hand, let us emphasize the evident fact that our modes of consciousness, whether those of sense or those of intellect, though they are world-revealing, are nowise world-creating.

III.

As explained in the former section, it is of decisive importance to our estimate of the ethical value of life, whether we are scientifically justified in regarding—in accordance with the spirit of ascetic religions, and with Bichat and Schopenhauer—the life of outside relations as developed solely to subserve self-gratifying passions? Or whether our appetitive cravings are, on the contrary, instrumental in supplying the life of outside relations with the means needful to carry on self-important and self-improving functions?

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I deem it one of the most satisfactory results of many years devoted to the study of the vital activities of primitive forms of life to be able positively to assert and to prove that the fundamental and essential activity of life consists in the functional play of the organism with the medium at their surface of contact. The living substance is alive because of this functional play. Its vitality consists in alternate disintegration through clashing contact with surrounding influences, and reintegration by dint of the specific affinities inwoven in its chemical constitution. In consequence, we find that the highest organs of animal life are all developed in the surface layer. Brain, sensory organs, and voluntary muscles are all of ectodermic origin.

Nutriment is nothing but complemental material serving the purposes of reintegration. And however elaborately constituted nutritive organs get to be in the course of organic development, they have no other office than that of supplying appropriate complemental material for restitutive assimilation. The organs of the life of outside relations, instead of being mere tools for appetitive gratification, are themselves the essential embodiment of life. And the entodermic organs, so far as food appropriation is concerned, are simply a culinary department entrusted with the complex and delicate preparation of complemental material to be used in furtherance of the life of outside relations.

Consequently, hunger, which with its ravenous train of ruthless passions is playing so dominant a part in the drama of life, is really an appetitive sign expressive of a need for restitutive material on the part of the life of outside relations. However fierce and relentless its struggle for satisfaction, it is essentially an effort to save from deterioration the secured results, the precious fruits of progressive life, so laboriously and precariously matured during ages upon ages of never-flagging vital activity. The end and aim which hunger in all verity subserves is to maintain intact the high-wrought integrity of the living substance. And, as the living substance becomes through gradual elaboration the more and more highly constituted matrix of what we recognize as the inherited wealth and

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worth of life, the gratification of hunger, far from being a self-sufficient appetitive craving, is really an indispensable means to the attainment of higher development. Biology furnishes thus the positive disproof of the hedonic end ascribed by many philosophers to this most urgent of appetitive cravings.

Sleep, another of our appetitive promptings, whose insistance is resistless and gratification balmy sweet, ministers likewise, beyond its own indulgence, in a supreme degree to organic restitution. It withdraws our being from the sense-obtruding world to those strange, unconscious depths, where nature's healing powers effect with silent toil the restoration, the buoyant rejuvenescence of life's strained faculties, used up in their day-long contest with the unrelaxing influx of the outside world. And more mysterious still, in that unconscious, sense-occluded state we call sleep are unified into a consistent mental structure the scattered fragments of waking experience. Here again biology positively shows, as in the case of hunger, that the pleasurable implications are mere means and not ends in themselves.

The appetite of sex, which along with that of hunger seems almost exclusively to sway the actions of animals, and whose gratification involves for us rational beings such grave ethical consequences, proves biologically to subserve ends, the consciousness of which is still less immediately given. And it is in proportion as we rationally come to appreciate more and more fully the import of these ends, that our conduct in regard to them assumes a progressively ethical character.

If the passions of hunger are instrumental, not only in the preservation of individual life, but also in its progressive development, all the more are the passions of sex instrumental, not only in the propagation of the race, but also in its future elevation in the scale of being. For manifold results point clearly to a unitary fusion of the sexual germs, and not merely to the mixing of their separate molecules, as Weismann teaches. With the same lavish waste that of million seeds "often brings but one to bear," or rather with the same profusion of means securing victory over multifold adverse chances, this unitary fusion of reproductive germs ministers

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with endlessly precarious, yet triumphant progress to the heightening of organic wealth and worth.

Now, while the most elemental of appetites, that of hunger; the most reconstitutive one, that of sleep; and the most preservative one, that of sex; while these sundry hedonic appetites prove to be subservient to the progressive development of life, by what kind of process is this progressive development itself brought about? How do these developmental increments arise that are the organic embodiment of a higher stage of life?

It is pretty generally known that two opposite views of what is called evolution are each defended by eminent biologists; namely, that of preformation, and that of new-formation. The former view has its philosophical counterpart in the Hegelian conception of world-evolution. It is conceived as a process rendering explicit what was already implicitly contained in a pre-existing totality of being. Biologically this view of actual pre-existence led to the conclusion, that all foregone and all future generations have existed precreated and preformed, either in the reproductive organs of all-mother Eve (ovulists), or in the seed of her sinful consort (animalculists). Under a modernized guise this same theory of preformation was recently revived by Weismann, who has now, however, virtually abandoned it.

The alternate hypothesis, which maintains that organic development is achieved through vital interaction of the organism with its medium, is not only far more intelligible, but is also supported by superior circumstantial evidence. It assumes that increments of development, acquired, as they actually are, through interaction with the medium, when firmly grafted in the organic structure and unified with the same, become potentially represented in the molecular structure of the reproductive germ. This, in fact, would seem strikingly demonstrated in nature, for instance, in the unitary fusion of originally separate individuals, which at last come to form the so-called segments or *metamera* of complex organisms. These have evidently managed to secure their molecular representation in the reproductive germ.

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I think it can be safely assumed that it is through vital toil that organic progress is achieved. And it is this organic progress with its cumulative preservation of vital results, that has teleologically to be called the aim of evolutional transformation.

Organic development through natural selection is not rightly understood, when the determination of favorable variations is wholly attributed to the conditions of the medium. Such variations as are particularly advantageous for life in a special medium are indeed thus selected. And this no doubt is the principal agency by which distinct species become established. But selective fitting for life in a given medium is apt to fit the organism into narrowing grooves of existence. An extreme example of this is given in the fitting for the parasitic mode of existence, which leads to an all but complete deterioration of the organs of the life of outside relations, with complete entodermic supremacy. What a subject for a moral sermon! On it might be based the entire "gospel of work;" nay, ethics itself needs no stronger biological support.

Whatever natural selection may accomplish for better or worse, individuals arising with variations which eventually prove to stand higher in the scale of being, are not merely selected as the fittest to live in the specifically given medium of their progenitors. They themselves select a medium fitter for their higher endowments. And it is this self-selection of a more suitable medium that becomes predominant in the human race, whose progress and ascendancy are chiefly due to it. And due, furthermore, to self-imposed transformation of the selected medium in keeping with acquired increments of development.

The "struggle for existence," which has its root in the passions of hunger, becomes thus—like hunger itself—a means for the attainment of higher existence; and the "survival of the fittest" becomes a survival of those best fit for a higher mode of life.

The ruthlessness of this struggle, however much it may become mitigated in the course of human civilization, will remain a process of elimination of at least the assailers and obstructors

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of the higher life. It receives its ethical justification when rationally waged in the defence and upholding of its wealth and worth.

Our ability to decide what kind of life may rightly be called "higher" can, of course, be cynically questioned. But, though superiority may not always be immediately evident in a special case, experience on the whole proves conclusively and superabundantly the existence of an ascending scale of being, however gropingly established. Thwarted ever so often, and forced to recede, the progressive tide has proved victorious in the end, so far at least as the history of our own planet has proceeded. And is it not just this pathetic perilousness and transitoriness of individual existence, this precariousness of human culture, that infuses into our life, on the one hand, our tender solicitude for those we love; arousing, on the other hand, our martial valor, our *ἀνδρεία*, in defence of what we deem life's wealth and worth?

IV.

In order clearly to apprehend the end and aim of ethical conduct or right living, we have definitely to know in what higher or rational life really consists.

Candid observation can hardly fail to recognize, that we are fundamentally emotional and volitional beings, whose instinctive feelings and doings, originally sense-aroused and sense-guided, become gradually enlightened and directed by developing reason. And it seems pretty obvious that the emotive and volitional root of what we generally hold to be most precious in life has to be sought in those intuitive affections that bind together with deepening significance and widening comprehensiveness the lives of kindred beings.

Only intellectual perversity can pretend to estimate these affections from the point of view of egoistic hedonism. This mode of interpretation is too frivolous or too sophistic to deserve serious consideration. Even in their purely instinctive origin these affections are fundamentally and essentially altruistic. However ravenous and lustful, even to revelling in hot blood and the tearing of palpitating flesh, tiger-like

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voluptuousness may dwell in beast and man; surely the affectionate solicitude of the tigress for her cubs is essentially devoted to their well-being, and not a mere pleasurable gratification of her own appetites. Nor are the caresses of the mates mere expressions of self-regarding passions. They unmistakably betoken affectionate consideration for each other; a sympathetic community of needs, grounded in the fact that, though different individuals, they are in verity bearers of complemental lives.

The emotions of affection form indeed part of the occluded self-consciousness of each individual, but they derive, nevertheless, their true significance, and have their veritable end, solely in correlation with the existence and qualities of other beings. In fine, they are distinctively altruistic, and belong thus to the life of outside relations. Their legitimate satisfaction is not of the nature of self-interest, nor of self-perfection, but is clearly found in reciprocity of sentiments.

The proud delight in the human worth, in the human beauty of the subjects of one's affection, is in essence no less altruistic than the distress at their sufferings, the anguish at their moral degradation. Here, as everywhere, it is the laboriously secured wealth and worth of life, realized and typified in the world-attuned human individual and his altruistic sentiments, that is the object of ethical approval and ethical joy. The self-regarding ethical consciousness of the individual has value only in so far as it prompts him to become more and more fully a living embodiment of the wealth and worth of life foreshadowed in the ethical ideal.

It is community of sentiments and reciprocity of affections that weave those invisible, yet prepotent links between kindred beings, which underlie ethical conduct. Ethical difficulties arise when there is no community of sentiments, no reciprocity of affections between beings of, nevertheless, the same kindred nature. The instinctive emotions and the common interests that hold together the members of a primitive family, constitute it in feeling and action a superindividual unity—the germ of a social organism, if you like. These unifying ties do, however, not readily extend to such as are of more remote parentage,

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and not co-operating units of the family group. And family ties themselves are apt to weaken and be broken.

Here the task of ethical reason begins. It recognizes the common humanity in strangers even, and seeks to harmonize conflicting interests. It condemns the faithless betrayers of the family, of the altruistic bond; sanctions their being rendered harmless, and the ill repute in which they are held.

In the intensifying and refining of altruistic sentiments, and in their extension over wider and wider groups of human and other beings, ethical progress finds its expression. This involves the extremely laborious process of devising means, not only for the harmonizing of clashing interests, but also for the awakening of reciprocal ethical sentiments in those to be included in the altruistic communion. This difficult task we seek to accomplish through social organization and social labor, national and international, secular and spiritual. And such organization and labor, to answer their purpose, have therefore to be instrumental in the deepening and widening of the ethical bearings of our life of outside relations. They have to be essentially altruistic in a collective sense, and not essentially self-regarding in an individualistic sense, as has been hitherto far too much the case in church and State.

When we consider that all, yes all, that imparts to life, not only its material well-being, but its supersensual, spiritual worth, accrues to us through the deepening and widening of social relations; and that the legitimate satisfaction of the spiritual needs and aspirations thus created can only be attained by finding in these social relations adequate response; it surely becomes evident that social life forms the veritable medium through which and in which moral existence becomes established.

Reason or intelligence, fantastically held by transcendentalists to be itself veritable reality, pre-existing in some wholly mysterious way as the self-sustained totality of all being, is—as experience very obviously shows—slowly developed in us by means of linguistic signs. The fact, which leads transcendentalists to look upon what they call "reason" as ultimate reality, is evidently the active part we play in discriminating,

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judging, and controlling the increasingly complex material arising within our conscious content.

The self-activity, which is thus manifesting itself introspectively is, however, of the same nature as the activity which manifests itself to our senses as purposive movements. Both these volitional activities are primarily exerted on constituents of the conscious content, which content forms a more or less consistently ordered microcosm, in which the organized experience of self and the world is symbolically represented by mental signs.

The symbolical signs, upon which animals exercise their co-natural, though greatly inferior discriminating, judging, and controlling faculty, are almost entirely of an emotional, sensorial, and perceptual nature, directly stimulated or indirectly remembered.

It is by help of linguistic signs, by help of the *voluntary wielding* of the algebra of language, that we human beings become empowered to immeasurably extend the range of our self- and world-experience.

This algebra of language, by means of which we abstract, generalize, and condense given experience, admits in its capacity of a system of voluntary signs a more and more complete simultaneous representation of experience within the conscious content. This, in its turn, affords a more and more complete and systematized material upon which our discriminating, judging, and controlling power may be exerted.

It is this condensed and systematized experiential material, and our intensified voluntary power over it, which is at our disposal for ethical use or otherwise. And it is only when used in furtherance of the ethical end, that it deserves to be called truly rational; because the veritable aim of life as disclosed in its progressive development is then recognized.

We have direct volitional control only over our life of outside relations; not over entodermic functions. This volitional control is most strikingly manifest to the senses in the movements of our executive organs. We are organically endowed with the power of moving and directing them at will. And the intentions and aims with which we execute these volitional

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actions are judged to be ethical, unethical, or ethically indifferent, because we are free to execute them, or to refrain from executing them. And it is only through these voluntary movements that we can give practical expression to our ideal designs. It is, however, not to these ideal designs, as such, nor to any other constituent of actual consciousness, that can be attributed the power, the motive energy, to set the executive movements going. This is done by our veritable self, which dwells in its organic, extra-phenomenal totality of being beyond any of its special mental or physical manifestations; revealing its ethical character in its ideal designs, and the ethical character of its practical conduct in their execution or non-execution through voluntary movements.

And remember that these voluntary movements, *as perceptually realized by us*, are themselves only symbolical signs of the real activity exercised by the being who executes them. When I greet you with the waving of my hand, the activity of my being makes itself known to you by arousing in *your* consciousness the perception of *my* waving hand. And, surely, it is not this perception of *yours* of myself, and my waving hand, that does the waving.*

The mechanically necessitarian interpretation of physical phenomena, which physical phenomena are as consciously realized by us, purely perceptual phenomena, finds its most glaring contradiction in the undeniable power of self-movement possessed by animal beings. The possibility of ethical conduct, and indeed of any kind of conduct, is wholly grounded in this biological fact. In this power of self-movement is to be found the key to the vexed problem of volitional freedom.†

I think it will be granted that biology proves essentially helpful in leading us to recognize that the ethical end is no other than the preservation, enhancement, and enjoyment of the inherited wealth and worth of life, which wealth and worth has its existence in social sentiments organically developed in us human beings, sentiments which find their appropriate satis-

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* See "Mental Activity," *Mind*, Vol. XIV.

† See "Automatism and Spontaniety," *The Monist*, Vol. IV., No. 1.

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faction in reciprocity, within an ethically rationalized social medium. The progressive realization of this ethical end brings with it its own exceeding reward, and needs no sanction beyond its own becoming, and its own proof of superiority before the tribunal of enlightened reason.

Those whose ethical ideal of perfect justice and all-protecting love leads them to invoke with child-like trust super-human modes of adjustment and guardianship, fail to give due weight to the pitiful, the appalling pathos of human life, whose delicately fashioned frame and high-strung sensibilities have ever been ruthlessly exposed to the million-fold perils of unfeeling nature. Yet this very background of ruthless insensibility forms the dark foil on which sparkle the felicities of human loving-kindness.

But what about the "moral imperative," the "ethical ought," the obligation under which by force of our ethical consciousness we feel compelled to confess ourselves in duty bound so to order our conduct as to make it subserve the ethical end? I think this superindividual, and therefore eminently mysterious obligation, will be found likewise grounded in biological relations.

The wealth and worth incorporated in what we perceive as our wondrously constituted organism is the result of the endless vital toil of innumerable foregone generations of kindred beings. We now alive in this present fleeting moment of endlessly past and endlessly future time are sole bearers and realizers of these laborious results, painfully wrought in ages upon ages. Unto our exclusive safe-keeping the precious inheritance is confided. The entire future welfare of the human race depends on its faithful preservation and unimpaired transmission. It seems self-evident, then, that this solidarity of past, present, and future existence imposes upon us the duty of holding our vital endowments in trust, and not for arbitrary disposal; forbidding us egotistically, wastefully to luxuriate either in the spiritual or the material wealth of our common inheritance.

From the unintermitting continuity of life and its affiliating heritage emanate those strange intuitive feelings of sympathetic

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purpose that make of a multitude of separate lives one organic whole, linking the passing generations into a totality of being through community of achievement, in which the life-worthy abilities of all are miraculously rescued into rejuvenated presence from what to individual consciousness appears as the ravages of time and death.

This is the great transcendental paradox of human nature, that each of us is individually the bearer of the entire wealth and worth of life, and yet only an infinitessimal fragment in the collective life of humanity, in which each succeeding generation sums up the existence of all its predecessors.

EDMUND MONTGOMERY.

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NATIONAL CHARACTER AND CLASSICISM IN ITALIAN PHILOSOPHY.

THE only way of describing the character of a nation is to go back into its history and study the manifestations of its faculties, and to seek to discover what distinguishes it from other nations in universal society. For, however far we may trace back to unknown origins the primitive source of the aptitudes of races and nations, it is obvious that there must have been a moment of relative pause in the evolutionary movement. And the result of this must have been a certain psychological basis, from which, under the influence of the external circumstances, combined with the laws of life and history, there was subsequently developed their entire after activity. We believe that, in the case of the Italian race, we must admit this psychological basis to have been already in existence after the Roman conquest; that is, when the peoples of the peninsula, united under a single government, and bound and mingled in a single common life, attained a psychical unity, which the subsequent invasions of the barbarians diversified by the importation of new ethical elements, but which, so far from being destroyed, fused those elements anew into itself and assimilated them. From this original

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psychological basis must have issued, in course of time, the Italian character. But we cannot undertake to investigate minutely either the one or the other. Such an undertaking would be too vast for the limits of this article, which must content itself with the far more modest task of tracing, for the history of philosophy, the more obvious lines of the moral type of the Italians, in so far as it finds expression in the philosophic reflection of their thinkers. At all events, without including the history of the external forms of social life, or at all pretending to embrace within the limits of this brief study the chequered history of the Italian people in the various spheres of civilization, we shall, nevertheless, cast a brief glance at the relations which these hold to the moral and civil life in the unity of its spirit. Indeed, the tendencies and habits which we try to bring out into clearness are not confined to the individual or to the family, but, while operating in both, form the dominant elements in the collective development of the nation. This means that we do not lose sight of the great antagonism existing between the collectivist and individualistic tendencies in the practical life of the Italian people; tendencies which sometimes favor, and sometimes impede, the formation of national unity, and the unfolding of those feelings and virtues which belong to it.

Let us, before entering upon the special question in hand, put forward certain general principles of method, in order to make clear the difficulties which, in a study of this sort in the present condition of our knowledge, are unavoidable. No one would think of denying that, if we consider the virtues and the vices in their common nature, all civilized nations share in them in different measures; but it is just this quantitative difference in the facts which it is most important to know, if we would arrive at clear views with regard to the kinds of inclinations and passions which prevail in any race or in any people. At the same time we must not forget that statistics is too modern a science to throw any light for us upon a past at all remote. Nor will it be more easy to discover in just what relation the anthropometric measurements and anatomical observations stand to the ethical elements in

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the character of a people. All these things must be counted among the desiderata of our time. To these difficulties, which are common to all sociological studies such as the present, must be added another which is, in a special degree, due to the Italian spirit. This is the multiplicity of local types and the independence which these have preserved for long centuries in the history of the peninsula. The truth is, even at the present day, the inhabitants of Lombardy, Venetia, Liguria, the Romagna, Tuscany, and Naples, although united in a single State, and politically no longer foreigners to each other, nevertheless retain a great diversity of aptitude and of external customs, such as does not, at the first glance, reveal their common psychological basis.

Finally, let us add, that although for our purpose the history of morals in Italy is to be the principal object of this article, yet we cannot leave out of view the nexus which binds it to the history of speculative philosophy. The relations of effect and cause which unite morals with psychology and the science of consciousness render this imperative. Idealism, empiricism, scepticism, and mysticism exert a powerful influence upon ethics, and are the source of concepts, absolute or relative, of the good and of law, as well as of ethical systems founded on sense, on the useful, on the theological principle, and on religious faith.

These forms of theoretical and practical philosophy do not belong to any people in particular, but have adherents among all peoples. Italy itself, even in the saddest as well as the most glorious period of its history, never failed to contribute to the philosophical movement of Europe, and, if it did not exert the preponderating influence which the more famous modern systems of France, Italy, and Germany exerted on science and society, it was nevertheless beneficial, through the original impulses which it imparted, and in the benefits of which all the other nations shared, as well as by the ampler views, which were not without effect upon its destinies. If we consult history and go behind these doctrines to the spirit which produced them, I think we may derive from their special character a certain amount of information with regard to the spiritual

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tendencies of the Italian people. We may mark, then, (1) their inborn tendency to the contemplation and enjoyment of the sensible world, and an unwillingness, hence resulting, to separate thought from the objectivity of the real, from the concrete phenomena of sense. (2) An æsthetic tendency, which, starting from the relations of feeling to external nature, predisposes the Italian mind to poetry and to art; and which links it, perhaps more than any other, to the traditions and forms of classical culture. (3) An aptitude, connected with the two preceding, for the study of the physical and mathematical sciences, whose objective symbols are as inseparable from sensible reality as they are appropriate to the ideality of the mind and the scientific contemplation of the world. (4) An impulse tending to objectify the last results of thought analysis, imparting to the philosophic method an impress which shows its affinity to the artistic process, to the intuition of finality, and of cosmic beauty. (5) A special aptitude for practical life, a need to reap immediately the fruits of meditation, to draw the useful out of the certain and the true, an unwillingness to concentrate the energies upon the solitary, and, so to speak, dead sphere of the subject turned back upon itself. (6) A blending of mental faculties and instincts, which, while favorable to encyclopædic aspirations, tends to produce an equilibrium, and makes it difficult for the best endowed individuals to abandon themselves to a single line of work, especially if it is of the objective order and demands a violent separation of the intellect from its most natural objects. (7) And lastly, a disposition as alien to exclusive directions of activity as it is favorable to conciliatory views and to the satisfaction of common sense in science and in philosophy.

The last of these traits of character is not, in my opinion, without a certain importance for the explanation of the different proportions in which, in the history of Italian philosophy, we find initiations and the constructions of philosophic systems. Nevertheless, the correspondence of the known characteristics of Italian philosophical doctrines with the classical tradition and the artistic tendency, referred to above, seems to us more general and more evident.

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Let us first rapidly review the phases in the history of philosophy, and try to find in the facts a basis for our conjecture.

In the Middle Age Italy possessed philosophers whose names need not fear comparison with the most famous. The influence of classical tradition on the philosophy of the Middle Age is so well known, and so common to all parts of Europe, that there is no need to prove its effect upon the Italians. No one, indeed, would care to deny that it passed from them to the schools of the other peoples, or that it had its deepest root in their spirit. Indeed, in the period from Boethius to Dante and Petrarch, this fact is so manifest that, if we were to disregard it, we should be altogether unable to comprehend the deepest springs of the speculative and practical life of the men who best represent the spirit of the nation. Let us for the present leave out of sight the history of moral and civil ideas, and consider merely certain personages of this period who were eminent in speculative thought. Their names need not fear comparison with the most famous. Thanks to them, Italy and the Middle Age shared the glory of philosophic initiatives and syntheses with the other nations. We cannot, indeed, claim for Italy the initiative in the three doctrines which roused and divided the principal movement of scholasticism. For the solutions to the question regarding general ideas are commonly attributed to three Frenchmen: Roscelinus, William of Champeaux and Abelard. But, apart from the fact that realism received from two Italians, Anselm of Aosta and Bonaventura of Bagnorea, an ontological development whose influence was not without its effect on modern idealism; another Italian, greater than these in dialectic power, in vastness of erudition, and in breadth of theoretical and practical views, St. Thomas, in his two "Summæ," masters the whole knowledge of his time, and recasts and reorganizes the materials furnished him by previous systems into a system of his own. He subordinates reason to dogma; but with this reservation, he displays an organizing energy which, while subject to the force of the theological principle dominant in his time, in matters theoretical and political, pre-

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serves even to-day the impress of genius. A spirit at once practical and theoretical, Thomas labors to harmonize in their supreme principles the forces which move the civil world—a world not abstract but concrete—the world in which he lives. Even in the circle of metaphysical problems, his mind seizes on solutions which reveal a tendency to avoid excesses, and to pursue that middle course which is preferred by prudent and practical characters. Indeed, in the great question respecting the nature of universals, he stands neither with the realist, who regards general ideas as so many substances, nor with the nominalist, who reduces them to mere names, nor with the conceptualist, who makes them mere modes of mind; but from all these various doctrines he gathers the manifold views which, criticised and united, go to make up the truth. In regard to the proof for the existence of God he combats St. Anselm's *a priori* demonstrations, and cleaves to those which, resting on the principle of cause and upon experience, are more characteristics of the habits of a positive mind. And, although from these rapid touches the large eclecticism of this great Italian is sufficiently evident, yet we must not fail to make another observation, which is not without its importance for our argument. Every one knows the efforts which he made in order to popularize among the Latins the works of Aristotle, with what liberal spirit he drew from them, with what acumen he labored to reconcile them with Christian dogma and morals. And it was not only Aristotle, but all the classical writers who had come within the reach of the Schoolmen that he called to his aid, not to speak of the Arabs, who before the Latins had been their interpreters; and he did so in order to add the weight of an imposing tradition to the twofold authority, lay and ecclesiastical, on which his arguments are based.

The speculative philosophy of St. Anselm of Aosta is very different from that of St. Thomas. In his proof for the existence of God, in which more than anything else the originality of his mind becomes apparent, he introduces into the Middle Age an *a priori* form of reasoning which Descartes and Leibnitz inherited and reintroduced with modifications

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into modern philosophy. But this bold flight of rational intuition, which, without any support in experience, passes from thought to absolute being, is not the complete expression of his mind, which raises speculation to this high goal only for the purpose of enabling it to meet the demands of his reason, which labors to reconcile its own satisfaction with feeling and with life. He is seeking an explanation for his faith; he is speculating in order to introduce harmony between philosophy and religion (*fides quærens intellectum*), between the Christian tradition and the Platonic, transmitted to the ecclesiastics of the Middle Age, mainly by St. Augustine and the pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita—a traditional connection of which Ficinus, the restorer of Platonism and the Academy in the second half of the fifteenth century, shows himself to be aware when he names St. Augustine among his predecessors.

More mystical, but not less closely connected with the Platonic tradition, is the Christian idealism of St. Bonaventura, whose "Itinerarium Mentis in Deum" recalls the Athenian philosopher's dialectic, and shows the endeavor to embrace, in the ascending grades of united thought and love, the various forms of practical and speculative life, with bonds which unite it to the finite and infinite objects of contemplation.

The original elements in these forms of ontological idealism must not prevent us from admitting that, from the point of view of systematic construction, they are inferior to the system set forth in the "De Divisione Naturæ" of Scotus Erigena, the predecessor of the modern, and the continuer of the ancient, pantheists; but it is just in this difference of speculative development, counterbalanced by practical and comprehensive purposes, that we find the distinctive mark of the Italian mind and of its manifestations in philosophy. A superabundance of initiative, accompanied by a relatively meagre development in any one direction of thought, is a phenomenon which strikes any one who reads over the history of Italian thought. The views which appear at the time of the Renaissance are a special proof of this. In this period of two centuries the philosophical initiatives of the Italians were the

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precursors of modern systems. And such was their importance that Victor Cousin was compelled to admit that at that period Italy alone possessed a true philosophy. But whereas, in modern metaphysical systems, there is hardly any important idea which is not derived from principles laid down by them in psychology, yet they, like their predecessors in the Middle Age, generally contented themselves with writing commentaries on the "De Anima" of Aristotle, or on the doctrines of the Neoplatonists, adding, indeed, frequently observations and developments of their own to the theories of the masters, sometimes with noteworthy novelties, but without any sufficient development of analysis or of method. For example, Pomponazzi owes his fame to the ingenuity displayed by him in the discussions and polemics of his time on the question of the soul; nevertheless the part which he plays in these is rather that of a dialectician than of an observer and analyzer of the human faculties. The problem discussed was a metaphysical one, relating to the nature of the soul. Nor was the aim which Ficinus proposed to himself at all different, when he wrote his great treatise on the "Immortality of Souls," which is a *résumé*, with commentary, of Neoplatonic doctrines. The really psychological part of this treatise is far surpassed by that which relates to cosmology and ontology, and which gives it the character of a system of philosophy. Francesco Patrizzi, the implacable adversary of Aristotle, devotes part of his treatise on "Universal Philosophy" to psychology. But the very title, "pampsychia," reveals the purpose and method of the doctrine, which, following in the steps of the Neoplatonists, seeks to discover the relations of the individual soul to the soul of the world. The writings of Giordano Bruno, and especially those recently published for the first time, deal in large part with a subject closer related to psychology, we mean the art of memory, of which Raimond Lulli was the most famous master in the Middle Age; but the philosopher of Nola, while displaying all the resources of his genius in multiplying the precepts of a complicated and illusory mechanism, does not analyze the memory or discover the laws which govern it. Campanella,

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who claims to base philosophy on experience, and who, in some of his rapidly formulated maxims, makes us think of Descartes and Locke, does not care to develop these, but objectifies sense, diffusing it through all things, (in his "De Sensu Rerum,") and offers us no critical examination of thought from which the empiricism of the eighteenth century could have started. The two martyrs of philosophic liberty staggered, so to speak, at the entrance of the way. To the French, with Descartes and his school, and to the English, with Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke, belongs the honor of having gloriously entered upon it, founding upon the doctrine of consciousness modern idealism and empiricism.

And thus, while in the centuries of the Renaissance all the teachings of the ancients were resuscitated by the efforts of the Italians, and there is no portion of physical or mathematical sciences on which their discoveries have not left a fecundating impress, and no application of the moral disciplines or of arts and letters which does not owe them some original inventions; yet modern philosophy will count their thinkers rather among followers than among masters. Even the one who might have been among the first, was not so, because he did not choose to be so, but fulfilled instead a loftier and more useful mission, by reforming, from the roots upwards, the concept and the practice of the experimental method, or, as he expressed himself, by rearranging some strings in the organ of human reason. It is well known that writing to Campanella, who, when informed of Galileo's philosophical ideas, sought to induce him to work them up into a system, the great scientist refused, protesting that he preferred a few certain ideas to specious and problematical doctrines.

Returning to the considerations in which I have rapidly formulated the traits which seem to me most salient in the Italian mind, as manifested in speculative philosophy, it seems to me that some of them must be especially dwelt upon, as the causes of the difference which prevails between Italy and other nations with respect to originality and breadth of philosophic systems in modern times; and these are, a tendency towards the practical and positive part of knowledge, a repugnance

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to solitary meditation on the part of the thinking subject, and a need for mental equilibrium and for a coherence with common reason and the sense of life. To these causes must certainly be added the influences of the despotism prevailing in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the violences and the acts of the despotic governments which deprived Italy not only of political independence and activity, but also of freedom and flight of thought, at the very time which, coming as it did after the initiatives of the previous centuries, ought to have given opportunity for the development of the new principles and tendencies. There can be no doubt that the persecution of free thought, begun by the theocracy in the times in which Italy was her own mistress, was so much reinforced by foreign rule that the spirit of reform which had arisen in other parts of Europe, and passed from religion to philosophy, was repressed on the peninsula, and that, at the same time, the consciousness of the powers of reason was to a remarkable degree enfeebled, and the impulse to penetrate into its ultimate basis and supreme laws diminished.

Hence, from the beginning of the seventeenth century to the appearance of Antonio Rosmini, we find only a philosophic thought which does not rise above the level of common sense; which follows, with but slight additions, the systems developed elsewhere. The names of Facciolati, of Magalotti, of Muratori, and Genovesi may be cited as noteworthy in this regard. It is true that Vico laid the basis of the philosophy of history, called by him the "New Science,"—a large objective psychology, preceding modern sociology,—but he postulated, rather than supplied, that investigation into those interior principles of the mind which modern psychologists, before and after him, brought to light. Nevertheless, at that very time in which psychological studies were so feeble in Italy there were not lacking intuitions which minds more systematic than those of their authors might have developed into more far-reaching doctrines. In proof of this we may name Zanotti, who, contemporaneously with Hartley, saw the importance of the law of association in psychology, without, however, doing anything more about it than writing a small

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pamphlet, little known beyond the Alps; and Pietro Verri, who, notwithstanding the praises which he received from Kant, did not care to develop his ideas with regard to the relativity of pleasure and pain—a matter of so much importance in the psychology of our time. Be this as it may, without extensive investigations into psychological facts and into consciousness, the entire system of philosophy lacks its proper basis, if it is true, as it most certainly is, that logic, ethics, and æsthetics reveal their principles only to the student of the intellect, the will, the taste, and the imagination. Antonio Rosmini rises above the other modern philosophers of Italy, just because he is the author of a system and because of the importance of his psychological doctrines, chiefly of those which relate to sensibility and will. From these he derived a theory of feeling which, anticipating that of the present English school, resolved into known elements the old mystery of instincts, settled with clearness the part which animality plays in human psychic life, drew from it the criterion of a profound distinction between eudæmonology (science of happiness) and ethics (science of the absolute good), as well as the more scientific reasons for his opposition to the Criticism of Kant and to the radical identity of thought and being, common to the chief representatives of German metaphysics.

At the same time, we must not forget that in Rosmini, as well as the two other thinkers who received their impulse from him and who, in spite of secondary differences, continued the movement which he began, the psychological process was counterbalanced by a love for a Platonic-Christian tradition, by an excessive reverence for the ill-determined authority of common sense, by a desire to make a solution of the main philosophical problems meet the immediate needs of civil society and of the Church, which were sincerely united in his thought and in his heart. In fact, like St. Anselm, his predecessor in Christian Platonism, he seeks to found a philosophy which shall serve theology, while at the same time he maintains the necessity of philosophic liberty, no less than of the authority of reason. More than anything else, the classic

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tradition of Platonism imparted to his doctrine of ideas and of being a form which, varied by Gioberti and Mamiani, revealed, by its revival in the nineteenth century, the persistent force of the artistic tendency in the most speculative sphere of Italian thought. And, in truth, this re-birth of the ontological objectivity of ideas, this effort to base a metaphysical realism on their absolute existence, and of a more or less circumscribed vision in God, cannot fail to produce an impression, at a time when the Kantian Criticism has relegated this hypothesis to a place among the transcendental illusions of pure reason, as if the intellect had no other means of recognizing and legitimizing its own authority and the value of its own supreme principles. This vision of infinite being, claimed by Plato for pure thought, whether as reminiscence or direct intuition—a vision advocated more or less openly by Augustine, and implied in the ontology of Anselm and Bonaventura—came to life again in the Neoplatonism of Marsiglio Ficino, and continued without interruption in Italy, being represented by Patrizzi, Bruno, Vico, and Gerdil, the apologist of Malebranche and the immediate predecessor of the Platonists of the nineteenth century. I cannot, of course, forget that England, through Scotus Erigena, gave the first impulse to the Neoplatonism of the Middle Age; that in the seventeenth century Herbert of Cherbury, Gale, Cudworth, Henry More, and Parker were Neoplatonists; and that in France, besides Malebranche, Fénélon was a Platonist, pure and simple, and one who, with regard to the nature of truth, came very near the doctrine of Bossuet himself. Let us note also that the philosophy of the Renaissance begins with the Platonism of a German, Nicolaus of Cusa, and, finally, that the intuition of the absolute was professed by Schelling.

No one can maintain that the idealistic, and particularly the Platonic, direction of thought is extraneous to the philosophic spirit of any nation. But while granting this, I believe that the foregoing considerations lead to this conclusion: That in Italy more than elsewhere the speculative movement followed in the footsteps of the Græco-Roman thought; and that, while it contributed largely to the development of Aristotelian phi-

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losophy and to the empirical tendency which distinguishes it, it left a more original impress on the development of Platonic thought and its reconciliation with modern philosophy. The chief task attempted by Italian philosophers in this sense has reference to the problem of the origin of ideas, the nature of truth, and its relation to the world. They believed that they could untie the knot by the objectification of ideas, and by means of the relation of copy and model in the work of creation. As the poet contemplates and describes the idea; as the artist imitates and realizes it, so the supreme function of the intellect would be a contemplation, and that of nature an imitation of the eternal exemplars. Thus the poetic and artistic process, instead of receiving an explanation from the deepest conditions of thought, superposed itself upon them, and, strengthened by the influence of tradition and of race, pretended to explain them. But this same influence, united to the feeling of reality and of life, made it impossible for the Italian spirit to neglect one part of classical tradition for another in Italian philosophy; so that at the Renaissance we see the Italians ardently cultivating both Platonism and Ontologism; and both in the restorations of Neoplatonism as well as outside of them, we find frequent attempts to harmonize the two systems, and in the Italian metaphysicians who have done most to develop their concepts, we are continually coming upon a similar endeavor to reconcile the ideal with the real, reason with experience. This endeavor is openly expressed by Rosmini in his "Introduction to Philosophy," and Mamiani speaks of it no less clearly in his "Confessions of a Metaphysician."

It is easy to see that this unwillingness to follow a one-sided direction in philosophy has deprived the labors of Italian metaphysicians of that mark of originality or greatness which distinguishes certain modern systems, deduced by imperturbable dialectic from a single principle, such, for example, as the systems of Spinoza and of Hegel. At the same time it must be admitted that this eclectic tendency enables those who follow it to avoid excesses contrary to the rational need for harmony and also reactions against forced syntheses which

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are condemned to destruction. This feeling for measure is too closely connected with the classical tradition, too deeply rooted in the general character of the Italian race, and at the same time united to the practical sense and to the need for unity in knowledge, to make any further consideration necessary.

The encyclopædic aptitude is certainly the privilege of genius, when it succeeds in realizing itself to a high degree by the extent and depth of the requirements, and especially when it creates scientific methods and discovers fundamental truths. In this sense we may apply the term encyclopædic *par excellence* to an Aristotle, a Descartes, a Galileo, a Newton, a Kant, a Leibnitz, a Goethe; but there is no want in any nation of men of ability, who, without arriving at the height of such men, show in their works an endeavor after universality. Examples of this sort of genius Italy furnishes in large numbers, and these may be arranged, so to speak, on a scale of corresponding values between mediocrity and genius; but what we are concerned to mark in this relation is the union of the encyclopædic aptitude and a philosophical aspiration with the poetic and artistic faculty, a union which appears in the history of the sciences and arts.

What sphere of knowledge is there into which the author of the "Divine Comedy" has not cast a profound glance? Dante's poem is a fusion of philosophy and poetry, such that we find it difficult to say whether he is more of a poet or of a philosopher; so true is it that the most abstruse questions respecting the world and God, man and his faculties, in one word, respecting the most important problems of theology, metaphysics, and psychology, are therein treated with a subtlety of dialectic, matched only by the force of the language and the novelty of poetic symbolism. Dante certainly had the consciousness of one of the characters of his poem when he said of him that he "describes the bottom of the universe." But we may note another principle in thinking over his fundamental philosophic thought, that, namely, which informs the entire "Divine Comedy," and which, limited in "The New Life" to the individual soul of the poet, creates in the "De

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Monarchia" an idea of universal society, and in his poem identifies itself with the life of the world and with God. This principle is Love. In Dante's poem, the first Love determines the creation, and displays the eternal beauties, and no creature was ever without love, either natural or spiritual; from it proceeds an instinct which governs the motion of everything and forms its law.

> "This bears the fire up heavenward to the moon;
> This is prime mover in the human heart;
> This grasps the earth within and makes it one."

This concept of Love carried to such height and generality in metaphysics is so closely combined with Dante's æsthetic faculty that in the "Paradise" especially the whole system of poetical symbolism is determined by it, so much so that he establishes a proportion between the degrees of the joys of the blest and those of the light and laughter which correspond to the movements of love in their souls, to the merits of their virtues, and to the grace which the supreme Love showers upon them from sphere to sphere.

At all events, the degree to which an early love was influential in the poetic destination of Dante cannot be a secret to any one. And criticism has sufficiently proved beyond doubt the reality of Beatrice and the successive steps in the elevation of this fortunate maiden to an ideal, which in the end identified itself in the mind of the poet with theology.

This intimate marriage between the artistic and the philosophic faculties, springing out of the double and united feeling for the beautiful and the true, and combined with encyclopædic tendencies, appears in certain other eminent Italians of subsequent times, and deserves to be pointed out as an index of the degree which a racial disposition may reach in the individual who carries it to its highest. I shall cite only five names, three from the time of the Renaissance and two belonging to more recent times. The recently published manuscripts of Leonardo da Vinci bring into evidence his encyclopædic knowledge, which was already in part manifest from the specimens which we find in his treatises "On Paintings" and the

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"Motion of Liquids." To speak more precisely, his knowledge is not simply a development of existing sciences, but a creation of new ones. Nevertheless, while in every branch of science he makes wonderful discoveries, an overruling force attracts and subordinates in him all the others to its ends, and this is the artistic faculty. Da Vinci is encyclopædic, but he is above all a painter. A comparison between Leonardo and Michael Angelo is so obvious that I feel as if the reader must have made it already. His prodigious activity manifested itself in all the fine arts; nay, to this artistic knowledge he unites philosophic speculation, and every one knows the intimate connection which prevails in the inspiration of his verses between art, poetry, and philosophy. But he, too, is first of all an artist and shows to us that the encyclopædic tendency, even in the highest men, cannot in its manifestations reach or maintain that equilibrium which the tendencies of the races would require, and that, imperfect even in the most fortunate cases, it readily becomes a defect in less gifted individuals, jeopardizing depth by breadth and impeding the fruitful fixity of psychic energy.

Every one knows how hard Petrarch labored in order to advance the Renaissance of letters and to initiate that of philosophy. Orator, moralist, politician, precursor of the new civilization, he was also a philosopher; but first of all he was a poet, and the prime mover of his poetic genius, Love, idolized in his Laura the ideal and divine type of beauty. And the doctrine which he aspired to appropriate and restore was the Platonic, the one, namely, which best agreed with his poetic faculty and more generally with the artistic tendency of the Tuscans.

Not far from Tuscany are the Marches, to which belong two modern poet-philosophers, Leopardi and Mamiani,—the one, thanks to unfortunate physical organization and the sad condition of Italy, tending to sadness and despair, the other, thanks to a happy nature and a resistant constitution, tending to a vigorous reaction. Although they were contemporaries, the difference between their systems of thought is immense. They are separated by all the distance

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which lies between pessimism and optimism, between the loathing and the love of life, between the painful conception of the vanity of all things and faith in progress and in Providence. But in spite of this contrast, and of the fact that in Leopardi the thinker and the poet are marvellously united and, as it were, fused together, whereas in Mamiani they are, so to speak, juxtaposed and are intimately united only in the elegance of his literary form, still both are witnesses to that union between the artistic and philosophic tendencies which marks the spirit of their nation and to the influence of the one upon the other.

But it is time to call upon the practical philosophy of the Italians for a confirmation of those traits in their character, whose existence a rapid survey of the history of their speculative doctrines has enabled us to conjecture.

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RATIONAL HEDONISM.

MY object in this paper is to make a slight contribution to the defence of Ethical Hedonism, by considering, and meeting as far as I can, certain recently-urged objections to it. My reason for choosing the name "Rational Hedonism," which I have taken as title, is that the doctrine of ethical hedonism, with which I am here concerned, appears to me both in its harmony with "common sense well understood" and in philosophic completeness to answer the demands of reason as no other doctrine with which I am acquainted, does; and that oddly enough, this characteristic of rationality has not been appreciated by some of its most profound critics, who, in fact, base certain of their objections on its supposed inherent irrationality.*

And first of all, I should like to distinguish *ethical* hedonism as sharply as possible from *psychological* hedonism (the

* *E.g.* Dewey, "Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics," section xix., etc., and *cf. post.*

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view that *all* desire is for pleasure *quâ* pleasure). *Pace* Green's reproach of slavery to "the current psychology," it was from the keen and original psychological analysis of Bishop Butler that this doctrine received its death-blow. The doctrine is now, I believe, generally discredited; but in any case it is with something quite different that I am at present occupied—the view, namely, that the *rational* end of human action, the good for man, that which is ultimately worth having, worth having *in itself*, is happiness—happiness understood as meaning the pleasure-element in consciousness, by whatever name we may call it—enjoyment, satisfaction, joy, bliss, blessedness, etc. Happiness in this sense (which is, I believe, the ordinary sense) refers to the *feeling-element* of consciousness, its component parts being psychoses (or portions of consciousness) which are regarded as preferable *quâ* feeling,—that is, as being not only free from pain (which *quâ* feeling is the reverse of preferable), but moreover positively pleasant. In the view of ethical hedonism it is this delightfulness of conscious life which ought to be sought, by each for himself and for the whole community of rational and sensitive beings of which he is a member.* For since each is an individual, has *his own* consciousness, the quality of his own consciousness is a matter of moment to him, and since each is sensitive—so sensitive that severe pain is *in itself* horrible—the avoidance of pain, as far as possible, and the securing of its opposite are *in reason* (and indeed on any view of good) a matter of primary importance to each. And as consciously and *quâ* rational, a member of a community of creatures conceived as like himself; and capable, *quâ* sympathetic, of caring specially for the joy and misery of other sentient creatures: each ought to aim at promoting Happiness (the absence of

* Pain is *feeling which is judged in itself undesirable*, pleasure is *feeling which is judged in itself desirable* (preferable or good); the appeal being to the consciousness of the sentient (and rational) individual at the time of feeling. *Cf.* Sidgwick, "Methods of Ethics," fifth edition, pp. 130, 131. The above statement avoids, I think, some of the objections which have been brought against hedonism on the score of the *ambiguity* of "pleasure" (*cf.* Mackenzie, "Manual of Ethics," pp. 91, 94, 102; Ryland, "Ethics," p. 33, etc.), and also Mr. Ryland's somewhat obscure objection on the score of definition (*op. cit.*, p. 32). But *cf.* also *post.*

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painful consciousness and the presence of pleasant consciousness) in others. As a conscious individual each is necessarily —not to say rationally—concerned with the quality of his own consciousness throughout; as consciously part of a larger conscious whole, each is rationally and naturally concerned with the quality of consciousness of all the members who compose that whole. (This dualism is inevitable—as inevitable as the antithesis of subject and object in knowledge, or the unity in difference which characterizes the object of knowledge, or the permanence amid change which is the condition of all growth and development. Hedonism is not responsible for the general difficulty of unity in difference.) Further, since conscious life as known by us is subject to the condition of time, of realization in successive parts, the goodness of the whole is not independent of the goodness of the parts; and for a consciousness which is sensitive (living in the present only) as well as rational (living in the present but also transcending it) the parts are not good unless they are preferable *in themselves—i. e.*, unless they are pleasant and free from pain. I pass now to objections urged against Ethical Hedonism.

I.—OBJECTION FROM PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM.

Among the objections still urged against Ethical Hedonism is the assumption that *ethical* depends on *psychological* hedonism.* No doubt, if good is the object of desire, or that which satisfies desire, and if all desire is for an object consciously taken as an end (such object being what we call *good*),† then admission of the view that the only thing which men *do* desire is pleasure or happiness, necessitates the admission that pleasure or happiness is good, and that, being good, it is the right end of action; and thus, if any method of ethics remains possible, it must be egoistic hedonism. And, on the other hand, on this view the rejection of psychological hedonism makes

* *E.g.* Bradley, "Appearance and Reality," p. 406; Muirhead, "Elements of Ethics," pp. 91, 106, etc.; Dewey, "Outlines," pp. 32, 33, etc.

† *Cf.* Mackenzie, "Manual," p. 71; Bradley, "Appearance and Reality," p. 402; Dewey, "Outlines of Ethics," pp. 5, 95, 215, etc.

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the rejection of ethical hedonism inevitable.* It is also to be observed that if the object of desire (the end or part of the end) is good, and "Motive is the end with a view to which the action is performed," † it is difficult not to allow that actions *must* be largely, if not entirely, judged by motives. It seems, however, also difficult not to allow that *all* motives are good.

But if psychological hedonism is true: if, according to an unvarying psychological law, pleasure (or happiness) is the only possible end of action, and desire for pleasure the only possible motive: does even the miserable ethical refuge of egoistic hedonism remain open to us? If pleasure is what we all do seek and must seek, whether or no, is there any force in saying that pleasure or happiness is what ought to be sought? Where there is *no* choice, there can be no *moral* choice, the question of a right end of action seems to become irrelevant; what I inevitably *must* do cannot be what I *ought* voluntarily to choose to do.‡ Hence, so far from ethical hedonism being based on psychological hedonism, the two seem incompatible. A necessary foundation for quantitative ethical hedonism is the doctrine that it is possible to seek *both* pleasure *and* that which is not pleasure.

II.—OBJECTIONS TO ADMITTING PLEASURE AS THE END, AT ALL.

(*a*) One of the objections to admitting pleasure as the end is on the score of confusion. It has been expressed as follows: §

"When it is said that what we desire is always pleasure, what seems to be meant is, that what we desire is always some object, the attainment of which is accompanied by an agreeable feeling.‖ Now this is so true that it is almost a tautology. It is clear that if we desire anything, the attainment of it will bring

* Mr. Mackenzie ("Manual," p. 97, note 2) does indeed say that Ethical Hedonism has no necessary dependence on Psychological Hedonism.

† Mackenzie, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

‡ *Cf.* "Methods of Ethics," pp. 42, 43.

§ Mackenzie, "Manual," p. 95; *cf.* also Ryland, "Ethics," pp. 30, 69.

‖ The distinction between *causes of pleasure* and *pleasure* is fully brought out in a chapter (ch. iv. on Objective Hedonism) of Book II. of "The Methods of Ethics."

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at least a temporary satisfaction; and this satisfaction will be accompanied by a feeling of satisfaction—*i.e.*, pleasure. Consequently, anything that we desire may be said to be a pleasure—*i.e.*, something that will bring pleasure when attained . . . But . . . the fact that we desire *pleasures* is no evidence that we desire *pleasure*." . . . "Pleasure is the accompaniment of objects which have a certain value for the consciousness to which they are presented. It is of some importance . . . to remember that it is the objects, not the feelings of pleasure, that have value." (P. 108; *cf.* also p. 115.)

But when *e.g.* looking forward to the future, we wish for ourselves or others a pleasant party, or an agreeable visit, a happy New Year, or many happy returns of the day, a happy childhood or youth or old age, though we cannot indeed imagine feeling without causes of feeling, happiness or pleasure without "objects," yet in as far as we do not define the objects or causes further than as *pleasure-producing*, surely it is this quality in them which we are thinking of, and which recommends them to us. Or when, as Butler says (Sermon 1, note 2), a man undertakes "some laborious work upon promise of a great reward, without any distinct knowledge of what the reward would be," or when a child is vaguely promised a *treat*, it is the pleasantness or happiness-producing quality of the reward or treat, and this only, that can be definitely thought of and desired. May we not similarly desire to attain, *e.g.*, truth—though it is an abstraction, and we may not know at all in what particular statements it may turn out to be embodied?

I pass now to further objections to the hedonistic end which are based on the plea that pleasure and the absence of pain are an impossible or irrational or actually undesired end.

(*b*) They are an impossible end, it is said, because there is nothing similar in all pains except that they *are* pains, and similarly of pleasures,* and there is not "any such thing as agreeableness or disagreeableness in the abstract." "Pleasure in fact is not a distinguishable element in our constitution." But even Carlyle allows that the highest good is blessedness, and Kant conceives that to merit happiness and receive it is

* Mackenzie, "Social Philosophy," pp. 222, 223; Ryland, "Ethics," p. 31; *cf.* p. 68; Dewey, "Outlines," p. 51, etc.

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the highest good for man; and both blessedness and happiness are assuredly (on any view of them) to be distinguished as pleasant, and are equally abstract with pleasure. And all the similarity (between pains and pleasures) which is contended for, all that is necessary in order that pleasure and absence of pain may be a possible end, is only just as much as is implied in the existence and application of the general or abstract name, only such similarity as makes language and science possible; we can class things together and call them by one name, although there may be no two things which are exactly similar: we can distinguish in thought and words, qualities or groups of qualities without asserting or implying that they have any "real existence" except as constituents of a concrete complex.

If pleasure and pain are not distinguishable from other elements of consciousness, how is it that we can talk so much about them, and what is the meaning of such familiar words as *rapture*, *torture*, *sorrow*, *imprudence*, *delight*, and so forth? And do not all such objections against hedonism as the present one, apply equally to the view that pleasure is an *accompaniment* of the attainment of the end, or that it is *part* of the end, or the *sense of value* of objects? And are not such ends as activity, self-realization, perfection, equilibrium,* etc., at least as abstract as pleasure, and at the same time much vaguer? (not to dilate here upon the fact that many people not only do not desire them as ends, but never think of them as such.)

Granting that pleasures and pains are distinguishable, and may be grouped together, it seems difficult to deny that this grouping and distinction are in virtue of the similarity of pleasures and of pains, and that, *in this respect*, they are theoretically commensurable. Supposing, however, that pleasures and pains, though they can, as such, be grouped together, yet have such qualitative differences among themselves that they cannot fairly be compared quantitatively: this objection would

* Mackenzie, "Manual," p. 116; Dewey, "Outlines," pp. 20, 24, 25, 95, 101, etc.; Alexander, "Order and Progress," pp. 218, 240, etc.

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tell with as great or greater strength against the acceptance of pleasure as the *sense of value* of objects,* or as *part* of the end. In the latter case it would seem that pleasures and pains must be capable of quantitative comparison not only with each other, but also with that which is not feeling.

(*c*) Again, pleasure, it is said, cannot itself be the ultimate end, cannot be that which is intrinsically valuable—for "the feeling of pleasure is simply the sense of *interest* or of *value for consciousness*," "the sense of value presupposes value," "pleasure is a sense of value."† But *are* pleasure and pain as we know them, simply the sense of value (positive and negative), and what exactly is meant by saying that they are so? And granting that they are, it seems that we have to measure the *value* by the *pleasure;* and if so, the supposed differences of quality in pleasure and pain must be as inconvenient here as in the attempted calculus of the empiric hedonist. Further, (1) it is not very clear what can be meant here by *value* unless it means *good;* (2) it seems to be *practically* identified with pleasure and pain; (3) the value (however described) of objects appears to be entirely derived from the fact that they have been desired—that which is desired being good *quâ* object of desire. There is perhaps no doubt that *generally, some* satisfaction results from the attainment of a desired object; but I think that even this is not always the case, and it certainly seems that we do sometimes desire things which, as we know, are "ill to hae." Further, it seems repugnant both to common sense and to reflection to make actual desire the creator of value. Is it a satisfactory or even tenable view of good to hold that an object is good *because desired?* Is intoxicating drink good because desired by the intemperate? Is undeserved obloquy good because desired by envy or malice? Can we say that some eagerly desired indulgence or extravagance is good, when it brings what is commonly called ruin in its train? It is surely taking a very atomistic and irrational view of good to say that it is. Was

* *Cf. post.* II. *c.*

† *Cf.* Mackenzie, "Manual," p. 107, etc.

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not Benjamin Franklin right when he said that a man may pay too dear for his whistle?

Again, must not *value* of any object for a conscious being, be some effect of that object in consciousness? But it is said that pleasure is a sense of value accompanying certain objects —that it is the *objects* (*e. g.*, fame, music, money, etc.)* not the pleasurable feelings which have value.

To conscious and sensitive creatures, however, it must of course be *as felt or known* that objects (such as fame, etc.) are valuable. In what does this *value to consciousness* consist, feelings of pleasure being excluded? It would appear that it is thought to consist in realization of self—self being realized in the attainment of any object (whatever it may be) that has been desired. We "look for our good in the satisfaction of our rational wants. If we cannot find it there, our plight will indeed be a desperate one."† "It is clear that the end we are to aim at must be some end which will give us satisfaction. When asked why we pursue any end, the only reasonable answer that can be given is that it satisfies some demand of our nature; [What is it, except the fact of giving *satisfaction*, that makes it a reasonable end?] and the only finally satisfactory answer that can be given, is that it satisfies the most fundamental [= ?] demand of our nature."‡ That most fundamental demand appears to be reason—the demand for self-realization, *i.e.*, the realization of the true§ or rational self.‖

(*d*) Once more, pleasure, it is said, is an irrational end, because it would be necessary for a Hedonist to evaluate

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* *Cf.* Mackenzie, "Manual," pp. 96, 97.

† Mackenzie, "Social Philosophy," p. 229.

‡ Mackenzie, "Manual," p. 101.

§ Mackenzie, "Manual," pp. 116, 135, 136, 137; *Cf.* p. 153. *Cf.* also Muirhead, "Elements," Book IV., chapter ii., etc.

‖ Since this seems the last word of Ethical "Idealism," it appears to me to resign the torch at the precise point where modern Utilitarianism takes it up. (In suggesting this, I am not unmindful of what Mr. Mackenzie says, in chapter ix. of his "Manual," about the Social Self and Self-sacrifice; but as I infer that the self-sacrifice by which the Social or True Self is to be developed must itself be rational, I think the discussion in this chapter does not transcend the conclusion reached in the chapter (vii.) on Perfection.)

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pleasures of the merely sensitive nature, and compare mere sensitive values with rational values; for "what is pleasant to sense need not be pleasant to thought:" "what pleasure means for us *on reflection*, is not the same thing as what it means for us *prior to reflection*:" of two *senses of value*, "one may be a sense of value for us as sensitive beings, the other may be a sense of value for us as rational beings." * This kind of objection seems to endow "sense" with powers which it can have only in combination with reason. How could we, as merely sensitive beings, have any *sense of value?* In order that anything may be known as "pleasant to sense," must not *sense* be reinforced by *intellect?* In order to adopt and defend his position, must not a hedonist both possess reason and suppose himself to possess it? It is *because* man is rational, that he is able to compare pleasures and pains and form the conception of happiness on the whole, and that he recognizes the need of taking into account his capacity of feeling pleasure and pain, and of endeavoring to at least ward off pain. But of the worth of pleasure and the unworth of pain, I shall have something to say later on.

And if pleasure is the *sense of value* (*i.e.*, I suppose, a recognition that the object valued is good), the theory that *good is an object of desire* seems to be discredited; for very keen pleasure may often occur to us without being anticipated or desired, as in unexpectedly seeing a fine view, or learning of some beautiful life or act of splendid heroism, or chancing upon a delightful book, or receiving a quite unforeseen kindness. Further, the pleasure of satisfied desire is by no means necessarily in proportion to the intensity of the desire. And a desired object when attained may be disappointing,—may be even repulsive and disgusting,—as *e.g.*, life on board ship to a boy who has run away to sea, or the first taste of uncooked oysters, or the first pipe, to one who has wished for these delicacies because he has heard others praise them. To say that there can be no pleasure without objects, is doubtless true; but this is disputed by no one, and simply amounts to saying

* Mackenzie, "Social Philosophy," p. 224, etc.

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that pleasure which is an effect, has causes like all other effects.

(*e*) It is said that pleasure is an undesired end. For a brief consideration of objection, *cf. post.* IV. (*b*).

(*f*) An objection is found in what has been called the paradox of hedonism, that in order to get pleasure we must forget it. This seems no more than to say that in order to get a result which (like all else) is due to causes, we must sometimes fix our attention upon the *causes* rather than upon the result itself.

III.—OBJECTIONS TO EMPIRICAL QUANTITATIVE HEDONISM.

The question (1) of fact and (2) of ethics is (1) *Is any* object regarded, or *can* or (2) *ought* it to be regarded, as good or valuable (however much desired), if it causes no happiness whatever,—no pleasure and no freedom from pain,—to any sentient creature? And the case could be put more strongly still by supposing an object which, so far from causing pleasure, causes pain—pain severe, prolonged, extensive, and unrecompensed. It is not, I think, a sufficient answer to this to urge * (*a*) that pleasures differ qualitatively, and are therefore incommensurable. This objection I have already spoken of (*cf. ante* II. *b*), and pointed out that pleasures and pains *quâ* pleasures and pains, have a common quality, as much as *virtues*, or *motives*, or *desires*, or *goods*, or *activities*, or *characters*, or any other class of states or things comprehended under a common name. And they appear to be quite as capable of commensuration as *values*. Indeed, when pleasures are said to differ qualitatively, it seems that by "pleasures" is generally meant *pleasant feelings, their sources or accompaniments.* If thus understood, there can be no doubt that "pleasures" differ qualitatively; but (i) no ethical hedonist would deny that the (objective) sources and accompaniments of pleasant feeling may differ indefinitely; (ii) it is not "pleasures" in this sense that are taken as the end by thinkers who recognize that any good for man must be a good *of consciousness*, and hold that

* *Cf.* "Social Philosophy," p. 222, etc.; "Order and Progress," pp. 196, 202, etc.

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the ultimately desirable consciousness is pleasant feeling and the absence of painful feeling; (iii) it is not generally held that because "things" or "objects" differ qualitatively, therefore we cannot so far compare them as to say that one is better than another.

Further, when it is said that pleasures differ *qualitatively*, —*i.e.*, differ as being better or worse, higher or lower,—and, *therefore*, are not commensurable, *therefore* cannot be compared *quantitatively*, it seems to me that to this objection the retort may be made, *Qui minium probat, nihil probat;* for surely, in order that they may be estimated as better or worse, higher or lower, they must be not only *commensurable*, but actually *compared;* and to be *better* is only to have *more* of a certain quality apprehended by the moral reason, to be higher or lower is to have more or less of moral excellence. Not that I admit one pleasure, *quâ pleasure*, to be better than another. I only wish to point out that the judgment that this is so, involves a *kind* of quantitative comparison of pleasures and pains; a comparison which would, I think, be indefinitely more difficult to carry out than the purely quantitative comparison required by Hedonism.

That men *do* constantly compare pleasures and pains, and decide that some are greater and others less, there seems absolutely no room to doubt; and that they are influenced by the prospect of pleasures and pains there seems, again, no doubt. If this is not so, how can we explain, *e.g.*, the whole penal code, or the whole industrial organization of society, or the whole theory of purgatory? And, though it is admitted by Hedonists themselves that the hedonic calculus is difficult and subject to inaccuracy, for all that, we are perforce continually making the calculation and trying to guide ourselves by it; our calculations may be no more than probable, but is not any calculus whatever of *better* and *worse*, subject to as great imperfection? We may not indeed be able to say that one pleasure or pain is twice or half as great as another, or that any given pleasure exactly outweighs any given pain,*

* *Cf.* Ryland, "Ethics," ch. iv.

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any more than we can say that one life or one action is twice as good as another. But we may judge that an hour of one pleasure is as great as a day of another, or that some sharp pain or wearisome toil is cheaply purchased by a desired reward. When the terrible choice between three months' flight before his enemies, three days' pestilence, or seven years' famine was put before David, it must have been by a calculation of the greater or less intensity of suffering, multiplied by the less or greater duration, that he reached a decision. He did not complain that the calculation was impossible, but only that each alternative was frightful.

(*b*) The objection urged by Mr. Mackenzie ("Social Philosophy," p. 204, etc.), that even if the end is happiness or pleasure, it does not follow that the attainment of the greatest pleasure possible is the nearest approximation to the end, has already been met in as far as it depends on the assumptions (1) that happiness is measured by satisfaction of wants and desires, (2) that pleasures and pains differ qualitatively in such a way as to prevent their being dealt with quantitatively. Another form of the objection to taking *amount* of pleasure as the end, is stated as follows:

"If pleasure is the one thing that is desirable, it is clear that a sum of pleasures cannot be desirable; for a sum of pleasures is not pleasure [but it is pleasures] . . . pleasures, like men, cannot be added to one another [men can surely be added, though certainly a *sum of men* is not humanity] . . . If the hedonistic view were to be adopted, we ought always to desire the greatest pleasure,—*i.e.*, we ought to aim at producing the most intense feeling of pleasure that it is possible to reach in some one's consciousness. . . . A sum of smaller pleasures in a number of different people's consciousnesses, could not be preferable to this." *

This form of the objection to the idea of a "sum of pleasures" appears to me to be founded on the absence of a clear distinction between the *individual* and *universal* point of view. Of course, for *one individual* there is no way of increasing *his* amount of pleasant feeling except by adding to the quantity in his *own* consciousness; but taking a general point of view, the quantity of happiness possessed by any number of per-

* Mackenzie, "Manual," p. 113; *cf.* Dewey, "Outlines," section xix.

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sons, is increased by any addition, however small, in the consciousness of any one of them. Unless one is prepared to say that it does not matter whether one man suffers or a thousand, that it does not matter whether I have five minutes of agony or five hours, that it is all the same, or indifferent, whether those for whom I care have but few or many days of happiness: unless one is prepared to say all this, I do not see how it can be affirmed that "pleasures cannot be added."*

I must subjoin one word with reference to the implication conveyed by the use of the word *intense* in the quotation given above. It seems to indicate that *one individual's* quantity of pleasant feeling can be increased only *intensively* and not *extensively*. To assert this with reference to a creature whose life has to consist in a succession of moments, pleasant or painful, seems very curious. The hedonist, like other men, has memory and expectation, has a before and after with which the present is indissolubly linked, and upon which its character largely depends. It might even be suggested that neither past nor future would have much interest for anybody if devoid of "hedonistic" content. And surely every reasonable man, whether an ethical hedonist or not, would hold that from the individual point of view, if one has to live for say fifty years, those fifty years will be *in themselves* more choiceworthy in proportion as they contain more happy and fewer painful hours. Professor Green himself allows that a series (or sum) of pleasures may be at any rate *desired, his* objection (*c*) to a "sum," and his reason for calling the phrase *sum of pleasures* "unmeaning," being that a sum cannot be enjoyed all at once. As, however, we live and act, enjoy and suffer, in a succession of moments, this kind of objection would seem to apply to life itself; and one is at a loss to imagine how there could be *any* chief good that would not be subject to a similar disability. "We habitually think," says Mr. Mackenzie ("Manual," p. 113), "of the desirable

* Indeed, in saying "A sum of pleasures . . . could not be preferable to this," Mr. Mackenzie seems to admit the possibility of addition. The possibility seems also to be admitted by Mr. Bradley, "Appearance and Reality," pp. 157, 158.

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thing for man not as a feeling of pleasure, but as a continuous state of happiness." It seems to me that we cannot conceive of "a continuous state of happiness" except as a succession of predominantly happy or pleasant states of consciousness, which necessarily occupy successive moments. Life is, indeed, "not *merely* a series of moments," but still it *is* such a series; and if every moment is miserable, what can make a *whole* life worth having? Life is but a permanence amid change, and no moment is either isolated or indivisible; time is as continuous as the universe, as coherent as space.

There are a couple of objections which, though not intrinsically different from some already considered, are so often brought against Hedonism, that I should like to say a word with reference to that form of them which seems most familiar.

(*d*) It is said (1) that some pleasures are *low*, and that it is base to prefer a larger quantity of *lower* pleasure to a smaller quantity of higher.*—Let us first recall that pain as well as pleasure has to be taken into the account, and then let us ask, What is it that distinguishes the so-called *lower* pleasure or happiness from the higher? Is it not that if we take a man's life as a whole, and his relations to others (and Universalistic Hedonism is very careful to do this), we find that *e.g.* the pleasure which a glutton or wine-bibber derives from the objects of his desire are brief and intermittent, that they endanger his health and bring the pains of disease, that they minimize or destroy his participation in the pleasures of intellect, art, reputation, friendship, benevolence, and all excellent activity; they probably shorten his life and so remove all further possibility of terrestrial happiness or usefulness, they are likely to be financially injurious, and so bring the pains of money difficulties or absolute want, and they are likely to be a source (direct and indirect) of enormous suffering to his family and friends.† They are thus truly to be avoided; but

* *Cf.* on this point, Alexander, "Moral Order and Progress," pp. 206, 207, etc.

† The preference of pleasures of intellect, art, benevolence, etc., to pleasures of eating, drinking, revenge, etc., are to be explained and justified on similar grounds.

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not because any item of Happiness is *in itself* and *quâ happiness, bad*, but because for them an outrageous price in pains and loss of pleasure to self or others has to be paid. And these are considerations which it especially behooves Hedonism to insist upon. Any given portion of pleasant consciousness is related not only to its causes and accompaniments, but also to its results; the contention of Hedonism is, not that the *mere* feeling of *isolated moments* (what *is* "mere feeling" or "an isolated moment"?) is the end; but that for sensitive (and rational) beings, the element of *intrinsic* worth in the whole complex of life is happiness of self and others. All this has been so fully and convincingly set forth by the Utilitarian moralist that it is a little surprising to find it still sometimes not understood. If a whole universe of rational and sensitive beings were endowed with every imaginable good thing *except* happiness and the absence of pain, what would it all be worth? Are there any conditions whatever that could make general and unalleviated torture desirable?

IV.—OBJECTIONS TO UNIVERSALISTIC HEDONISM.

(*a*) The other of the two objections above referred to is (2) that different people take pleasure in such different things that it is impossible to know how to promote happiness.* (This is, of course, a crude popular form of objection against the possibility of an altruistic calculus.) In answer to this, it can only be said that on the whole, we *do* know a good deal about the causes of happiness, as *e.g.*, we know a good deal about the nutritive, etc., properties of food, although we admit that "one man's meat is another man's poison," that infants require different food from adults, and invalids need other fare than those in robust health. *E.g.*, the laws of any civilized country, and the rules of positive morality embody a great deal of knowledge on this subject. And, moreover, these laws and rules have a powerful effect in making *individual* and *general* happiness coincident. That *for the most part* this coincidence holds in tolerably well-ordered communities seems evident. It is not

* Compare *e.g.* Ryland, "Ethics," pp. 73, 74, 90, etc.

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to be denied, however, that both for practical morality and for Utilitarian theory, the possible and occasionally actual, conflict between self and others is the great difficulty. But if we may believe in the "moral government of the world," the theoretical difficulty is overcome; and prominent opponents of Utilitarianism declare that the necessary postulate of Ethical Theory and Moral Conduct is the presupposition that "the agent who duly satisfies the community in which he shares by that same conduct satisfies himself," or that self-realization is only accomplished by self-sacrifice.* On any theory the practical difficulty can only be minimized by the growth of individuals in wisdom and benevolence; and on the Utilitarian view, every increase of *Virtue* in the agent means an increase of *Happiness* in others (at least), so that there cannot be an increase of virtue in a community without (*ceteris paribus*) a corresponding increase of happiness.

Except II. (*f*) and IV. (*a*), the objections above considered relate to Hedonism whether Egoistic or Universalistic. With the special objections to egoistic hedonism taken alone, I am not here concerned.

As regards Universalistic Hedonism, it has to encounter somewhat greater difficulties of hedonistic calculation than the egoistic form of the doctrine; but as such difficulties have already to some extent been considered, and are recognized and up to a certain point admitted by Universalistic hedonists, it is perhaps not necessary to say more about them now. They are moreover of a kind not peculiar to hedonism; and would to some extent certainly apply to a calculus of activity or motive or equilibrium, or virtue however conceived.

(*b*) More important is the objection that "the pleasure of others cannot be the good for us if the good is pleasure."† If, however, the good is pleasure *quâ* pleasure, all pleasure is

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* *Cf.* Dewey, "Outlines," p. 131, etc.; Mackenzie, "Manual," pp. 155, 156.

† "Social Philosophy," p. 209, p. 212, note 1. Ryland's "Ethics," pp. 84, 85, 86. A precisely analogous objection would seem to apply to *any* Good which is a *Good of consciousness*, since each man's consciousness is individual to himself.

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good—therefore the pleasure of others from an universal point of view, as well as the pleasure of myself from an individual point of view—and though certainly an individual, I am not a mere individual. It is true that if I cannot desire anything but my own pleasure, then I cannot desire the pleasure of others; but if psychological hedonism is denied (as it is denied by the latest and best exponents of Utilitarianism), then the pleasure of others may be an object of desire to me.* And hence as an *ethical* end, it is *psychologically* possible. The hedonist does not put *feeling* into the place of *reason*—but he asks: Granted that there is something which it is right and rational to seek, *what is it?* and failing all other answers, he finds the reply: That which is ultimately and intrinsically good is happiness.† If it is said that Happiness or (II. *e*) pleasure is an *undesired* end,‡ we may appeal to the evidence of common phrases, of professed moralists (even the most typical Intuitionists), of poets and preachers, as proof that happiness or pleasure is esteemed as something in itself worth having, and pain as something intrinsically to be avoided. We may also appeal to the proof furnished by ordinary conduct, and to our own consciousness. It seems to be a most undoubted fact that some people *do* desire both their own happiness and also other people's. And pain, at least, is what all without exception avoid and dread. (The special importance of considerations of pain with reference to questions of distribution, is too much lost sight of by objectors.)

(*c*) A kind of converse of the objection that "the pleasure of others cannot be the good for us if the good is pleasure," is the view (put forward, as I understand, by *e.g.* Professor von Gizycki) that although the pleasure of others is Good to me, my own pleasure is not Good to me. This is, perhaps, the most curious of all hedonistic views; for surely it is only if my own consciousness tells me that my happiness is *for me*

* It cannot, I think, be denied that *some* people certainly *do* desire the happiness of some others. Admitting this fact, those who say that good is the object of desire, must admit that *others'* happiness may be a "Good" to me.

† *Cf.* "Methods of Ethics," Book II., chapters iv., vi., Book III., chapter xiv.

‡ *Cf.* Mackenzie "Manual," p. 95, *seq.*, Ryland, "Ethics," p. 30, etc.

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as an individual intrinsically worth having, only on this condition is there ground for holding that the happiness *of others* is that which, for *their* sakes, it is worth while for me to promote. Why should I think that another's happiness is any good to *him*, unless I feel that *my* happiness is a good to me? Can I judge his consciousness except by my own?

Again, each individual when aiming at the happiness *of others*, since he does not aim at the happiness of *one man alone*, has to aim at both happiness and virtue (in as far as virtue conduces to happiness) in each. (And, of course, on the utilitarian view, conduciveness to happiness is the very content of virtue.) I think these considerations have some bearing on (*d*) Mr. Rashdall's objections to Utilitarianism, which are considered and answered by Professor Sidgwick in *Mind*, vol. xiv., p. 486. The supposed difficulty, that Utilitarianism assigns "a different end to the individual and to the race," might, it seems to me, be better expressed by saying, "a different end to the individual, *qua* individual merely, and to the individual *qua* part of the whole," for there can be no end aimed at by men, and no end worthy of human attainment, except as aimed at and attained in the consciousness of individuals. The conflict (if conflict there be) is a conflict within the consciousness of individuals (as indeed Professor Sidgwick points out). It seems to me that Mr. Rashdall's objection of "a different end" would be more appropriate to the case of self *versus* one other solitary conscious individual.

The objections which I have endeavored to meet in the foregoing pages may be summarized and grouped as follows:

I.—Objection that Ethical Hedonism depends on Psychological Hedonism.

II.—Objections to admitting Pleasure as the Ethical End.

(*a*) Because the adoption of pleasure as end is based on confusion (ambiguity of "pleasure").

(*b*) Pleasure is an *impossible* end, because it is a mere abstraction; and, also,

(*c*) because it is not intrinsically valuable, but only a *sense* of value.

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(*d*) Pleasure is an *irrational* end.

(*e*) Pleasure is an *undesired* end (*cf.* IV. (*b*)).

(*f*) To *get* pleasure we must *forget* it.

III.—Objections to Empirical Quantitative Hedonism.

Even granting that *pleasure* is the end, amount or sum of *pleasures* is not the end; because,

(*a*) pleasures are not commensurable, since they differ qualitatively.

(*b*) *pleasures* are not *pleasure*, and cannot be added;

(*c*) a sum of pleasures cannot be enjoyed all at once.

(*d*) It is base to prefer a larger quantity of some pleasures to a less quantity of others.

IV.—Objections to Universalistic Hedonism.

(*a*) Owing to individual variations, we cannot know how to promote happiness generally.

(*b*) If the good is pleasure, the pleasure *of others* cannot be a good *to me*.

(*c*) The pleasure *of others* is a good to me, but *my own* pleasure is not a good to me.

(*d*) Universalistic hedonism assigns a different end to the individual and to the race.

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DISCUSSIONS.

THE PRACTICAL VALUE OF ETHICS.

In a former number of this JOURNAL (July, 1893, p. 507), I offered a defence of my view of Ethics as essentially a practical* science, with special reference to the opposing doctrine set forth in Mr. Bradley's "Ethical Studies," which I had just discovered to have a wider prevalence than I was previously aware of.† I afterwards expanded this defence in an article on "Moral Science and the Moral Life," (January, 1894, p. 160), and I added some

* It ought to be noted, however, that the term "normative" is preferable to the term "practical." Ethics is concerned primarily with the discussion of the moral judgment, *i.e.*, with the consideration of the standard of rightness and wrongness. Now, it is conceivable in the abstract that this study might be pursued by a race of non-practical beings, for whom it would have a purely theoretical interest. For such beings the science would still be normative, being concerned with a standard of judgment; but it would not be practical. This is a point to which I have not given sufficient attention in previous explanations. Still it is a somewhat formal point. For a practical being like man, the study of the moral standard becomes at once a source of moral principles. It is well to remember, however, that a normative science need not be practical. Æsthetics may, perhaps, be taken as an instance.

† Wundt is one of the most notable upholders of this doctrine. Both in his "Ethik" and, more explicitly, in his "System der Philosophie," he insists that philosophic study is purely theoretical. In the latter work, however, he admits that, in an indirect way, philosophy becomes practical through its criticism of the particular practical science. The science of law, for instance, or the science of theology, may have a practical bearing; and the philosophy of law and the philosophy of religion are indirectly practical, in so far as they criticise the principles upon which those particular sciences rest (see *Einleitung*). But this is really all that I contend for. I do not conceive that it is the business of ethical philosophy to tell us what in particular we are to do. It does not, for instance, instruct us with reference to the pursuit of health or wealth. It leaves this to Hygienics and Economics, and even these particular sciences leave a final appeal to common sense. But Ethics may be expected to throw some light on the place occupied by the subordinate ends with which these particular sciences deal in relation to the supreme end of life. For some instructive criticisms of Wundt's views on this point, I may refer to *Mind* (Old Series), vol. xv., pp. 103–120. I believe that the doctrine of Wundt, as well as that of several other writers, results from a one-sided interpretation of the famous Hegelian dictum that "The Actual is Rational." This excellent saying ought not to be understood as meaning that everything that we happen to find existing at a particular stage in human development is a perfect embodiment of the principle of reason. Such an interpretation is little better than fatalism. If God is to "mend all," we must at least "help him to mend it."

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further remarks in a note to the second edition of my "Manual of Ethics." Since the publication of these various statements, I have been waiting with some interest to see whether any of those (apparently a somewhat numerous body) who hold different views would think it worth while to present some counter-statement. Up to the present time, however, my hopes have been disappointed. Views similar to my own have recently been propounded by Mr. Hastings Rashdall in an article on "The Limits of Casuistry"* (July, 1894, p. 459), but I have seen no statement of any other views. With regard to Mr. Bradley himself, I gather that he no longer adheres to the doctrine set forth in his "Ethical Studies," and apparently repeated in his "Principles of Logic;" or at least that he would no longer be prepared to uphold it in the same emphatic form.† Indeed, some of his recent writings in this JOURNAL would lead one to suppose that, so far from being a heretic in this matter, he now bids fair to take his place as "the first by the throne." There is no one, I think, who has more boldly applied ethical principles to the treatment of practical problems than Mr. Bradley has done in his recent article entitled "Some Remarks on Punishment" (April, 1894, p. 269). It is true that, even there, he guards himself at the end from being supposed to lay down any explicit statement as to what ought actually to be done in any particular circumstances; but with this reservation I should entirely concur, and so, if I understand him rightly, would Mr. Rashdall. I am inclined to think, therefore, that on this matter there is now no substantial difference of opinion between Mr. Bradley, Mr. Rashdall, and myself; and I am not aware of any one else who has recently attempted to give a reasoned statement of opinion on the subject, except Dr. Simmel, whose views I have already criticised.

Though, however, there has been no definite exposition of any counter opinions on this matter, my attention has been directed

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* *Cf.* also Mr. Hodder's article on "The Morality that Ought to Be," in *The Philosophical Review* for July, 1894.

† In his "Appearance and Reality" (p. 4), Mr. Bradley has justly ridiculed the idea that reflective thought is not to be pushed to its ultimate metaphysical issues. This, as he says, "appears to be a paradox, since it seems equivalent to saying, You may satisfy your instinctive longing to reflect, as long as you do it in a way which is unsatisfactory." But is there not a similar paradox in the view that reflective thought has a practical value so long as it does not rise above the level of common sense, but ceases to be practical as soon as it becomes systematic?

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to two brief criticisms of my views, which it may perhaps be worth while to notice. The first of them is one that appeared in *The Indian Messenger* for Sunday, May 13, 1894. The writer, who signs himself "H. H.," after giving several extracts from my article on "Moral Science and the Moral Life," and commenting upon them in a highly sympathetic way, concludes with the following criticism: "Thus far our agreement with Mr. Mackenzie has been complete. But we feel compelled to join issue with him when he says, 'How this "ought" is to apply itself in the particular details of life, is largely a question for individual insight guided by the long experiment of history. It is not the business of Ethics to lay down particular moral rules.' Does not Mr. Mackenzie see that such a view is perfectly incompatible with his own just contention against the divorce of Ethics and morals? If it be impossible or unnecessary to deduce particular moral rules from the true ideal of conduct, what justification is there for saying that theory and practice are not independent of each other? The neglect to lay down particular moral rules has made all modern ethical theories incomplete. Mr. Spencer has perceived the necessity of supplying this *desideratum*, and in his 'Principles of Ethics' has made a praiseworthy attempt to classify moral virtues. It is surely an anachronism to maintain at the present day that 'it is not the business of Ethics to lay down particular rules.'" This criticism seems to me to have some force, and to deserve a reply. My answer must be, however, that I certainly do not see the incompatibility between the two elements in my view. It is possible, indeed, that I have somewhat too emphatically repudiated the effort to lay down particular rules. I certainly think that Ethics can furnish us with general principles for the regulation of conduct; but I do not think that this is incompatible with the view that, in the complications of actual life, it must after all be left to the common sense of the individual to determine how the principles are to be applied. Even in Hygienics, which is perhaps the practical science that most nearly resembles Ethics, the rules of health that are laid down are subject to considerable modifications in particular circumstances; and when we are dealing, not merely with conduct directed to such a comparatively simple end as that of securing bodily health, but towards the far more complicated end of securing the highest form of human well-being, I conceive that it must be immeasurably more difficult to devise rules which shall be directly applicable in in-

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dividual cases. The power of applying principles seems to me to be an art rather than a science, and to be learned by experience rather than by the study of rules.* Even Mr. Spencer seems to admit that in dealing with the details of conduct it is not possible for Ethics to add much to the common sense of mankind. Ethics may warn common sense against false directions of activity, and set it, as it were, on the right trail, but the finding of the precise path on that trail must still be the work of common sense.†

This leads me to notice the other criticism to which I have referred above. Mr. Muirhead, in reviewing the second edition of my "Manual of Ethics" in the July number of this JOURNAL (p. 516), remarks that he would be willing to agree with the general statement of my position "if we were allowed to amend the sentence in which he says that it is the function of Ethics to enlighten us 'with respect to the principles of [by] which common sense *is to be* guided in its practical judgments,' by reading '*is* guided.'" I am sorry that I cannot accept this emendation. I believe that the common sense of mankind has often been guided by erroneous principles. I admit, indeed, with Goethe, that even in man's wildest aberrations he retains a certain consciousness of the right way. One cannot go very far astray in conduct without in some way being pulled up and made to feel the blunder, just as one cannot depart from the correct principles of health without in the end being similarly checked. But this does not make it the less true that "es irrt der Mensch so lang er strebt." Common sense can allow men to go pretty far astray, in matters both of health and morals, without definitely bringing them to a stand; and even if it were true that experience is a perfect teacher, she is at least a very hard one. It is only after repeated error that the right path is hit upon. It is the business of a practical science, like Ethics or Hygienics,‡ to endeavor to

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* When my critic refers to the classification of moral virtues, he seems to misunderstand my point. It is not the classification of virtues, but the deduction of particular duties, that I consider to be impossible. I have endeavored to distinguish carefully between virtues and duties.

† Even in such a science as Economics, it is now generally allowed that it is a mistake to seek too directly for practical applications.

‡ I do not mean, of course, to affirm any absolute parallelism between Ethics and Hygienics. I recognize several important points of distinction. The ideal of health, for instance, is much more external to our self-conscious nature than the ideal of morals. The latter is consequently much more inevitably present,

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set us on the right path without the need of this hard discipline of experience; and to set us upon it, moreover, by reason, instead of by blows and stings. This difference would be important even if experience always succeeded in setting us on the right path. But I do not think it does. The common practice of mankind, in matters both of health and of morals, is, I think, at the best only approximately right; and, in complicated matters, is often seriously wrong. It is the business of Ethics (*i.e.*, of systematic reflective thought on morals) to try to set common sense right in such matters. I admit, indeed, as Mr. Muirhead says, that Ethics is not an oracle any more than common sense. But Ethics does not set up as an oracle. No science professes to be an oracle. Reflective thought is always recognized as being critical and tentative in its methods. It is only "instincts" and "senses" that are supposed to be oracular; and with regard to the "moral sense" I entirely deny that it has any such oracular character. It is perhaps generally right, but it is sometimes wrong, and sometimes seriously wrong.* It requires to be criticised by reason.

I am glad to observe, however, that Mr. Muirhead does not really object to the application of ethical principles to practical problems. On the contrary, towards the end of his review (p. 517), he blames me for not having applied it in this way even more than I have done. He seems to think that I ought to have

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even to ordinary common sense. There are, however, several points in which Ethics and Hygienics resemble each other. One important point may be noticed. Both with health and with conduct in the larger sense, the rightness and wrongness of individual action are generally more immediately obvious to common sense than the rightness and wrongness of social action. The man who thinks too much about his own health is apt to injure it; and so it seems to be with conduct in general. But we can hardly think too much about the conditions of public health or about the conditions of social welfare. Of course, in comparing Ethics with Hygienics, it should be remembered also that, in a sense, Hygienics is a branch of Ethics. Conduct with reference to Health is a part of Conduct in general. So with Economics and other practical sciences (*Cf.* the statement by Prof. Marshall on this subject in "The Economic Journal," vol. iii., No. 11, p. 389).

* There are also, I think, several matters on which ordinary common sense, even at one definite stage in its development (in a single age and country and in a single stratum of society), is confused or uncertain in its judgment, and gives no precise guidance. This seems to be the case, for instance, with respect to the population question, to which Mr. Bradley refers in his recent article. Vivisection is in a similar position; and several other cases of uncertainty in the judgments of common sense have been brought out by Dr. Sidgwick and other writers.

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given a more explicit utterance on the subject of the relative merits of self-restraint and self-development in modern life. No doubt it might have been possible to deal at length with this subject, and to lay down principles that would lead to a solution of the problem in certain cases. But on the whole the answer would depend so much on individual circumstances (on questions of individual capacities and acquired habits and position in life, on questions of age, sex, and so forth), that I do not think it could be very profitably dealt with in an elementary book on Ethics.

I have ventured to make these remarks with the view of further clearing up the view of Ethics which I have been led to take, and in the hope that some one who holds a different view may be induced to give an explanation of it. I feel that I have now sufficiently uttered myself. It is some one else's turn; and unless some one else states his views at some length in opposition to mine, I do not think I am likely to be tempted to make any further explanations. Personally, I hardly understand how any other view is even possible,—at least the only other view that strikes me as consistently tenable is one such as that set forth by Dr. Simmel.*

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"ITALY AND THE PAPACY."

THE three striking articles on this subject, by three representative Italian writers, which have appeared in the January, April, and July numbers of the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, carry the well-informed reader back to the ante-Vatican period of Italian unification;—or rather, they bring forward again, in their essentials, the very arguments and pleas which were then urged for and against the claims of the Papacy to the Temporal Sovereignty of Rome, and for and against the claim and finally the act of Italy in taking possession of her capital.

* I think the differences of opinion on this subject are largely due to the fact that Ethics may be approached from various sides. Perhaps it would be convenient to divide Ethics into three parts: (1) the psychological and anthropological part, dealing with the development of conduct and ideals of conduct in the individual and in the race; (2) the normative part, discussing the ultimate nature of the ideal involved in the moral judgment; (3) the practical part, considering the application of the moral ideal to the criticism of the moral life and of the ordinary judgments of common sense. Different writers on Ethics have naturally laid the emphasis on one or other of these parts or on some particular subdivision of them. Perhaps I, being chiefly interested in the metaphysical side, have tended to give an undue prominence to the second part.

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On the ground of some personal knowledge of the Italy and of the Italians of those stirring times, may I not offer a few brief addenda to these articles.

1. Archbishop Satolli has been misinformed. He is certainly greatly mistaken in charging that this claim and the act of Italy was, in any degree, prompted by religious hostility to the Catholic Church, or even to the Papacy. Romanism may indeed have largely reduced Italian Christianity to a merely external conformity to an ecclesiastical system, and so have unfitted it to bear the adverse strain of any passion which took genuine hold upon the heart; but, before this national movement, the Italians had not been alienated from the Church of Rome as they since have been. Italy was Catholic—Italy was Papal—before the breach was opened between her patriotism and her religious loyalty. Whatever may be true of the more radical leaders of a later day, the great constructive statesmen of the Right or Moderati, who made Italy a nation, —Cavour, Ricasoli, Minghetti, Menabrea, Visconti-Venosta,— ever labored earnestly to achieve Italian nationality without a breach with Catholicism or with the Church. They strove to treat the question of Rome as a secular and a purely Italian issue, without prejudice to the spiritual interests or wider influence of the Papacy. Whether they were defeated in this endeavor by the Papacy itself, or by the inherent impossibility of constituting the Italian Kingdom save on the ruins of those conceptions of the Church which alone were then recognized by Rome as Catholic, it was they who, in *this* respect, were defeated.

2. These men acted, moreover, not in the interests of the State alone, but, as loyal Catholics, in what they as sincerely believed to be the true interests of the Church. They *knew* that Rome was the one necessary capital for Italy. They also *believed* the Temporal Power to be the bane of Italian Catholicism. Mgr. Satolli, writing of an *ideal*, says that "in the union of the temporal and the spiritual sovereignty, the spiritual would always control." When the data are at hand, modern publicists are more accustomed to reach their conclusions by *a posteriori* reasoning. These statesmen, therefore, familiar with the facts, held with Dante, that—

> "The Church of Rome,
> Confounding in herself two governments,
> Has fallen in the mire and sore defiled
> Alike herself and burden."

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What Italian Catholicism had thus become, in the judgment of such men, let two of them say.

The distinguished philosopher Terenzio Mamiani—in 1848 President of the Pope's lay cabinet—(whom Mgr. Satolli himself cites, p. 378) wrote, in October, 1870, "Romanism has at last produced in Italy three deplorable results,—superstition in the lowest populace, indifference in the other classes, infidelity in the greater part of thinkers and writers. At all events, the first thing to remove, to make a Catholic reform possible, was to break down the *temporal power;* and Providence has made us the happy witnesses of this great event."

The Baron Ricasoli, in June, 1871: "I fear that there is no faith left among us; that religion in Italy is a corpse, a dead body from which the life has departed;" adding, however, "Do not think I despair of my country. Under the influence of better teaching and holier examples, a living faith will revive again in time."

There was a considerable body of ecclesiastics also, learned and godly priests not a few of them, who felt much as these Christian laymen spoke; and who, from 1864 to 1871, found in the *Esaminatore*, denounced by authority though it was, an organ for the expression and interchange of such convictions. These men might have welcomed Mgr. Satolli's presentation of Catholicism to that periodical; but they would certainly have deemed Professor Mariano's account of the *de facto* Catholicism of Italy, at that time certainly the truer one. If it be true, as it has been said, that three-fifths of the members of the present Italian parliament are Freemasons,—*i.e.* (in Italy), avowed *atheists*,—it is to be feared that it is even yet the more faithful statement of the fact.

3. None the less, neither would the *Esaminatore*, nor would its ecclesiastical *collaboratori*, nor would these statesmen, have accepted the alternative to which Professor Mariano assumes that Italy must needs turn. Baron Ricasoli wrote, in April, 1868, to the director of that journal, "To develop the religious sentiment, in a truly Catholic sense, is a common duty . . . Italy can never be Protestant. Wishing to make her such, we should end in making her *atheistic;* we should certainly end in increasing that carelessness and indifference in religious matters which is the worst of evils, because it is the real source of immorality, enervating the soul and unfitting it for every noble and vigorous work. If we wish to re-arouse an honest and productive religious sentiment, we must remain Catholic."

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Few readers of Professor Barzellotti's article will fail to note how largely his views of the essential situation accord with those which found such expression more than twenty years ago.

It was not, then, to foreign religions or religionists, nor was it to German philosophy; it was to such Italian Catholics as the Cardinal Archbishop of Perugia,—for there were some such,—that their thoughts then turned, however dreamily and hopelessly; and could any one of these men ever, in his most sanguine mood, have anticipated that this same Cardinal Pecci would be the next Pope, he would have welcomed the mere possibility with a glad *Nunc Dimittis*.

4. Saving the truth of all this, nay, perhaps, because it is all true, it is also true that the pontificate of Leo XIII. is separated by such a moral distance from that of Pius IX. and Antonelli, that one who knew Italy only at that time does not know what to say of the Church of Italy to-day, nor how far such language as that of Mgr. Satolli is now warranted. Very slightly, it is to be feared, even yet. The recovery of a people from spiritual exhaustion and general religious atrophy cannot but be very slow and painfully gradual. But one thing is sure, and it can but occur to many of those who read his plea for the restoration of the Temporal Power,—that if such conceptions of the Catholic Church are now warranted, and if he can freely publish them to the world over the signature of an "Apostolic Delegate" of the Pope, it is a new thing in Roman Catholic story. The noblest pontificate of modern times—that which has been most worthy of its own solemn claim to the Vicariate of Christ; that which has thrown a cantilever bridging farthest out over the chasm which, for more than three centuries, has yawned in Western Christendom; that which is now exerting a Christian influence more effective for Christ's righteousness than could be exerted by any formal ecclesiastical supremacy, the exercise of which may have been restrained by the fall of the Temporal Power—is precisely the first pontificate which has not been embarrassed by the possession of that power. The words and deeds of Leo XIII. and of Mgr. Satolli himself are anything but illustrative of that spiritual bondage to which it is claimed that the Church of their love and loyalty has been subjected by the loss of temporal sovereignty.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

SOCIAL EVOLUTION. By Benjamin Kidd. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1894. Pp. 348.

This book has already attracted a good deal of attention in the newspapers and reviews of Great Britain, and has been widely read and discussed in America also. The favorable opinion which has been very generally passed upon it I find myself unable to share (I am obliged to speak in the first person singular), and I am, therefore, in honesty compelled to make my notice of it polemical in character. I must first, however, attempt to state very briefly what appear to me to be Mr. Kidd's main theses. (1) In the region of biology he accepts the theory of Weismann, according to which natural selection is the sole factor in evolution, use-inheritance being excluded (*Cf.* p. 34). (2) Human history can only be understood properly and can only become a science if the biologist carries his methods into it (p. 28). (3) Throughout the whole volume Mr. Kidd identifies "progress" with "evolution" (*Cf. e.g.* p. 34). (4) There is "no rational sanction for human progress" (ch. iii.). By this Mr. Kidd means that the individual has no personal interest in the progress of society; he assumes that "reason" is entirely selfish in its dictates. (5) Since religion has everywhere existed, it must serve the interests of evolution: the function of religion is to lead the individual by *supra-* or *ultra-*rational sanctions to act in the interests of social progress. (6) Modern democratic movements are due primarily to the influence of altruistic sentiment which is due entirely to religion. Social evolution does not diminish competition, but brings all mankind into the rivalry of life on conditions of equal social opportunities (pp. 227, etc.). But (7) the "Anglo-Saxon," having the greatest social efficiency, does and always will dominate the world (see ch. x.).

These propositions seem to me a fair summary of Mr. Kidd's main argument. Those who accept them all will doubtless admire his work. Those who cannot may at least find the consideration of them profitable and suggestive—of various things. To me every one of these theses, in the form in which it is maintained by Mr. Kidd, seems either false or misleading. I shall try to give my reasons as briefly as possible.

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(1) I agree with Mr. Kidd in regarding the Lamarckian and Spencerian theory of use-inheritance as at least "not proven;" but in considering biological theories in their applicability to human society, it is a very grave omission to say nothing about *artificial* selection, which has indisputably played a great part in the development of all domesticated plants and animals, not excluding the domesticated human being. Mr. Kidd omits all reference to sexual selection as a factor in evolution. In considering the problems of human society, he entirely ignores the fact that, while natural selection has been interfered with and the survival of the unfit promoted, owing to artificial selection due to customs, prejudices, religious beliefs, philanthropic sentiment, etc., the ill effects of this partial cessation of natural selection may conceivably be counteracted by rational artificial selection (see *e.g.* pp. 192, 210).

(2) Human history cannot be understood properly, if the biologist transfers his methods and conceptions uncritically into a much more complex sphere. What should we think of a mathematician or a physicist or even a chemist who regarded his methods as all-sufficient in biology? Mr. Kidd, indeed, recognizes the struggle between societies as a factor differentiating social evolution from the evolution with which the biologist as such is concerned; but he does not recognize that the struggle between societies necessarily brings about a greater internal cohesion within the more successful society and therefore a diminution in the competition between individuals. The social and sympathetic instincts of man within the society to which he belongs (family, class, or nation) are a factor to be taken account of and must continue to be "selected," apart from (or in spite of) the influence of particular religions. Even what is called the struggle for existence between human "individuals" is mainly, in all societies that have yet existed, a struggle between families, and not between mere individuals. This the "individualist"—so called—is constantly forgetting.

Mr. Kidd talks of raising history to "the dignity of a science;" he complains that "historical science is still a department of knowledge almost without generalizations of the nature of laws" (p. 27). We need not dispute about the dignity; but the genuine historical student would probably feel that his main concern was with the explanation of particular events, particular institutions, particular persons even, which have an interest and a value for him and for mankind that does not belong to the mere specimens of

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genera and species that concern the biologist. Science is occupied with generals or universals, because to understand the individual fully is hopeless and the particulars in mere (sub-human) nature are not of sufficient interest; but scientific history can and must deal with concrete particulars. Mr. Kidd's own excursions into the region of history are not encouraging examples of the value of biological methods, though it would be unfair to judge the value of biological methods by Mr. Kidd's generalizations. His authorities for Greek and Roman history appear to be principally certain rhetorical phrases culled from the pages of Mr. Lecky and Mr. Froude (see ch. vi.). In speaking of the rise of Christianity, Mr. Kidd blindly follows the usual picturesque exaggerations about the intellectual brilliance and moral corruption of the Pagan world over which Christianity gradually triumphed. Every serious student of history knows that there was both an intellectual degeneration and a religious revival going on independently of Christianity and preparing the way for it; while as to morals, it has again and again been pointed out that nearly every age, if judged by the language of satirists and preachers and by the *chronique scandaleuse* of courts and capitals, could be proved to be the most corrupt that ever existed. "The intellectual forces of the time were directly in opposition to Christianity" (p. 124). This is simply not true. Has Mr. Kidd never heard of Alexandrian philosophy or of Stoicism? If he has not thought of Eusebius's "Preparation for the Gospel," he may have come across Archdeacon Farrar's "Seekers after God." The triumph of Christianity over the old civilization is narrated without any mention of the barbarian invasions! (p. 127.) In the Middle Ages we are told by Mr. Kidd "*all* the attainments of Greek and Roman genius are buried out of sight." How, then, did Alfred come to translate Boethius? Why did Virgil lead Dante through the nether world? What of the great fabric of Roman Law? What of the Platonism of Erigena, the Aristotelianism of the Schoolmen? Mr. Kidd delights in unqualified universal propositions. In speaking of the old Greek and Roman society, he says: "Infanticide is universal." If so, how could there be a second generation to practise it? The proposition reminds me of the Irishman's biological generalization—that sterility is hereditary. Speaking of the twelfth century, Mr. Kidd says "there was simply no organic continuity between the old life and that which has replaced it." This is biologically scientific history! And yet Mr. Kidd has evidently heard of and approved

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the late Mr. Freeman's thesis about the unity of history. In still more startling violation of the historical spirit, we are told that the past, even the recent past, "may be searched in vain for any clue to the solution of the problems that confront us in the future" (p. 6); and yet (on p. 120) we have Mr. Kidd blaming the French people for having cut themselves off from the past. On p. 140 we are told that "slavery, for the first time in history, became extinct in Europe, somewhere about the fourteenth century." I suppose Mr. Kidd takes no account of serfdom in Russia, Prussia, etc. But if "the development has never been interrupted," how are we to account for the rise and prodigious growth of slavery again in America under Christian powers—yes, and, as even Mr. Kidd has to admit, under his altruistic, humanitarian "Anglo-Saxons"? (p. 168). British encouragement of the slave-trade is never mentioned. The British nation is supposed to have been "persistently" (although quite thanklessly and unobtrusively) making efforts towards the suppression of the slave-trade (p. 159). Nothing is said about the very recent date at which the movement began. On p. 23 occurs this sentence: "That illustrious school of political philosophy which arose in England with Hobbes and Locke, and which earlier in this century. [*sic*] had attained to such wide influence in the writings of Hume, Adam Smith, Bentham, Ricardo, and Mill, has towards our own time become unduly narrowed and egotistical largely through its own success." Now, apart from the awkward and ambiguous phrasing and the curious chronology suggested by it, what does this sentence mean to any one who knows anything of these writers? In whom has "the school" become more narrow and egotistical (I suppose he means "egoistical") since Hobbes? and since Ricardo? On p. 109 we read "As the family expanded in favorable circumstances into a related group (the Latin *gens*), and the *gens* in turn into clans (*phratriari*) [*sic*], and these again into tribes (*phylai*), etc." Why this odd mixture of Latin and Greek, or what is meant to be Greek?

(3) Every careful biologist (the qualification is unfortunately necessary) recognizes that evolution is not identical with what we mean by progress. Even in the biological sphere, success in the struggle may be attained by degeneration as well as by advance. And as to social evolution, has not Professor Huxley very well said that the being who survives a free fight proves his ability to survive a free fight, but no other kind of ability? The rise of ethical ideals may be explained *historically* in terms of natural selection;

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but when these ideals have once arisen, they make social progress become something different from mere organic evolution, though, of course, such progress must, for a metaphysical theory, fall within evolution as a conception applicable to the universe as a whole.

(4) For Mr. Kidd's assumption that reason is always entirely selfish in its dictates, I find no other evidence given than a twice-quoted grumble of Mrs. Mona Caird's about "the absurd sacrifice to their children of generation after generation of grown people" (pp. 210, 294). It is true that the old-fashioned Utilitarians were apt to argue as if ethical and political problems must be settled simply by referring to the pleasures and pains of the individuals now existing—a form of Utilitarianism expressly discarded by Professor H. Sidgwick ("Elements of Politics," pp. 34, 35) and quite inconsistent with any form of evolutionary ethics, whether idealistic or not. "The central fact," says Mr. Kidd, "with which we are confronted in our progressive societies, is that the interests of the social organism and those of the individuals comprising [*sic*] it at any time are actually antagonistic; they can never be reconciled; they are inherently and essentially irreconcilable." What sense is there in talking about a social *organism* at all, if this dogmatic assertion of absolute antithesis between the part and the whole be seriously meant? What does Mr. Kidd mean by "personal" when he talks of the individual having no personal interest in the progress of the "organism" to which he belongs? (p. 64). What is the content of any one's personal interests if *all* reference to the well-being of *all* other persons be rigidly excluded? Is Mr. Kidd's rationalistic individual going to live a hermit's life? On p. 103 Mr. Kidd speaks of "that large class of conduct in the individual where his interests and the interests of the social organism are antagonistic," implying that there *may* be *some* interests of the individual and of the organism which are not antagonistic. This is a more intelligible view; but it contradicts what is said elsewhere (*e.g.* on pp. 64 and 78).

(5) The counterpart of Mr. Kidd's abstract conception of the individual's reason, as necessarily and absolutely selfish, is to be found in his conception of religion as necessarily anti-rational and necessarily altruistic and subservient to social progress. It might well be asked how, if the mere fact that religion has everywhere existed proves that it is socially useful, the fact that reason has existed at least as universally is consistent with its being everywhere anti-social? But apart from this difficulty in Mr. Kidd's arbitrary

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application of the idea of natural selection, of how many actual religions is his theory true? Even within Christianity, how does it apply to the individualistic soul-saving, which till quite recently has been a very general characteristic of those who have most loudly proclaimed themselves Christians? On pp. 89 and 90 Mr. Kidd gives a collection of fifteen definitions of religion,—to illustrate the conflicting conceptions prevalent on the nature of religion. But this list, which is curious both in its inclusions and in its omissions (*e. g.* Schleiermacher's historically famous definition of religion as "the feeling of dependence" is conspicuously absent), contains definitions of *professedly* different subjects: *e. g.* a sarcasm of Ruskin's about "our national religion" ("the performance of church ceremonies and preaching of soporific truths, or untruths, to keep the mob quietly at work while we amuse ourselves") is put alongside of Comte's definition of his own "Positive Religion" ("the worship of Humanity"), and both these alongside of attempts to define religion so as to include all religions (*e. g.* the quotation from Gruppe), a psychological analysis of the religious sentiment (taken from Bain), and philosophical statements of the idea of religion according to various theories. On the other hand, several of the definitions quoted do not conflict with one another at all: *e. g.* Seneca's phrase, "To know God and imitate Him," includes both those philosophical definitions (*e. g.* of Hegel and Professor E. Caird) which lay stress on the element of knowledge and those (*e. g.* of Kant, Matthew Arnold, and Huxley) which lay the stress on conduct. Thus the conflict and confusion are largely of Mr. Kidd's own creation. His own definition is to be found on p. 103: "It is evident that our definition of a religion, in the sense in which alone science is concerned with religion as a social phenomena [Mr. Kidd has confessedly made the definition to suit his own theory], must run somewhat as follows:

"*A religion is a form of belief, providing an ultra-rational sanction for that large class of conduct in the individual where his interests and the interests of the social organism are antagonistic, and by which the former are rendered subordinate to the latter in the general interests of the evolution which the race is undergoing.*" He adds, "We have here the principle at the base of all religions." Have we? Such a definition would exclude some religions altogether, and a great part of every historically famous religion. It is conspicuously true indeed of the Jewish religion and of the political religions of Greece and Rome that they furthered the social coherence and,

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on the whole, the success of the societies which observed them. But how does such a conception apply to Buddhism, or to the Christianity of the early centuries, which produced what Mr. Kidd himself calls an "epidemic of asceticism"?

Again, with regard to the great mass of the lower religions, it may very well be doubted whether it is correct to say that they provide "ultra-rational" or "supernatural" sanctions. The "supernatural" is a concept relative to a definitely asserted theory of what is natural or rational. To pre-scientific thought there is, properly speaking, no *super*-natural occurrence. Nature, for the primitive and unscientific mind, includes demons, fairies, gods, patron-saints, miracle-working images, charms, etc., which cause events in the same sort of way in which for the scientific mind electricity, magnetism, etc., cause events. The distinction between a natural and a supernatural sphere is the result of incipient rationalism or scepticism, as we see *e. g.* in Herodotus who, like many people after him, seeks to get rid of mythological difficulties by supposing a "pre-human" or heroic age in which more wonderful things might be expected to happen than in his own day. What *we* call the supernatural is not such to those who really believe in it and have not been taught to speak a language due to rationalistic thought. The supernatural has to be envisaged as a quasi-natural region. The absolutely ultra-rational is the absolutely unthinkable, is that in which nobody can believe, however loudly they protest their belief.

On the other hand, of the higher religions it is quite false to deny that they contain a very considerable rational element. Christianity succeeded in conquering the Græco-Roman world partly just because it took up into itself a great part of the philosophic thought of Greece and of the political organization of Rome. It is historically absurd to regard the religion that was preached by Paul and whose doctrines were formulated by Augustine and Athanasius as standing in a merely antagonistic relation to reason. *Credo quia absurdum* is a formula that will only serve to summarize Tertullian. When Mr. Kidd says (p. 113) that "all [religions] assert uncompromisingly that the rules of conduct which they enjoin have an ultra-rational sanction, and that right and wrong are right and wrong by divine or supernatural enactment, *outside of, and independent of, any other cause whatever*," his remark may be true of a great deal of popular religion, but he will have to exclude every Thomist theologian from the ranks of Christianity.

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In fact, a more careful study of history would show that it is only because and in so far as a religion becomes rational that it really and in the long run furthers social well-being. (Mr. Kidd simply begs the question when he asserts that "a rational religion is an inherent contradiction in terms," p. 101.) This, I take it, is, if we try to put the matter briefly, the significance of the Protestant Reformation and the explanation of the greater social success of Protestant communities. Protestantism introduces a large element of reason into the popular religion,—primarily to be used only in the interpretation of Scripture, but certain to be used more freely in the long run. Mr. Kidd thinks otherwise. He believes he is able to understand the Reformation better than the historian "with the methods at his command" [!] has hitherto been able to do. "Its immediate significance was that, while it represented an endeavor to preserve intact the necessary super-rational sanction for the ethical ideals of the Christian religion, it denoted the tendency of the movement which had so far filled the life of the Western peoples to find its social expression. It liberated, as it were, into the practical life of the peoples affected by it, that immense body of altruistic feeling which had been from the beginning the distinctive social product of the Christian religion [How then can it be an essential characteristic of *all* religion?]; but which had hitherto been, during a period of inactivity and intense vitality, directed into other channels" (p. 154). (It is worth noting how the leading metaphor here is not biological, but merely physical or mechanical.) But why the Protestant revolution caused this "body of altruistic feeling" to flow into practical and social channels is just the very matter that needs explanation; and the very matter which Mr. Kidd does not attempt to explain. Translate his metaphorical language into plain English, and what does his theory come to mean? Not that Martin Luther appealed from the external authority of the Church to the conscience and reason of the individual as the interpreter of Scripture, but that Martin Luther the monk married a nun, and this was the true outcome of the asceticism of the hermits of the Thebaid! Most people would call it a reaction towards the civic ideals of pre-Christian antiquity and a revolt against the *irrational* altruism of mediæval religion. Progress, according to Mr. Kidd's view, is only possible if the multiplication of the species goes beyond the limits which the average conditions of life completely provide for (p. 37, etc.); so that a religion which exalts virginity above marriage would seem to be necessarily

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anti-social. But the meaning of the seemingly anti-social asceticism of early Christianity only comes out, according to Mr. Kidd, in this combination in Protestant countries of numerous families with humanitarian sentiment. The objection that unreasoning humanitarian sentiment frequently contributes to the survival of the unfittest Mr. Kidd brushes lightly aside as "what can hardly be possible" (p. 155); but he gives no proof that it is not possible, no proof that it does not happen, except that it runs counter to his theory which supposes all humanitarian sentiment—provided only that it is irrational—to be conducive to social progress.

On p. 153 occurs a characteristic example of Mr. Kidd's incapacity to understand the religious ideas of the past, except in the light of modern sentiment. "At a period," he says, "when the history of the ancient empires still formed a kind of lustrous background, in the light of which the deeds of men continually tended to be judged, the typical vision of the Church was always [*sic*] of the knight

> Who, in many climes and without avail,
> Had spent his life for the Holy Grail;

but who found it at last in the cup and the crust which he shared with the outcast leper." This, however, is not the typical vision of the mediæval church, but the invention of the author of the "Biglow Papers," who, in a prefatory note, distinctly claims the plot of "Sir Launfal" as his own.

The existence of religions and beliefs and usages, which seem to us of an obviously anti-social and anti-progressive character, is a very important and very difficult problem for the student of human evolution; but the problem is not solved by a mere assertion that religion is and must be anti-rational and yet conducive to social progress. In leaving this subject, I would only call attention to the following considerations, in justification of my criticisms of Mr. Kidd: (*a*) There is a social instinct independent of religious sanctions (it exists in germ among all gregarious animals), and many kinds of religion and many elements in religion frequently conflict with this instinct, though some forms of religion and some elements in all religions may lend support to it. (*b*) Rational considerations may support and supplement this social instinct, and it is chiefly those forms of religion which are largely permeated by the direct or indirect effect of rational considerations that lend support to the social instincts of mankind. (*c*) Mr. Kidd entirely neglects the

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extent to which in a fairly-settled condition of society "survivals," which, under other circumstances would be destructive of a society, may continue without doing sufficient injury to lead to their disappearance through natural selection,—*e.g.*, human sacrifices, mutilations, ascetic practices injurious to social efficiency, celibacy of many of the best individuals, etc., may continue to be practised, because counterbalanced by the social cohesion which arises from the sharing in and defending of a *common* religion. Mr. Kidd also neglects the possibility of what Weismann has very well called "bye-products" of evolution,—*i.e.*, the appearance of variations, which subserve no social utility, but which may not be sufficiently hurtful to be eliminated by natural selection.

(6) Mr. Kidd frequently appeals to the abolition of slavery as a proof of the effects of altruistic religious sentiment. Now there is undoubtedly a sense in which it may be said that Christianity led to the abolition of slavery, but it is the same kind of sense in which it may also be said that Christianity, through the Protestant Reformation, produced the rationalism of the eighteenth century and the French revolution. But, on the one hand, there is clear evidence that slavery was already attacked by Greek rationalism in the age of the Sophists, long before Christianity existed: on the other hand, there is clear evidence that Christian theologians, Catholic and Protestant, were almost unanimous in approving the rightness of slavery until after the rationalistic movement of the eighteenth century had begun. Undoubtedly, Christianity gave the slave religious rights equal to those of the freeman; but from that to the abolition of slavery was a long step, not easily taken, and there was no continuous progress towards it. To mitigate and "humanize" an institution may even be to hinder its abolition by removing its more obvious evils. Furthermore, while modern humanitarian sentiment, influenced, however, by reflection and by rationalistic theories about equality, has, undoubtedly, contributed to the abolition of slavery, other causes, economic and political, have co-operated in bringing about the change. It is utterly unscientific to trace historical events to isolated single causes (as Mr. Kidd does, *e.g.*, on p. 182). As a rule, only those people among whom slavery had already disappeared became aware of its evils. I have already referred to Mr. Kidd's complacent tone about the attitude of the British nation towards slavery and the slave-trade. He seems quite unaware that slavery was *formally* abolished by the rationalistic French Convention long before the Christian philanthropists in the

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British Parliament succeeded in doing anything practical. Its abolition in the French colonies was, indeed, only formal: the institution was restored, along with the Catholic religion, by Napoleon.

In examining the socialistic movement, Mr. Kidd begins by setting aside France, Germany, and the United States of America on various grounds, and proposes to study "the developments of the modern spirit in England alone" (p. 197), an easy way of simplifying the problem. This spirit he finds in *laissez-faire*. "Its spirit," he says, "still pervades the entire political life of all lands into which these people have carried their institutions" (p. 201). What of Victoria and New Zealand, with their experiments in State-socialism? Nay, if we limit our attention to Great Britain alone, it is quite untrue to say, as Mr. Kidd does, on page 157, that to secure for each individual "a free rivalry with his fellows" has been the object of *all* modern legislation. What of factory acts, and all those acts interfering with freedom of contract, which are more and more in this country characteristic of legislation? Mr. Kidd has nowhere explained how "equal *social* opportunities" are to be secured for all mankind without a system of socialistic legislation: nor how natural selection (which, if violence be suppressed, means for the unsuccessful death by starvation), is to be "humanized" (p. 226) without being to a great extent counteracted. Mr. Kidd admits that "the conception of the native equality of men" is essentially irrational (p. 184); but, apparently, he expects that his socially efficient "Anglo-Saxon" will take care to be sufficiently rationalistic (and, therefore, selfish) to prevent the inferior races, —*e.g.*, the negro, from really attaining to the equality professedly given to him. "The Anglo-Saxon, driven by forces inherent in his own civilization [a phrase as "scientific" as that about opium putting you to sleep because of its soporific virtue], comes to develop the natural resources of the land [possessed by barbarians], and the consequences appear to be inevitable." "The natives must go." I do not know whether the cynicism is intentional or not in Mr. Kidd's appreciative accounts of the manner in which equality is secured to the negro in the Southern States (p. 51), and of that in which without war (*sine sanguinis effusione* in the old pious style), the "Anglo-Saxon" is "involuntarily" exterminating inferior races (p. 58).

(7) With regard to Mr. Kidd's frequent and proud references to the victorious Teuton or "Anglo-Saxon"—that model man after

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Mr. Kidd's own heart who succeeds so well because he can combine the philanthropic cant of Exeter Hall with the competitive morals of the stock-exchange and the prize-ring—the following problems may be suggested. Why is nothing said in favor of the Irish, who are certainly a religious people, who often seem an irrational people, and who have the virtue (for natural selection) of multiplying beyond the means of subsistence? What proportion of English-speaking people at the present day have any claim to be considered ethnologically "Anglo-Saxon"? Anglo-Celtic comes less far from the truth. What is to be said of the curious historical phenomenon of this century—the relative retrogression of Teutonic domination in Europe? Germany is united, it is true; but under the supremacy of Prussia, largely Slavonic, so far as race goes. Italy is no longer ruled by the Teuton. Hungarian and Slav have asserted their independence. The English (in the narrower sense) have to make concessions to the "Celtic fringe." Lastly, what may come of the Latin immigration into South America?

In discussing the nature of human evolution, Mr. Kidd concludes that it is not primarily intellectual. He gives some good arguments to show how there is no natural selection of the best intellectual powers, while there is selection of the qualities that go to produce social efficiency. He takes, indeed, too little account of the fact that these qualities are not the same at all times, and that in some periods they imply more intellectual elements than at others. He exaggerates in supposing that the average person of European race to-day is greatly inferior to the average Athenian of the time of Pericles (p. 253). But he sees quite correctly that the apparent intellectual progress of mankind is due to social and not to biological inheritance, to "mental equipment" and not to "mental capacity" (p. 271). He fails, however, to notice the bearing of this on the problem of social evolution generally. He continues to think that a type of civilization,—*e.g.*, that of France, is doomed because the race does not increase with the same rapidity as the Teuton. He takes no account of the fact that every immigrant into France is assimilated by French civilization, so that the French type is perpetuated, whereas the overflow of the superfluous population of Germany into the United States and other countries adds nothing to the continuance of the distinctively German type of civilization. The effect of German universities on American students probably counts for far more in the long run than the whole Teutonic migration in spreading and perpetuating German culture.

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For social evolution this assimilative capacity of a people may be far more important than their physical multiplication. Latin civilization was Latin and is Latin still, though every one of the Roman families that fought against Hannibal may have been extinct by the time of the Antonines. If no descendant of the New England Puritans survived on the American continent, we can hardly doubt that many of the characteristics of the New England type of civilization would still be perpetuated. Of course, this power of assimilation is within limits, fixed by the capacity of different races for taking on or for transmitting a type of civilization.

Finally, a protest is necessary against Mr. Kidd's manner of writing. On one page (123) are to be found the following adjectives and phrases: "remarkable spectacle," "the phenomenon of a gigantic birth," "fierce ebullition of life," "extraordinary," "vast," "profound," "immeasurable," "immense," "amorphous vigour of life." The passage is about the Christian religion. After all these gigantic births, fierce ebullitions, etc., comes the anti-climax "From the very beginning its action was altogether unusual." "To once more briefly revert" (p. 164) is a vile phrase. "The motive force behind it has had its seat and origin in that fund of altruistic feeling with which our civilization has become equipped" (p. 185). "If we look back once more over that ethical movement which we have regarded as the seat of the vital phenomena we are witnessing, and which projects itself with such force and distinctness through the history of the European peoples, it may be perceived that it is divided into two clearly-marked stages" (p. 147). What image can the word "seat" present to Mr. Kidd's mind? "The movement of a certain class of minds towards the Church of Rome, the most conservative and uncompromising of all the Churches, which began in England in the middle of the century, etc." These few examples may suffice in addition to those already incidentally given. It is to be feared that such frequent confusion in language goes along with a very considerable confusion in thought, a confusion that renders possible that nauseous muddle of sentiment which shrinks with horror from war and from slavery, and yet approves unchecked competition—"a friendly rivalry" is Mr. Kidd's phrase—as a means of securing the survival of the fittest, a competition which is perfectly useless for the purpose, unless it means the starvation of the unsuccessful. Mr. Kidd's subject is one of surpassing importance, and he has done well to raise the problem of the influence of popular religious

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beliefs on social progress; but the problem for its solution would need a wider and more careful study of history than is shown in this volume, and a greater absence of false abstractions, arbitrary assumptions, and hasty generalizations.

D. G. RITCHIE.

OXFORD.

ETHICS OF CITIZENSHIP. John MacCunn, M.A., Professor of Philosophy, University College, Liverpool. Glasgow: MacLehose & Sons, 1894.

This is a timely book. When we are being flooded in response to a popular demand with hand-books on the Duties of Citizenship, it is well to have the subject treated from a wider point of view by so competent a writer as Professor MacCunn has shown himself to be. "The object of the following pages," he tells us in the Preface, "is to connect some leading aspects of democratic citizenship with ethical facts and beliefs."

In the first Essay, which is upon "Equality," the key-note is struck. The abstract equality of the French Revolution is set aside. "Those who attempt to level" (quoting Burke) "never equalize." The ground of equal legal and political rights is found in the germ of human Worth which is latent in every rational soul. If there is a ground for the so-called social right of the individual to have deliverance from the conditions of degrading poverty secured to him it must be looked for in the same direction. The second Essay is upon "Fraternity," for which, threatened though it is by the intensified competition of modern times, the writer finds guarantees in the family and the Greek virtue of friendship (these private affections, he finely says, must not be thought of as spending themselves where they rise, but are "like waves that break in unexpected music upon shores that knew nothing of the winds that raised them") in the humanitarian feeling which emancipated the negro slave at the cost of £20,000,000, and in the growing sense of industrial dependence of one class, and even one country and continent on another. In the third Essay, upon the "Rights of Man," Mr. MacCunn carries his principle a step further. A right is regarded as a claim whether recognized by law or not put forward in the name, not of what man is or has been, but of what, under favorable circumstances, he may become. As against the leaders of the French Revolution, Bentham was right in demanding a utilitarian justification of the rights that were claimed; Burke,

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in denouncing the crude individualism of men who, after they had spent their force of assertion, appealed, for lack of reasons, to force of arms and "argued in ultimatums;" Malthus, in trying to turn men's eyes from claims of rights to the conditions of subsistence—but underlying the fanaticism of the revolutionists and surviving all the attacks upon them lay the unconquerable conviction of an individual human worth that court decorations were powerless to give or social oppression to take away. The fourth Essay, on "Citizenship," further emphasizes the truth that to possess rights is not to be a citizen. Rights are the beginning, not the end of citizenship. Beyond them lies the duty to fit ourselves to use them. True freedom is freedom to perform this duty. The exercise of the right is merely the last step in making this developed worth effective in society. Rousseau, who maintained that Englishmen were free only at the moment of going to the poll (he added that they then used their freedom so badly that they deserved to lose it), states precisely the reverse of the truth, "for the stuff and substance of freedom we must look to the weeks and months and years that lie in the intervals when we are *not* electing members of Parliament." On p. 32, the objection to giving votes founded upon the unfitness of their possessors to exercise them is well met. Essay V. puts the case for the "Rule of the Majority" against the common objections, including Mill's; Essay VI. defends its machinery of "Party" on the usual grounds, but with a forcible and suggestive application to present English politics. But the most serious contributions towards the solution of current problems are to be found in Essays VII. and VIII. The former discusses, in close and suggestive connection with Aristotle's doctrine of φρόνησις, the "Elements of Political Consistency," in which lie the author's hopes for the future of Democracy. They are three: 1. Enlightenment, by which as he explains, he means "an ideal of our country's Future,—a conception or picture of what in our most reflective moments we wish our country to be." 2. "Deliberation," or the insight by which, in the face of competing alternatives, the right means are securely linked to the chosen end, the isolated decision of the hour riveted on the strong chain of settled policy. 3. But these are intellectual conditions, and of themselves are insufficient. Selfish or sinister interest may betray the cleverest of politicians. To knowledge and deliberation we must add Disinterestedness. With an enlarged idea of education to help to secure the first two, and the spirit of honor and self-surrender to secure the last, Professor

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MacCunn is ready to meet the enemy of Democracy in the gate. But just here comes the difficulty, for is it not the contention of the most recent and powerful critics of Democracy that the moral and intellectual movement of which it is the outcome make steadily against the last and most essential of the above conditions? But Mr. MacCunn has an answer for the prophets of decay in national life and character. He admits that Religion is necessary to counteract the "virtuous materialism" which De Tocqueville foreboded. It is needed to stimulate the sense of individual responsibility, to nerve to resist the "tyranny of the majority," and to inspire the citizen to work for distant and unseen ends. But he refuses to admit that religion is threatened by the intellectual movement of which Democracy is part outcome and part cause. Historic criticism and rational philosophy are not the enemies, but the friends of religion and the higher morality. The Christian ideal of human excellence is only the brighter for the removal of scholastic obscurities, while Modern Philosophy sets itself the task not of exploding ideals, but of finding a basis for them in reason, so that "there is not a peasant or a dock laborer to whom it has not its message." It is this cheery optimism combined with a masterly familiarity with the best literature on the subject which gives freshness and charm to Professor MacCunn's treatment of these problems. One might have asked from him some clearer indication of the line his Philosophy would take in seeking to justify to Reason the ideals of the higher morality, but we cannot look for everything in two hundred and twenty pages, and this notice might have begun and ended in praise had it not been for the last Essay, which seems to call for a word of criticism.

This Essay hardly seems to belong to the preceding argument. It is upon a new subject,—viz., "Luxury," nor does it seem to add anything of sufficient value to that to justify its inclusion. It has, moreover, other defects. It starts from no principle or definition of what constitutes luxury. Professor MacCunn is not unaware, as he clearly shows, that the justification of all expenditure over and above what is necessary for bare existence must always be the satisfaction of permanent and rational wants. But he fails to apply this principle consistently to the subject on hand, and permits himself some inconclusive reasoning as to the limits within which "luxury" is justifiable. Thus, when he suggests their *durableness* as a test of the more legitimate forms of luxury, he lays himself open to the retort that it is the permanency of the

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want not of the instrument which satisfies it which is here the test. It is a poor justification of a pleasure yacht that it can be turned into a fishing smack (rather a poor one, surely) after its racing or cruising days are done. It might even be claimed that the less enduring has the advantage over the more enduring in that it does not remain a monument of folly. Similar obligations are suggested by a second test which he proposes, that of the selfishness or unselfishness in the use to which a luxury is put. It is surely no justification for indulging unreasonable desires in one's self that one encourages them in others as well.

But all this lies outside the scope of Professor MacCunn's main argument, which deserves the careful study, not only of the student of political philosophy, but of any one who, whether radical or conservative, would understand the "Case for Democracy."

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

LONDON.

"SCIENCE AND EDUCATION." Essays by T. H. Huxley. Macmillan & Co., 1893.

So prominent is the position occupied by Professor Huxley in the forefront of the intellectual life of the day, that the issue of a collected edition of his works, vol. iii. of which is the object of the present notice, will be eagerly welcomed by both the literary and the scientific student. The versatility of the author, his singularly lucid exposition, his brilliant and incisive style, and, when occasion arises, his masterly polemic—all contribute to invest with exceptional interest everything that comes from his pen. To the school-master, the volume under consideration will come with additional emphasis at a time when we are rapidly nearing that general organization of our secondary education which we are told is now "the one thing needful." However much we may differ from Professor Huxley in the value to be attached to the cult of science, and in the position he would give to his own subject in the curriculum of our schools, his views are so broad, and his experience is so great, that whatever he has to say on this topic carries unusual weight. And further, his enthusiasm is so lofty, that he is certain to enrich and adorn what has of late years become a rather threadbare subject of discussion, and to raise it to a distinctly higher level by the sheer force of thought that he brings to bear on what he has been inculcating "in season and out of season" for more

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than a quarter of a century. It is a melancholy satisfaction to the "Levites of the Ark of Culture" to feel that his mightiest strokes are dealt with weapons that after all were forged and tempered in their own armories.

Upon the two essays with which the volume opens, dealing respectively with the episode in the history of science connected with the justly honored name of Priestley and with the Emancipation of Woman, we are not here concerned. To most of us, these, and the remaining essays in the book, are familiar. The writer will confine his remarks to those on (*a*) the importance of Science in general Culture; (*b*) Technical Education; and, finally (*c*), those parts of our educational system represented by the Universities and the School Board. Of these the best known is probably the essay on "Science and Culture," delivered in 1880 at the opening of the Joshua Mason Science College, Birmingham. One cannot always follow the author as closely as might be wished in this excellent address, in which he had to grapple with a novel situation—the opening of an educational institution from which "mere literary instruction" was expressly debarred. We can see ample justification for exclusive devotion to science as long as its supporters confine themselves to purely utilitarian grounds. And that, from the days of Comte onwards, the number of those who deny its legitimate place in the curriculum to elementary science has been rapidly diminishing, is as much due to the strenuous persistence of Professor Huxley as to any one else. But the sturdy claim that Science is a necessary ingredient of all culture gives us pause. Surely the essential part of the intellectual discipline in both scientific and literary training is of the same nature. Is there not the same need for minute observation, sound deduction, and careful generalization? The Germans seem to have felt this from the wide connotation given to the term *Wissenschaft*. Probably the only real ground for preference lies in the simplicity of subject matter. There is, however, a refreshing, breezy, virile common sense in the author's treatment of this and other debatable topics. It is pleasant, for instance, to read: "Among the scientific topics, using the word scientific in its broadest sense, I would include the elements of the theory of morals and of that of political and social life, which, strangely enough, it never seems to occur to any one to teach a child." The general remarks on the teaching of the elementary laws of conduct are opportune and very much to the point. He holds that the determination of the laws of conduct by

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the intellect belongs to that part of science called morality, whereas the engagement of the affections in favor of what is called "good" conduct is something "quite beyond mere science." It would be well if the following words of one who has been much abused for the supposed intolerance of his religious opinions were more widely known: "If I were compelled to choose for one of my own children between a school in which real religious instruction is given and one without it, I should prefer the former, even though the child might have to take a good deal of theology with it." And his remarks on pp. 397, 398, on the teaching of the Bible in schools are in every way worthy of a broad-minded *savant* with a fine instinct for what is morally noble, pure, and grand. Upon the subject of Technical instruction few men can speak with a more authoritative, and let us add, with a less uncertain, voice than Professor Huxley. Nothing could be better than his cogent pleas for a system which will secure to the nation whatever of special capacity it may possess. "I weigh my words well when I say that if the nation could purchase a potential Watt, or Davy, or Faraday for a hundred thousand pounds down, he would be dirt cheap at the money." No less emphatic is he on the importance of escaping the pitfall into which misdirected efforts have led, and will lead us, in the supplying of advanced instruction for those who have not received the requisite preliminary training. In lavish provision for the many of but mediocre ability, we run a serious risk of not doing all that is possible for the few of special capacity. There is both courage and foresight in the definite admission, or rather in the prophetic assertion, that we shall only reach success by a series of blunders. To the minimizing of these blunders the author has done as much as any man living, and we can only hope that he will be spared for many years to give the nation the benefit of his wisdom and experience.

In the essay on the Universities, Professor Huxley unctuously endorses Pattison's remark that the "colleges are boarding schools in which the elements of the learned languages are taught to youth." These words he would have engraved in public view, "for they have never been refuted." If this odd reason had been given in the admirable post-prandial oration, the notes of which appear in this volume, the reader would have smiled to himself and passed on. "*For* they have never been refuted," comes queerly from the lips of the High Priest of the cult of Science. That there is an evil no one conversant with the life of the Uni-

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versities will attempt to deny, but surely nothing is gained by this deliberate overstatement of the evil.

Again, in many passages in this volume, stress is laid, and none too forcibly, upon the training received by the student of science in manipulative dexterity, in patience, and in ingenuity. It does not seem to us that any of the arguments in this connection apply with less cogency to the function of Art, for instance, in developing and cultivating these capabilities.

Within the limits of this notice it is impossible to do more than draw the attention of the readers of the JOURNAL to a few of the more stimulating and suggestive points that crop up on every page of this fascinating volume. It should be on the shelves of every student of the conditions under which form is being slowly but surely given to the shapeless mass, which, in our vanity or ignorance, we have been pleased to call our "system" of national education.

W. J. GREENSTREET.

LONDON.

LA PSYCHOLOGIE DES IDÉES-FORCES. Par Alfred Fouillée. Two vols. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1893.

This book treats of morality only indirectly; but, since it contains an essential part of the author's philosophy and gives the psychological and metaphysical basis of his moral theories, it deserves our serious attention. The magnitude of the work undertaken by M. Fouillée is already known, for he has sketched the program and indicated the principal features of it in two former books, "L'Avenir de la metaphysique fondé sur l'experience," and "L'Evolutionisme des idées-forces." M. Fouillée endeavors to establish a complete system of monistic philosophy, which he founds, not on the general laws of the objective world, as Spencer has done, but on the deeper and more intimate fact of consciousness or subjective experience.

Consciousness, according to M. Fouillée, is neither sensation, nor ideas, nor even pure volition; it is a triple process, in which sensation, emotion, and desire are indivisibly united, but of which desire is the basis. This process, when it reflects upon itself, becomes an *idea* in the sense in which Descartes and Spinoza understood that word, that is to say, a *discernment* conjoined inevitably with a *choice;* and, since it acts upon the body and the external world, since it is always accompanied by a movement of which it

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is the efficient cause, it is also a *force*. Hence the name, *Psychologie des idées-forces*, given by M. Fouillée to his book. This psychology is in open opposition to three doctrines which, in our day, have numerous adherents: materialism, the philosophy of the unconscious, and rationalism. M. Fouillée states at length his objections to these doctrines, and undertakes to refute them rather than to establish his own philosophy.

Materialism professes to give a monistic explanation of things by not recognizing any other reality than that of material movements which indefinitely reproduce each other. According to it, consciousness is a phenomenon without influence, a sort of shadow or reflection of the material organism, which might disappear without anything being changed in the order of the universe. M. Fouillée has not thought it worth while to show the inconsistencies and contradictions of such an hypothesis, which he well claims is entirely incompatible with true monism. He does not admit that things can be explained by supposing a psychic life devoid of consciousness, or which becomes conscious only accidentally and under certain particular conditions. The distinction he makes between spontaneous and reflective consciousness is, without doubt, profound; but spontaneous consciousness, however indefinite, feeble, and fleeting, is always consciousness, since an unconscious psychic life is a pure contradiction in terms. In the fact of consciousness then, fully admitted to be a reality and not an illusive appearance of some other supposed reality, we must seek, according to M. Fouillée, for the principle of universal explanation. Furthermore, we must conceive consciousness as containing within itself an activity, a force, and not regard it, as rationalism always has, as a simple representation. This idea that consciousness is essentially a reproduction, an expression of an object existing outside of itself, is a false idea. Intelligence is posterior to the will. To use a favorite expression of Leibnitz's, *appetition* is not derived from *perception*, but, on the contrary, is its source.

We have mentioned the name of Leibnitz. It appears to us that M. Fouillée has returned to the point of view of that great metaphysician. It cannot be claimed, however, that he accepts the doctrine of monads; for he does not concentrate the psychic life —the universality of which he attempts to demonstrate—around such substantial points as the monads. He seems, on the contrary, to suppose that it is organized and united in individual minds by a

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process of slow evolution. His doctrine differs greatly from traditional spiritualism.

As will be readily understood, we cannot here follow M. Fouillée into the theoretical details in which he develops his philosophy. We will only add that he studies in turn sensation, pleasure and pain, desire, the emotions proper, memory and a perception, the different operations of the intellect, attention, judgment, generalization, reasoning, imagination, the principal ideas of the external world, the idea of space, the idea of self, the idea of time, the principle of identity, the principle of sufficient reason, and, finally, the will, with its character of apparent freedom.

The last and not the least interesting chapter of the book is devoted to the obscure problem of hypnotism, suggestion, and double personality.

Extraordinarily rich in facts and ideas, "La Psychologie des idées-forces" merits, independently of its high metaphysical character, the serious attention of the philosophers of the day.

E. Boirac.

Paris.

Suicide and Insanity. A Physiological and Sociological Study. By S. A. K. Strahan. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1893.

The preliminary chapter of this volume is devoted to an exposition of the ideas entertained among the Greeks, Romans, Jews, and oriental peoples with respect to self-destruction, and the writer arrives at the conclusion that suicide was provoked in early times by religious fanaticism, the fear of slavery, the ill-treatment of conquerors, and the desire to escape physical suffering. In modern times, Dr. Strahan considers that the conditions which produce suicide are chiefly of a pathological character, and he believes that the development of civilization is augmenting the pathological conditions which generate the suicidal tendency. As civilization becomes more complex, life becomes more artificial; artificial modes of life tend to deteriorate the physical and mental qualities of the individual, and in this manner prepare the way for ideas of self-destruction. In England, suicide has increased more than seventy-five per cent. within the last twenty-five years, and in the United States it has increased more than thirty-five per cent. since 1860. According to these statistics, suicide is increasing much faster than the growth of population in England, but not so fast as the growth

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of population in America. Assuming these figures with respect to the United States to be correct, it would be interesting to know why the ratio of suicide is rising so much faster in England than across the Atlantic. Dr. Strahan is of opinion that suicide is principally produced by hereditary transmission. At the same time he admits that it is impossible to bring forward statistics of a sufficiently comprehensive character to establish the validity of this opinion. In our view, it is hazardous to seek an explanation of the increase of suicide in the facts of heredity alone. Inherited biological predisposition is no doubt an important factor in the production of the suicidal act, but in every case this predisposition is called into activity by social or cosmical circumstances or by a combination of both. In fact, in a very great number of cases of suicide it is impossible to say whether the predominating cause is social or biological. The interaction of social and biological conditions in determining the course of human conduct is so intimate and far-reaching that it is impossible to disentangle them. It is much safer to say that suicide is a compound product of cosmic, social, and biological conditions than to seek its origin in heredity alone. Again, we cannot quite follow Dr. Strahan when he informs us that the rate of suicide rises and falls with the price of bread. In England, during the last few years, the price of bread has been steadily falling, but the ratio of suicide has been just as steadily rising. The truth which Dr. Strahan wishes to express is that the ratio of suicide is, to a certain extent, regulated by the growth and decay of economic prosperity, but the economic condition of a community is exhibited much better by the total volume of exports and imports than by the price of bread. Dr. Strahan very truly points out that insanity is much higher in the prison population than in the general community, but it is a little misleading to say that the criminal is about forty times more liable to insanity than the ordinary citizen. It is to be remembered that the criminal population in prisons is almost entirely composed of persons over fifteen years of age, and, before a fairly exact comparison can be made between the prison and the general population, all juveniles under fifteen must be excluded from the general population. But no doubt Dr. Strahan has already noted these and a few other inadvertences and will correct them in a new edition. His book is a timely contribution to the study of social pathology. It contains much excellent material. It is written in the "hope that people may be induced to use intelligently, in the propagation of the human

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race, some of the knowledge, care, and forethought so successfully exercised in the breeding of the lower animals." It is a book eminently calculated to do something towards fulfilling this expectation, and if it succeeds in the smallest degree, Dr. Strahan will be entitled to the gratitude of his fellow-creatures.

W. D. MORRISON.

LONDON.

STOICS AND SAINTS. Lectures on some of the later Heathen Moralists, and on some Aspects of the Life of the Mediæval Church. By the late James Baldwin Brown, B.A., Minister of Brixton Independent Church. Glasgow: James MacLehose & Sons, 1893. Pp. viii., 296.

This is an altogether delightful, and, in one aspect, even a remarkable, work. It belongs to the series of books, so notable in the history of English speculation, which are not the production of trained specialists, but of reflective men drawn by natural taste to investigate a department or period of philosophy. Such works have nearly all been characterized by a naïve freshness, an absence of pedantry, and a measure of insight that go far to win upon the reader. And this one has a notability of its own in that it reminds the larger public that the English nonconformist minister is no longer necessarily limited by educational disabilities, that he is no more a slave to dogmatic presuppositions which warp judgment and render critical appreciation an impossibility (*cf.*, *e.g.*, p. 271).

The book consists of ten lectures, four being devoted to "Stoics" and six to "Saints." On the whole, the latter are the more satisfactory. The word "heathen," which appears in the titles of two of the "Stoic" series, is to some extent indicative of a tendency to treat the Roman schools as if they had been fated to accomplish nothing. But, apart from this fault, pardonable for its frequency, and leaving one or two positive misstatements as to technicalities aside, the author evinces an excellent sense of the reasons why later pre-Christian philosophy did not furnish forth constructive ideas adequate to the most pressing problems of its age. His remarks on certain aspects of Epicureanism (pp. 19, 24, 25) are often singularly felicitous, and there is a powerful comparison (pp. 84 *sq.*) between Pagan thought and the central life of Christianity.

The transition to the "Saints" series is at once marked by an access of power, due largely to deeper sympathy and fuller under-

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standing, if not to greater familiarity. The opening discourse of this group, "The Monastic System and its Relation to the Life of the Church," is the high-water mark of the book. It is a really strong piece of writing, marked throughout by force, and sometimes by much grace of expression. There are also passages which strike home. "Hegel says that nowhere are there to be found such revolutionary utterances as in the Gospels. Hegel is right, but let no revolutionist think that either their letter or their spirit will help him. The first thing he will find, if he reads the New Testament honestly, is that it lays the axe to the root of his arrogance, his impatience, his self-will, and his idea that Society can be a God to itself" (p. 103). "Self-enfolded nothing can live. And age by age this Eastern monachism grew more and more boneless and bloodless; and now probably the dullest and dirtiest sloths that are slinking about Christendom are these monks of the Eastern Church" (p. 109). The account of Becket, in the seventh lecture, is vivid and well balanced; and the criticism of the Crusading spirit, although uncompromising, is tempered by a just estimate of its value (p. 249). Throughout these more specifically religious lectures, too, are scattered not a few phrases that bear the mark, not simply of research or knowledge, but of an original reflective grasp. "The great monks bear full comparison with the greatest soldiers, statesmen, and kings." "The Roman Church during the period of its supremacy was just a rude battery of force, the main direction of which was Christian, acting on a state of society too hard and too gross to be influenced by more subtile and spiritual means." "We may depend upon it that a man must have a certain strain of commonness in him, who is so universally popular and successful as was Bernard." "Worldly men might wield the power, but only unworldly men could create it. . . . When saints became scarcer, Rome became feebler." "Splendor always follows in the wake of power; an age of splendor is always vitally an age of decline, and its glow is just the fungoid brilliance of color with which nature does her best to cloak decay." (Pp. 112, 127, 150, 205, 268.)

All who wish to be induced to make some further study of the Middle Ages, and many who are already familiar with their main events, will find in Mr. Brown's work pleasant stimulus and wealth of suggestion.

R. M. WENLEY.

UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW.

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MAN AN ORGANIC COMMUNITY: being an exposition of the law that the human personality in all its phases in evolution, both co-ordinate and discordinate, is the multiple of many sub-personalities. By John H. King, author of "The Supernatural, its origin, nature, and evolution." In two volumes. Pp. 327, 328. Williams & Norgate, Putnam's, 8vo, 1893.

On the third page of Mr. King's laborious essay we read, "Hence we start with the assumption that the human personality is a co-ordination or growth combination of many differentiated distinct sub-personalities, and that these sub-personalities in like manner consist of aggregates of lower class differentiates, until we arrive at the primary constituents of organisms, the free-moving granules of plasma." Starting with this assumption,—an unscientific order of procedure,—the author argues at great length in support of it, marshalling an array of facts concerning man's structure, development, and functions, both normal and abnormal. The fundamental fact is the familiar one, that the man's life begins in a fertilized egg-cell,—a complex mosaic of inherited qualities,—and that this divides and redivides into a community of cells, which, while retaining a varying degree of independence, co-operating and competing like the inhabitants of a city, are integrated into a body more or less unified and more or less perfectly controlled by the brain and its centralized consciousness. That the cells and larger parts may retain some independence or individuality is an important physiological fact; that there may be a diffuse consciousness or analogue of consciousness in all the units is a plausible hypothesis; that the facts are best unified by a theory of "sub-personalities" is Mr. King's contention.

Mr. King's main thesis, so far as we can disentangle it, is that the unity of our personality is more apparent than real, that unified action is the sum of numerous co-ordinated activities. "The human personality is a co-ordination of many 'sub-personalities,' 'a varying compound,' 'it never is a unity, and never continues to represent like co-ordinate elements,' 'there is no central sovereignty.'" This appears to us to be an unwarranted exaggeration of the generally-recognized truth—that a body is an imperfectly integrated unity of individualized parts.

The essay shows a general lack of analysis, as evidenced, for instance, in the conception of "sub-personalities." It is also marred by a failure to keep the objective and the subjective aspects duly apart, which leads to much intemperate use of words, and to such

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a conclusion as the following: "There are two forms of being: the organic and the mental, one is the result of asexual continuity, the other of sexual conjunction." Perhaps the chief value of the book is in the immense body of facts which the author has collected, doubtless with no small labor. But here, also, there is a sad lack of critical discrimination: great authorities of the past are quoted on behalf of conclusions which they would be the first to scout were they now alive, small authorities come cheek by jowl with the greatest, and obvious fiction with accurate observation. There are also far too many mistakes, which more careful proof-reading should have detected.

J. ARTHUR THOMSON.

EDINBURGH.

NATURAL THEOLOGY: the Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Edinburgh in 1893. By Professor Sir G. G. Stokes, Bart. Edinburgh: A. & C. Black, 1893. Pp. viii., 272.

This volume contains the second course of lectures delivered by Sir George Stokes as Gifford Lecturer. In this course the author widens the somewhat narrow view he previously took of the sphere of natural theology, and proposes to discuss more fully scientific questions on the one hand, in so far as these are "of a nature to be turned to account in some way towards the object of the Gifford Foundation," and "the distinctively Christian doctrines," on the other, with the purpose of showing that these doctrines, though revealed and supernatural, "appear to fall in with what, by our natural powers, we feel to be right and just and good." In dealing with the former of these questions the author makes free use of the argument from Design. But in one instance, at least, he is careful to make a distinction between the application of the argument to organic beings, and its application to the inorganic world. Living beings, he thinks, cannot be explained save by postulating the idea of design as well as the laws of matter; but in the case of a general law, such as that of gravitation, which entails a host of consequences, "it seems hardly reverent to ask the question whether we may regard the law as designedly laid down, in order to bring about a particular consequence." On the meaning and bearings of the theory of Evolution, there are also some useful remarks.

The rest of the book is devoted to a proof of the thesis, that the doctrines of natural and revealed theology are entirely harmoni-

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ous,—in the sense, at least, that they do not conflict; and that we should, therefore, accept, as at least consonant with reason, beliefs which reason can neither discover nor certify. The assumptions that underlie this statement of the problem are, however, nowhere examined, and there are suggestions of one or two ideas which would, if properly worked out, carry us beyond them.

The scientific illustrations are stated with admirable lucidity; the treatment of the subject is more systematic than in the previous course of lectures; and, while we cannot regard the volume as a great contribution to the science of Natural Theology, it is a sensible, and in parts suggestive, discussion of problems more or less connected with it by one whose reputation as a scientist is of the highest.

ROBERT A. DUFF.

REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CONFERENCE OF CHARITIES AND CORRECTION. Chicago, 1893. George H. Ellis, Boston, Massachusetts.

This report contains, besides the usual matter of such documents, several articles of considerable interest. The lengthy paper by Mr. Kellogg, secretary of the New York Charity Organization Society, is especially interesting, not only for its history of that movement in this country and England, but mainly for the statistics of poverty which throw considerable light upon the causes of it. Forty-four cities of the Union report nearly 75,000 cases as having come under the care of these societies. The total number of persons will probably be 300,000, counting four to a family on the average. The societies, however, do not all report in the same way, and hence a complete tabular view of results cannot be given, after the model of the system adopted by an earlier conference. Hence, in regard to "social condition," only 15,000 cases are reported here. But the figures in these are very instructive. Nearly 35 per cent. are married couples, 19 per cent. are widows, 6½ per cent. are deserted wives, 6 per cent. are single women, and nearly 26 per cent. are single men. This was for the year 1892. The percentage of single men compared with single women is rather large when we come to consider the common belief that woman is much more handicapped in the struggle for existence than man. Either this is not true, or moral causes operate very largely to increase the number of men. Of 35,000 cases considered, 36 per cent. represented children under 14 years of age, and 9 per cent. those be-

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tween 14 and 20, while there were 9 per cent. between 20 and 40, 32 per cent. between 40 and 55, and only 19 per cent. between 55 and 70, the period of declining strength. The last ought to be much higher in comparison, unless its reduction can be accounted for by the drifting off of the incompetents into almshouses.

Of the 75,000 cases treated, it is interesting to remark that only 16 per cent. needed work rather than relief, showing that economic causes had the smallest share in the production of the general poverty. Still, if we add the 18 per cent. who were given employment, this number may appear much larger. It is noticeable that 10 per cent were absolutely refused relief as unworthy on account of vicious habits. The benefits of the movement for restrictions upon out-door relief are very well illustrated in a table showing the saving by charity organizations to four cities annually,—Brooklyn, Buffalo, Indianapolis, and Philadelphia. This is put at $350,500 a year, and shows a large sum saved to the taxpayer, where before the State or city had spent this amount for relief. No doubt still more is saved by the educational influence of such societies upon the community in regard to legitimate and useful charity.

On other matters the report contains much instructive material, though some of the papers are not very exhaustive. It is interesting to note what proportion of imbeciles, in some grades 20 to 30 per cent., can be trained to self-support. This fact throws much light upon the possibility of successfully treating incompetency among the ordinary poor. Nothing of striking importance is reported regarding the insane. The reports from the various States are mostly statistical, but confined largely to the mere numbers of persons cared for. There is room for more careful study of insanity, imbecility, and poverty than is evidenced by most of the State returns. Each institution ought to be required to report on the causes of the phenomena with which it has to deal, and to classify its inmates very carefully. We need in this country better statistical methods than are generally applied. Reports of this kind, valuable as they are now, would be greatly improved by them.

JAMES H. HYSLOP.

COLUMBIA COLLEGE, NEW YORK.

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BOOKS RECEIVED.

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QUESTIONS OF THE DAY. A Volume of Sermons. By the Rev. D. J. Vaughan, M.A. (Subjects: Christianity and Politics, Capital and Labor, Domestic Life, Co-operation, Trade Unionism, War, The Morality of Business, Secularism, The Temperance Movement, Disestablishment, The Church and Socialism.) London: Macmillan & Co., 1894.

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L'IDÉE DU PHÉNOMÈNE. Par Emile Boirac. Paris: Alcan, 1894.

LA PHILOSOPHIE DE JACOBI. Par Levy-Bruhl. Paris: Alcan, 1894.

SPINOZA. Par Brunschwieg. Paris: Alcan, 1894.

Books to be reviewed should be sent to one of the following addresses:
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Prof. G. von Gizycki, Nettelbeckstrasse 24, Berlin, Germany.
J. S. Mackenzie, M.A., Trinity College, Cambridge, England.
Prof. Josiah Royce, 103 Irving Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

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INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

JANUARY, 1895.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RECENT LABOR TROUBLES IN AMERICA.

ALL matters which affect men in their relations to each other and to the community in which they live come within the realm of ethical consideration. In these later times all great matters are being brought to the ethical standard of judgment. Political economy has undergone almost a revolution in the changes which have been brought into it from the stand-point of ethics. That grand department of human knowledge which relates to the accumulation and distribution of wealth and the body of facts relating to it, which has been designated "political economy," has not been adequate to the full consideration of the various phases of business life. The recognition of the power of moral forces in all that pertains to the accumulation and the distribution of wealth is recent, and with three or four exceptions (and the exceptions will come readily to the mind of any man familiar with economics), the writers of this country, as well as those of England and the Continent, are shaping their views to take on the higher thought, stimulated by ethics. Dogmatic theology is giving way before the power of moral considerations; politics looks to the law of right living, of right dealing in the institution of the statutes of advanced nations and states; the politician who is simply seeking personal advantage must, as the years

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go by, more and more consider the welfare of the commonwealth, and in this consideration he must judge of the actions of men in their mutual relations. The judgment of business men on the characters of their associates rests entirely upon an estimate of their downright moral elements or qualities. Even the most active stock gambler must make his word good when he agrees to lay on the desk of a business associate at a certain hour certain securities, checks or bonds, or leave the field. Notwithstanding all that we hear of political corruption, of business looseness, of defalcations, of newspaper recklessness, of church degeneration, the ethical standard of life is growing higher and higher and the moral conduct of men in all relations more in accord with the precepts of the highest principles of action; and it is upon the ethical basis that we ought to consider the influence and the significance of the great labor controversies which prevail at the present time. Economic principles alone will not suffice for the student who cares to look deeply into the industrial affairs of a state and the results which come of their active prosecution. The business relations of labor and capital can be judged by purely economic standards. The relation of labor and capital as joint forces in relation to all the forces of society can only be judged properly by a philosophical application of the highest ethical rules. If society depends for its maintenance, its development, and its purity upon industry, as I believe it does, there must be connecting lines which ought to bring all the industrial relations into accord, that the highest product may be realized and the highest social development secured. In this view, what is the significance of our recent great labor wars? During the brief period of seven months, ending with June, 1894, four controversies, each of vast proportions, occurred in the United States,—the Lehigh Valley strike, in December, 1893; the American Railway Union strike on the Great Northern, which occurred in April, 1894; the great coal strike, which occurred the same month, and the Chicago strike of June and July.

The strike of the Lehigh Valley Railroad employees embraced all classes and extended over the entire line, the inter-

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ests of the people of three States being affected, much property destroyed, and the public seriously discommoded. The trouble was ended by the united efforts of the Boards of Arbitration of New Jersey and New York, the action being brought to conclusive results on the invitation of the New Jersey board to that of New York to co-operate with it in the endeavor to effect a settlement.

The Great Northern strike brought under its conditions a very large percentage of the employees of the Great Northern Railway, causing for eighteen days the almost entire suspension of business on forty-five hundred miles of road. This strike ended May 1, as the result of the decision of a board of arbitration, to which the parties involved voluntarily submitted their affairs. The commercial bodies of St. Paul and Minnesota induced the leaders of the strike to submit their grievances to arbitration, and in a few hours the wage question was brought to an amicable adjustment through compromise on the part of the company and the men. The contention was over a wage scale. The president of the railroad was in favor of arbitrating the differences between the road and the men from the opening of the difficulty, and the striking employees finally accepted that method of settlement.

The third great strike within the period named was that of the bituminous coal-miners of twelve States and Territories. Probably over one hundred and thirty thousand men were affected by this strike. It occurred April 21, and was carried on under the auspices of the United Mine Workers of America. The contention was over wages, and the original intention was to secure a general movement in every State and Territory in the United States, that every mine should cease work on April 21, and that no mine in any State, regardless of whether the demand in any particular region was granted, should resume under any circumstances until every mine in every State and Territory involved secured what was demanded, when all were to resume work at the same time in all parts of the country. This gave the contest, in some of its features, the characteristics of a sympathetic strike, for any operator who was willing to pay the price demanded in his particular region

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was not to be permitted to resume operations or his men to accept the price demanded unless every other operator and all the mines in every other State had a settlement at the same time.

The fourth great contest was that inaugurated by the American Railway Union—the organization which opened the strike on the Great Northern about the middle of April—against the railways of the West, in order to compel them to take such action as would protect the striking employees of Pullman's Palace Car Company. The contest was a combination of the boycott and strike. It was purely sympathetic, the origin of the trouble being the strike which occurred at the town of Pullman among the employees of the Pullman Company on account of the reduction of wages. Many of these employees had joined the American Railway Union. They struck May 11, last, and were out when the American Railway Union held its regular convention in Chicago, commencing June 12. The affairs of the Pullman employees were brought before the convention, and in order to help them, as has been stated, the great sympathetic strike and boycott of the latter part of June was ordered.

The material features of these contests are too well known to necessitate their rehearsal here, but their significance in various directions is a matter which needs thorough discussion, wise deliberation, and the consideration of all thoughtful, patriotic men; for it must be conceded that the public has rights in these matters which must be respected, and if these rights are not respected the public must see to it that it be obeyed.

It is interesting to note that all contests, whether of one kind or another, beyond the mere fights of brutes, are for principle, each party claiming that it is standing for a vital principle and insisting that on that account it will not yield. It may be said that there cannot be two vital principles of antagonistic nature, and yet wise men, intelligent men, men who love their country, who prefer peace to discord, who prefer prosperity to adversity, will insist that a principle is at stake and that they are fighting for it. This is true in all labor

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contests, it is true in all national contests, it is true in all individual contests. Lawsuits could not exist if each party did not feel that he was standing for a principle, vital to him and his interests, and yet each knows perfectly well that with the decision of the court his principle may go for naught. In the recent labor contests no exceptions occurred in this matter. Each party believed, and honestly, we must concede, that it was conducting a fight for a principle dear to it, and which it deemed essential to its success and happiness. The labor question, concretely stated, means the struggle for a higher standard of living. A strike is a vigorous protest against any condition existing or which may exist interfering with the higher standard. So it is a matter of principle with the leaders of a strike that nothing shall be countenanced which will in any way lead to a lower standard of life or which shall infringe upon the life-line of wages. The strike is an assertion that inconvenience, suffering, deprivation, hunger will be endured rather than to yield the principle at stake. We need not, in this connection, take into consideration the violence, the rioting, the destruction of property which accompany some great strikes, and which usually lead to the defeat of the original purpose, even when that purpose was for a just cause. These are incidents, as are the characters of the men engaged. The leaders of the strike may be men of undoubted wisdom, or agitators, or unprincipled demagogues, or loud-mouthed blatherskites; the personal equation only aggravates the matter in the public estimation, but does not affect the ethics of the case. On the other hand, the employer, who may be honest or dishonest, arbitrary or generous, feels that he has a right to manage his own business in his own way, and that he knows better than any one else what he can pay for wages; he knows that as competition grows fiercer and fiercer, as the processes of manufacture grow more and more expensive, the capital necessary to conduct his enterprise must be increased, the margin of profits narrowed, the cost of production reduced, and with all this he knows that on the whole the general trend of wages is upward. He knows, therefore, when he says he will not yield to the demands of the striking

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party, that a principle vital to the integrity of his business is at stake, and he feels secure in this position and has the sympathy of all men who have been or who may be situated in like manner; and yet, as in the ordinary lawsuit, that which was a vital principle to one of the parties must either be vacated through defeat or else each yield something for the sake of the public welfare. Ordinarily, the fight goes on without much regard to the public, until one or the other is obliged to yield. Take the most recent of our great troubles. It was a tri-party contest, organized first by the employees at Pullman, and had it remained a purely local affair the world would never have heard much of it or cared much about it. The Pullman Company was, as it often declared, contending for a principle, and a principle which all political economists and business men would endorse. The men were contending for a wage, not beyond the life-line, and certainly not up to it, and for certain concessions which they believed vital to their interests, to their welfare, and to their continued ability to work. This strike, I believe, would have been settled then and there had it not been for inopportune circumstances which occurred, and which brought two other parties into the field, —the American Railway Union and the combined railroads radiating from Chicago. A powerful labor organization, on the one hand, took up the fight for the Pullman employees and made it a sympathetic contest. A powerful combination of railroads took up the fight for the Pullman Company on the other side, and made it a sympathetic contest in that respect. Here, then, were three great elements, all-powerful in their way, each contending for a principle, and each equally ready to sacrifice the public, if the sacrifice of the public was essential to the success of the principle it was contending for. Judge Cooley has well stated, in his address before the Bar Association in August last, that it is difficult to deal with a sympathetic strike,—that arbitration cannot come in under such circumstances, because the sympathetic strikers have no grievances which can be arbitrated. If this is true, and I believe it is, what can be done when two great forces are engaged in a sympathetic strike, one on the one hand, and

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the other on the other, neither having any particular cause of its own as the basis of the strike? The American Railway Union had no grievances to present to the General Managers' Association, and the General Managers' Association, in its resolutions of June 25, stated that "We learn through the public press that the American Railway Union will declare a boycott on all Pullman palace cars," and that "said boycott is in relation to matters over which we have no control, and in which we have no interest whatever." Yet, notwithstanding this, by the same set of resolutions they declare that they ought to do certain things, and their contention in what they ought to do will not be disputed by right-minded men anywhere; but the point is that it was a sympathetic strike and a sympathetic opposition. There could, therefore, be no adjustment as between the American Railway Union and the General Managers' Association on any points at issue between them as parties. The ethical significance, therefore, in this particular respect reaches deeper than the rights of either party or the principle which either party was maintaining, and reaching farther back, to the original trouble, which was being attacked and defended sympathetically, the significance of the whole controversy points to the conclusion that each owed a duty to the public which neither recognized. This is the chief significance of the four great contests alluded to.

Stubbornness in men is often claimed, by those having it, as a virtue, as a principle. It is difficult sometimes to distinguish between stubbornness and principle, and when such a state of affairs occurs as existed last summer, and the public interests are at stake, the public has a right to determine for itself whether it is stubbornness merely or principle, and to protect itself as against a too stubborn adherence to an assumed principle, which on close examination may prove to be faulty. Too strong words cannot be used in condemning the insane acts of men who, in fighting for what they call a principle, violate all the principles of society and of ethics by destroying the relations of men to each other and to the whole, whether these actions are on the part of the one or of the other party.

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Another significant lesson taught by the recent troubles, and especially by the most recent one of them all, lies in the fact that public attention is more emphatically called to the necessity of some sane method of prevening like occurrences, or at least of reducing their number and their severity. The leaders of great strikes are learning as much as the other parties, if not more, and their utterances are encouraging to those who hope to see a better state of affairs. Grand Master Workman Sovereign, of the Knights of Labor, has said that he can imagine that an emergency might arise that would justify a strike, but, generally speaking, nothing more than a temporary victory can possibly be achieved, at the best. He has announced that strikes widen the breach between capital and labor, and that, no matter which side is worsted, it is sore over its defeat, and will retaliate with vengeance at the first opportunity; and he says, further, that it is in study, in education, and in the wise use of the power that is placed in their hands by the ballot that workingmen must hope for release from the condition of which they justly complain. Grand Master Sargent, of the Locomotive Firemen, insists that a man who will encourage men to strike at a time when thousands of his craft are out of employment, when the business of the country is paralyzed, and when men are begging for bread, and when the strike means certain defeat for those who participate in it, displays poor judgment and is unfit to be the leader and counsellor of a labor organization; and he further wisely asserts that when you have a quarrel with one man you cannot make all others suffer. And Mr. Debs, the president of the American Railway Union, an organization that has by its action brought upon itself the severest public condemnation, is reported to have declared recently that the country will see no more great railroad strikes.

In examining the whole situation, as displayed by the Chicago affair, it is quite apparent that its cost was exceedingly small compared to what might have been experienced ultimately had it never taken place. The lesson has been expensive, the losses great, the demoralization certain, the bitterness intensified, and yet out of it all the great moral lesson comes

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that there must be found a way to deal with such affairs without the presence of the sheriff and all that the sheriff stands for. This is one of the most significant lessons of the recent troubles. But what significance attaches to them when we undertake to define just how society shall proceed in order to reduce the number and severity of strikes or to prevent them altogether? Can it be hoped that such a condition will prevail or will be secured through any action of the public, either by legislation or otherwise, as shall prevent labor controversies? Is it desirable that they should be entirely prevented, except through the increased intelligence of all parties to them to such an extent that each would recognize the right of the other? It sounds exceedingly weak and of the nature of mere platitude to recommend anything which involves simply right action and a comprehension of the best ethical methods of considering questions. One who has the courage to recommend anything so weak and so in the nature of pious platitude, is not usually considered as comprehending the situation. If, on the other hand, he should be so weak as to recommend something strong, something vigorous, he would be at once condemned, and very properly, too, as being revolutionary. But the men on the side of labor, who organize and carry on strikes, believe in radical measures,—believe that only through radical measures can matters be so adjusted as to leave strikes entirely in the past, or as unused methods for seeking an end; while, on the other hand, business men take the other radical extreme of *laissez faire*, and insist that if labor does not get what it seeks it should lie down and rest content with what may be given it. The one would drive us into state socialism by one method; the other is as rapidly driving us into state socialism by the other method; the basis of contest assumed by either party is dangerous and will not lead to any satisfactory results.

Arbitration, at the best, is a resort to a simple method; yet it is undoubtedly the very best method that can be adopted when a contest is on. Conciliation seeks to avoid the contest, leaving the matter to arbitration if it cannot succeed in bringing people to understand that they owe something to others

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rather than all to themselves. I believe one of the most significant results of the recent troubles will be the application, through various offices, voluntary and statutory, of the principles of conciliation and arbitration. These principles are ethical in their bearing; they involve the economic conditions, of course, but the ethical consideration must take higher rank in social and industrial affairs than the economic, and to this end all the work of the intelligent and patriotic men of the country should be aimed, not with any Utopian hope of removing contest entirely, but of paving the way to a better understanding, to clearer conceptions of right and wrong, and to higher conceptions of the deep, underlying ethical principles of the whole matter. In order to succeed in this direction we must lay aside forever some of the heretofore considered axioms of political economy and take into our business life some of the principles of ethics. No matter if they are considered weak by the radical, they must prevail under any system. If the resort is to state socialism, then the higher principles of ethics must prevail. If the resort to state socialism is to be prevented, certainly there must be more peaceful relations, more decent treatment, more mutual consideration; and if these recent troubles signify the dawn of a day or of an era of mutual understanding, of reciprocal relations, of an endeavor to help each other, of the highest altruistic conceptions, as between two great elements, each essential to the other in production in all the business of the world, they have not been in vain. Nothing can be secured by calling hard names. When a man knows for certain what another man will do under specific provocation, and he then deliberately resorts to that provocation, he has no moral right to complain of the result of the action. If one man nags another until he cannot longer forbear and turns upon his persecutor with a blow, and the persecutor then thrashes him, the persecutor is not the hero of the event. But there should be no under-dog in the fight: there should be no fight. There should be a recognition of the absolute necessity of the existence of the other in industrial matters in order to secure success. The builder of an ocean steamship who expends some millions in its con-

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struction, cannot move it from the pier until some ordinary man goes into the hold and carries on the laborious work of the stoker, and for the man who has spent his millions in the construction of the magnificent machine to attempt to crush or to own the stoker is a violation of every principle of ethics. The stoker is entitled not only to the very best treatment of the man who owns the machine, but to his sincere regard and respect, and until this principle is recognized, through the claim of the stoker for the respect of the man who has built the ship and the freely accorded claim on his part, there will be no settlement and no adjustment of labor troubles.

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THE NECESSITY OF DOGMA.*

I OUGHT perhaps to start with a definition of dogma. But I shall not endeavor, and, indeed, I do not desire or seek to find a very accurate or appropriate one, for I wish to consider an idea which is essentially popular,—I might even say fashionable,—the idea that dogma is not essential to religion nor to our own well-being. In dealing with ideas which are in the air,—which seems equivalent to being in the magazines,—any very great accuracy of definition would be hopeless pedantry. For the purposes of this paper, however, I think we may fairly take dogma as comprising all propositions as to the real nature of things which neither fall within the range of physical and mental science on the one side or of morals on the other. Dogma, as used by the writers whom I wish to consider, depends upon the subject-matter and not on the evidence. The Athanasian Creed and Hegel's Logic are alike dogma. The immortality of the individual or the unreality of matter are dogmas; but the law of gravitation and the duty of honesty are not dogmas, for they deal with experience, and dogmas deal with what is beyond and behind experience, if anything there be which is beyond and behind it.

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* A lecture delivered before the London Ethical Society.

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I venture to maintain two propositions: the first is that religion is impossible without a basis of dogma, the second is that the existence of dogma, and of dogma of a particular nature, is of vital importance to the character of our life,—that on the possession of certain dogmas depends the decision whether we are to regard ourselves and the world as a success or as a failure.

I freely admit that it would be very desirable if we could avoid this conclusion. If only we *could* introduce order and harmony into our lives by the aid of science and morals alone it would be much to be desired, for if we look around we find clearly in science and morals both certainty and progress. Doubtless there is always a margin of uncertainty in science, —a set of questions raised but not answered. Perhaps the number of propositions which are now in this doubtful land is larger than it used to be. But this is only because they are raised more quickly than they are answered. And they are answered. Problem after problem is solved, and the solution becomes the common and undoubted property of mankind. The advance of science and the certainty of its results are beyond all doubt. What it all means is a very different question, but we cannot deny it is there to mean something.

And in morals the certainty, though not so striking as with science, is still very marked. It is, no doubt, to some extent, as Mr. Balfour told the Cambridge Society, exaggerated, but it is still all-important. If we compare the disagreement of men's opinions on any metaphysical point—the existence of God, of matter, of immortality, of design—with the agreement as to the general duty—and even as to the details—of honesty, of truthfulness, of courage, we shall find the balance overwhelmingly in favor of the latter. Nor can we doubt that to some extent our moral ideas are advancing on a path of inherent development,—becoming more subtle, more comprehensive, more coherent.

Compare all this with dogma. If we take the religion which claims to be revealed, we find not a single proposition laid down which is not challenged as eagerly and bitterly as it is asserted, nor does there appear any chance of discovering

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a common ground upon which it would be possible to settle the question; and if metaphysics is better off, it is better off to very little practical purpose. It is, indeed, erroneous to the verge of absurdity to deny that it advances. But it only advances in the sense that it changes the battle-ground, not by settling any question finally. The questions evolve into different forms, but the answers are still various. We may hope that the long contest will eventually develop into a form when opposition may cease, and that we shall at last put the question of all questions in the form that will wring an answer from the universe. Personally, I believe that this will come. I even agree with those who think they can discern the first faint signs of its coming. But the goal must at the best be distant, and many fail to see any hope that it can ever be reached. For many centuries to come, we must resign ourselves to the fact that where we have dogma we shall have division.

Dispute without any particular hope of reconciliation is bad at all times,—worst of all when, as must always be the case to some extent with subjects so vital and so deep-reaching, it implies not only intellectual but spiritual discord. If we could put dogma altogether on one side, or confine it to the studies and lecture-rooms of divines and philosophers; if we could say that in spite of dogmatic divisions and doubt we could still have religious unity and certainty, still lack no element for a significant and happy life, then the world might surely count itself fortunate.

But to do this is, I fear, impossible, for it would ignore, as I shall endeavor to prove, something which is essential to religion and essential to our acquiescence in and approval of our own life as ultimately and absolutely worth living, and this something is the sense of complete harmony. Not merely of complete harmony of the universe regarded as a single whole. Science will give us some reason to believe in a certain harmony of the universe with itself, though it may be doubted whether that harmony would stand a close examination. But we require something more. The question arises whether the universe is in harmony with ourselves. That we,

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as part of the universe, form part of its harmony cannot be denied. But, from our own point of view at any rate, we are more than this. We can conceive ourselves not as parts, but as individuals; not as means but as ends. We can place ourselves on one side and the universe on the other, and we can, and we must, ask whether from this opposition there results harmony or discord.

To put the matter in another way, we find in ourselves two independent and ultimate tests and predicates of all reality. We can ask of everything, in the first place, Is it true? and, in the second place, Is it good? These two questions are independent and ultimate. Neither of them, as Mr. Balfour has brilliantly shown in the "Defence of Philosophic Doubt," can be made to depend on the other. Nothing is true merely because it is good. Nothing is good merely because it is true. To argue that a thing must be because it ought to be is the last and worst degree of spiritual rebellion,—claiming for our ideals the reality of fact. To argue, on the other hand, that a thing must be good because it is true, is the last and worst degree of spiritual servility, which ignores the right and the duty inherent in our possession of ideals,—the right and the duty to judge and, if necessary, to condemn the whole universe by the highest standard we can find in our own nature.

We have thus a divided allegiance. We are bound to own the truth as truth, however horrible or despicable it may be. We are bound to own the good as good, however impossible it may be to obtain it, however certainly the whole current of the universe may be running the other way. Each is supreme in its own sphere. But the difficulty is that the sphere of each comprehends the entire universe. It is clear at first sight that of any conceivable thing the question may be asked, Is it true? And we must take good in the wider sense, not of moral virtue alone, but of all that we desire,—true good being that which we long for, not from caprice or accident, but from the essential nature of our being. And then, since in a single universe no one fact can be without influence on any other, there can be nothing which does not

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either help or hinder the attainment of our aspirations,—nothing which must not be pronounced either good or bad.

It follows, then, that the only possibility of a real harmony in our point of view towards the universe will lie in a conviction that whatever is in the long run true is also in the long run good, or, as Hegel expresses it, that what is real is righteous and what is righteous is real. Otherwise we shall find it impossible to escape a position of pessimism; we shall be forced to pronounce that the real is not good, and that our aspirations are doomed, to some extent, not to be realized. Reality will seem unsatisfactory, goodness will seem empty and hopeless, and we shall find ourselves driven to admit that nature and ourselves are discordant and inharmonious.

Now pessimism, as it appears to me, is incompatible with what is properly called religion. Religion, I suppose it will be generally admitted, is a mental attitude or disposition of some sort; and I believe I shall be in accordance with general opinion if I go on to say that it must at least be an attitude of acquiescence towards the universe: of confidence, however reached, that the supreme power which governs events makes for righteousness; that the ultimate reality is worth not only our fear, but our admiration; that cheerful acceptance of the fate that befalls us is not merely a degrading submission to a power stronger than we are, but rather an ennobling recognition in that power of the perfection and realization of all our ideals and aspirations.

That the common idea of religion includes at least this is obvious from the fact that the ordinary definition of religion would require a belief in some supreme being who is not only feared but worshipped, who is conceived not only as stronger than his devotees but as more admirable. The assumption of a beneficent deity, so far as it is thoroughly realized, is clearly a way, the shortest and simplest way, of insuring that truth and goodness shall coincide. The only belief to which the name religion is generally accorded, which does not ascribe the existence of the universe to a power working for righteousness, is Buddhism. And even here the

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acquiescence is gained, though in a different way, for although the universe, in so far as it exists, is held by Buddhism to be essentially evil, yet it teaches that the constitution of the universe provides a way for each of us by which we can escape from its tyranny to the shelter of annihilation. Reality, in itself a curse, becomes a blessing, in so far as it points the way to its own negation.

Other definitions of religion have, however, been proposed, and especially, in some cases, with the object of rendering religion independent of dogma. I shall therefore endeavor, in the first place, to show that, if we accept this definition of religion, dogma is indispensable to it; and, in the second place, that if we define religion so as not to include this acquiescence in the universe as a whole, we must at any rate admit that our attitude towards the ultimate questions of life must, in the absence of dogma, be one either of indifference or of despair.

If we reject dogma, we have still left, on the one hand, science, on the other, morality, including not only the pursuit of virtue in the stricter sense, but also the pursuit of knowledge and of beauty, in so far as we consider them desirable ends for man. Can we base an attitude of acquiescence in the universe on either of these? Let us take science first. Does science give us any ground to regard the universe as morally desirable, or its creator, if it have one, as morally admirable? I conceive that it gives us no such ground.

Taking the question, in the first place, generally, we find that science demands, and from its stand-point rightly demands, that all conscious life, including our own, should be regarded as the effect of the merely mechanical and physical laws of matter and motion. If this is the case, it follows that, since no part of the universe is determined to exist as fact, by those laws which we lay down for the universe in our aspirations and desires, or by any laws of a similar nature, it can merely be by chance that any harmony exists between those aspirations and the facts. The chances are, in the strictest sense of the word, infinitely against a complete concurrence of the two, and even if the infinitely improbable

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event happened, we could scarcely pronounce the outside universe to be righteous merely because a blind chance led it to fulfil the postulates of righteousness.

And even if we do not, as I think we must, take science as postulating a materialistic monism, we must at the least admit that it requires a dualism, and is incompatible with an idealistic monism. Even if, that is, it could be induced to abandon its claim to treat the *prima facie* spiritual as really material, it could not be induced to allow that the *prima facie* material was really spiritual. Supposing we could hold, on the basis of science alone, that mind was not merely matter, —and I do not think that science would allow us even this concession,—still, we could not possibly hold that matter was merely mind. Now, I do not see how in this case we can possibly admit that the universe is righteous, for we are conditioned by matter all around us. We are never free from its influence. And if matter is governed by non-spiritual laws, the chances must again be infinity to one that it will to some degree thwart the nature of spirit. Revealed religion escapes this difficulty by the hypothesis of a beneficent deity, who so arranges and controls matter as to render it compatible with, and even subservient to, the realization of righteousness in the universe. Metaphysical idealism escapes it by maintaining that matter is essentially of the nature of spirit, and will in the long run be found in harmony with it. But each of these courses involves the forbidden dogma. And without them it seems impossible to suppose that spirit is not in some degree thwarted by facts outside it,—impossible, therefore, to regard the universe as righteous, since it is subjected to a necessity which has no regard for the good as such, because it has no law common to it with those laid down by our moral nature.

To look again at the matter from a more concrete point of view. It can scarcely be denied, I think, that we demand permanence somewhere, that a universe in which everything was doomed to destruction was not one which we could regard as satisfactory. Now, from the point of view of science, for what have we the right to expect this perma-

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nence, except perhaps for mere dead matter? The latter may perhaps be put out of account. As Mill is reported to have replied to an enthusiastic positivist, it is rather cold comfort to look forward to our whole civilization being eventually transmuted into an infinitesimal augmentation of the temperature of infinite space. And what else is there? Science certainly gives us no reason to suppose that we can survive the death of our bodies. That conviction must be found in dogma, if it is to be found at all. And as for the race. Even if we could suppose it permanent, it would scarcely be a satisfactory ideal, when the lives of the individuals of whom it is made up were fragmentary and unsatisfactory. But we cannot suppose it permanent, for science, I conceive, insists that the temperature compatible with human life is only a very transitory phase in the existence of a planet. And, besides, even if science could promise us immortality, either for the individual or for the race, would such an immortality be worth having? For our dissatisfaction with a finite and limited life is scarcely to be removed by an endless aggregation of finitudes. The only result of such a process—the best science could offer us—would be, I fear, that the unsatisfactory element would be infinitely multiplied, and that the life which was trivial and inadequate when it had an end would not be improved merely by being lengthened. There *is* a conception of eternity which might perhaps satisfy our cravings,—the eternity which is as much in a moment as in a thousand years, the infinity which shows itself more clearly in one of us than in the whole physical universe,—but this, too, is on the forbidden ground. Metaphysic knows it, and pays the penalty for her folly in the contempt of all sensible people! Theology has dreamed that time may be no more. But science knows better. She proudly wears the badges of the finite. If men are so foolish as to long for the infinite, so much the worse for them.

To sum up, then, we have no reason to believe that because a thing is good it will be true, and we have very definite reasons for believing that some things which are good are not true. This is the result of science. And it follows that we

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have two alternatives. The one is to pronounce the universe to be morally admirable because it is physically stronger than we are. If we suppose the universe, or its creator, to be endowed with a lively sense of personal dignity, this course is unquestionably prudent, but scarcely to be recommended on other grounds. The other is to deny to the universe any right to be regarded as in any sense admirable or good; and in that case our acquiescence in it must be impossible; the good and the true will be not only independent but contradictory, and religion, in the sense in which we are now using the word, will be replaced by defiance or despair.

Can we, then, get to a position of greater peace and harmony from morality only? Again, I think not. No doubt, independent of any rationality or righteousness in the universe, morality still remains binding. The idea of the good is valid for us. If it is not valid for the universe, so much the worse for the universe. No doubt, too, however much we believed that the stars in their courses were fighting against us, we might, in carrying out the demands of our own nature, and in striving to make the best of such an extremely bad business as the universe would then be, feel not only enthusiasm, but a certain amount of pleasure. But it could not give us the sense of harmony with the universe. It sounds plausible, at first, to say that the possession of virtue ought to console us for everything, and that, therefore, we have only to be virtuous to feel in harmony with the universe, since with the virtuous man no external element can disturb his happiness or, consequently, affect the harmony. But we must remember that in proportion as we are devoted to virtue we care for its success, and are therefore considerably affected by a world which denies success to it. A man who was so excessively virtuous that the defeat of virtue in all its endeavors was a matter of entire indifference to him, would be more psychologically interesting than logically consistent. And, again, not only the virtuous man himself, but other people are subject to the decrees of fate. A virtue which was so intense that it rendered us indifferent to the sufferings of others would almost have passed into its opposite. Of course, if we

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suppose that those sufferings are part of some plan which on the whole works for happiness, we may trust the event, and not despair or condemn because of them,—but such a trust that "good will be the final end of ill" would take us once more into the forbidden precincts of dogma.

Nor do we escape the difficulty by saying that if these other people also had been virtuous they would have been happy. Even if this were so, it only deepens the tragedy of the situation, if truth means, not only that men are unhappy, but also that they are wicked. Nor do we avoid it by saying that their wickedness is their own fault, even if that were true, for the difficulty is that there is a want of harmony between the universe and our ideals, and that is not removed by any decision as to what being in the universe is responsible for the want. Whose ever the fault may be, the want of harmony is there. And how are we to deal with beings not yet high enough for this stoical virtue? Granted—and it is granting a good deal—that the contemplation of the moral imperative could solace a man,—say in the spasms of hydrophobia,—it would be unreasonable to expect such devotion to the ideal from a dog or a guinea-pig. And then how is their pain to be prevented from destroying the harmony?

Pain is an evil,—all our morality implies that. Even if we have a right to forgive the universe our own pain,—and I doubt if we have the right to do even this,—we have certainly no right to forgive it the pain of others. We must either believe the pain inflicted for some good purpose, or condemn the universe in which it occurs. But the first is certainly not obvious on the surface, and therefore requires dogma, and the second means utter pessimism. Can Natural Religion provide us with a third alternative?

Surely, the more keenly we desire the good, the more keenly we must condemn a universe which baffles and thwarts our desires. And if neither science nor morality can make a religion by itself, still less can they do so together. If the true and the good are discrepant, the more enthusiastically they are pursued, the more obvious and painful would be the want of harmony. Their reconciliation might indeed form

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the basis of a religion. But since, as I have endeavored to show, they are in themselves inconsistent, they can only be reconciled by something outside them, and, alas, the only thing outside them is the much-condemned dogma.

We must now meet a modified position. No doubt, it is said, especially by the author of "Natural Religion" and "Ecce Homo," no doubt this religion, which we get from science and morals, is inferior to a religion obtained from revelation or metaphysics, which should enable us to say that the supremely true is the supremely good. But still it is an approximation to it, it is only quantitatively behind it, and it is worth having if you can't get anything better. The God revealed in science "is also the God of Christians. That the God of Christians is something more does not affect this fact."* This I deny. The God of Christians is held by them, whether justifiably or not, to be not only the deepest reality, but the highest perfection we can conceive. The God of science, on the other hand, if you are to strain language so far as to call him a God, falls very short of such perfection. No doubt you may say that, since the philosophical and theological idea of God implies complete symmetry and order, and science shows a certain symmetry and order under the lower categories, that the difference is from one point of view quantitative. But then this difference becomes, in its effect on religion, qualitative. The difference between an ounce or a pound of bread a day is quantitative, but it may issue in a qualitative difference of life or death to the person who eats it. The difference between a rivet that breaks at one pressure and a rivet that breaks at another is quantitative; but that, too, may mean a qualitative difference of life and death. So the difference between a being who surpasses our ideals of the good and one who falls short of them is from one point of view merely quantitative; but it may be all the difference between a God and a devil, and that, from the point of view of religion, may perhaps not unreasonably be considered a difference of kind.

* "Natural Religion," p. 23.

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It is clear that, from the point of view of science, the good is often thwarted. In that case I conceive we are shut down to two alternatives about the God revealed in science, who is so much patronized by advanced thinkers. He may be entirely indifferent to good or evil. In that case he cannot be a spiritual being. Every spiritual being must have some end which it proposes to itself, and that end is its own good,—true or false according as the spirit is high or low. The good of a spirit higher than ourselves might far exceed ours, but must embrace it, and a power absolutely regardless of either good or evil must be unspiritual. Such a power would be mere blind chance, and such a power, it seems to me, we can have no right to admire or reverence. We may reverence that which fulfils our idea of good, we may reverence still more that which surpasses it; but that which has no relation to the good, has no claim to reverence. It is stronger than we are, no doubt; but to reverence it on this ground seems to me, I confess, an error much of the same sort, though enormously more flagrant, as estimating the artistic worth of a picture by the square feet it covers.

Or, on the other hand, the God of Science may have regard to good and evil. In that case he put the evil there, knowing it was such. Now, dogma might possibly say that evil was a means to an end, or transitory, or unreal; but without dogma we have no reason to believe that the evil is less part of the purpose of the universe than good, for science is strictly impartial between them. In that case we must suppose that the evil was put there as evil; and as we can scarcely plead for a God, even a God of science, that he was misled by ignorance, or tempted by circumstances, we must suppose that he put the evil there because he liked it. In which case the God of science seems to bear a fairly close relation to the devil of theology.

The author of "Natural Religion" has, however, given a quite different definition of religion. He calls it "the influence which draws men's thoughts away from their personal interests, making them intensely aware of other existences to which it binds them by strong ties, sometimes of admiration,

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sometimes of awe, sometimes of duty, sometimes of law." * To adapt Matthew Arnold's definition, we might call religion "life touched by enthusiasm." Doubtless for this we can dispense with dogma. We can be enthusiastic about truth, even though it be horrible or evil, we can be enthusiastic about virtue, though it is doomed to failure. Only, in this case, why call it religion? The word always has been used in the past, if not always to include explicit optimism, at any rate to exclude explicit pessimism. And this creed by no means excludes explicit pessimism.

And there is something more serious, for the use of the word "religion" in this case gives an unfair advantage to those who use it. Because religion has always excluded explicit pessimism, because for the last nineteen centuries this could only have been done by the assertion of explicit optimism, because religion has meant a belief in some infinite and eternal good, because it has meant an assurance of utter harmony and of the peace which passes understanding,—therefore the word has a charm and a significance as of something supremely good. And I think that, doubtless unconsciously, the people who use the word for nothing higher than an enthusiasm for virtue, profit, and to some extent deceive themselves, by transferring with the name the mystery and the restfulness which only clung about it in respect of its older meaning.

Still, if it pleases any one to use the word religion for a state of mind which may include utter despair of the destinies of all things, utter contempt and defiance of the universe, and of its creator, if it have one,—this is a free country and he can use what words he likes,—only we say, in that case, that if dogma is not important for religion, it is all-important for the happiness and dignity of our own lives.

It will depend on dogma whether we are bound to conceive the universe as governed by a being incurably malicious, or one whose blind caprice is as thwarting to us as malice could be, or whether, on the other hand, we may trust that the

* "Natural Religion," p. 236.

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highest ideals and aspirations of our own nature are realized, and far more than realized, in the ultimate reality, implicit now, and some day to be explicit. It will depend on dogma whether we can regard the troubles of the present and the uncertainties of the future with the feelings of a mouse towards a cat or of a child towards his father. It will depend on dogma whether we regard our lives as worth living only as desperate efforts to make the best of an incurably bad job, or whether we can regard them as a passage to a happiness that it has not entered into our hearts to conceive. It will depend upon dogma whether we regard our pleasures as episodes which will soon pass, or our sorrows as delusions which will soon be dispelled. It will depend upon dogma whether we regard ourselves as temporary aggregations of atoms, or as God incarnate. I must confess that I am egoistic enough to regard the point as one of some interest.

And so I find myself lamentably "out of touch," to use their own language, with the advanced thinkers of the present day. I cannot be certain that the difference between ὁμοουσιος and ὁμοιουσιος was so unimportant as it appears to certain energetic preachers of tolerance. In fact, I sometimes ask whether the zeal of these excellent men is not becoming a little contradictory, and am not without my fears that, if this demand for tolerance goes on increasing, I may find myself in some inquisition of the twentieth century for the crime of attaching some importance to the question of my own immortality. I have a haunting suspicion that, in spite of our present enlightenment, it may after all be the things which are not seen which are eternal, and sometimes go so far as to hope that the investigation of our relations with the Absolute and the Divine may again come to be thought almost as serious an occupation as the counting of beetles' legs or the abolition of taverns.

Dogma, as I admitted before, means division. But it may, perhaps, be doubted whether you can get any unity worth preserving by the process immortalized by Mr. Saunders McKaye of first stripping mankind of their clothes, and then proclaiming them brothers "on the gran' fundamental prin-

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ciple o' want o' breeks." The insides of two empty boxes are no doubt singularly alike. But a unity of this sort may possibly be overvalued.

It does not, of course, follow that dogma will deliver us from our troubles. We cannot set out on an inquiry and prejudge the answer. If we begin to inquire into what lies behind phenomena, the answer may be even more depressing than the superficial aspect of the phenomena themselves. But the only possible line of escape lies in this direction. Whether we take the path of revelation or of metaphysics, we must go behind experience for any view of the universe that we can hold to be truly satisfactory.

It is here, as it seems to me, that the strength of the so-called revealed religions of the world lies. They are, at any rate, formally adequate to the purpose with which they set out. They have, in their own estimation, reconciled the two great postulates of our nature. They have, somehow, arrived at the conclusion that Omnipotence and Benevolence are united. They may be entirely unjustified in their conclusions. Their conceptions of Benevolence may have been of the most remarkable nature. But they were, at any rate, of some importance to the people who believed in them. The gifts they promised were worth taking. They changed the aspect of heaven and earth for those who believed them. But the systems in which we are invited to put our faith to-day seem mostly based on the hypothesis that you can make things in general worthy of admiration by spelling them with enough capital letters.

As I said at the beginning of this paper, the result which we reach is by no means entirely satisfactory, for to reach the truth, which alone can make us free, only two roads have ever been suggested,—that of so-called revelation and that of metaphysics. Now every year fewer people appear willing to believe in the rationality and the righteousness of the universe on the ground of revelation. And even if every one who studied metaphysics arrived at idealist conclusions,—which, unfortunately, is not the case,—yet the study of metaphysics is only open to those who have a certain amount of natural

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and acquired fitness for it. The number of people who will be left between the rapidly-receding trust in revelation and the slowly-advancing trust in philosophy is unpleasantly large. Whitechapel in particular will probably lose its faith in revelation sometime before it adopts, with any approach to unanimity, any form of idealistic philosophy. And the idea of a large number of people with nothing to hope for in the future, and not much to live for in the present, is not a very cheerful prospect, either for them or for society.

But we shall gain nothing by not facing the facts. If the supply of bread runs short, we shall gain nothing by distributing stones. Such a course may have two positively evil effects. It may persuade the ungrateful recipients, not only that there is a deficiency of food, but that there is no such thing as food at all. And it may prolong the scarcity, or even render it perpetual, by turning men's minds to quarries rather than to wheat-fields, as the source from which may arise some satisfaction for their desires.

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THE JUVENILE OFFENDER, AND THE CONDITIONS WHICH PRODUCE HIM.*

The subject which I have selected for consideration this evening is the juvenile offender and the conditions which produce him, or rather which tend to produce him. I have chosen this topic, because it has been an important part of my daily duty for a considerable number of years to come into close and constant contact with large numbers of the juvenile delinquent population, and thus to see the youthful offender at first hand as he really is. In the second place, I have chosen this subject because I am sorry to have to tell you that our present methods of punishment by imprisonment

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* A lecture to the Cambridge Ethical Society.

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have exceedingly little effect on a large class of offenders, and were never more inefficient for reformative purposes than they are to-day. A conclusive proof of this condition of inefficiency is the steady growth of what our French friends call *recidivism*. At present, recidivists, or, as we should say, old offenders, form a larger proportion of the prison population than ever they did before. And when you have the same people coming back to prison again and again, this is a sure sign that imprisonment is doing them not one particle of good. In all such cases imprisonment may be successful in punishing the offender, but it is useless as an instrument for making him better in character or a better member of society. What the real dimensions of recidivism are, it is at present impossible to say. Our moral statistics relating to this matter are just now in an unsatisfactory condition. The returns as we have them tell us that about one-half of the prison population are old offenders, and that one-fifth of the prison population have been more than ten times in prison before. But I am satisfied that if we had proper methods of identification, it will be found that old offenders comprise about three-fourths of the prison population. In the face of a fact such as this, it must be confessed that our present methods of dealing with the criminal classes are of very limited value as an instrument for renovating the character. Imprisonment fails as an instrument for reforming the character, because in the majority of cases it does not touch the conditions which produce the criminal. On the contrary, our cellular system aggravates these conditions. It produces a high ratio of insanity and suicide. It sows the seeds of mental and physical disorders, which often incapacitate the liberated offender for the duties of social life.

Now, I believe that the proper way of dealing with the problem of crime, is to do what you can to remove the conditions which produce it. If you have an outbreak of fever in Cambridge, you will not put an end to it by building a fine hospital for the sufferers; you will only succeed in stopping it by putting your drainage in proper repair. In other words, you will combat the disease by removing the conditions which

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produce it, in so far as they are removable. Now, I consider that you ought to deal with the ordinary offender on the same principles as you deal with an epidemic. You ought, as far as possible, to remove the conditions which produce him. But before these conditions can be removed, the first thing to do is to ascertain what they are. When you begin to try to ascertain this in the grown man, you at once find that they are exceedingly complex. You find them very difficult to unravel. It is, therefore, better to study them in the youth. The juvenile touches life at fewer points. The process of interaction between him and the complicated social mechanism of which he forms a part, is on a comparatively simple scale. The conditions which tend to deprave his character and turn him into a criminal offender, are more easily grasped. It is on this account that I intend to confine the following remarks to the juvenile offender and to him alone.

The conditions which produce the delinquent juvenile are divisible into two fundamental classes: conditions residing within his personality, and conditions residing outside of him in his surroundings. Conditions residing within him are of two kinds, physical and mental; and as the physical are the more palpable, we shall discuss them first. There is one physical condition tending to produce the young offender which I am afraid we cannot remove, and that is the physiological fact of sex. I do not suppose the wildest dreamer ever anticipates the arrival of a day when there will not be two sexes. And yet sex exercises a wonderful effect on the inward predisposition to crime. A boy is much more likely to become an offender than a girl. At the present time we have eighty-four boys in our prisons under the age of twenty-one to every sixteen girls. We have eighty-five boys in our reformatory schools to every fifteen girls, and we have seventy-nine boys in our industrial schools to every twenty-one girls. Whether you look for the juvenile offender in the prison, in the reformatory, or in the industrial school, you will always find that the boys outnumber the girls in the proportion of at least five to one. This is a proof of the immense influence of the physiological fact of sex on the conduct and character

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of the young. We are sometimes told that the difference between men and women with respect to criminal offences, is in the main a difference arising out of differences of social function. No doubt there is a considerable amount of truth in this contention. But if it were entirely true, we should find the female as much addicted to criminal offences as the male, in all those cases where a difference of social function had not come into existence. In the case of boys and girls under the age of fourteen, there is practically no difference in social functions. Children under this age are brought up in the same way. They are subjected to almost the same supervision; their social life is the same in all its essential features; and yet boys under fourteen are five times more likely to become offenders than girls. I think this fact proves the powerful effect of sex on certain forms of conduct or misconduct. I think it is fatal to the idea that women are just as prone to become offenders as men, with this difference that females offend in other forms. It is the fundamental differences attaching themselves to the fundamental fact of sex which makes women less likely to become offenders than men, just as it makes girls less likely to become offenders than boys. These fundamental differences can never be obliterated by similarity of education, similarity of social habits, or similarity of industrial pursuits. They are resting on foundations far too deep to be disturbed by any conceivable social transformations, and they will always have the effect of rendering the boy more likely to become an offender than the girl.

I now pass on to physical differences of another character, which exercise a powerful effect on the fate of the young. If you proceed to examine the juvenile offender, you will find that he suffers much more than the general population from constitutional defects and infirmities. In our English industrial schools the rate of mortality and mortal illness among the inmates is three times as high as the rate of mortality among the juvenile population of the same age. In reformatory institutions we find an equally high rate of mortality and mortal illness. In appreciating the value of these facts, remember that the children in these schools are in some meas-

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ure picked lives. Each juvenile before admission has to be certified by a doctor that he is sound and healthy; and many a juvenile is rejected because he does not come up to the required conditions. If all the juveniles committed by the magistrates to reformatory and industrial schools were admitted into these institutions, we should find that the rate of mortality and mortal illness among young offenders is more than three times higher than the rate of mortality in the general population.

Another proof of the degenerate physical condition of the juvenile offender is to be seen in the proportion of these children who are wholly or partially orphaned. The premature death of the parent, when not produced by violence, is usually a sure sign of feeble vitality. If a large proportion of juvenile offenders are descended from parents who die young, this fact may be taken as a proof that these children are descended from a feeble and decadent stock. Between the years 1887–91, no less than thirty-nine in every hundred of the inmates of English and Scotch industrial schools had lost one or both parents by death. In reformatory schools during the same period, thirty-three inmates in every hundred had lost one or both parents by death. In the London prison with which I am connected, forty-five young offenders in every hundred had lost one or both parents by death. When we witness such a high mortality among the parents of juvenile offenders, it is not surprising to find a correspondingly high rate of mortality among their offspring. As far, then, as the rate of mortality among the parents is to be taken as a sign of a tendency to physical degeneracy among the children, we find that this sign is present among at least one-third of the juvenile delinquent population.

Other signs of degeneracy are not wanting. If we compare the stature, the weight, the chest measurement, the span of arms of the juvenile offender, with the stature, the weight, the chest measurement, the span of arms of the juvenile population of the same age and sex, we shall find that in every one of these respects the juvenile offender exhibits a marked inferiority. Let me give you an example of the extent of this

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inferiority. In an industrial school in Lancashire the average stature of boys of thirteen is 53.2 inches; in the general population the average stature of boys of thirteen is 56.9 inches. The average weight of these industrial school-boys is 72.3 pounds; the average weight of boys in general is 82.6 pounds. The chest measurement of industrial school-boys of thirteen is 26.31 inches; the chest measurement of boys in the general population is 28.3 inches. The span of arms of industrial school-boys of thirteen is 52.45 inches; the span of arms of boys in the general population is 55.51 inches. Thus we see that in height, weight, chest measurement, arm measurement, the juvenile offender in industrial schools is distinctly inferior to the juvenile of the same age and sex in the general population. In the prison population the juvenile offender exhibits precisely the same physical inferiority. About two-thirds of these offenders are below the average of the general population of the same age in weight and stature.

I think the facts I have just put before you are sufficient to show that the juvenile offender is in a great number of cases a degenerate member of the population from a physical point of view. The fact that he is in so many cases either totally or partially orphaned shows that in many instances he is descended from a feeble stock. The fact that he is so much more apt to die than the rest of the community shows that this feebleness has descended to himself. The fact that he is below the average in weight and stature is a further proof of his decadent condition. In short, the physical basis of mental life is distinctly below the average among juvenile offenders taken as a class.

Now, what does defective physical condition teach us with respect to mental condition? Let us make it clear at the outset that bodily vigor is not always to be accepted as a sign of mental vigor. Neither is bodily enfeeblement always to be looked upon as a proof of mental incapacity. Instances are not wanting to show that a person may be in possession of a vigorous and well-compacted frame, and yet fall below the usual level of character and intelligence. And, on the other hand, there are conspicuous examples of great mental capacity

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being associated with defective physical development. Fineness of texture as well as mere bulk is an element which must be taken into consideration. But, after allowing for these exceptions, I think it must be admitted that on the whole physical degeneracy has a tendency to produce or be accompanied by mental degeneracy. The correlation between bodily and mental processes is so intimate that a defect in the one has a tendency to be responded to by a defect in the other. If, then, the mental condition of the juvenile offender is to be measured by his physical condition, we should be forced to conclude that it is distinctly below the average. We should be forced to conclude that about one-half of the juvenile delinquent population is deficient in general mental power.

If we look a little more closely at the mental condition of the juvenile offender, we shall find, in the first place, that his intellectual capacity is on the whole of an inferior order. Many young offenders from the towns exhibit a considerable amount of superficial sharpness and dexterity in certain directions. This arises from the fact that they are practically left to themselves at an extremely early age. Whilst the children of the well-to-do are in the hands of nurses, and are not allowed to take a single step on their own initiative, the children of the streets are learning the lessons of street life. It is this which accounts for their premature precocity in everything relating to street life, street ways, street habits. And it is precocity in this department which makes some people imagine that the young offender has more than his share of intellectual ability. This wonderful precocity of the immature mind is in reality something akin to the instincts of the wild animal. It no doubt contains an intellectual element, but it must not be taken as a proof of intellectual power. When set to purely intellectual tasks the precocious street offender is, in a high percentage of cases, dull and unintelligent. Captain Brooks, after an experience among juvenile offenders of more than twenty years, records it as his conviction that the intellect of most of them is of a distinctly inferior type. Of course there are clever boys among them. But my own experience leads me to confirm the testimony of Captain

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Brooks. Educational acquirements are not to be taken as a test of the intellectual capacity of the young offender, inasmuch as he has often had no educational opportunities. Still, in these days of compulsory schooling, children of every class are more or less at school. Among juvenile offenders only ten or twelve per cent. can read or write as well as juveniles of the same age in the national schools.

In so far as the moral sentiments are a product of heredity, the juvenile offender is distinctly in danger of having inherited obtuseness of moral feeling. What amount of moral feeling can parents have when they neglect the elementary duties of parenthood? And are not these elementary duties neglected in all those cases where the juvenile offender is deserted or descended from criminal parents, or left to the tender mercies of the streets? About one-third of our juvenile offenders are the children of such parents. Undoubtedly, lack of moral sensibility is a prominent characteristic of the young offender. This is partly due to immaturity, for a refined moral sensibility is the last as well as the finest acquirement of the human mind. In the juvenile offender I am afraid it is also due to congenital causes. Anyhow, it is a notorious fact, admitted by every experienced observer, that the vast majority of young offenders, and for that matter old offenders too, have absolutely no sense of wrong-doing, no susceptibility to moral impressions. The head of the New York State Reformatory has recently stated in one of his reports that three-fourths of the inmates have little or no susceptibility to moral impressions: one-third of them have absolutely none. I admit with sorrow that this statement would hold true of the young offender in English prisons. How far this state of moral insensibility is the result of a defective moral training, and how far it is the result of inherited and congenital moral decadence, is a matter on which I do not venture to pronounce an opinion. That it is sometimes the result of inheritance, I firmly believe. In proof of this, we have only to look at the moral differences among children brought up in the same family under exactly the same moral conditions.

I also incline to the belief that the feebleness of will and

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character, which is another distinct characteristic of the young offender, is in many cases a product of heredity. I found this belief on the fact that the parents of these offenders lose almost all control over their offspring at a very early age. The parent loses control not because the child is abnormally intractable, but because the parent is unusually weak. The parent is inert, wants will, wants character, wants fixity and stability of purpose. If mental inheritance is as true as physical, this mental inertia, this defect of will, this instability of purpose in the parent, is in many cases transmitted to the child. Incapacity to control the child is exhibited among more than forty per cent. of the parents of juvenile offenders, and this mental condition is reproduced among these juveniles in the shape of incapacity to control themselves.

I think I have said enough to satisfy you that the juvenile offender is mentally as well as physically anomalous. His mental anomalies consist in a low level of intellect, a low level of feeling, and a low level of volition. These mental defects are often inherited from parents who are similarly defective. Both on the mental and the physical side the young offender is sprung from a decadent stock, and it is undoubtedly the existence of this fact which helps to make him what he is. Much as I should like to enlarge on the biological condition of the juvenile offender and the biological causes of juvenile delinquency, I feel that time is short, and I must, therefore, pass away from it in order to be able to say something on the principal external conditions which tend to produce the juvenile offender. I divide these conditions into two classes, parental conditions and economic conditions. First, then, as to the parental conditions of the young offender.

In our industrial schools more than one-half of the inmates is composed of juveniles who are either illegitimate, or have one or both parents dead, or are the offspring of parents who have deserted them. In our reformatory schools a still larger number of the population is in a similar abnormal parental condition. In prisons we have no figures as to the number of juveniles under twenty-one whose parental condition is similarly anomalous. But as far as my personal investigations

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have extended it is equally as large. It is a very curious fact that the abnormal parental condition of illegitimacy is not so productive of the juvenile offender as might naturally be supposed. Illegitimate children do not contribute more than their proper share to the population of reformatory schools. This remarkable circumstance is to be attributed to the fact, that nearly all over England illegitimacy is most prevalent where there is the smallest amount of crime. In Cambridgeshire, for instance, you have less than the average amount of crime and more than the average amount of illegitimacy. In London we have more than the average amount of crime and less than the average amount of illegitimacy. Both the rate of crime and the rate of illegitimacy, as far as England is concerned, are governed by the same sociological law,—namely, the degree of density of population. But this law operates in one direction in the case of illegitimacy, and in another direction in the case of crime. If you have a sparse population, as in Cambridgeshire, you have much illegitimacy and little crime. If you have a dense population, as in the metropolis, you have little illegitimacy and much crime. But in one or two exceptions to this general sociological law, such, for instance, as the county of Cheshire, where you have at once a high rate of illegitimacy and a dense population, you have also a high rate of juvenile crime, and adult crime too. From an exception such as Cheshire, I conclude that the illegitimate child, if placed under the same social conditions as the legitimate, is more likely to become an offender than the child of lawful wedlock. Fortunately for the illegitimate child, social conditions of a favorable character largely neutralize the adverse accident of birth.

I pass from this point in order to touch on another curious circumstance relating to the future of a child. It is generally better for the future of a child to lose both its parents than to lose only one of them. A juvenile who loses both his parents is usually taken charge of by some benevolent institution or by the poor-law authorities. The result is that the orphaned juvenile is removed from almost all the surroundings which tend to produce the young offender. In the union or in a

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benevolent institution he is protected against himself. He is shielded from the temptations which beset juveniles in the outer world. Hence it is that a comparatively small proportion of the reformatory and industrial school population is composed of young people who have lost both parents.

Children who have lost a father only are four times as numerous in industrial schools as children completely orphaned (twenty per cent. in industrial schools are fatherless). In other words, one in every five of the industrial school population is without a father. Of course, children who have only lost a father are more numerous in the general population than children entirely orphaned. On this account we must expect to find more of them in the delinquent population. Yet it is unquestionable that children who lose their fathers contribute more than their due share to institutions for juvenile offenders. If we think of it for a moment, the reason of this is obvious. It is true the poor-law gives relief to the mothers of more than one hundred thousand fatherless children (1891–92, children relieved, one hundred and seven thousand one hundred and eleven). But in most cases the relief afforded is not enough to enable the mother to stay at home and watch over the welfare of her family. She has to go to the workshop or the factory in order to supplement the efforts of public charity. The children are thus left to their own devices during the day. They are deprived of the benefits of maternal supervision and of the educating influence of maternal affection. The mother sees comparatively little of the child, and loses some of the self-sacrificing devotion of motherhood. The child sees just as little of the mother, and thus loses some of the hallowing influences of filial love. The result of this anomalous parental condition is, that a large percentage of fatherless children become offenders against the criminal law.

It is usually regarded as a greater calamity for a child to lose its mother than to lose its father. Among the well-to-do classes, where the home is properly provided for in the event of the father's premature death, the loss of the father may be the lesser evil of the two. But where the home is not properly provided for, the loss of the father is a greater calamity

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than the loss of the mother. Children dependent on the mother form, as I have said, one-fifth of the industrial school population. Children dependent on the father number only one-seventh of the industrial school population. And among young prisoners I find that the loss of the father is usually more disastrous to the character than the loss of the mother. How is this to be accounted for? In the first place, male mortality is rather higher than female. There are, therefore, more fatherless than motherless children in the general community. The proportion of fatherless offenders should accordingly be somewhat larger than motherless. But in addition to this, the father retains his authority over the child longer than the mother. We must also remember that he is the bread-winner, and that as long as he remains, the family income is not diminished. The children are not forced to go out and pick up a living at an unduly tender age. On the other hand, children dependent on mothers are often compelled to go to work too young. In large cities this class of children, as they will tell you, get their living in the streets. In this way they sink into vagabondage and descend by unconscious steps from vagabondage to crime. Thus it is, in my belief, that children dependent on mothers, are more apt to become offenders than children dependent on fathers.

The greatest moral danger to children dependent on the father, arises in those cases where the father marries again. Remarriage is a perilous experiment where there are young children. It is apt to introduce division and disaster into the home. This applies to the remarriage of either parent, but it perhaps applies with greater force to the remarriage of the father. The stepmother is too apt to consider the children she has to look after in her new home, as a kind of burden she is not sorry to get rid of. This I find is more particularly the case if she has afterwards children of her own. From the stepmother the motherless child in many instances receives little attention, little affection, little parental care. Thus, the home loses its attractions for the young. It is regarded as a place where they are likely to be bullied and brow-beaten. In large cities, as a sort of refuge from it, they seek the danger-

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ous liberty of the streets. This is the first step towards a criminal career. It is possible that a growing recognition of this fact has something to do with the decrease of remarriages. Remarriage was never so infrequent as it is now. It is just possible that among other circumstances which undoubtedly account for this interesting social phenomenon, a place may be assigned to the rise of a greater sense of duty towards the young.

The parental condition of the juvenile offender is sometimes anomalous, from the fact that he is deserted by his parents or is the offspring of criminal parents. Deserted children form about six per cent. of the reformatory and industrial school population. Children of criminal parents form about two per cent. of the reformatory and industrial school population. As you may readily imagine, children are more frequently deserted by the father than the mother. In 1891, more than seven thousand fathers were proceeded against in the criminal courts for deserting their wives and families. Only two hundred and seventeen mothers were proceeded against for deserting their children. As far as the reformatory school child is concerned, desertion by the parent is most frequent after he has passed the age of twelve. Sometimes he is deserted in the lodging-house, sometimes in the streets. For a time the deserted child drifts hither and thither on the treacherous tide of city life. He descends to the lowest possible surroundings, and usually ends by appearing in the criminal courts. Deserted children are often descended from criminal parents. It is, therefore, natural to pass from the deserted child to the child of criminal parentage.

That a child of criminal parents should himself become a criminal is only natural. At no period of life is the impulse to imitate so keen as in early youth, and the child of a criminal home falls into the habits of its elders as soon as it is capable of copying them. At first these habits are imitated on a small scale, but bolder enterprises are undertaken as soon as mental and physical ability permit. And if a child of criminal descent should escape the meshes of the law till he has acquired skill and experience in some department of crime, it is almost impossible to reclaim him from a criminal career.

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It is fortunate for society that the cares and duties of parenthood are incompatible with a life of crime. Criminals who have children are accordingly anxious in many cases to get rid of them. Such children fall upon the poor law or are admitted into voluntary homes, or are sent out to beg so as to be committed to industrial and reformatory schools. In this way the criminal calling of the parent is not hampered by the cares of home. This is the reason why in England the criminal profession does not, as a rule, descend from father to son. It descends by apprenticeship and not by inheritance. This is a point which should always be remembered in dealing with the hereditary aspects of crime.

I have now dealt with that half of the juvenile delinquent population which is in an abnormal parental condition as far as regards the number of their parents. I must proceed to deal with the other half, who are in a normal condition as far as regards the number of their parents. In reformatory and industrial schools one-half of the juvenile population had both parents alive and were living with them at the moment of their fall. In all these cases it is not the circumstance of being without parents or of being deserted by parents, which has helped to turn the juvenile into an offender, in so far as parentage has anything to do with their criminal condition; it must accordingly be attributed to something in the character of the parents. In order to ascertain whether this is so or not, we have now to ask, What is the character of the parents of juvenile offenders who have both parents alive? Before a royal commission appointed a few years ago to inquire into the state of our reformatory and industrial schools, it was stated by a member of the Gateshead school board, that the parents of the children in the Gateshead industrial school consisted of the refuse of the laborers in the large manufactories, men who had drifted to the very lowest class of the population. The superintendent of a Liverpool industrial school says, that from their connection with their parents and the set of people they meet in the homes of their parents, it is astonishing, when talking to the children, to find what a vast amount of vice and indecency they have listened to without being

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aware of it. Mr. Mark Whitwell, a Bristol magistrate, says he could tell the particulars of every child in the Carlton House Industrial School; and with respect to the girls he adds, there is not a single instance where I should like to see the girl back to her parents. Perhaps no one occupies so favorable a position for forming an accurate estimate of the character of the parents of juvenile offenders, as the official who collects the contributions of these parents on behalf of the home office. The duties of this official bring him into the closest possible contact with the parents. He sees them in their homes at regular intervals for a number of years. In a word, he sees them as they really are. Mr. Macdonald, one of these agents, says that in only six per cent. of the cases he visits do juvenile offenders come from homes which are morally fit for a child to live in. In Manchester the chairman of the industrial schools committee says that sixty-eight per cent. of the parents of juvenile offenders are known to be disreputable, that fifteen per cent. are of doubtful character, and that seventeen per cent. are supposed to be well conducted. Vicious or criminal habits usually stamp the parents of juvenile offenders.

Putting all these facts together respecting the parental condition of the juvenile offender, what do we get as a final result? We find that the parental condition of fifty per cent. of the juvenile criminal population is an abnormal one, as far as regards the number of their parents. In other words, one young offender in every two is either without parents or has only one parent, or is illegitimate, or is deserted by his parents, or is a child of criminals. Of the remaining fifty per cent. who are living with their parents at the period of their fall, we find that not more than fifteen per cent. have parents who are morally fit to be entrusted with the education of the young. We accordingly conclude, that in eighty-five cases in every hundred, the juvenile offender is in a bad parental condition.

Now as to his economic condition. In all cases where he has lost both parents by death, or is deprived of them by desertion, it may safely be said that his economic circumstances are distinctly unsatisfactory. It is impossible for a

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juvenile who is left alone in the world to be anything else than miserably off, if he has to depend entirely on his own resources for the means of subsistence. Even if he obtains some sort of employment, his earnings are too small to keep him in ordinary decency and comfort. But children without parents and without a home find it exceedingly difficult to get regular and salutary work. Most employers of young people like to know that they have a home. They do not care to engage a lad who has to sleep in a common lodging-house. They know that in such places the risk of contamination is very considerable, and if there is room for choice, as there generally is where work is worth having, a boy who has a home is taken in preference to a boy without one. Thus it comes to pass that orphaned and deserted children have to pick up a living in a very precarious manner. In large cities many of them earn a scanty pittance as street hawkers, and when this kind of occupation fails them, as it often does, they resort to begging, or degenerate into thieves. Irregularity of occupation begets irregularity of habits, and when manhood is approached it is difficult to correct customs which have become habitual in youth. The inability at the outset of life to procure regular employment ultimately develops into a want of aptitude for it. The worker who has been compelled to live by casual employment as a youth ends by preferring to live by this kind of labor when he becomes a man. Children who live with widowed mothers as well as children who are illegitimate, are in a better economic position than juveniles completely deprived of parental care. They have at least a shelter of some kind, and this is an economic advantage in an humble way. But as a rule juvenile offenders entirely dependent on the mother are low down in the economic scale. In most cases they are very indifferently clad, and want of proper clothing is an economic disadvantage of great importance to this class of children. Clothes, it is true, are the merest externals of respectability; but in a great many instances these externals are the only tests employers have to go by, and a boy in rags is always looked upon with suspicion in the labor market on this account alone. It is a very common thing for juveniles committed to

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prison to complain that they cannot get work, as they have no clothes, and one of the many ways in which a Prisoners' Aid Society is of inestimable benefit to the young, consists in providing them with a workmanlike suit of clothes. Even in cases where the juvenile offender has both parents alive, he is rarely apprenticed to a trade. In this respect he resembles the criminal population as a whole. No less than sixty-five per cent. of the prison population class themselves as laborers. In the general community, laborers of all kinds—agricultural laborers, general laborers, road and railway laborers—do not at the outside exceed sixteen per cent. of the male population over fifteen years of age. Thus, you see, the low skilled worker is three times more likely to be sent to prison than other members of the male community. Of these laborers it is the general laborer from the towns and not the agricultural laborer who does so much to swell the annual returns of crime. In other words, the class which is lowest down in the scale of industry is highest up in the ranks of crime. Several causes are at work in producing this result, but undoubtedly the principal cause is that, as a class, general laborers are recruited from the most backward, the most impoverished, the least intelligent portion of the community. Recruits also come from those who have failed at other occupations either from want of ability or from want of character. In order to get work, the general laborer needs little ability and no character. General labor is accordingly the resort of persons without worldly advantages of any sort. It is the last refuge of all who have failed from whatever cause in other departments of industrial life. It is the only resource of a large class of juveniles who have no parents or no home, or whose parents are too impoverished or too disreputable to give their children a training in some skilled employment.

I think I have said enough to satisfy you that the economic condition of the juvenile offender is, as a rule, distinctly bad. At the same time a protest must be uttered against the idea that crime is entirely a product of defective economic conditions. I am the last man in the world to say that defective economic conditions have not a tendency to demoralize the

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character and to produce criminal habits of life. But respect for truth compels me to admit that a low economic condition, standing by itself and acting by itself, does not produce an abnormal amount of crime. If this were the case we should find most crime where there was the greatest amount of pauperism. We find, on the contrary, that there is least crime where there is most pauperism. And we also find that where there is most pauperism there is least crime. I do not say pauperism is an absolutely accurate test of the economic condition of a community, but it is on the whole the best test we can get. Now, in those English counties, such as Northumberland, Durham, Lancashire, Glamorgan, Stafford, where we have an abnormally high ratio of crime, we have also an abnormally low ratio of pauperism. And on the other hand, in counties such as Norfolk, Suffolk, Wilts, Cornwall, where we have an abnormally high ratio of pauperism, we have an abnormally low ratio of crime. Facts of this character cannot be got over by people who wish to persuade us that the moral problem is solely an economic problem. The prince of modern economists was far from sharing this view, and I think his words at this moment may be opportunely repeated:

"A man of rank and fortune," says Adam Smith, "is the distinguished member of a great society who attend to every part of his conduct, and thereby oblige him to attend to every part of it himself. His authority and consideration depend very much upon the respect which this society bears to him. He does not do anything which would disgrace or discredit him in it, and he is obliged to a very strict observation of that species of morals, whether liberal or austere, which the general consent of this society prescribes to persons of his rank and fortune. A man of low condition, on the contrary, is far from being a distinguished member of any great society. While he remains in a country village his conduct may be attended to, and he may be obliged to attend to it himself. In this situation, and in this situation only, he may have what is called a character to lose. But as soon as he comes into a great city he is sunk in obscurity and darkness. His conduct is observed and attended to by nobody, and he is, therefore, very likely to neglect it himself, and to abandon himself to every sort of low profligacy and vice."

In the town the laborer's economic condition is probably better than in the country, but in the country his character is probably better than it is in the town. In other words, the

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moral problem is not merely an economic problem, and it will not be solved by the application of merely economic remedies.

Time is passing, and I must bring this address to a close by a brief recapitulation of its principal conclusions. An examination of the biological condition of the juvenile offender showed that he is, as a rule, inferior both in body and mind to the average member of the community. A similar examination of his parental and economic circumstances showed that his social condition is inferior to the social condition of the mass of the community. It was also pointed out that adverse economic conditions acting alone, do not produce an abnormal crop of juvenile offenders. And the same remark holds good of adverse biological conditions acting alone. The juvenile offender is a product of adverse social and adverse biological conditions acting in combination and indivisibly. It is a mistake to try and resolve the one set of conditions into the other. To try and do this is to revive the old Byzantine futility as to whether the egg existed before the chicken or the chicken before the egg. At the same time, in certain forms of juvenile crime and, in fact, crime of all kinds, biological conditions usually predominate as in offences against the person. And in other forms of crime social conditions predominate, as in offences against property. A conclusive proof of this statement is, that offenders against the person suffer much more from mental affections than offenders against property. But in every instance biological as well as social circumstances contribute something to the sum of conditions which produce the criminal act, and I may add the merely immoral act too.

The final outcome of our inquiries is to show that the offender against the criminal law exhibits in a large number of cases biological and social characteristics of a distinctly abnormal kind. It is the existence of these abnormal characteristics which make him what he is. Hence it follows that the only proper and effective method of dealing with him is to remove the anomalous conditions which produce him in all those cases where they are removable. And in all those cases where they are not removable, the only effective method is to

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remove the offender himself from ordinary social life. It is only on offenders whose biological and social condition is almost normal that the prison has any appreciable effect for good. On the multitude of abnormally constituted and abnormally circumstanced offenders, I am convinced, from long and watchful experience, that the prison has only an effect for evil. Imprisonment for short terms in its present shape neither does the offender nor the society which imprisons him any good whatever. It is in fact one of those forms of punishment which an eminent ethical teacher says he personally regards with the strongest moral aversion.

I have not come among you to-night to propose remedies, but to lay bare causes. I have no cut-and-dried remedy for social ills. I do not believe that such a remedy exists. But as to-day is the anniversary of the death of one of our greatest contemporary moralists,—Thomas Carlyle,—I will conclude by reminding you of the remedy proposed by his immortal master. "If each one," says Goethe, "does his duty as an individual, and if each one works rightly in his own vocation, then it will be well with society as a whole."

W. D. Morrison.

London.

THE TELEOLOGY OF VIRTUE.

Most ethical systems agree in regarding virtue as teleological in that it secures by its own intrinsic properties the highest good of man. How virtue is connected with this well-being; whether or not it is in itself the ultimate end of action, is a question on which, as we shall see, there is a wide difference of opinion. Yet there is a general consensus of belief that either virtue and human well-being are identical, or the two are related as end and means.

Such a view has not been invariably accepted. It has sometimes been thought that it is more honoring to God to represent the moral law as the expression of His arbitrary will. God has given us the moral precepts we have, but He might have given others. It is our part as His creatures to obey

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the laws we have received, and it would have been equally our part to obey any others He might have imposed, however different in quality they might be. Rewards may be given by God, but the same rewards might as well follow any kind of conduct. Virtue is not causally connected with welfare; or it is so only through its relation to this foreign power. This view, which had as its champions such thinkers as Duns Scotus and William of Occam, was a natural intellectual product of the mediæval church. It is scarcely to be reconciled with Christianity; but the mediæval church had relapsed largely into Judaism. It is a natural part of any doctrine which lays too great emphasis on the article of the Divine Sovereignty.

Modern systems of ethics show a more or less complete break with such theological conceptions. That these have been entirely discarded, it would be too much to aver; but the tendency is away from them. In Idealistic systems human reason has been identified with the divine. The spirit of God and the spirit of man are said to be akin, and therefore the moral law is not regarded as an arbitrary enactment of the Supreme Being. While it reflects the divine holiness, it appears at the same time to man as his own legislation, and in obeying it he is realizing his own best nature. Even Kant, who more than any other may be regarded as unwilling to sacrifice anything of the unconditional authority of moral law, finds the source of that authority in our reason, and thus makes virtue man's obedience to himself.

The teleological nature of virtue has been yet more explicitly asserted by those who hold that pleasure is the end of life. To them the term good has no meaning, except as denoting a distinctly human good; and virtue belongs to actions only as they conduce to this good. Idealists and Hedonists are thus agreed that human welfare is the end of moral action.

But when it is asked wherein human welfare consists, the divergence in view already indicated is found to stand for a hitherto unreconciled antagonism. The Idealists and Intuitionalists make prominent the part of Reason in the constitu-

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tion of the true good. According to Kant, the Practical Reason utters its precepts for the direction of the crowd of desires and impulses found in man's nature. The relation of the Practical Reason to these is analogous to the relation of the Intellect to the data of sense. As, in the realm of cognition, thought brings order into the chaos of sensations, disposing them into a cosmos, so into the world of passion reason comes to legislate, with an authority derived not from the material on which it acts, but from itself. The good life is not in the gratification of any natural desire, but in the controlling of that desire by reason.

Professor T. H. Green taught likewise that the ethical life of man consists in the control of his appetites and other powers by reason. To what does reason order the faculties? To the pleasure which satisfies desire? No; its end is to realize itself in them, to exercise them for the sake of exercising them well. The categorical imperative enjoins only disinterested obedience to itself. The unconditional good is the good will. The good will is likewise the will for the unconditional good, and if there seems to be movement in a circle, the circle is that of the ethical life.

Similar is the view presented by Mr. Muirhead in his "Elements of Ethics."* "The end of life is an ideal of self; but the ideal self cannot be realized in the pleasant consciousness which follows the satisfaction of desire; but in the subordination of the desires according to the law of the self as an organic unity."

These theories agree in making the rational the end of life. The reason guides the other elements in human nature, and this guidance is the ideal or end. As was said of old, we shoot, not that the mark may be struck, but that we may show skill in shooting.

The Hedonistic opponents of such theories find in feeling with its poles of pleasure and pain the rationale of the ethical life. They start from the obvious fact that we desire pleasure and have an aversion to pain. This is taken to represent the

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ultimate principle of all action. All action has as its end human welfare, by welfare pleasure being meant. Virtuous action is action that is wise.

In Bentham's view, pleasures varied in quantity only, not in quality; and the end of life was, consequently, the greatest sum of pleasures. J. S. Mill, however, maintains that pleasures vary in quality as well as quantity; there are higher pleasures as well as lower. Still the theory, even in this more attractive form, is defective, and Mr. Spencer offers to correct and supplement it. Mill had not explained why we have such and such pleasures; he had given no genesis of the moral faculties. He had also failed to show how these faculties are interrelated. Spencer believed that he supplied such an explanation and unifying principle in his use of the conception of evolution. He teaches that, at the beginning of animal life, the securing of pleasure takes place in simple ways. But, as life develops, there is in the method of accomplishing this an increasing complexity. The end is not something immediately attained, and there is a more elaborate adjustment of means or actions necessary for the securing of the end. The simplest living forms absorb the food with which they are brought into contact. But the more developed beast of prey gains its food in no such direct way. "Before the gullet swallows, the jaws must lay hold; before the jaws tear out a piece fit for swallowing, there must be that co-operation of limbs and senses required for killing the prey; before this there must be persistent activities of limbs, eyes, and nose in seeking prey." * There is still more to be said of these subsidiary activities. They come to be attended by pleasure irrespective of the end which they were meant to serve. There is a pleasure in the search for prey as well as in the satisfaction of appetite. Similarly in human life there are the pleasures of business which are distinct from the pleasures of food and clothing, though these ultimately prompt the merchant's energy. The good of life can thus be said to be in its fulness,—*i.e.*, in the pleasures which are immediately and directly

* "Data of Ethics," § 58.

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pursued, and those which attend the actions done with a view to ulterior ends. Under the head of means are to be classed those activities which are known more distinctly as moral. The ultimate sanction of moral action is in those pleasures which were the original cause of activity. While "to use effectually each more complex set of means becomes the proximate end, and the accompanying feeling becomes the immediate gratification sought, there may be, and habitually is, an associated consciousness of the remoter ends and remoter gratifications to be obtained."* More explicitly Mr. Spencer says, "Is it not clear that observance of moral principles is fulfilment of certain general conditions to the successful carrying on of special activities. . . . May we not infer that though conformity to moral requirements precedes in imperativeness conformity to other requirements; yet that this imperativeness arises from the fact that fulfilment of the other requirements is thus furthered."* When we inquire further what these primal requirements are, they seem to resolve themselves into some such pleasures as those of food-taking. It is extremely important that it should be clearly understood that this is the meaning of Mr. Spencer's theory.

The teaching of Mr. Stephen is similar. We learn from him that the reason of conduct is always its quality in terms of pain or pleasure. The kind of pleasure the agent seeks, depends on his character. His character, again, depends on the conditions of his existence. It must be such as to fit him for the struggle of life. Life here must mean physical life. Character is not the supreme end; it fits for life. It is scarcely a misrepresentation of the doctrine to interpret it as saying that the primary pleasure is either that of mere existence, or that of the sense of taste, and that the character and the pleasures thereon dependent are subordinate to it. It is only in agreement with this view of the end that Mr. Stephen makes the maxim, Be strong, the maxim of the individual virtues. The strength inculcated is evidently that which is requisite to the preservation of life.

* "Data of Ethics," § 59.

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We have now before us the modes in which some of the leading ethical theories employ this conception of teleology. Though the category plays so important a part, a critical examination of it is looked for in vain. Vagueness of thought is the necessary consequence of this neglect of criticism, and there is need for an investigation to determine the value and limits of the conception. The investigation is essential to the formation of ethical theories; it has also, as we shall see, no unimportant bearing on ethical practice.

We may provisionally define human teleological action as voluntary action, the idea of which precedes the doing of it. We must, later, analyze such actions. We have also to determine how many kinds of action can be so described, and what the end of such actions is, more especially, what actions have pleasure as their motive. We have also to indicate how much of the ethical life has an origin independent of human will and purpose.

To start with the last-mentioned problem, it is to be observed that much in human life, including many of its most valuable elements, is not due to man's purposive action. The faculties with which he is endowed are not of his making. The power to perceive truth he did not call into being. His social instincts he did not create. His "random" movements are not volitional. Even his habits are only to a small extent a result of choice. It is, after all, to a comparatively small fraction of life that deliberate intention has application.

Our view of this matter would not be intrinsically modified were we to adopt the point of view of evolution. For while to the evolutionist the animal improves slowly towards the man, the improvement is not due to its design; scarcely, if at all, to its desires. Animals are born with finer endowments, but it was, of course, no design of theirs that such should be secured. Nature, we say, meaning a power other than the finite will familiar to us, brought into being that richer life. The genesis of the moral nature is only a chapter in this story. The origin of sympathy is not in design. The altruistic instincts were not arranged for. The family and other

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institutions were made for men or their progenitors, rather than by them. It would scarcely be too much to say, whether we are evolutionists or not, that the beginnings of our ethical life and almost all its developments in intelligence as to ideals, are due to a power other than our wills. It is true that when we have tasted a good, we can labor to secure it. But we do not labor for it till it has been brought into our experience. Neither can we be said to wish for new forms of it unless there has first been an enlargement of our experience. It is an advanced reflection which would make experiments with life for the purpose of getting a larger satisfaction. And even in such cases the human attitude is that of receptiveness. The good is given to us, and is not of him that willeth. Our good gifts are from above.

How are these endowments of thought and instinct and habit related to the moral life? Are they a part of it? We would surely be justified in saying that they are. It is surely an improper limitation of the moral life which would restrict it to the conflict with evil. The good which is imperilled in the conflict is not necessarily more precious than that which is given in the exercise of habit and instinct, and natural mental gift. Whether this be allowed or not, these factors enter into our ethical life. Without them our ethical life would not exist.

What kind of relations these elements exhibit is a question we shall not here discuss at length. It may at least be said that they cannot be construed after ordinary human analogies of end and means.

When we pass to actions which originate with human wills, we find that an important class, representing no small part of human life, is composed of those which are the fruit of desire, though they do not embody any choice. Every idea of an action tends to project itself outwardly. The action is produced by its suggestion; the sight of means to do deeds makes the deeds done. Specially clear illustrations of this type of actions are afforded by those which result from the morbid persistence of the idea of them. A man throws himself over a precipice from the sheer dread of doing so. His

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fear gives the thought of the suicide such vividness that nothing inhibits it. Of such "ideo-motor" actions the incipient stages may be called desire.

Such actions are teleological and voluntary in one sense. The idea of them precedes them; the performance of them is conscious; there may also be the selection of means necessary. Such actions may also have moral quality, for moral ideas can pass thus directly into deeds. Yet from such impulses choice is absent. There is no conscious self-reference; there is no selection from a number of possible states or activities of the self. The idea of the action, which is the action incipient, produces its overt realization. If there is teleology here, it is not in the deliberate purpose of human intelligence; it is in the necessities which govern the human mind; or, to put it physiologically, in the natural working of the nerve-cells. The protoplasm stimulated must act in some way; the cases considered have the peculiarity that the incipient action is itself the stimulus.

Again, actions may be done for pleasure. These are among the most familiar, as they are among the most significant, of the activities of organic beings. The study of them is beset by endless controversies. It may suffice here to consider what is in some respects the most important group of such pleasure-motived actions, those which are done from choice. We shall see, as we proceed, whether this group includes all choices.

Choice is less wide than desire. It is that desire which has been in conflict with others, and has won the victory. In desire there is a contrast of two states, but the contrast is not necessarily present to consciousness. The present want and the future possession are elements in it, but there may be no reflection on the relations of the two. Where the contrast is present to consciousness there is choice. There are two states of the self thus contrasted, and selection between them is made. It is in respect to choice that the theory holds, which declares that in voluntary activity there is reference to a self.

What is the end of the actions which choice determines?

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Is it always pleasure? Or, may it be a rational principle? Or, is it a combination of the two? At the outset, attention should be drawn to the ambiguity in the term choice. We say we choose the means to a given end; or, of two methods of accomplishing a task we choose the better. The expression is not objectionable, yet it should be observed that choice is here made to include a judgment on the qualities of things. But such a judgment has not choice proper in it any more than the judgment that a right angle is larger than an acute angle. Choice is present when we appropriate to ourselves that which is deemed good.

This is the true relation of intellect to choice. We have seen the claim of the Idealists that the ethical life is the realization of reason. The statement contains truth, but it cannot be accepted in the form in which it is presented. The impulse to moral action does not come directly from reason. For, in the first place, reason does not utter imperatives. To give to its dictates the form Thou shalt, is, it need not be remarked, to speak in a pictorial way. It is the function of the Reason to see truth. From this insight into truth an impulse to moral action may arise, but the two are distinct. The so-called imperative is more properly indicated by the expressions, feeling of obligation, sense of duty. It is approval of and delight in the good presented, a sentiment varying in its *Gefühlston* with all the variations in the quality and relations of the good, and possessing in presence of a rational conception of conduct that quality which we regard as having a peculiar sacredness. The impulse to action is not from reason. We have spoken, indeed, of ideas passing into overt action. But we can say this only because of the wide meaning of the term idea. In such an idea, *per se*, there is no judgment, there is no perception of relations; and if it is the work of the understanding to judge, or to indicate relations, that faculty must be declared to have no place in such ideas.

From this it can further be seen that it is not the function of reason to change man's nature. The theories referred to represent reason as acting on the various empirical elements

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in human nature, and shaping and transforming them to suit its purpose. There is in this a good illustration of the mischief which follows failure to criticise categories. These theories present a conception of the activity of reason which has been gained by observation of a very different kind of activity. Reason does not struggle with the world. The term "practical Reason" is misleading. Reason contemplates the world. The business of changing belongs to animal life. Birds build nests; beasts of prey hunt and kill and eat; and man as resembling them has earing and harvest. The organism uses its environment; it changes it, and changes itself. But the peculiar activity of the organism does not represent the activity of reason. It is through emotion that the decisions of life are determined; when there is a conflict between two or more ideas, there must be appeal to this arbiter of the practical life. The will is the source of our deliberate acts; and the will is not reason. Hegel says that nothing great has been accomplished in the world without passion. Professor A. Seth points to the fallacy lurking in the statement, that the world is governed by ideas. It might be more prudent to say that great things may be accomplished without passion, but that when the individual has to choose between two states or conditions of himself, he will accomplish nothing, either great or small, till passion has turned the scale. Feeling changes the world. The intellect makes no selections, but it is the part of feeling to choose. We prefer the pleasant, we shun the painful. While the intellect contemplates the laws which it discovers in the world, pleasure consumes the world, having as its one interest that the ministry to itself should be perfected.

It need scarcely be added that pleasure is various in quality. The self whose good we seek is not always the same self. There is the self as cognitive, as æsthetic, as social; and besides these and within these there is an indefinite number of gradations; and the feeling attendant on the idea of each is unique. Yet all such feelings have the general characteristic that they are part of that happiness which constitutes our well-being.

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Choice is of the pleasant. Yet it is scarcely to be supposed that psychological analysis can stop at this result. It must further determine the meaning of this statement, by showing what elements enter into this consciousness of the ego and its pleasure. It seems to be the case that the feeling of the self is largely constituted by the so-called organic feelings. It is also the case that these organic feelings are in large measure emotional; it is their pleasure or pain qualities which we are aware of. So that when the Ego consciously identifies itself with the idea of an action it is meant, at least, in part, that the idea awakens the pleasurable feelings, and thus in turn receives a reinforcement which secures its realization. The basis of our life is emotional, and we can be said to be stirred to the core of our being only when our emotional nature is thus awakened. Only when thus stimulated do we choose. Appeal is made to the deep-seated primal emotions. How these blend with the other psychical elements, we need not wait to inquire.

It will conduce to greater clearness if two of the objections which can be brought against this doctrine be considered. On the one hand there may be urged the familiar *Meliora probo, deteriora sequor.* The drunkard believes that sobriety would secure him the finest enjoyment, yet he cannot refrain when the cup is near. In such a case there seems to be choice. Yet the poor victim of appetite knows how little choice there is. The idea of the indulgence is in presence of the temptation, too powerful and urgent for any other idea to have its legitimate influence. All other motives pale away. For choice, the various motives should be carefully weighed; but this is a requirement which it is impossible for the mind so enslaved to meet. The action thus, though there is in its initial stages the semblance of choice, resolves itself into one in which an action suggested has been realized.

On the other hand there are actions which seem to be done simply from obedience to moral law. In the crises of life, choice has its most important function, but the choice is not determined by pleasure. The action chosen is thought to

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lose all moral value if pleasure has been its motive. Such actions must be examined more minutely. Obedience to the moral law may be the result of any one of many motives. There may be obedience from fear, or for reward. Most of these cases may be dismissed at once; it is not in them that the exception to the general rule can be found. The cases to be considered are those in which the moral law leads immediately to action. Yet it will be found that in them there is no illustration of choice. The law arrests attention; or, rather the idea of a concrete moral action does this. The idea gains ascendancy and passes into outward action. There is not reference to a self whose good is regarded as realized in moral activity. Were there such reference there would be choice of happiness. The action is more mechanical. It may be added that such actions do not display the highest type of morality. There is an irrational element in them. The moral law is obeyed without any understanding of its authority. The morality is mediæval, judaistic. If virtue is teleological, he is surely on a higher plane who understands the teleology and renders an obedience, not blind, but intelligent.

There is possible yet another account of the end of action. It may be a combination of reason and emotion; it is often the object as given in the vision of enjoyment which seems to excite our efforts. This view need not detain us long. It is so far correct. So far as we are rational, ideas mingle with all our experience; they are the best light to lighten human ways. But when we choose between two courses of action, it is not from them, so far as they are of reason, that the decision comes.

We have thus found many kinds of actions: those which are the natural exercises of the faculties; those which are random; those which are habitual; those which are preceded by their idea; and those which are done for pleasure including those which are the result of choice. It would be interesting to ethics, as to psychology, if they could be reduced to one type. That there is unity of type is suggested by a consideration of their physiological counterpart. It may be

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that in all these cases we have repeated the functions of the nerve-cells, nutrition, and liberation of energy. Repeated, indeed, in different conditions, and varying with the varying environment and interrelations of the cells; yet ultimately similar; even pleasure-motived actions can be reduced to this type.

It is not meant, indeed, that all actions are identical in nature: there is no such barren identity. But there seems to be enough to show that the teleological conception is subordinate. The final interpretation of life cannot be in its terms. But the question arises, Is all action to be explained on mechanical principles? We must beware of abstractions. The concrete material world is probably, in the essence of its working, not merely mechanical.

There is a further question awaiting us. The utilitarian value of the pleasure which is chosen must be determined. Mr. Spencer teaches not only that pleasure is the end of action, but that only those animals survived whose actions were useful towards self-preservation; and he finds the sanction of conduct in this utility.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the value of this utilitarian doctrine for the light which it throws on the organic relation of the virtues to life. It was natural that Mr. Spencer should ignore the facts which it did not explain. But life has not the simple unitariness which it demands.

In the first place, we are not entitled to regard the struggle for food and the struggle for existence as identical. The two may conflict: a hungry animal faces dangers which in other conditions it would shun. Neither do these two exhaust the catalogue of desires. Even in the lower organisms, there are, as Darwin has shown, two other motor forces at work. There is the instinct of sex, which may conflict with other impulses. There is also the delight in beauty. This last case is specially important, as it points so directly to the presence of other factors than those which conduce to the preservation of the animal. The beauty of the male bird, *e.g.*, is in the eye of the female, and neither to male nor female does it bring any advantage. In fact, the male may develop its powers of

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gratifying the female's æsthetic sense, as Darwin has shown, at the cost of injury to the species.

Further, when it is stated that the activities pursued as means become ends, the utilitarian principle is again departed from. For it is implied that the activities thus practised are carried beyond the limits which utility prescribes: the independent pleasure which they yield is an end in itself. But that is to give them an importance very different from that assigned them while they are regarded as subservient to something beyond them. A revolution is wrought in conduct: there is not one only end; there is a variety of ends. The centre of gravity in life has shifted. The change may go so far that that which was originally the end may become the means. Courageous deeds may have originated with the struggle for food. Now food may be sought that there may be strength for noble deeds. Is it not a matter of history that the *Vivo ut edam* has in large measure changed into the *Edo ut vivam?* The æsthetic development, already referred to, is the most striking illustration of this principle. The senses are teleological; eye and ear are useful; but it is by no reference to the struggle for existence that the enjoyment of sonatas and studies in colors is to be explained. The so-called practical man is justified in his scoffs at such uselessness.

Again, there may be activities which have not their source in the useful at all. The nerve-centres when stimulated must liberate their energy in action of some kind, but the action may be a waste of energy, so far as the future welfare of the organism is concerned. Random movements, some at least of the expressions of the emotions, are of this meaningless, useless character, and when such elements once find a place, they in turn react upon and modify that which was in its origin directly useful.

The truth is that the activities of organic beings are not at any stage necessarily utilitarian. Nature furnishes the organism with many members, useful and useless. In the struggle for existence the non-utilitarian have tended to be eliminated. The elimination has been complete in proportion to the fierceness of the struggle. Blessed are those organisms

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which are so adapted to the conditions of the struggle, that no part of their energy is wasted. For the time, the struggle is nature's expedient for shifting such organisms from the less economical. But apart from the struggle, there is no reason why the organism should show this economy. Piano-playing may be out of place on the battle-field, but may be a pleasant employment when there is a truce in the conflict. It is impossible to state the functions of the organism or the ideals of life in terms of economy in the struggle for existence.

There are thus actions that are useful and actions that are useless. After what has been said on the possibility of finding unity of type in all actions, it may not be difficult to see how, so far as teleology is concerned, the two are one. In both there is liberation of energy. In the useful action the energy liberated secures directly or indirectly its own renewal. Yet this regeneration of energy, so to name it, is contingent; though nature gives the prize in the conflict to those organisms in whose constitution she has exhibited it, it is not primarily essential to, or designed by them.

Our investigations have put us in a position to state the ideal of life. We cannot restrict the virtues to the useful, as usefulness is generally estimated. We may not say that the final end of all action is the getting of food, and the preservation of life. To do so is to put an incubus on morality. The useful is only a part of the good; it is only a part of the pleasant. Our nature expands in many varieties of activity, and the moral ideal is the development of all our faculties, or if we, by the power of sympathy, include others with ourselves, it is the development of the faculties of humanity, the filling of the world with joy.

From this point of view, it can be seen that it is the function of the ethical rule to give a method for reaching the good of life. Primarily, the good is extraneous to the law; later, the mere obedience may become an end in itself, as any means may become an end: Virtue for virtue's sake. But still this particular rule is empirical, and with the increasing complexity of life, new methods must

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be discovered, and the old discarded. This work of remodelling and adding to the laws of life is as delicate as it is serious. The earnest days which Carlyle applauds so stormily, were days when life resolved itself into a fairly simple struggle for existence, and the requisites for success were physical vigor allied with the more elementary virtues. But the conflict slackens, and then there is a leisure which is not incompatible with the retention of the good things of life. Then the grossest forms of vice arise, but then also there is opportunity for a refinement compared with which the condition of the past age seems coarse and barbarous. It is then that the moralist has one of his most delicate tasks. Yet he is surely wise if he regards the statutes of men as empirical, and, while reverencing the past, reverences yet more truth and the fulness of nature.

A true Ethic would thus put for the ideal of man the development of his faculties; only, it does not take these as static; it teaches that the perfection at which he aims is larger than he can now understand. New faculties are emerging; new relations are being entered into; life bursts all bonds. Man's present powers and all those whose potency now lies in his spirit, are to be partakers of a completer satisfaction than the world has known. The development of each faculty is limited only by its own conditions and the demands of all the others. The ideal of life, we can say, though with a meaning different from Mr. Spencer's, is its fulness.

Something more positive should be added on the relation of ideas to practical life. Nothing has been said to belittle their importance. It is largely in proportion as the emotions have had reason for their guardian, that they have bloomed into happiness. Nor is this the only good in ideas. As the intellect develops, ideas are deemed valuable for their own sakes: for many, truth is the highest possession. And the movement of ideas is often independent of any desire for satisfaction. It does not indeed always have this independence; there is a peculiar pleasure connected with the solution of problems, and the acquisition of truth. And when there is a choice between the intellectual life and other goods, it is in

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that pleasure, blended, it may be, with the primal joys referred to above, that the source of the decision in favor of such a life is to be found.

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THE ALTRUISTIC IMPULSE IN MAN AND ANIMALS.

IT often happens that the mind, imbued with and dominated by a familiar theory, sees in nature things that do not exist. The projected reflection of dominant ideas assumes the aspect of real existence. And while man has the penetrating vision and shows the interest of a lover of nature for these products of his mind, which can properly be called nothing more than hallucinations, he does not even perceive the real facts which seem to contradict his dogmas, or, if he observes them, he gives them a minimum importance, and, by a process of transformation, psychologically explicable, he harmonizes them with the aspiration of his soul, he sees them as interpreted by his prejudices. Thus he sees everywhere only proofs of his own thesis, where an impartial mind can perceive only things which are indifferent if not contrary to his theory. In this case, freedom of mind disappears. The captive of his own thoughts, man seems condemned to contemplate himself eternally in the outward projection of his inner world, which he imposes upon everything and which he finds always between his mind and objective reality.

We have in Don Quixote an example both celebrated and clear, because it is magnified to the pathological stage of the phenomenon. But who can determine the point at which, upon a mistaken path, the nature of the healthy man is clearly separated from that of the sick man? The difference is one of degree and the ascent is by imperceptible gradations. When we study a phenomenon of mental peculiarity in its clearly marked form, we are able to understand more easily what

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occurs on a small scale in its lower stages of development. Such methods have, in the sciences of mind, almost the same value as apparatus of increasing accuracy has for the boasted analyses of the sciences of matter.

The pathological fact of illusion, encountered so often in the case of the good knight of La Manca, is found also on a small scale among those who assert that *all* our acts and undertakings are guided by egoism. The writer who, thanks to his easy and clever style, has succeeded best in spreading this idea, is Larochefoucauld. The paradoxical French moralist can serve better as a point of departure in the discussion of this question, because he presents the theory of egoism under the clear light of exaggeration. In his maxims and aphorisms at once so interesting and so irritating, so spicy and so agreeable, he has applied his theory to the most varied situations and circumstances of life. His ready and skilful pen has contributed much to spread abroad the belief that human nature is entirely egoistic, a belief scientifically maintained by the modern philosophers, Hobbes, Locke, Helvetius, and Bentham. But it is precisely the bold and brutal frankness of his speech, presenting his thought in the stark nakedness of its consequences, that enables one easily to discover the defects of his theory. Errors disappear quickly when they find logical and sincere defenders.

According to Larochefoucauld, all the noblest impulses, all generous acts, all that is called great, magnanimous, heroic, is reduced to the motive of self-love. A certain man shows himself disinterested? It is a mask assumed by interest. The most devoted friendship is only a bargain by which our egoism aims to gain something. We rejoice in the happiness of our friend? It is because we, too, hope to profit by his happiness. In reality, in the misery of our best friends there is something which does not displease us. Generosity is nothing but the disguised ambition that scorns small interests only to seek greater ones. Liberality is nothing but the vanity of giving, and pity for others nothing more than pity for ourselves. In fine, virtue has its source in self-interest, it feeds upon vanity. When one says that he has not done a certain

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thing from egoism, he lies. If one works so as not to permit the motive of self-interest to appear, he is a clever comedian. To be generous is to lay snares.

However, we believe that those moralists would be greatly perplexed who could not comprehend you and reduce your activity to the narrow and arbitrary limits of their abstract categories. But the consequences of a false interpretation of the nature of the things that constitute the domain of practical philosophy extend farther than that. When Don Quixote —to use the example already given—thrust his lance into the windmills that he mistook for giants, it was he alone who suffered the consequences of his diseased fancy. Caught by the sails of the mill and hurled far off, it was he alone who had a pain in his back. But when a person asserts and tries to demonstrate that human nature is simply and wholly egoistic, he who suffers the least from this illusion is perhaps that very person. It will not be difficult or disagreeable for many people to convince themselves of the truth of this tenet and to take refuge behind it in order at times to still the disquieting murmurs of conscience. Not that good and truly disinterested men will endeavor to change their nature so as voluntarily to harmonize it with a pretended natural necessity. But it is enough to make the theory reprehensible that it performs this great, repugnant office of consoling the wicked.

The subtleties of Larochefoucauld's analysis, which produce almost the effect of logical sleight of hand, endeavor to make every human action of the highest nobility appear egoistic. But human nature is only the final product of a long evolution that has the nature of the lower animals as its starting-point. Man is the flower of animality. All faculties, considered as the exclusive possession of man, differ from the corresponding faculties of the animal only by their degree of development, not by their nature. There is only a quantitative not a qualitative difference between them.

If we wish to see more clearly the nature of the psycho-physical mechanism, we must consider the biological forms which are relatively simple, because the functions of developed organs are more complicated. Naturally the intellect

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will be able to comprehend better the complexity of higher phenomena after having studied what takes place in simpler ones. Hence, we expect to find in the higher stages of evolution the same principles and psychic properties, but more developed, that contribute also in the lower stages of evolution to the realization of a more complete adaptation to the environment, to the conservation and development of life in general. Sympathy, the sacrifice of the individual for the interests of the species, is, incontestably, one of these biological forces. But in a being so complicated as man, its nature appears susceptible of interpretations which result in its negation as sympathy. It is for that very reason that we shall seek for it in its simpler and more primitive forms. We shall see it subjected to a difficult test, the specious and false interpretation of altruistic manifestations, the examples being taken from the life of animals.

Let us cite a few carefully observed cases.

Sir John Lubbock, who has studied so well the life and habits of bees and ants, did not have precisely a good opinion of the heart of these creatures. In spite of that, he has himself observed a case which confirms the assertions of Latreille as to the sympathy of ants for their fellows when smitten by disease:

An ant without antennæ had been beaten by another of a different species. It was suffering grievously when it was found by an ant of its own species. The latter began by examining it attentively and with interest; then it raised it and carried it to the nest. "It would have been difficult for a witness of this scene," adds Lubbock, "to refuse to recognize in it a feeling of humanity."

But Romanes cites a much more striking case, related by Belt who observed it.

"One day," says Belt, "when I was observing a little colony of ants (*Eciton humata*), I put a small stone upon one of them. As soon as the next one had perceived its condition it retraced its steps, greatly excited, and told the others. All ran to the rescue. Some bit the stone and tried to remove it, others seized the legs of the prisoner and began to pull with so much strength that I expected to see them pulled off, but no harm was done, and by dint of perseverance they ended by freeing the captive. After that I covered one with clay so as to leave

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only one of its antennæ free. Its companions soon discovered it, and without loss of time, they set to work detaching the clay with their teeth, until they had delivered their friend. At another time, having noticed some ants following one another at long intervals, I placed one of them at some distance from the column, under a little clay which concealed the body but left the head visible. Several passed without suspecting anything; but at last one came which noticed it and tried to free it. Not being able to succeed, it departed rapidly, and I believed that it had abandoned its friend, but it had only gone to seek for reinforcements and reappeared in a short time with a dozen companions, all evidently talking about the situation, for they went straight to the prisoner and soon freed it. It seems to me that here there was more than instinct." *

What personal interest did the ants have in working thus? or what sort of recompense? But let us go farther. Similar cases are not found isolated in nature, and it would be very curious to see a philosopher logical enough in his conception of universal egoism to explain them by reducing them to vanity or the calculation of self-interest.

At the beginning of the chapter on the emotions of birds, Romanes says:

"In respect of emotions, we find ourselves in the case of birds in the presence of a real progress in the feelings of affection and sympathy." . . . "Even the ostrich, in spite of its stupid appearance, has enough heart to die of love, as is proved by the death of a male in the *Jardin des Plantes* in Paris when he had lost his female." †

What personal interest dictated to the ostrich this conduct which brought him death? Was it perchance the ambition to preserve the reputation of a devoted husband and a loving heart, or the hope of an inheritance?

In speaking of the mental faculties of elephants, Romanes concludes: "Sympathy is a characteristic feeling of the species." Let us give at least one example of it, that of an old elephant observed by Bishop Huber. ‡

"Overcome by weakness, the animal had sunk down, and they had gone away to get another to help him to rise. Huber was greatly struck by the almost human expression of surprise, emotion, and sympathy of the second elephant when he saw the position of his companion. At first he obeyed the order and pulled strongly upon the chain that had been passed around the neck and body

* L'Intelligence des Animaux, vol. i. p. 44. French translation.
† Ibid., vol. ii. p. 32.
‡ Ibid., vol. ii. p. 145.

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of the sick elephant, but at the first groan of the latter, he stopped suddenly, turned around with a savage growl and with the aid of his trunk and forefeet began to remove the chain from the neck of the old elephant."

Is this feeling of a pity so touching, a hypocritical mask, assumed from interest? Was the elephant, perchance, thinking, at the very moment in which he was acting under the powerful impulse of sympathy, that he too would one day be old and sick and that then another would aid him if he now felt sorrow for the sufferings of his fellow-elephant, and if he untied the chain that pressed his neck? Was he thinking of himself then? Did he act thus in consequence of an egoistic calculation? Was his pity for his companion in reality, as Larochefoucauld says, pity for himself?

If the most devoted friendship is a "bargain," what is the advantage to the good elephants that make of their loads a rampart and shield for their chief and friend?* Do they think of national rewards, of glory? Are they ambitious to be handed down in history or to have statues erected to them?

I have chosen the most characteristic of several cases cited by Romanes.

James Malcolm, a "very exact" observer, as Romanes calls him, says that aboard a ship on which he had embarked were two monkeys of a common Indian species. There was no bond of relationship between them. One day the younger fell into the sea. At this sight his companion began to be agitated with a feverish anxiety; he grasped with one hand the side of the ship, and with the other held out to his young comrade the end of a cord which was tied around his own body. Great was the astonishment of all those on board. It goes without saying that the little monkey would have drowned with this insufficient aid, because the cord, being too short, could not reach him. A sailor succeeded in fulfilling the moral intention of the monkey. But the success of our intentions, men or monkeys, does not depend upon our will and our strength alone. The moral character of acts and deeds is

* L'Intelligence des Animaux, vol. ii. p. 145.

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determined by the thought and feeling that call them out, by the desired result, not by the actual one.

Here I cease citing instances. I fear even that I have cited too many. A single, very simple case, in which one could see clearly the altruistic character of the actions of animals, would have sufficed to restrict the theory of absolutely egoistic motives. The universal affirmative proposition: "Every action is interested," is annihilated by the truth of its contradictory, the negative particular proposition: "Some actions are not interested."

And, in truth, what interest could be ascribed to the individual in the cases quoted? By what calculation does the monkey let herself die of grief after the death of her little one? Is there not rather visible here a despotic anti-individualistic force? Of what use is it to the individual to die? The egoistic philosophers, racking their brains for an answer, have found one at last. That which attracts us towards and makes us desire death, is, they say, the hope of an eternal happiness, more precious than earthly happiness, because the latter is transitory. Very well! Apply this theory to the monkeys. Do they, too, believe in the immortality of the soul, in rewards and the future life? Do they also make a metaphysic? It would be difficult to prove this point, but certainly interesting, and the burden of proof rests upon the adherents of the egoistic school.

But, it will be said, the death of a being caused by sorrow at another's death, if it be not useful to the individual that perishes, is still less so to the species. Quite true. But while the cause can be found in some form of sympathy—in an inferior or even degenerate form, if you will—it cannot at all be explained by any form of self-interest.

At bottom, we have here the same impulse that urged other monkeys to brave threats and dangers in order to secure the body of one of their companions,* or that dictated the heroic resistance of the elephants that defended their chief. It is the same force that bade a little dog carry food to a hollow

* Romanes: L'Intelligence des Animaux, vol. ii. p. 226.

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tree for an old dog, sick and abandoned. This same inner force it was that made the pelicans run up at their captive companion's cries of distress, and furnish him with fish that he might have the food he needed.* It was this same mysterious force that troubled the parrot at the sight of his sick friend, that taught him to serve her well and to give her the necessary care, and that made him act as if in despair at seeing her die, and finally stretch himself out to die soon after her death.†

This last case is particularly interesting, for it reveals clearly the different forms assumed by the sympathetic impulse, even to the pathological form when the active manifestations of the feeling become opposed to the primary end in whose service they had originally appeared as a biological function.

Is it not manifest that in these examples there is a force different from those that tend to the preservation of the individual agent? Are there not manifest here the genuine impulses of an innate tendency profoundly rooted in the organism of those beings called social? Have we not here to do with a psycho-physiological property of the individual, with the *natural* and not yet *conventional* ground of the foundation of animal societies? Sympathy, the force that urges us to act for the good of others, is the psychical side of a physiological impulse that is due to the native organization, to the very constitution of the individual. It is the emotional echo of the instinct towards the conservation of the species, that manifests itself in conjugal and filial love and in actions corresponding to these feelings.

Self-love, then, is not absolutely sovereign. Its will is found to be sometimes in conflict with that of the love for others. The tendency towards self-preservation does not always emerge victorious from this conflict. When swallows fly boldly to save their little ones from the flames of a burning house where they had made their nests, they do not think at all of themselves, of their own life. The instinct of self-preservation can only bid them to fly from the destructive heat of the fire.

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* Romanes: L'Intelligence des Animaux, vol. ii. p. 37.

† Ibid., vol. ii. p. 38.

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Moreover, they obey this command of nature when their progeny are not in danger.

But nature is not so simple in her processes as certain theories would have us believe. She orders beings to throw themselves into the abyss, to annihilate themselves, if such sacrifice appears necessary to the realization of the supreme end,—viz., the preservation of the *many*. Her maxim seems to be: "The death of an individual is better than that of the whole people." One would say that she too cries out: "*Salus populi suprema lex esto.*" Before man comes to sanction these decrees in his conscious legislation, she has applied them unconsciously in the organic world. Man has found the content of this law of social biology in his moral nature. It is a product of an evolution ages long. He has not *invented* it by his reason.

There is then a force which the individual, in the narrowness of his personal interests, may consider as mysterious and transcendant, because it takes him out of himself, forces him to subordinate his happiness to facts of nature and even to surrender his life for it. It is this force that the metaphysicians and the poets call the "genius of the species," that genius that makes the young man forget his physical and moral life for a smile of his well-beloved, that gives the most timid creatures an extraordinary courage for the defense of their offspring, that chains the mother to the bed of her sick child and consumes her with agony, that fills the heart with pity at the sight of misery, and that creates the heroes of patriotism and of humanity.

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MATTHEW ARNOLD'S POETRY FROM AN ETHICAL STAND-POINT.

At the very beginning of an examination of Matthew Arnold's poetry, one is struck by the significant fact that, in the heyday of his powers, he withdrew from the poetic field. True enough, in so doing, he announced his conviction that the world needs, above all, criticism, and he set to work to contribute to its want. But, though the reasoning be ever so conclusive, one may well question the genuineness of poetic talent to which expression can be so entirely, so arbitrarily, denied.

Arnold is, in truth, a poet who shines with reflected light. His inspiration is not native, his contact with life not close, immediate, fresh. Hence his note is not spontaneous and irrepressible. He did not come face to face with life through sheer force: he saw it through the medium of history, philosophy, literature. We shall soon see how this affected his thought; for the present it is enough to observe that he cannot be placed with those who borrowed no man's torch, whose glowing genius blazed its own path.

Properly to appreciate Arnold's position in the realm of ideas, we must transfer ourselves to the intellectual and social conditions in which his mind and taste were formed. He was not one of the supreme spirits whose inherent force transcends to a degree the influence of environment. His development is a tribute to painstaking and persistent effort; and the conditions under which the effort was made determined its direction and result.

The son of a distinguished classical scholar, Arnold was trained in the classical Hebrew, Greek, and Roman learning. His taste was formed on the ancient models, his thoughts directed into ancient channels. There is no questioning the sincerity of his love for the literatures on which to a large extent he was reared. He had not only a critic's appreciation of the service rendered by the gifted peoples of antiquity, but

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he entered intimately into the finer manifestations of their peculiar traits. He loved their literature, their art, their life, as a Greek, a Roman, or a Hebrew might have loved them; they had for him a value in themselves, apart from their importance as links in the lengthening chain of universal thought.

But during the years when Arnold was poring over his Bible and his Homer in the cloistered shelter of Oxford, the new learning was knocking ever louder at the doors of the University. It had not yet won its way; it had not yet established its methods as proper not only to the narrow field of physical science, but to knowledge and life at large. So far, indeed, was the University from leading the age, that the spirit of the age had not yet by any means subdued it. But, in the world without, it had long been playing havoc; the critical and destructive effort of which the French Revolution was the loudest thunder-clap, was pursuing its course into every nook and corner of human activity.

Imagine a serious youth, educated in the Oxford of that day and then suddenly projected into the atmosphere of actual life. Even the powerful voices of Carlyle and Emerson, which had penetrated the academic walls, could not fully have prepared him for the change. He must have been overwhelmed at once by the antagonism, of which he had already been more or less dimly aware at Oxford. Reconciliation would be his first impulse; such at least one would infer from the history of mental emancipation. The first endeavor is to save, for no thinking man breaks lightly or painlessly from his past.

As a matter of fact, Arnold's attitude toward the characteristic movements and ideas of the century appears to me to be determined at every point by the play of the two forces here indicated. His earlier associations made him conservative, anxious to preserve; the *Zeitgeist* made him eager to renew, to recreate. Between the two, he wavers, trying to pour the new wine into the old bottles. His lifelong effort aimed to conciliate and combine two different civilizations: he saw an element of truth in each, and essayed to effect their immediate synthesis.

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Though Arnold proclaimed himself a Liberal, and was in some quarters regarded as a dangerous innovator, his decided conservatism is unmistakable. He felt the strange fascination of the Past, not less than its strong, though partial, grasp of Truth. He was gently intoxicated by the "rare enchantment of the Middle Age." The "mystic chords" of his memory vibrate with the infinite suggestiveness of historic association. "Beautiful City!" he exclaims of Oxford, "so venerable, so lovely, so unravaged by the fierce intellectual life of our century, so serene. . . . Steeped in sentiment as she lies, spreading her gardens to the moonlight, and whispering from her towers the last enchantment of the Middle Age, who will deny that by her ineffable charm she keeps ever calling us nearer to the true goal of all of us, to the ideal, to perfection, nearer, perhaps, than all the science of Tübingen." "Fifty years ago," he says of Cardinal Newman, "he was in the very prime of life; he was close at hand to us at Oxford; he was preaching at St. Mary's pulpit every Sunday; he seemed about to transform and renew what was for us the most national and natural institution in the world,—the Church of England. Who could resist the charm of that spiritual apparition, gliding in the dim afternoon light through the aisles of St. Mary's, rising into the pulpit, and then in the most entrancing of voices breaking the silence with words and thoughts which were a religious music,—subtle, sweet, mournful." Arnold's temper in one of its aspects is fairly represented by the tone of these extracts, and, unless conservatism necessarily implies absolute impenetrability, they certainly point to a strongly conservative element in his organization.

But his love of truth forbade him to stop here. Like one of his Masters, he too

> "Saw the suffering human race,
> He put his finger on the place,
> And said: 'Thou ailest here, and here.'"

He recognized the changes which the new spirit was destined to accomplish; democracy and science must, he clearly fore-

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saw, reconstruct alike politics, society, religion. "Oxford, the Oxford of the Past," he sadly admits, "has many faults, and she has paid heavily for them in defeat, in isolation, in want of hold upon the modern world." Or, again: "Hebraism and Hellenism are neither of them the law of human development, as their admirers are prone to make them; they are each of them contributions to human development. . . . The lesson must perforce be learned that the human spirit is wider than the most priceless of the forces which bear it onward."

I have noticed Arnold's disposition to reconcile the warring tendencies which he was fond of reducing to these apparently simple elements. But, though in practical life compromise is too often the only resource, in the domain of ideas it cannot permanently satisfy. There at least makeshifts are notoriously short-lived. They may bridge over the transition from orthodoxy or error—and that, not only religious orthodoxy or error—for many an individual, but they cannot achieve lasting validity.

Nowhere, perhaps, better than in his essays on Religion does his peculiar attitude manifest itself, and nowhere is its vulnerable character more clearly displayed. He was eager to save from destruction the "most natural and national institution in the world," the Church of England; yet he saw, as surely as Professor Huxley, that the *Zeitgeist* was eating away its very foundation. He thought it might still be saved by readjustment, by adaptation. To accomplish this he plead hard for a literary interpretation of the Bible; but he did not realize that when the Bible is subjected to such critical treatment as the modern spirit requires, and as he himself urged, it loses irretrievably its solitary importance. It can no longer be the corner-stone; it remains indeed one of the landmarks in the process of the ages, but, like the sacred books of the East, it has parted with its magical, its authoritative power, "for both were faiths and both are gone." Few, in truth, can pass through such changes as Arnold himself underwent and at every phase find in an institution or a book possibilities of adaptation adequate to accompany them. The past held him, not slavishly, but still strongly; and though in a way he main-

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tained his spiritual and intellectual integrity, it was at the cost of such an effort as to most men would be impossible.

Naturally enough, he won no considerable following. At least one-half of his philosophy was bound to be unacceptable to any that could accept the other half. He went too far for one side and not far enough for the other. He stood, therefore, midway between the two camps, and drew upon himself the fire of both.

His poetry abounds in illustrations of the endeavor to face both ways, and, on the whole, confesses the futility of the attempt to maintain traditional forms while renewing the spirit:

> "The world but feels the present's spell,
> The poet feels the past as well."

In "Progress" he asks, incredulously:

> "Say ye: 'The spirit of man has found new roads,
> And we must leave the old faiths and walk therein'?"

"What girl," he questions in the "Future,"

> "What girl
> Now reads in her bosom as clear
> As Rebekah read when she sat
> At eve by the palm-shaded well?"

Now mark the contrast:

> "But, oh, an inextinguishable sense
> Haunts him that he has not made what he should;
> That he has still, though old, to recommence,
> Since he has not yet found the world God would."

Unluckily, his heart was at variance with his judgment. The prospect of the conflict which would in the end establish the ideal order did not exhilarate him. He felt his affections to be with the age which he helped to destroy. So he speaks of the beautiful souls that seem to "have fallen on evil times and evil tongues" with a pathetic tenderness that suggests Arnold's own kinship with them. He writes of Wordsworth:

> "He grew old in an age he condemned,
> And, like the Theban seer,
> Died in his enemies' day."

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Do we not discern the poet's own lineaments behind the veil of Empedocles,—

> ". . . Whose youth fell on a different world
> From that on which his exiled age was thrown,
> But in a world he loves not, must subsist
> In ceaseless opposition?"

So, likewise, of Senancour, with his "sad lucidity of soul":

> "The day I lived in was not mine;
> Man gets no second day."

Obviously, his acceptance of the new spirit could not be frank and joyous. He did not wholly trust it; he felt that it would not discriminate; that in its iconoclastic course neither age nor beauty would impede its slashing progress. He did not, therefore, hail its advent with loud acclaim. Democracy, equality, he declared, are here, and we must reckon with them, but their coming gave him no thrill of joy.

> "See, on the cumbered plain
> Clearing a stage,
> Scattering the Past about,
> Comes the new age. . . .
> All things begin again;
> Life is their prize,
> Earth with their deeds they fill,
> Fill with their cries."

He had no love for such boisterous work, and he could not see beyond the battle-field, where the tangle looked so hopeless. Somehow, while he urged the necessity of a broader basis in life, he did not comprehend that you cannot win victories, even in the world of ideas, without struggle, and that you cannot struggle without din and confusion. And it was this turmoil that drove him at times to despair: this was "the strange disease of modern life," as though conflicting counsels, wasted energy, ill-regulated effort were not the price humanity must pay for the larger wisdom on which its futures must rely. Arnold did not understand it:

> "Our minds
> Are confused as the cries which we hear,
> Changing and shot as the sights which we see."

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And, accordingly, like that sweet character of whom he has written so touchingly, Lord Falkland, he longed always for peace. Must man, he cried, be either madman or slave? The "flying and elusive shadow, rest" becomes thus the dearest object of his search. Screened by the deep boughs of Kensington Garden, he exclaims:

> "The will to neither strive nor cry,
> The power to feel with others give,
> Calm, calm me more, nor let me die
> Before I have begun to live."

Assuredly there are few who do not at times yearn with him for the peace that is not "on sea or land." We have, it is unfortunately true, too little fixity, even to test fully our own experience. But this is, at any rate, by no means the whole case; nor should we marvel at the enthusiasm, nay, the extravagance, of men trembling with the consciousness of newly-found power and opportunities. Peace, simplicity, may come at last, but only when we have mastered and effected the revolution that is stirring. Meanwhile, it is worth asking, despite this superficial restlessness, is it necessarily impossible for the "perturbed spirit" to find a patient, philosophical, inward calm?

In the end, however, what remains for Arnold? He dares not despair; he cannot be glad. He is therefore resigned:

> "The mute turf we tread,
> The solemn hills around us spread,
> If I might lend their life a voice
> Seem to bear rather than rejoice."

In a general way I have, I think, fairly represented the train of thought which the poet Arnold pursues; but the critic Arnold went more or less beyond it. His poetry was perhaps his consolation, and representing his negative side may not do him full justice. At any rate, during the later years of his life, when he eschewed verse, he developed greater confidence in the beneficence of the changes that cost him so dearly. I say that he wrote little poetry during this period; yet a single poem—"Obermann Once More"—shows conclusively that he had in a measure outgrown the despondent yet resigned poet revealed in the mass of his verse. Now, at length, he beheld

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the world which had once seemed to him "powerless to be born."

> "The world's great order dawns in sheen,
> After long darkness rude,
> Divinelier imaged, clearer seen,
> With happier zeal pursued."

Arnold himself thus came to know that resignation is not the last word to be spoken.

It is clear, then, that Arnold is not a poet with whom we can rest. He expresses a phase through which many have passed, and at a particular juncture we sympathize keenly with his prevailing mood. But, sooner or later, we emerge from it into a larger, a more patient optimism, very different from the patience which is the "too near neighbor of despair." Arnold's doubts are, however, not to be despised; for, as nothing is easier than unreflecting optimism, so nothing is harder than optimism which triumphs in the full consciousness of danger and difficulty. The poet Arnold did not attain this severe and arduous hopefulness; but the scream of the eagle and the whistle of the engine do not refute his criticism. It appears to me to be well worth inquiring more fully into the cause of his failure.

I have said that he did not get at life directly by plunging into its mighty current or sympathizing profoundly with all social classes, but that he looked at it somewhat remotely through the lenses of history and literature. This was attended with disastrous consequences. It prevented him from grasping the entire situation and deceived him as to his own competency. He had the equipment of a superb literary critic; he made it answer the needs of a social philosopher. It was altogether inadequate. As a matter of fact, he was prepared to deal only with some of the special intellectual aspects of life; yet he shrank from nothing, applying with singular confidence an ideal framed on quite insufficient data. Naturally enough, the results were often decidedly fanciful.

It is true that Arnold defined civilization as the humanization of man in society; yet he does not appear to have realized fully the meaning of human brotherhood. With the con-

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ception of society which is familiar to the sociological science of the day, he certainly is not in hearty sympathy. His scorn of the practical is significant, as likewise his failure to dwell on those conditions of Greek life, an impartial consideration of which might perhaps have moderated his enthusiasm for Greek civilization. With all the charm and wisdom and beauty of Greek literature, and notwithstanding the heavy price which humanity has paid for the loss of Greek flexibility, Arnold's insistence on this point strikes me as somewhat excessive.

For at best, Greek civilization was but a miniature, resting on a very narrow and selfish basis, and exhausting itself in a very short space of time. Its work during that brief, though brilliant, epoch was truly of incalculable value, but no modern nation either could or would duplicate its experience. Where Pericles aimed at the culture of ten, we must contrive the culture of a million. We can no longer relegate to slaves who are mere labor-saving devices, and whose presence in the community we ignore, the homely tasks which cramp the soul. It is our problem to civilize ourselves, not by avoiding the unattractive and sordid, but despite them or with their aid. We have under way, indeed, a stupendous undertaking, in the completion of which we shall be wise to draw as heavily as wisdom will allow on the inherited treasure of the race; but in its present fragmentary state, it is unquestionably unfair to compare with it that exquisite bit of sculpture which we call Greek civilization.

The Greeks, as Socrates remarks of Callicles in the Gorgias, were initiated into the greater before the lesser mysteries. That was the characteristic weakness of ancient life. We are now beginning with the petty details in the hope and expectation of ascending to the realization of a lofty conception of human relations in society. Like Arnold, we have found established conventions and interpretations too narrow, and we must return. But to what? Not with him to previous revelations, the full and exact meaning of which has been perverted in the effort to reduce them to a coherence that does not belong to them, but to that on which all revelations rest, and of which all are alike incomplete expressions,—to the

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primal reason and conscience. It is not enough to stop with Judæa and Athens: neither one nor both can embody our religion. Why may we not come into immediate contact with the forces which produced both them and ourselves? It is idle to contend now that any previous deliverances of the human mind, however interpreted or however unified, can meet the necessities of the present. We need all the light which we can get from history, but, in the last resort, we must attack life from our own stand-point, not from that of the inherited authorities. This is in fact the spirit of the ethical and economical movements which are dominating thought and action.

The falsity of Arnold's entire conception of culture—and this conception inspires his verse as well as his prose—lies just here. He aimed at "symmetry;" yet this delicate balancing of old and new, of Hebraism and Hellenism, of science and literature, looks rather like a balancing of means than a balanced end. In the infinite diversity of mind and conditions, is it not a bit fanciful to suppose that symmetrical culture can be thus obtained? Endless adjustments would be necessary to secure impartiality of result. But it may be that the ideal is, after all, a vain one, and that the world will achieve ideal poise, not because the delicate balance within each organism is reflected in the delicate balance of the whole, but because a great variety of opposing and unequal forces,—*i.e.*, individualities, resting on and agreeing chiefly in moral integrity, reach a kind of moving equilibrium.

But whatever be the truth in this matter, we cannot, in the moral and social conditions which now confront us, talk of realizing at once ideal culture such as, even if admitted to be a sound conception, would befit a stationary or approximately perfect state. While we are doing the backwoodsman's work, we need the backwoodsman's muscle and tools. Similarly we require especially at this moment the knowledge and training that will promote the moralization and rationalization of social life. The necessities of society must determine the educational stress; before the imperious demands of life, no dream of an absolute and unrelated ideal can stand. We must start

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with and from life, not with and from a scholar's ideal; and life is essentially renunciation, compromise. We must needs ever trim between what we wish and what we can, between what we ought and what we must. One way or another, no individual in this imperfect social state can escape the necessity of subordinating his own completeness to larger and nobler ends. To the first the compromise comes as a physical one, and he yields up life or limb on the field of battle; to the second, it comes as an intellectual compromise, and he foregoes the full development of his powers to perform some humble but urgent duty; to the third, the compromise may present itself in a moral guise, and he may be bound, however reluctantly, to sacrifice his moral wholeness for the sake of an object dearer than his own life, health, or soul. If, indeed, the world ever realizes the generous hopes that embody the true ideal, it will be because many successive generations have followed the narrow path before them, avoiding the effort to precipitate a hasty millennium. And this is no mean surrender of the ideal; on the contrary, it is the attempt to effect it step by step. The attempt is thus a joyous progress, and banishes the disappointment which must otherwise attend partial achievement.

A prudent regard for the fact that we cannot foreknow the part to be played by each individual admonishes us to interpret broadly the position here taken, and in early years to make our culture as general as may be. But in any case there are no grounds for uneasiness. The printing-press, the universities, the diversity of tastes which our very excesses tend to accentuate, will make certain a healthful variety; and as the rude work awaiting us is achieved, mankind will be directed back to the neglected paths by an inherent, perhaps unconscious, impetus.

Arnold's attitude thus appears to me fundamentally and essentially in error. His emphasis of the Past led easily to an actual, though expressly disavowed, injustice to the Present. He betrayed a signal capacity to appreciate the latter, when he said that the advent of Democracy is no cause for either rejoicing or sorrow. These are cold words. Democracy has,

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it is true, done much to grieve the judicious, but assuredly its possibilities appeal strongly to the emotions and the imagination. Has mankind ever yet contemplated a loftier or more inspiring spectacle than that "federation of the world" towards which genuine Democracy feels its way?

Arnold could not do it justice because he could not get away from the conflict, he could not get away from himself. He had a carefully trained artistic sense, which was painfully and constantly wounded by the immaturities and extravagances of this overwhelming activity. He made the additional blunder of supposing that those who disagree with him inevitably agree with Mr. Carnegie; this is not true. The new movement has no severer critics than many who believe most fully in it. Steamboats and population are as far from satisfying us as from satisfying him; but we are not dismayed by them. We are not even dismayed by the fact that they apparently satisfy many. Any successful soldier will tell you that, despite the battle's turmoil, you must keep your vision on the main conflict. There is much firing into the air; many points are seized and elaborately fortified, only to be abandoned as the event progresses; neither general nor historian is distracted by this; he fixes his eye on the strategic, the final point, and there is the battle for him.

Arnold's faith was not large enough for that. He could not look steadily beyond; he could not always hear the "still, soft voice" above the "maddening discord." Yet to the undaunted listener it gives no doubtful sound. We are striving, even if blindly striving, with high purpose. However distant the achievement, it is much that it has become the object of effort, not with the few, but with the masses. That every effort is a strong reason for optimism. The restless activity whose result is so often amiss, as Arnold truly pointed out, is gradually teaching us wisdom. Let us not cease to exhort, to condemn, to object, when need be; but let us not for a moment consider that we are dealing with final and inexorable results. Persistent effort, despite repeated failure, will in the end make the path. Very likely its direction will surprise us. Much that we value most highly in government and institu-

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tions may fall away from us like so much scaffolding. Our very patriotism may merge into a world passion. But, whatever its form, we cannot permit ourselves to doubt the outcome. We must face the contest like Virgil's oarsmen: *Possunt quia posse videntur.* Arnold's was no such defiant and heroic mood; in consequence, his poetry—half protest, half exhortation—is destined to occupy a precarious place in the history of the century's thought.

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DISCUSSIONS.

"RATIONAL HEDONISM."

MISS JONES'S article in the October number of the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS seems to me one of the best defences of Utilitarianism that I have yet seen. I have no intention at present of attempting a complete reply to it; but as several of her remarks are directed against statements of mine, a few explanations seem to be called for. It will be best to take up the points in order. I hope that the inevitable curtness and dogmatism of my remarks will not be supposed to imply any want of respect for Miss Jones's criticisms, which I have certainly found both interesting and suggestive. I think she has advocated a bad case about as well as it could be advocated.

Miss Jones begins* with an attempt to meet the objection raised by me (among others) to the term pleasure on the ground of its ambiguity. She meets this by giving a careful definition of pleasure and pain. But, unfortunately, this definition seems to me to be itself highly ambiguous. "Pleasure," she says, "is *feeling which is judged in itself desirable.*" What does "feeling" mean? Is it used in Mr. Bradley's sense or in Dr. Ward's? If in the former, why should only feelings judged to be desirable be called pleasure, and not also thoughts? If in the latter, there is surely a *petitio principii*, since it is a disputed point whether feeling in that sense is ever judged to be desirable at all. And there are other senses

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in which the term "feeling" may be used. Again, why should it be said that feeling is *judged?* Do the lower animals judge? And, if not, are we to hold, with the Cartesians, that they have no sense of pleasure and pain? Again, if a Stoic judges pleasure to be indifferent, or an ascetic judges it to be undesirable,* are we to say that they do not feel pleasure? Miss Jones says that the appeal is to be made "to the consciousness of the sentient (and rational) individual at the time of feeling." What does "and rational" mean? Does it mean that mere animals are to be excluded? And what are we to do if (as in the case of the ascetic) sense and reason seem to be opposed? Finally, what are we to understand by "desirable"? Cannot a man simply enjoy pleasure without going on to desire it, or to think of it as being desirable? It was such difficulties as these that led me to prefer "sense of value." I used the term "sense," so as to avoid "judgment;" and I used the term "value," so as to avoid "desirable;" and I avoided the term "feeling" altogether. But I admit that some difficulties are still left.

The next objection to which Miss Jones refers † is that with reference to the *abstractness* of the term "pleasure." In connection with this she draws the distinction between *pleasure* and *causes of pleasure;* and apparently she identifies causes of pleasure with *objects* of pleasure. Is an object of pleasure properly to be described as its cause? The two elements, pleasure and its object, seem to me rather to be simply two aspects in a single state of consciousness. Of course, there are objects antecedent to the pleasant object, which may be described as its causes; but the pleasant object of consciousness itself and the pleasantness of it do not seem to be distinguishable as antecedent and consequent. The object is not *pleasure-producing*, but simply *pleasant.* Then Miss Jones goes on to say, with reference to such objects, "surely it is this quality in them [the pleasant or pleasure-producing quality] which we are thinking of, and which recommends them to us." Certainly a pleasant object is pleasant, and the pleasantness of it consists in its being pleasant. But is this pleasantness an *effect* produced by a pleasant object? Is it something which

* In Miss Jones's sense. Does not "undesirable" properly mean simply *not desirable?* Miss Jones uses it to mean the contrary of desirable,—*desirable not.*

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persists when the pleasant object is removed? I confess that, to my mind, pleasantness by itself seems too like the smile on the vanished Cheshire cat. The only pleasantness that I can understand is the pleasantness of some pleasant object (by which, of course, I mean some object of consciousness, presented or represented). Pleasantness in itself seems to me a pure abstraction. When, to use Miss Jones's illustration, "a child is vaguely promised a *treat*," I do not conceive that the child expects to be presented with a quantity of pleasantness. It expects some pleasant object, and probably has even a pretty definite idea of the kind of object (or, at any rate, of several alternative kinds of objects) which it may fairly expect.* "May we not," says Miss Jones, "similarly desire to obtain,—*e.g.*, truth,—though it is an abstraction, and we may not know at all in what particular statements it may turn out to be embodied?" I think not. To say that any one seeks truth is an abbreviation. What he wants is to know the truth about some object or class of objects; or, it may be, to know the general conditions of the apprehension of truth, or, perhaps, the ultimate nature of metaphysical reality. No seeker for truth would be satisfied by being presented with a number of statements which happen to have in common the quality of being true,—*e.g.*, Peter struck William on Thursday morning, and the like. When it is said that we seek truth or pleasure or beauty, or any other abstraction, what is meant is merely that we seek true statements with reference to some particular class of objects, pleasant experiences of certain kinds, or certain varieties of beautiful things. Within certain limits there are no doubt many different objects that might satisfy these desires; but still what is sought in each case is certain more or less clearly defined concrete objects. In no case is it a mere residual *effect* of these objects,—an abstract quality of truth,

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* Perhaps I may venture also to express a doubt whether the average child would value the promise of "a treat" quite so much as Miss Jones appears to suggest. I remember to have heard of a child which, when invited to pay a visit some day, remarked, "Some day is a day I do not like." I suspect that children do not value the vague and the abstract any more than grown people do. If they ever care for general ideas, it is not for the abstract general ideas of the older logicians, but rather for such general ideas as those that are dealt with by Lotze. They have little regard for truth, beauty, and pleasure as abstractions; but they like fairy-tales (which they take to be true), pictures (which they fancy to be beautiful), and sweetmeats (which they know to be pleasant).

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pleasantness, or beauty, which the objects bring with them and leave behind.

In her next point * Miss Jones seems to be replying to other writers, and I do not know that I have much concern with what she says. It is certainly no part of my view that pleasure is not a distinguishable element in our experience, in a similar sense to that in which truth and beauty are distinguishable elements. What I deny is that it is a separable element. I believe it to be simply an aspect in a concrete whole. I do not see how it can be regarded as a separable unit, capable of being summed up along with other units of the same kind, any more than I see this in the case of truth or beauty. If it were said, for instance, that Carlyle's "Frederick the Great" contains thirty-four units of truth and Thomson and Tait's "Natural Philosophy" forty-seven, or if it were said that in the Dresden Galleries there are fifty-three units of beauty and only 26.7 in the London ones, I should not feel sure in either case that I had correctly apprehended the meaning of the statement. So with the measurement of pleasure. Truth, beauty, pleasure, and the like, all mean something; but they do not mean anything that can be separated from the objects to which they belong and regarded as a sum of units.† Miss Jones adds that "activity," "self-realization," etc., are as abstract as pleasure. I think not; but even if they were, it must be remembered that those who take these as ends do not, as a rule,‡ regard them as units to be summed.

The next point § is concerned with the view that pleasure is sense of value. Miss Jones urges that, if this is so, the value must be measured by the pleasure. This is a strange doctrine. We

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* Page 83.

† I may note here that I am doubtful whether Miss Jones has correctly represented Carlyle's meaning at this point. I am not aware that Carlyle ever stated that the highest good is blessedness. What he said was that we could do without happiness and content ourselves with blessedness. And I suppose he meant by blessedness nothing more than the consciousness of doing right. Is it certain that this is always a pleasant consciousness?

‡ Simmel is an exception. He thinks of a maximum sum of activity as one way of formulating the moral end, or at least as furnishing the basis for one form of the moral imperative. This kind of abstraction seems to me quite as unjustifiable as that of Hedonism. But, after all, Simmel himself regards it as only symbolical.

§ Page 85.

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measure heat by means of thermometers, not by our sensations; and if value also has an objective significance, why should it not have an objective measure? In Economics values are generally measured in terms of money; and it seems to be now almost universally recognized that in the estimation of such values pleasure (in the purely psychological sense) has no place. In morals there is no similar measure of value. Moral values could be estimated only, I suppose, by observing the relations in which different objects are placed to one another in the choice of the best men. Pleasure is a sort of unreasoned choice;* and this is what I mean by calling it a sense of value. So far from its being the case that such value can only be measured by pleasure, I should be disposed to say rather that the only intelligible meaning that can be given to the measurement of pleasure is the measurement of preferability, —*i.e.*, the measurement of value as immediately apprehended without reason. The rest of Miss Jones's objections at this point seems to me to be entirely removed by means of the conception of "universes of desire," of which I have made frequent use in my treatment of the subject. She asks whether every desired object has value. Certainly, I should answer. Only we have to ask, further, value *for whom* or value *within what universe?* Pleasure is sense of value only for the consciousness that feels it and only at the moment at which it is felt. Value in the highest and most objective sense is, of course, value for the highest universe, value for reason. It is not value in this sense of which pleasure is a sense, unless the pleasure in question happens to be the bliss of satisfied reason. Drunkenness is certainly a good to the man who is for the moment "o'er a' the ills of life victorious." Whether it is a good on the whole, a good for the completely rational consciousness, is another question. Undeserved obloquy is certainly a good to the envious man. "Evil, be thou my good," says Satan; and why not? It is good enough *for him.* But it is not good objectively, good on the whole, good for reason. We have to distinguish between subjective and objective values; and it is only of the former that pleasure is a sense,—except when it is the pleasure of satisfied reason. When this distinction is carefully drawn, it seems to me that all Miss Jones's objections at this point vanish at once.

* That pleasure is an implicit judgment of value seems to be recognized in Miss Jones's own definition of it.

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I am not sure that I understand Miss Jones's next objection.* She says that, as sensitive beings, we could not have any sense of value. If sense meant judgment, this would certainly be true; but I have used the somewhat vague word "sense" to indicate a form of immediate apprehension. I suppose animals feel pleasure and pain; and I think pleasure and pain in animals may fairly be described as an immediate sense of certain experiences as good or evil, choice-worthy or the reverse. At any rate, whatever we may think of mere animals, surely it can hardly be denied that, at different stages of human development, in which it diverges more or less from a merely sentient consciousness, different objects please and pain; and that even at a single stage of consciousness a single object may please or pain us, according to the point of view from which we regard it, according to the universe in which we place it. But perhaps what Miss Jones wishes to urge at this point is that pleasure is not merely sense of value, but is actually that which is judged to be valuable. If so, it is no doubt as rational beings that we judge it to be valuable. But I see no sufficient reason for believing that pleasure as such is what we as rational beings judge to be valuable or desirable; and to *define* pleasure in such a way as to imply this, seems to me to involve a *petitio principii*.

The next point,† as to whether *good = object of desire*, is essentially the same one, and is answered by reference to universes of desire. It should be remembered also that, when we speak of desire in this sense, we mean simply *choice*. It does not necessarily imply *anticipation*. There may be desire, in this sense, for that which is present. When we desire something that is future, our desire for it now and our desire for it at the time when it is attained are, of course, desires within different universes. What is good in anticipation is not necessarily good in attainment or in retrospect. By applying this conception throughout, Miss Jones's objections seem to me to vanish entirely.

The objection founded on the paradox of hedonism ‡ is, as I understand, an objection to *psychological* Hedonism, which we have all agreed to reject.

Miss Jones's question,§ whether any object can or ought to be regarded as good or valuable if it causes no happiness, does not seem to concern me; since I have never denied that pleasantness is, in some sense, a characteristic of every desirable object.

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* Page 87. † Page 87. ‡ Page 88. § Page 88.

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Her next point* seems to me to involve some want of clearness. A great number of questions are raised together, some of which do not seem specially to concern me; and the difficulty about the qualitative differences of pleasures (which seems to be the main point) does not appear to have been rightly understood. Roughly speaking, most Hedonists regard pleasures as being measurable in respect of two dimensions, their extent and their degree; but some hold that, in addition to these, there are differences of quality, of which it would be necessary to take account. Now there are difficulties in connection with all these. In connection with extent there is the difficulty of discreteness, to which we shall have to return. In connection with degree there is the difficulty of reducing an intensive to an extensive magnitude; and this appears to be the difficulty that Miss Jones has in her mind at the present point. The difficulty is the same as that which would be involved in measuring degrees of truth or beauty or heat (the subjective sensation †) or any similar quality. In all these cases we distinguish higher and lower degrees of the same quality, and the question is whether a higher degree can be said to be so many times a lower one. To this Miss Jones would apparently answer that to say that one thing is higher than another is to say that it possesses *more* of a certain quality. But this is a mere evasion. The question is, Can this kind of "more" be reduced to the other kind? Can intensive quantity be reduced to extensive? Can that which is more beautiful, for instance, be said to possess so many more units (and, if so, units *of what?*) than that which is less beautiful? Similarly, we have to ask whether the more pleasant has a definite number more units of something than the less pleasant; and, if so, we have to ask, further, whether that of which it has more units is itself pleasure,—*i.e.*, we have to ask whether intensive magnitude can be reduced to extensive; and, if so, whether the extensive magnitude to which it is reduced is still a magnitude of the same quality? Now I am not prepared to deny that this may be so; but surely it is mere dogmatism to affirm that it is so.

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* Pages 88–90.

† I suppose it will not be disputed that in physical measurements of heat it is never degrees of heat as a subjective sensation that are being estimated. It seems at least extremely doubtful whether it is even conceivable that degrees of heat in this sense should ever be estimated as extensive magnitudes. At any rate, I wish that Miss Jones, or some other upholder of the Hedonistic Calculus, would explain how such intensive magnitudes are to be reduced to extensive.

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But however this may be, this difficulty is only the difficulty about *intensity*, and does not touch that about *quality* at all. If pleasures differ, not merely in intensity, but also in quality, then the more or less which differentiates them is certainly not a more or less of pleasure,—unless, of course, the qualitative difference is in reality reducible to a difference of extensive or intensive quantity. The point is that in this case what we are measuring is *not pleasure at all;* and this point Miss Jones seems to have missed entirely.

When Miss Jones says * that there would be the same difficulty in measuring values as there is in measuring pleasures, she makes a statement which I have some difficulty in understanding. There could not be any theoretical difficulty in estimating subjective values, as they are constituted simply by individual choice. Nor could there be any ultimate theoretical difficulty in estimating objective values, as they are constituted by the choice of an entirely rational self. Of course, in both cases there is a serious *practical* difficulty; occasioned, in the one case, by the indefiniteness and capriciousness of individual choice, and, in the other case, by the fact that we have not realized the rational self. But even in the latter case an approximation is possible. The more we advance in insight the more possible does such a calculation become; whereas, in the case of pleasure (if my view is correct), the more we advance in insight the more does it become obvious that such a calculation is in its very nature absurd. I may add that I think it would not be difficult (though it would certainly be tedious) to show that in all cases in which Hedonistic writers seem to have reached any valuable result by the estimation of pleasures (*e.g.*, in Political Economy), it is value that they have really been estimating, not pleasure at all.†

Miss Jones remarks ‡ that though a sum of pleasures is not pleasure,

* Page 88.

† Most of the economic writers who have dealt with the estimation of values (*e.g.*, Jevons, Walras, Menger, Wieser, Böhm-Bawerk, etc.) seem to me to err by not sufficiently distinguishing between subjective and objective values. And I am not sure that those writers, such as Edgeworth ("Mathematical Psychics"), and Ehrenfels ("Werththeorie und Ethik" in the *Vierteljahrsschrift für Wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, 1893–94), who have dealt with this subject from a point of view broader than the merely economic, have entirely avoided the same defect. *Cf.* my remarks on this point in the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, vol. iii. pp. 297–299.

‡ Page 90.

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yet it is pleasures. I think not. Take a series of pleasures, a_1, b_1, c_1, d_1, and compare this with another series, a_2, b_2, c_2, d_2. Then any member of either series is a pleasure, and any two or more of them are pleasures; but $a_1 + b_1 + c_1 + d_1$ is neither a pleasure nor pleasures, but merely an abstract idea. Suppose they were series of coins instead of pleasures. Let the first series be a series of pennies and the second of halfpennies. Then a_1 would be a penny; a_1, b_1, c_1, d_1 would be four pennies; $a_1 + b_1 + c_1 + d_1$ would be fourpence. Similarly, a_2 would be a halfpenny; a_2, b_2, c_2, d_2 would be four halfpennies; $a_2 + b_2 + c_2 + d_2$ would be twopence. How is the third step in each of these cases possible? It is possible because money is continuous as well as discrete. The four pennies might, if necessary, be melted down so as to form a single fourpenny piece. And, even apart from this possibility, it is conventionally agreed that four pennies shall be equivalent to fourpence,—*i.e.*, that the pennies need not always be used separately. They can be regarded as forming a single whole.* Now

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* For the coin-collector, on the other hand, coins are simply discrete. Four old pennies are not for him fourpence. If the pennies are all alike, the extra three probably add nothing to the value of the one. They may even detract something from the dignity of its uniqueness. (Of course, I admit that pleasure, as conceived by the Hedonist, is not quite on a par with this,—since each pleasure is thought of as having a unique and independent value. But this does not affect the main point—the discreteness of pleasures.) At any rate, if four are preferred to one, it is for some extraneous reason,—*e.g.*, because if one is lost there are still some left; or because it diminishes the chance of rival collectors; or for some other reason. Similarly a number of men may acquire value for some extraneous reason.

> "While three men hold together,
> The kingdoms are less by three."

Here a number of human beings, regarded as discrete, is valued as diminishing a totality regarded as continuous. But the extraneous reasons might also tell the other way. "Two's company: three's none." In all such cases it is not the mere addition of discrete units that has significance. And in the same way the addition of pleasures may acquire significance. Just as the coin-collector may count his different coins with the view of seeing how nearly he approximates to the ideal of a complete set, so one may count his pleasurable experiences with the view of seeing to what extent he has appreciated the various sides of life. But it is the power of regarding life as a continuous whole that gives this calculation significance; and such a way of regarding life is wholly incompatible with the Hedonistic view of it. Even when Byron says,—

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what warrant have we for regarding pleasures in this way? A sum of pleasures is merely the idea of a collection of discrete elements. They cannot be fused into a whole, so as to become a single pleasure; and if we regard them as our end, we are regarding something else than pleasure as forming our end. We are taking the idea of a sum as our end. Now there may be some adequate reason for this; but *primâ facie*, at any rate, it is incompatible with the view that pleasure is our end.* Miss Jones's remark about its not mattering whether one man suffers or a thousand, and so forth, seems to me rather irrelevant. The question is, Why does it matter? Is it because pleasures can be summed, or because life can be regarded as a totality, or for some other reason? The same applies to the remark about the separate pleasures of a single individual. In my treatment of the subject I have insisted that this is quite on a par with the separate pleasures of different individuals.†

When Miss Jones goes on to urge‡ that it is difficult to imagine any chief good that would not be open to the same objection as the Hedonistic one,—viz., that it can only be realized by summing a series of successive moments,—she seems to show merely that she has become so accustomed to the Hedonistic chief good that she has a difficulty in thinking of any other. No objective end is open to this objection. Suppose a man regards the accumulation of wealth as his chief good; or suppose he takes the advancement of education as his end, or the founding of a family, or the progress of religion, or any similar object. No one of these would be open to this objection. The end suggested by Mr. H. Spencer or by Mr. Leslie Stephen is not open to it, nor is that suggested by Green. It is true that for these writers, as well as for the Hedon-

"Count o'er the joys thine hours have seen,
Count o'er thy days from anguish free;
And know, whatever thou hast been,
'Tis something better not to be,"

he is regarding life as a continuous whole, though he takes a quite fallacious way of estimating its value as such (since the "days from anguish free" are not necessarily the most interesting and valuable days in retrospect).

* Miss Jones says that I admit the possibility of addition when I speak of "a sum of pleasures." Of course, I admit the possibility as an abstract idea, just as I admit the possibility of an idea of $\sqrt{-1}$. But this idea is serviceable as a mathematical convention. I am not sure that the other is.

† "Social Philosophy," p. 209, etc.; "Manual of Ethics," p. 105.

‡ Page 91.

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ists, the good goes on realizing itself throughout successive moments; but the end is conceived by them either as a distant object to which we are gradually approximating, or else as consisting simply in the continuous process of development itself. No one of them thinks of the good, as the Hedonists do, as consisting in two incompatible things: on the one hand, a subjective state of feeling (pleasure); on the other hand, the abstract idea of an impossible sum.* Of course, if one were to say frankly from the first that the chief good is algebraic, that we can aim at nothing higher than the greatest possible development of a series, this might be a self-consistent view. It would be an end like that of the cricketer, who seeks to make as many large scores as possible. But, after all, the cricketer values his scores, not because they make up a big sum, but because they are a sign of good play. Has the big imaginary sum of the Hedonist any similar significance? If so, then I should say that that which gives it significance, and not the imaginary sum itself, is his real chief good. And I have no doubt that this is what most Utilitarians really mean. When they fancy they are valuing an algebraic series, it is only because this series may be taken as the sign of a happy state of life. I cannot doubt, for instance, that this was what J. S. Mill meant. "The ingredients of happiness," he says,† "are very various, and each of them is desirable in itself, and not merely when considered as swelling an

* The true rational Hedonism, as I conceive, would be one which should regard the supreme good as consisting in a single flash of pleasant feeling. This is the view that seems to be suggested by Mr. Stout. (See, for instance, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, vol. iv., No. 1, pp. 117, 118.) Only so can my chief good be *mine;* as the Hedonist, above all men, should surely insist that it is. A sum of pleasures is a good for nobody. It exists at the best only as an imaginary quantity in the Hedonist's ledger. Mr. Stout's good would at least be real for him. And if Mr. Stout admits (as I believe he does) that this flash of pleasant feeling is inconceivable apart from an objective content, of which it is merely the hedonic aspect, the difference between us is certainly infinitesimal. The fundamental error of Hedonism, as I believe, consists in abstracting this aspect from the concrete content to which it belongs, and then treating this miserable abstraction as if it were a concrete object, capable of being summed up along with other objects like it. If pleasure is to be taken as the good at all, it should be regarded not as a collection of old pennies, but as an indivisible jewel. But, even so, I am convinced that it is a jewel that has value only in so far as it sparkles in the light of the objective good. It has value not in itself, but only as an appreciation of the true good.

† "Utilitarianism," chap. iv.

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aggregate. The principle of utility does not mean that any given pleasure, as music, for instance, or any given exemption from pain, as, for example, health, are to be looked upon as means to a collective something termed happiness, and to be desired on that account. They are desired and desirable in and for themselves; besides being means, they are a part of the end." Precisely; but this is not Hedonism. If music and health are parts of the end, the end is happiness in the concrete, not pleasure in the abstract. As a sort of symbolic representation of this concrete happiness, there may be a certain significance in the effort to sum up pleasures; just as there might be some significance in trying to estimate the number of points of beauty in a picture gallery, though what any one really cares for is not the abstract beauty, nor the number of points in which it is displayed, but the concrete beautiful pictures. Surely all good things are objective and concrete.

Finally, Miss Jones objects * to my saying that "the pleasure of others cannot be the good for us if the good is pleasure." This saying is founded on the idea that for a self-conscious being the good must be a good *for self*. Now this good may be conceived either as objective or as subjective. I may say that my good consists in the objects that I value, and ultimately in the most perfect realization of the whole universe of objects. Or I may "sit down in a cool hour," and say to myself that all the objects that I value are in reality valueless; that the only thing that has value is the mere sense of value itself, the mere subjective feeling of satisfaction. If the latter is the true view, then what has value for me is *my* feeling of satisfaction. Another person's feeling of satisfaction is objective to me, and must lose its value along with other objects. This truth is partly recognized by some Hedonists. It is, as I understand, the source of that Dualism of Practical Reason, of which Dr. Sidgwick makes so much.

I think I have now replied to all the points that have been raised by Miss Jones, so far as I am personally concerned in them. Though in the main I am in substantial agreement with the doctrines of Green, Bradley, and others, to whom she refers, yet I cannot, of course, hold myself responsible for their particular statements. And perhaps Professor Gizycki may be trusted to serve as his own interpreter. I am much indebted to Miss Jones

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* Pages 94, 95.

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for the careful and thorough way in which she has dealt with my objections, and for the opportunity with which she has provided me of giving some further explanation of points on which perhaps I had not previously made my meaning sufficiently clear. I hope I may have now succeeded in making it a little more apparent. Yet my gratitude is, I must confess, dashed with some regret that it should be necessary again to make what, I fear, must look like an attack on Utilitarianism. It has been said that the worst use you can put a philosopher to is to refute him; and I feel that this is as true of Utilitarian philosophers as of any others. The value of Locke's contribution to psychology is not annulled—perhaps even scarcely impaired—by the fact that he tripped a little over the word "idea." Neither is the constructive work of the Utilitarians in Politics, Morals, and Economics made of no account because they tripped a little over the word "pleasure." Assuredly, the best of them did not really mean to maintain that the chief good of life is a mathematical conundrum; and in their best work one may well forget that they ever seemed to imply that it is. At a time when so many are denying that ethical principles have any practical value at all, their magnificent insistence on social and political reforms can scarcely be too highly esteemed. They meant a concrete good, however they may have seemed to insist on an abstract one. However they may have appeared to reduce all values to the contemptible one of subjective satisfaction, and however they may have appeared to weigh satisfactions like grocers' merchandise, yet the concrete happiness of mankind always remained deepest in their thoughts; and in insisting that this happiness has a subjective * as well as an objective side they were no doubt rendering useful service. In view of all their work, "if I may take without prejudice the Hedonist's conclusion to be general pleasure, why should I seek to deny," any more than Mr. Bradley,† "that such a statement may after all convey, erroneously and one-sidedly, the truth"? Pleasure is certainly an aspect of the good; but I cannot admit that the whole good for man is pleasure in the abstract (separated from its objective accompaniments); I cannot admit that it is to be distributed

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* I have endeavored always to bear this in mind, though Miss Jones seems to suppose that I deny it. *Cf.* INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, vol. iv., No. 3, p. 381.

† INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, vol. iv., No. 3, p. 386.

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like grocers' merchandise; I cannot admit that it is a kind of mathematical conundrum.*

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"RATIONAL HEDONISM"—A REJOINDER.

MR. MACKENZIE complains of the ambiguity of the definition of pleasure upon which I rely, and says that if I take *feeling* in Dr. Ward's sense, the definition in question involves *petitio principii*, because "it is a disputed point whether feeling in that sense is ever judged to be desirable at all." *Feeling*, in Dr. Ward's sense, is simply pleasure and pain; and I accept the word in that sense, only explaining that it is concrete pleasantness of conscious states which I regard as the ethical end, and not any "abstract" and isolated constituent of consciousness which, though *distinguishable* (and necessarily distinguished in thought and language) from the other constituents, is not *separable* from them. (Similarly *beauty* is an artistic end, though not realizable apart from paint and canvas, etc.)†

It seems to me that certain ethical writers do most undoubtedly lay down that pleasant feeling in this sense is desirable, and pain undesirable. Indeed, is not the fundamental complaint of "Idealist" against Hedonist moralists this, that the Hedonists *do* judge pleasant feeling and absence of painful feeling to be the ultimately desirable end of action? Is it not, for instance, beyond dispute that Bentham and Herbert Spencer believe this? And the same is true of Clarke and Butler, who are generally classed as Intuitionists. Could anything be more unequivocal than Butler's assertion

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* On the difficulty involved in reducing intensive magnitude to extensive (with special reference to psychical intensities) I may refer to Münsterberg's "Beiträge zur Experimentellen Psychologie," Heft 3, pp. 4–5.

† When it is said: feeling is pleasure and pain, pleasure means desirable feeling, the good or end means what is ultimately desirable, and the good or end is pleasure—a *Circulus* is avoided; and what the final statement amounts to is *not* a definition, but the synthetic proposition that what is *ultimately and intrinsically* desirable is desirable *feeling*. Pleasure is defined (or described) by Mr. Mackenzie as "a sort of unreasoned choice." This appears to me to bring pleasure under the heads of Intellect and Will; and to be highly disputable, and it is not the same thing as saying (as he does elsewhere) that pleasure is a sense (or immediate apprehension) of value.

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that "our ideas of happiness* and misery are of all our ideas the most important to us;" that we cannot *justify* to ourselves any pursuit "till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it"? And passages might be multiplied from Bentham, from Spencer, and from many others. Indeed, Mr. Mackenzie seems to imply a *general* recognition of *pleasure* as valuable when he says ("Social Philosophy," p. 227), "The idea that pleasure is our end is the most obstinate of all our preconceptions." And when he allows (as I understand him to do) in this discussion that "the concrete happiness of mankind" is a pre-eminently worthy aim, I do not see in what important respect his end differs from that of the Utilitarian. And when Carlyle says ("Sartor Resartus," Bk. II., Ch. 9), "What is this that, ever since earliest years, thou hast been fretting and fuming, and lamenting and self-tormenting, on account of? Say it in a word: is it not because thou art not *happy?*" does he not imply that happiness is an end which has been judged desirable?

Mr. Mackenzie goes on, "there are senses in which the term 'feeling' may be used. Again, why should it be said that feeling is *judged?* Do the lower animals *judge?*" No doubt "feeling" (like other words) may be used in many senses; but unless a writer may choose in which of several current senses he will use it, he can hardly hope to make his meaning intelligible. My reason for saying that *feeling is judged*, is simply that judgment is necessary to evaluation and that judgment of feeling appears to be an extremely common fact. Surely, if we are considering and estimating life, *feeling* as a constituent of conscious life naturally becomes a subject of judgment. Whether, and how far, the "lower animals" judge, I do not know, though I think that, *e.g.*, a flogged spaniel's terror of the whip looks liks the outcome of a judgment that pain is to be avoided. But that *men* judge, and judge feeling, and frequently judge of pleasure and pain as desirable or undesirable (and rightly so judge), I feel unable to doubt. And if, as Mr. Mackenzie says, "a Stoic judges pleasure to be indifferent, or an ascetic judges it to be undesirable," do not the ascetic and the Stoic "judge feeling"?

Mr. Mackenzie objects to an appeal to "the consciousness of the sentient (and rational) individual at the time of feeling," and

* For Clarke and Butler (as in current usage), *happiness* means pleasure, or surplus of pleasure over pain.

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asks, "What does 'and rational' mean"? I meant it to emphasize the fact that in inquiring into human good, we are inquiring into the good of creatures both sensitive and "rational," and that it is only in as far as possessed of reason that comparison and judgment are possible to any being.

To the question, "What are we to do, if (as in the case of the ascetic) sense and reason seem to be opposed?" I reply that there appears to me to be here an implication that "sense" partakes of reason; and that the opposition supposed must be understood to be between this and *right* reason, which is assumed to condemn the implicit judgment of the *desirableness* of pleasure. As to the meaning of *desirable*, I answer that by it I mean what *ought to be desired*, what it is *rational* to desire. This seems to me to be the ordinary and obvious meaning; and to the next question I should reply that I believe it to be quite possible to "enjoy pleasure" unreflectively.* I cannot see that the difficulties haunting the terms "judgment" and "desirable" are avoided by the substitution of "sense," meaning (I think) discriminative apprehension, and of "value," which implies the quality of desirableness.

Mr. Mackenzie next objects that I identify *cause of pleasure* with *object of pleasure*. I certainly think that there can be no pleasure without an object, and I see no reason for refusing to call such an object a *cause*. If not, what is the precise place and function of the object? Has it, or has it not, any inseparable connection with the pleasure? But I do not wish to insist upon strict antecedence and consequence between cause and effect. I am quite content (and indeed prefer) to speak of the necessary "object" as *cause or concomitant;* but I do not think that the applicability of *cause* can be denied in all cases except where there is antecedence in time, one phenomenon (effect) persisting when the other (cause) is removed. In fact such a separation is arbitrary, and (if taken quite strictly) impracticable. Fire is a *cause* of heat, a lighted candle a cause of illumination; but need the effect *persist* when the cause is extinguished?

I should, however, completely agree with Mr. Mackenzie that

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* If, however, pleasure is a *choice* (as Mr. Mackenzie says further on), can there be pleasure without explicit judgment, and what exactly would be meant by saying that we enjoy a *choice?* And if pleasure means *a sort of choice*, and desire (*cf. post*) means *simply choice*, pleasure would seem to be a *species* of the *genus* desire, and desire itself seems to be a movement of volition.

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pleasure without an "object" is as chimerical as the smile without the cat (however much it may be the smile that attracts us). I think this is indicated even in the sentence quoted at this stage from my article: "Surely it is this quality *in them* [the pleasant or pleasure-producing quality] which we are thinking of and which recommends *them* to us."

With regard to the next point, Mr. Mackenzie has himself said, without qualification, that "Pleasure is not a distinguishable element in our constitution" ("Social Philosophy," p. 222); but I am ready to accept his disclaimer of the most obvious meaning of that statement, and I agree with all that he says about abstractness at this stage. Indeed, I could go further than he does and affirm that *whatever* we say is an abbreviation. No doubt when we seek truth, it is truth within some region more or less circumscribed (as when we seek happiness, it is happiness within some region more or less definitely indicated); but if we knew beforehand "in what particular statements the truth sought would turn out to be embodied," we should, of course, know it already, and should have no need to seek it.

When Mr. Mackenzie goes on to say that what he denies is that truth and beauty are *separable* elements in our experience, I am again quite in agreement; and it is from this point of view that I have observed (p. 84 of my article) that "we can distinguish in thought and words, qualities or groups of qualities without asserting or implying that they have any 'real existence' *except as constituents of a concrete complex.*" With reference to the note about Carlyle, I find that Mr. Mackenzie says, on page 203 of his "Introduction to Social Philosophy," that Carlyle "was quite willing to allow that what seemed to him the highest good for men might fairly be characterized as 'blessedness';" and the context seems to show that "blessedness" in this connection, is supposed to include a "sense of pleasure or enjoyment."

Mr. Mackenzie's actual statement here appears to me to be a perfectly fair and natural inference from the passage in "Sartor Resartus" to which he is alluding, though probably Carlyle would refuse to allow that "blessedness" is at all equivalent to *pleasure* in the narrow sense in which he himself uses pleasure. I do not, however, feel called upon to attach any special weight to Carlyle's utterances concerning Ethics; I know no reason for regarding him as an authority in matters either of ethical theory or ethical practice; and even if he were, his expressions are often much too violent and

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exaggerated to be taken literally. My answer to Mr. Mackenzie's question at the end of the note would be that I believe the consciousness of doing right to be always pleasant (and of doing wrong to be always painful).

With regard to the difficulty of summing units of pleasure, there need be no hesitation in admitting that a precise unit of feeling has yet to be formulated and accepted. But a valuable Hedonic calculus may exist, and, in fact, does exist, without this,—as economic exchange may have existed and did exist before the adoption of a definite and fixed monetary unit;* and there are calculuses existing and used in many other regions of thought and practice, in which it would be difficult to point to an exact and definite unit. It is not easy to measure even such striking objects of sense as sound and light and color; and, in the case of so-called "economic" values, it seems to me that we are driven back, whether or no, upon hedonistic considerations; also that Economists either recognize this or completely fail to assign any ultimate concrete content to the notion of value. Suppose, for instance, that (with a most distinguished English economist) we take "the development of the higher activities of the soul" as "the only reasonable aim of life" (ECONOMIC JOURNAL, vol. iii., p. 388), as that which is ultimately worth having, and by reference to which utility must be estimated. It is clear that the whole question of man's reasonable end remains completely vague, for an ultimate standard other than Hedonic, by which to test the relative worth of different psychic activities is yet to seek. Rational Hedonism, on the other hand, can not only include and justify the loftiest aspirations, but can also explain their significance, and point to their ultimate content. It is no part of the doctrine of Rational Hedonism either that pleasure is always the *proximate* end of reasonable action, or that it is only a man's own pleasure or happiness which it is reasonable for him to seek; and the end accepted by Rational Hedonism does not exclude the pleasure of "satisfied reason," or of the consciousness of well-doing.

Consider, again, the way out of the difficulty which Mr. Mackenzie suggests in the region of Ethics, namely, reference to the choice of "the best men." This is only pushing the difficulty a

* And is not money itself essentially only "counters," a conventional symbol of value? Is it not generally valuable only because it can be exchanged for other things?

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little further back, and, indeed, rather increasing it; for (1) how do we recognize precisely the very best men? Either we can give a reason, or we cannot. If we cannot, what is our appeal worth? If we can, what is the test? How are disagreements on this point to be settled? Again (2), among those whom in a rough-and-ready way we regard as the best whom we know, there may be enormous divergence of opinion as to the comparative value of objects.

And I cannot see that it is (as Mr. Mackenzie says) a "strange doctrine" to hold that if *pleasure* is *sense of value*, value must (it would seem) be measured by pleasure. For there must be different *senses of value* to correspond to the different *values*, and what could be more fitted to measure value than that sense or apprehension of it which varies with its variations? It is, of course, true that in a general way "we measure heat by means of thermometers and not by our sensations;" but in making and using thermometers we have to rely largely on our sensations, and, both primarily and ultimately, it is to sensations and comparison of sensations (or perceptions) that we must appeal. And if it is said that pleasure does not increase with increase of value, can pleasure fairly be called a *sense of value?* I do not feel that any unambiguous meaning is conveyed by the phrase "measurement of value as immediately apprehended without reason." It seems to me that for measurement or for recognition of any experiences as good or evil, or for any consciousness of *value*, comparison and judgment (which involve the use of reason) are needed.

It is, however, this "measurement of value as immediately apprehended without reason" that Mr. Mackenzie affirms to be "the only intelligible meaning that can be given to the measurement of pleasure," and he regards it as equivalent to "measurement of preferability." If "preferable" means "what ought to be preferred" (as *desirable* means *what ought to be desired*), this equivalence that is affirmed between pleasure and preferability seems to imply the worth of pleasure; if, however, *preferable* means merely *actually preferred or chosen* (and this seems more in consonance with calling pleasure a *choice*), the question remains, How is *actual* choice known to be always the *right* or *best* choice? Are we to admit that *actual* conduct furnishes the only test of *right* conduct? And if we do—to mention only one inconvenient result—what becomes of ethical consistency and the "objectivity" of right? And how should we distinguish "the best men" by whose choice right is known? And, indeed, how would they be supposed to help us?

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When it is said that the gratification of intemperance or envy has value—"subjective value"—it is a little difficult to see in what respect this *value* is preferable to pleasure as an end; or, indeed, in what possible respect it can be supposed to have value, *unless* as cause or occasion of pleasure to the intemperate or envious person. In what does *value* consist?

Exception might perhaps be taken (on the ground that it is likely to cause confusion) to the use of the term *desire* in the sense of *mere choice;* but passing this by, I should like just to observe, here, that the reference to *universes of desire* does not seem to me to do away with the objections to admitting that good = object of desire; that is, that whatever *is* desired, *ought to be* desired. If some monster of cruelty or revenge desires the torture of sensitive creatures, while some enlightened philanthropist desires the progress of his fellows in wisdom and bodily health, in art and knowledge, can the reference to different universes suffice to make these objects of *desire* other than disparate (in respect, that is, of non-hedonic qualities)? What is the intrinsic common quality in virtue of which they are both called *good?* If there *is* such a common quality, is the conception of *universes* required? If there is not, why should both be called good, and how can they be compared? Comparison must, it would seem, come in somewhere,—if individual desires cannot be compared, their "universes" must,—and can there be any effective comparison without a "common denominator"? Is it possible to show, or even to imagine, that all the objects of desire of any man and every man could be called "good" in any other sense whatever than a narrowly hedonic and narrowly "subjective" one?—unless, indeed, we resolve *what is good* into *what is bad* and both into *what is.* This, indeed, is, perhaps, what we are brought to by the view that *subjective values* "are constituted simply by individual choice."

Mr. Mackenzie goes on to say, "Miss Jones's question whether any object can or ought to be regarded as good or valuable if it causes no happiness, does not seem to concern me, since I have never denied that pleasantness is, in some sense, a characteristic of every desirable object." *

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* My exact question was as follows: "*Is any* object regarded, or *can* or *ought* it to be regarded as good or valuable (however much desired) if it causes no happiness whatever,—no pleasure and no freedom from pain,—to any sentient creature? And the case could be put more strongly still by supposing an

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Still, I cannot but think that the question *does* concern Mr. Mackenzie, since he repeatedly denies that pleasantness is a desirable characteristic, and of course the point of the question is simply whether pleasure (or happiness) is in itself desirable or not. If it is *not* intrinsically desirable, *to what end* and *in what sense* can it be allowed to be "a characteristic of every desirable object," and on what grounds depends the assumed concomitance of *non-desirable pleasure* with the desirability said to be proper to all objects of desire?

As regards the assertion of the qualitative differences of pleasures, I can only repeat that *if* they have a common quality, *in so far* they are qualitatively similar and comparable; if they have not, it remains to be explained why they have come to be classed together under one name. As regards "reduction" of intensive to extensive magnitudes, it seems to me evident that a greater extent of milder pleasure or pain may be, and constantly is, balanced against a less extent of more poignant feeling.* And surely it is not "evasion" to say that if things can be compared (as higher or lower, or in any other respect), they must be compared with reference to some common quality. And when Mr. Mackenzie says that as regards supposed differences of quality in pleasure, "what we are measuring is *not pleasure at all*," I do not see how this measurement of *non hedonic quality* concerns the Hedonist.

As regards the objection about *sum of pleasures*, it seems to me rather difficult to take it very seriously. I do not understand the phrase—a phrase which I have no desire either to use or to uphold—as meaning more than a concrete succession of periods which have been predominantly happy or pleasant; I do not suppose that *pleasures* or *pleasant times* can be "summed" in any other sense than that in which the hours and years of our existence are "summed" so as to make up our life—or the sense in which our *Lehrjahre* or *Wanderjahre* can be summed. Certainly we *ought* to, and in as far as we are reasonable we *shall*, regard our life, and the

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object, which, so far from causing pleasure, causes pain—pain severe, prolonged, extensive, and unrecompensed." Mr. Mackenzie has not, I think, in this discussion even attempted the ethical evaluation of *pain*.

* As regards the extensive measurement of intensive (subjective) sensations of heat, is not this, to some degree, attempted and accomplished in the medical use of thermometers? And are not intensive differences of capacity and effort measured by, or equated to, extensive differences of accomplishment and reward?

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lives of others, as a totality; and I have always understood Utilitarianism to make great use of this conception.

What I wished to urge in the passage (INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, p. 91) which Mr. Mackenzie next criticises was *not* that there can be no chief good except what can be "realized by summing a series of successive moments" *but* (since we live and act in time, in successive moments) that no chief good, no good of consciousness possible for men, could be "enjoyed all at once." Self-realization or self-development takes time; or if "the desirable thing for man" is (as Mr. Mackenzie in this discussion seems to say) "a continuous state of happiness," is not this, too, subject to the objection of Professor Green, to which I was referring; for it certainly cannot be enjoyed "in a single flash"; and even a flash has continuity and is divisible into moments. The "fancy" that an "abstract idea of an impossible sum," or "an algebraic series" is regarded by Utilitarians as man's chief good or final end is, I think, a fancy entertained by certain opponents of Utilitarianism, and by them alone.

When Mr. Mackenzie observes that "surely all good things are concrete," I entirely agree with what I understand him to mean; as human life is concrete, it would seem that the good or end of human life must be concrete too. But when he says that it is not Hedonism to take as the end *happiness in the concrete*, I can only rejoin that I think Hedonism aims at happiness in the concrete as much as the artist aims at concrete beauty, or the scientific thinker at concrete truth. May not "Hedonists" say what their own doctrine is? And what is the difference between happiness and a continuous, or even somewhat intermittent, state of "subjective satisfaction"? Must not any good of consciousness be *ex vi termini* a "subjective" good? But a good which is *subjective* in this sense, may be also *objective* in the sense of being *rational*. And as a rational as well as a sensitive being, and able *quâ* rational, to take an universal point of view, it is possible for a man to desire the *subjective good* of other men (as Mr. Mackenzie allows that Utilitarians have done, and as he seems to require the moral agent to do who takes realization of the social self as the ethical end).

As to the ends suggested by Mr. Herbert Spencer, by Mr. Leslie Stephen, and by Green, I understand the end of the first two to be frankly hedonistic. As to the end advocated by Green, it is affirmed to be a true self-satisfaction, resulting from, or accompanying, the realization of the Social Self in a society of rational self-

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conscious persons. The only unconditional good is the will to seek this good, to realize this *true and social* (*that is, rational*) *self.* Since the good, the ethical end, *means* that which it is reasonable for man to seek, this account of the end seems to leave us revolving in a circle, the only hint of escape from which (if it may be called an escape) is a reference to existing institutions, and unanalyzed moral opinions, Pagan or Christian. It seems to me that the ethical attitude of Green receives almost prophetic expression in the words of an American poet: "Dear Camerado! I confess I have urged you onwards with me and still urge you, without the least idea what is our destination."

I am grateful to Mr. Mackenzie for the liberal and conciliatory spirit in which he has criticised my article, but I am hardly grateful to him for suggesting that Utilitarians have "tripped" over the word *pleasure* as Locke did over the word *idea.* Since pleasure is the essential content of their fundamental principle, to "trip" over it could be nothing less than absolutely fatal. But in fact (as Mr. Mackenzie, with perhaps more justice than he supposes, charitably suggests) they *have* taken "concrete happiness" as end, happiness being explained as compounded of pleasant states of consciousness; and if happiness is something else than "subjective satisfaction," it would be very interesting to know what that something else is. Satisfactions may no doubt be, in a certain sense, weighed, but the subjective satisfaction of man as he is, and on the whole, cannot be secured with "grocers' merchandise" alone (though some of that is necessary event to existence),—it requires among other conditions the qualities of courage and foresight, self-control and benevolence; on the Utilitarian view, each individual has to exercise virtue as currently understood,—*i.e.*, justice, veracity, and regard to common good, and to aim at promoting it in himself and others. Though it is not the *ultimate* Hedonistic end, it is (as men are constituted) an indispensable means to that end (as earnest study and patient effort are indispensable to the production of artistic beauty or the attainment of scientific truth). And if the end of Universalistic Hedonism—the avoidance as far as possible of pain on the whole, and the attainment of as much happiness as possible in the long run—if this is a mathematical conundrum, it is one to which our rational nature impels us, since we are *sensitive,* to seek an answer.

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MR. BRADLEY ON PUNISHMENT. AN EXPLANATION.

IN a note appended to his "Remarks on Punishment," in the April number of the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, Mr. F. H. Bradley accuses me of misunderstanding the view which I ventured to criticise in a previous number of the same Journal. I should like to make a few remarks in reply.

1. Mr. Bradley says, "He takes me to hold an intuitive theory of punishment (p. 22), by which (so far as I can judge) he means a view based upon some isolated abstraction." I do not think there is any passage in my article which expressly describes any particular opinion of Mr. Bradley's as "intuitive." I did use that term to describe the view, maintained by a School of what Mr. Bradley would probably describe as "popular writers," which it seemed to me might fairly be identified, for the purposes of my argument, with the view supported by Mr. Bradley. I know, of course, that the term "intuitive" is a red rag to writers of Mr. Bradley's philosophical affinities. I meant by it simply *a priori*. The position which I attacked was the theory that punishment is inflicted in obedience to an *a priori* dictate of the moral consciousness, not as a means found by experience to be conducive to an end other than itself, an end which I do believe to be determined *a priori* by the moral consciousness. This opinion I do not understand Mr. Bradley to disclaim.

2. "What is perhaps stranger, is that he treats me as teaching that punishment consists in the infliction of pain for pain's sake. At least I am unable otherwise to interpret his language. Now, I certainly said that punishment is the suppression of guilt, and so of the guilty person. But I pointed out that negation is not a good, except so far as it belongs to and is the other side of positive moral assertion ("Ethical Studies," p. 25). Pain, of course, usually does go with this negative side of punishment, just as some pleasure, I presume, attends usually the positive side. Pain is, in brief, an accident of retribution, but certainly I never made it more, and I am not aware that I made it even an inseparable accident. If a criminal defying the law is shot through the brain, are we, if there is no pain, to hold that there is no retribution? My critic seems, if I may say so, to hold an 'intuitive theory' of my views."—[April Number, p. 284.]

If I have ascribed to Mr. Bradley an opinion which he disclaims, I gladly apologize. But I am afraid I must add that I was humbly trying to put his theory in a way which should be intelligible to myself, and that the acceptance of his explanation makes it more unintelligible to me than ever. He certainly did speak of "Pun-

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ishment for the sake of punishment," and I was, and am, at a loss to understand the phrase without translating it into the doctrine of "evil for the sake of evil." I admit that the evil which is of the essence of punishment is not necessarily pain. In strict accuracy, I should have said "pain or other evil or loss of good." I do not see that the argument would be seriously affected if I had invariably made that substitution. The correction seems to me scarcely more than verbal. If Mr. Bradley does not so regard it, if he would seriously contend that such loss or evil is not of the essence of punishment, I fear I must abandon as hopeless the effort to understand him. Granted all that he says about punishment being "positive moral assertion" (a statement which seems to be too vague to be either accepted or denied—in one sense I have very fully admitted it), still that assertion could not be made without the infliction of such pain or loss. I fail to see how punishment could be defined without introducing this idea of pain, evil, or loss. The moment the means actually used to punish criminals cease to involve in their view either pain or something else which they regard as evil, they cease in ordinary apprehension to be real punishments. Painless death would not be a punishment to people who had ceased to regard it as an evil. It may be questioned whether the modern anarchists are not in precisely this position. If an anarchist wants to be first talked about and then shot, I do not see that society is "asserting" the moral law by falling in with his wishes.

3. Mr. Bradley is of course entitled to his opinion that he would have little to correct in the old statement of his view "except a certain number of one-sided and exaggerated expressions." He will perhaps excuse my saying that I doubt if that is the impression which a comparison of the two chapters will leave on the minds of most readers. In "Ethical Studies" he repudiates the view that "punishment is medicine:" his article in the JOURNAL OF ETHICS is a passionate plea for "moral surgery." When he protested so vehemently against the "immorality" of punishment inflicted for any other reason than ill desert, he could not have meant that the immorality could be escaped by just not calling it punishment. When he declared that it was wrong to inflict "discipline . . . as a means of improvement" except in the case of beings "wholly or partially accountable" (*i.e.*, animals and children), he would surely have held that it is *a fortiori* wrong to "extinguish" people not for their own improvement but for "the good

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of the organism." When he taught that to remove the innocent was unjust, he surely did not mean that "though unjust, it is not, perhaps, therefore in all cases wrong." At least, if such were his meanings, he can hardly blame me for not having found them out. Apart from his vague re-endorsement of what he wrote in "Ethical Studies," Mr. Bradley would appear to me to have given up nearly all that I took exception to. He continues, indeed, to profess his adhesion to the "retributive theory," but what real meaning is left in it after all his explanations and qualifications seems to me to be not very different from the meaning which I conceded to it in my article, though he still wraps it up in phrases which, after those explanations, I cannot help thinking (no doubt ignorantly) to be either misleading or at least unnecessarily mysterious. But it would be useless to attempt any further reply until we have the advantage of knowing distinctly which parts of his former chapter Mr. Bradley is prepared to reassert and which he is not. At present I can only say that the theory which I criticised is now withdrawn, and that the theory which is to take its place is a very different one, and has not been adequately expounded.

I trust that Mr. Bradley will not ascribe my inability to admit that I have seriously misrepresented him either to discourtesy or to want of respect, even if he should feel obliged to explain it to himself in a way still less complimentary to his critic.

It may interest some readers to know that the late Professor Green told me that he had once held the view of punishment maintained by Mr. Bradley, but that "when he came to work it out," he had to give it up. Of course, I do not mean to claim that he would have been entirely satisfied with my own way of putting the matter.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

THE ETHICS OF LITERARY ART. The Carew Lectures for 1893 (Hartford Theological Seminary). By Maurice Thompson. Hartford, Conn.: Hartford Seminary Press, 1893. Pp. 89.

"No careful reader," says our author in his preface, "will need to be told that my aim has been at suggestion, and that I have not hesitated to sacrifice the graces of diction in order to say with fewest words what might have been turned to excellent account in the way of mere literature. . . . I have assumed that my suggestions are sufficiently connected to form the skeleton of a theory, critical and philosophical, which may be filled out and clothed by the student."

The words "suggestion" and "suggestive," as used in recent literature, whether by authors in characterizing their own work or by their kindly critics, have already begun to follow the fortunes that were long since followed by the word "essay." Even modesty has its own responsibilities. The author in vain calls his work only an "essay" if he obviously means to offer us his most deliberate and skilful labors. And that is what writers of essays have often meant to do. We have long forgotten the first meaning of the word, and an essay might now as well be named a thesis, or a discourse, or a dissertation. Just so, a man may indeed declare that he means only to "suggest," and many of us well remember having more than once felt a certain safety as we ourselves have written the word. But to "suggest" something after all must either mean in the end that we say something and are ready to stand by what we have said, or else the word cannot alone protect us from responsibility. There is no harm in the mere word, of course, and we shall all use it, no doubt, in the future; but "suggesting," like any other sort of teaching, is as responsible an affair, in its way, as nailing theses on a church door; and Luther could hardly have bettered his position by saying, "In my remarks concerning indulgences, my aim has been at suggestion."

One inquires, therefore, as to the theses that Mr. Thompson nails on the church door regarding the ethics of literary art. Some of them are substantially these: "We live life to enjoy it; we make and read literature to enjoy it. In either case enjoyment is not necessarily a light matter. It is a serious matter in the long

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run. I do not regard ethics with a long face and a drooping lip. Right doing is not such a doleful thing that we need groan and look as if God-forsaken at the mention of it" (pp. 5 and 6). "I assume that human ethics is the perfection of selfishness,—but the selfishness of the perfect man who can see that the good of all mankind is his good" (p. 8). "The wholesome notion of right must be human, not personal" (p. 9). "It may seem to you that I am not saying much about ethics as a science. There is no such science. Do right" (p. 46). So much for ethics. As for art and the beautiful: "Beauty is of ethical importance, even mere beauty of raiment." All the good is therefore so bound up with the beautiful that, on the one hand, the evil cannot be beautiful, and the beautiful must be good. Both are essentially enjoyable. "The chief office of art is to teach through fascination" (p. 28). "Be honest, and answer that in every action pleasure is your goal. From the notion of heaven down to the wish for a tin whistle your aim is pleasure. You imagine that you would enjoy heaven; you feel sure that a tin whistle would delight you" (p. 29). Accordingly, the difference between good and bad art lies in the fact that the fascination of the latter is, immediately or in the end, corrupting, while the former fascinates and improves.

Consequently, nothing is good in art which so depicts evil as to make us prevailingly admire the evil. The test, meanwhile, of the goodness of art is furnished by what Mr. Thompson calls "immanent criticism," which (p. 62) "is what a civilization thinks of itself." To be sure (p. 63), this immanent criticism might go wrong, but, on the whole (p. 37), "a civilization generates immanent criticism to which that civilization's art ought to conform in order to be æsthetically and ethically adequate." This seems to imply that whatever the average civilized consciousness condemns as corrupting in art must be bad. Accordingly (p. 26), "the average mind is the triumphant criterion .. . . what does not concern humanity as a body ought not to concern any man." And (p. 27) "the democracy of human economy always prevails."

Nevertheless, Mr. Thompson does not quite trust the average mind after all. "No genuine genius can be led by the nose; he likes a way of his own." "No very great book wears clothes of the extreme current style" (p. 78). Furthermore, as Mr. Thompson's indignant references to certain books show, a great deal of what he thinks bad literature does appeal to the vulgar taste, and even to masses of the cultivated, because this literature is fasci-

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nating, although he believes it bad. Yes, on page 74 we learn that: "All along, as we plough our furrow of inquiry, we turn up this stubborn bulb of responsibility. To the average tongue it has an acrid taste, but we must bite it every day and every hour of our toil, whether we relish it or not." So it here appears that the average taste is in this case at fault, and that "responsibility," although it is often unenjoyable, is still ethically good, although, as we before learned, the good was always the joyous; and although we had no need to make an ill mouth when biting "every day and every hour of our toil" what, as we now learn, has an "acrid taste."

The inconsistencies thus "suggested" are but a hint of the enigmatical "suggestions" that fill Mr. Thompson's whimsical and exasperating book. Condemning ethical formulations as vain, he still undertakes to "suggest" his own ethical views, and, in a way, to preach. Attacking one of the most difficult of critical problems, viz., the place to be assigned in literature to those works of genius which are not free from morally corrupting elements, he treats this problem with the most superficial of abstract "suggestions," expounded with the airy manner of one who defies you to pin him down to any one positive doctrine. The problem itself, for the rest, is one that simply cannot be treated *in abstracto*. A book is like a man's character. Shall I be able to get any good out of an acquaintance with a man whose character is at all seriously tainted? The question admits of no general answer. I must be careful when I deal with such men; but, if I live, I shall come to know many such, and sometimes a great rascal may teach me a great lesson. Just so with books. The real question is always the individual one. Ought I, under these given circumstances, to let this book alone? That question a man of character will answer on the evidence, if the question concerns him. The answer may be, and happily usually is, easy enough. But it may assume any degree of difficulty. A wise man will not prefer bad books. He will not shun what just now he needs to use. Nor will he be content with bare abstract "suggestions." When the problem arises, he will meet it on its merits.

As to "immanent criticism" and the "average taste" and the rest, the "public" is precisely that vague whole to which one appeals as one chooses, either to confirm or to refute any view. The book that I hate is popular. Well, then, that is what I expected. The "vulgar" always run after the bad. The book that

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I love is popular. Ah, then, I always knew that immanent criticism and the "average" man, in his health, would bear me out. Thus one can prove anything.

Mr. Thompson's intention to warn against corrupting literary art is admirable. His actual judgments are highly individual. His antipathies are whimsical. He has, in the present reviewer's opinion, made a serious mistake in giving his capriciously-worded lectures so definite a title. If a man thinks nothing of the "science of ethics," why need he publish a book on the "ethics" of anything? The word "Ethics" implies a formulated doctrine, and that again implies responsibility for one's "suggestions."

JOSIAH ROYCE.

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CONSCIENCE: AN ESSAY TOWARDS A NEW ANALYSIS, DEDUCTION, AND DEVELOPMENT OF CONSCIENCE. By Rev. J. D. Robertson, M.A., D.Sc. Vol. I. New Analysis of Conscience. London: Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co.

This is a painstaking but unfortunate book. The author gives us in Part I. a classification of the "activities of conscience." In Part II. A. we have a criticism of rival theories of their "formal constitution;" in Part II. B. an account of the "material constitution" (of which he means the content) "of the moral sense and the sense of duty." But he shows no evidence in any of these sections (which may roughly be said to fall under the heads of psychology, ethics, and sociology) of having taken the necessary care to prepare himself for a work of this kind. "Conscience" is a popular name which spreads loosely over a number of clearly distinguishable phenomena. In particular it is applied to the sense of pleasure or pain we experience in the perceived harmony or discord between the idea of an action (whether past, present, or future) of ourselves or others and our more or less consciously conceived ideal of the Good. One would have thought that some such general account of the popular use of the word was enough, and that the writer on psychology might then have been free to go on to show how these feelings issued in actions or tendencies to action, the writer on ethics to analyze the content of the Ideal on which the whole phenomena depends. This is not Mr. Robertson's idea. In Part I. he begins with a misleading coordination of conscience or moral sensibility with sensation or the sensibility to secondary qualities of perception, through which the primary

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qualities of bodies are apprehended. "High as the latter order of sensibility is, the moral is higher. It is more complex. For in addition to the natural qualities and relations of things, the moral qualities and relations of persons enter into its composition." After laying down this basis of confusion, the author goes on to classify the "activities" of conscience. We have—1. "Moral susceptibilities and the emotional judgments" classed together under the "Moral Sense." 2. "The moral impulses," together with "the judgments and sentiments of obligation," under "Sense of Duty." Under 1. we have again, *a.* "emotional judgments, which are simply *declaratory* of right and wrong;" *b.* "those that are also *judicial*." Under 2. *a.* "*Premonitory* impulses" (which "hold before the imagination punishment as impending upon wrong-doing and happiness as the reward of well-doing") and *b.* "*prescriptive* judgments" (whose appeal is "less to the lower fears and more to reverence"). Lastly, after the act, these latter "flow back again into the judicial activities," completing, as it were, the circle, and producing the shock of moral condemnation or approval. I have reported this, which to some will appear elaborate trifling, in the author's own terminology. As he modestly claims: "Results of fresh thinking and work in the field can be secured and made permanent only by the projection of a more correct and suitable scheme of naming."

In Part II. A. the writer criticises Hedonism under its two forms, "Individualistic" and "Socialistic" (an unfortunate "projection," surely, this last, as it obviously is intended to include Mr. Herbert Spencer), only to reject them in favor of "Humanistic Eudæmonism," which he identifies with the theory of T. H. Green. The classifications in this section are peculiarly unfortunate. Under the head of Individualistic Hedonism are classed without distinction Aristippus, Epicurus, Hobbes, Helvetius, Bentham, and Bain. Under Socialistic Hedonism, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, Comte, Schopenhauer, Professor Clifford, and Mr. Leslie Stephen.

Humanistic Eudæmonism unites Spinoza and Kant with Hegel and Professor Green.

How little the author has profited by the study of the masters he professes to follow is seen in his last section (II. B.), in which he discusses the relation between the "formal" and the "material constitution" of conscience. According to Green, of course, the "duty" to be realized is the system or unity, in relation to which the various objects of desire have their value assigned to them.

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It stands to these desires as universal to particular. Similarly, in the life of the community, the several institutions of civilized society, including the maxims of current morality, derive their value and significance from the function they perform in forwarding the better life. They thus stand to the individual will as a species of objective conscience. While to the good will they are only the particular forms in which it realizes itself, to the man whose will is immature, and who has not yet risen to the level represented by the accepted code, they stand for his own better self, and are thus for him the universal. All this, which might be called the organic view of conscience and society, is completely missed by Mr. Robertson. To him "the material" (or, reverting to the authorized nomenclature, the "content") "is in every case something *additional* (the italics are his) to the formal constitution. A conception of the good for man as man and some sensibility to the same are sufficient to set up an activity of conscience upon every occasion of free or self-determined willing. But as soon as the activity has thus begun, as soon as it proceeds from its first principle to these particular applications, conceptions and sensibilities additional to the formal constitution are acquired." The reader might be forgiven if he fails to attach any meaning to this paragraph; but if it means anything it means simply a blunder on a fundamental point in metaphysics. With all the good will in the world the writer has failed to bend his master's bow.

The same misconception as to the relation of universal to particular reappears at a later point. The writer is discussing the difficulty of reconciling his theory of conscience with differences of moral standard, and especially with the apparent absence of all standard among primitive races. Thus, he is struck with the venial treatment that "the homicidal and disgusting practice of cannibalism" receives in primitive society and puts the question, "How, if there were these formal conceptions and sensibilities in the consciences of primitive men, do they not give clearer and fuller evidence of their existence and activity? If they coexisted with such a highly anomalous content, why did they not actively condemn its manifestations in willing instead of shielding and sanctioning them?" There is, of course, no real difficulty here for Idealist any more than for Evolutionary Ethics. Mr. Robertson having created his own difficulty has to create his solution of it. This he does in the paragraph following the sentences just quoted: "In all probability this is precisely what conscience did in the first

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perpetrators of these horrors. It would register its protest against them. Some feeling of uneasiness and unsettlement would be experienced after the first perpetration of such deeds. There would be an emotional judgment of disapprobation in the moral sense of an inhibitory judgment and impulse in the sense of duty. Like later activities these might be overborne or disregarded until, through some combination of evil within and special temptation without, the act (*sic*) ceased to be common." This rationalist account of the Fall may be commended to theologians who take their Ethics from the book of Genesis. It may safely be said it is not likely to commend itself to anybody else.

For the rest, the only part of the book in which the thought is at all accurate or trenchant is that upon the "abstract rationalism" of Kant. This includes some good remarks. But even here we seem to have heard most of it before. J. H. MUIRHEAD.

LONDON.

SHORT STUDIES IN CHARACTER. By Sophie Bryant, D.Sc. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1894.

This little book does not need its apologetic preface. Its contents may be a trifle desultory, consisting as they do of a collection of diverse addresses to various audiences. But there is enough of unity in theme and still more of consistency of conviction to justify embodiment in a volume of "The Ethical Library." "The ostentatious continuity" is so often, and not least in "Theory of Education," the parent of dreariness that the reader may even rejoice to find that between chapters, many of which make a new departure, he may profitably supply links of connection for himself. It is even a doubtful gain, inasmuch as it suggests a methodical treatment to which these "Studies" do not lay claim, that the volume is divided into two "Parts,"—the one "Ethical," dealing "with considerations of character as such," the other "Educational," devoted to a discussion of "educational problems arising therefrom." In style, at times not a little homiletic, in frequency of suggested applications, in the limit at which analysis is cut short, the treatment is really "educational" throughout. No drawback, be it added, when, in addition to what Mr. Spencer would call "a preparation in psychology," there is so much first-hand educational experience, and so much just insight, especially into the souls of young people, as there is here.

In its essence, if we may single out what seems essential from

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much else that is interesting, the book is a plea for the use of ideas in the formation of character, and the use of character, in the sense of the conscience, in the formation of ideas. The first of these appears most explicitly in an earnest chapter on "The Intellectual Factor in Moral Education," but it is as emphatically urged elsewhere, especially in the quite pronounced section on "The Influence of Ideals." "If we could only make 'Thou shalt think' the Alpha and Omega of our intellectual education, the 'I will think' of our pupils would probably follow." "Genius, to take the extreme case, will form in one week a habit that gives work for years to stupidity." So elsewhere "Helping the child to grow his new ideas," "instilling into the child's mind right ideas," "transplanting" ideas, are declared to be the main business and hope of the educator. And there is a rationale for the policy,—to wit, the psychological doctrine that "every practical idea tends directly to realize itself in act," or, in other words, that "ideas of conduct do tend in a most real and direct way to realize themselves in conduct." All this we need not dispute. Abstractly, at least, it is true. It is likewise a wholesome protest against the notion that feeling, disciplined by "natural reactions," is (as Spencer would have it) the main element in moral education. Nor when Mrs. Bryant, building upon it, sets a hopeful trust in examples, actual and imaginary, or in "the influence of epigrammatic mottoes" (a rather unhappy word), does she suffer her championship of ideas to carry her into the extravagances of writers like Guyau, who are so much in love with "psychical suggestions" and its possibilities that they write at times as if children can be made to do anything if only they be patted on the back and persuaded that they are able to do it. While, however, it is well that this doctrine should be preached, there is, after all, but little educational comfort in it till we are in possession of a knowledge of the conditions under which ideas become practical. Mrs. Bryant does not fail us here. She is too experienced to be blind to the varieties and idiosyncrasies of the material to be wrought upon; and, indeed, one of the most interesting features of the volume is its discussion of the treatment appropriate to diverse types of character, both good and bad. It might, however, be suggested that the book would be improved by a more direct examination of the human instincts, their nature and number, their order of development, their period of growth and decay. Few subjects, as Professor James has so suggestively pointed out, are of

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deeper and more practical educational import than this. And however much we may believe in "ideas,"—*i. e.*, in examples, and precepts, and "mottoes," and ethical literature,—these are all instruments which can be wielded with tenfold effect when insight into the times and seasons at which instincts mature has taught us what ideas are most appropriate to general conditions of temperament, age, sex, and circumstance. This has, in a sense, been understood. Most—or, at any rate, many—parents know that there is a time when the sailor or the shepherd, the fireman or the soldier, does more in the way of example for their young people than the saint or the philanthropist; just as there is one age at which a boy may be introduced to "Treasure Island," and another age at which he may with profit pass on to Thackeray or George Eliot. This, however, has been left too much to chance or rule of thumb. The world needs something more. Nor could any bit of applied psychology well be of greater service to the bewildered parent than a careful study of when and how the unfolding instincts are most effectually to be nourished, or, if need be, repressed. Such a subject would receive justice at the hands of a writer like Mrs. Bryant.

When she comes to plead for carrying the conscience into the things of the mind, Mrs. Bryant is even more emphatic and earnest than elsewhere. The cultivation of soundness of intellect, she tells us, "is as absolutely a duty, though it may not always be so pressing a duty as justice and charity, as courage and self-denial." "The more closely we look at this excellence of the critical impulse, the more clearly do we discern in it the features of the old-fashioned virtue of honesty." "All ignorance is itself the effect of that lack of the honesty which rests not till truth is searched out whole." These are strong statements. It would be easy to suggest needful abatements. After all, a fallacy is not a sin, nor is a false quantity a grave moral offence, though a distinguished head of a college is reported once to have said it was. In mercy to stupidity, on which Mrs. Bryant has little mercy, it might be remarked that public opinion has always been sadly tolerant of intellectual backsliding, and that somehow or other Remorse does not dog the heels of the perpetrator of logical horrors as it does those of the sinner. These, however, are perhaps considerations which do but make a chapter like this the more needful. It is, at any rate, strong doctrine and wholesome, and likely to remain wholesome so long as there are so many people in the world whose

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consciences, sensitive to the stain of moral guilt, seem by a strange perversity to feel the yoke of ignorance easy and the burden of unreason light.

There is much else in the book which, did space permit, might well receive attention. A vigorous and well-reasoned attempt to remove some of the seeming contradictions between self-development and self-surrender calls for no remark, as it has already appeared in these pages. Even better, perhaps, is a bright, compact, and clear chapter on friendship,—a subject which has in modern ethics received too little attention. "Ugly Ducklings" handles a theme of perennial interest to every educator; and "The Causes and Cure of Some Moral Defects" touches, with knowledge and insight, but somewhat too cursorily, the pathology of the subject. Readers will find all these chapters profitable.

It may be needful to add, though it is a graceless thing to find even slight flaws in a good book, that it would be possible, with advantage and without serious recasting, to expunge something of the style which, however appropriate in an address, is best absent in print; that a fine quotation from Matthew Arnold is marred by an inaccuracy; that any trifling philosophical gain that may accrue, especially in a book meant for the general reader, is dearly purchased by such words as "other-conscious," "other-mind," "ego-altruism;" that the child as "father to the man" is one of those veteran quotations that had better now be honorably superannuated; and that, pending proof of accomplished fact, "the aid of mathematics as well as philosophy" in the construction of a science of just society is a prospect for which, though not perhaps in the accepted sense of the phrase, we cannot find it in us to be sufficiently grateful. A few trifling imperfections such as these, however, detract but little from the merits of a suggestive and valuable contribution to the theory of education.

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PHILOSOPHIE DER BEFREIUNG DURCH DAS REINE MITTEL. Beiträge zur Pädagogik des Menschengeschlechts. Von Dr. Bruno Wille. Berlin: S. Fischer, 1894. 399 S.

The volume under consideration is an interesting and suggestive work, one worthy the attention of a more extended circle of readers. It is not a book written from books, but is founded upon the author's own experience.

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The contents are indicated in the headings of the chapters. Idealism; My Aim; The Pure Means; Individualism; Individual Appreciations of Means; The Sword or Physical Authority; The Rod or Pedagogic Authority; Absence of Force; Religious Authority; Economic Profit; Political Authority; Moral Thraldom; Party Power; Liberation.

Dr. Wille sets forth "the importance of bearing in mind the concomitant effects of a measure." "Apparent as this truth must be," he says, "yet do people seem utterly blind to it, for in countless instances measures are adopted which cannot fail to be purposeless and ineffectual, if not injurious in their concomitant effects. Such means I denote as 'impure' because their effect is to some extent vitiated by the concomitant results so entirely at variance with the main object. A means can be regarded as 'pure' only when side issues do not affect the main purpose of the measure at all, or only in a proportionately small degree."

The goal towards which Dr. Wille is working is "the free, reasoning being." He therefore classes under pure means, narrowly speaking, or under "*the* pure means" all measures which help us to approach more nearly to this reasoning being, but which do not act so in opposition to liberty and reason as to do more harm than good in the attainment of this important end.

In reference to this aim of his our author criticises various political and social regulations. He objects to the use of punishment in education, and his reflections upon corporal punishment (p. 87) are indeed excellent. His remarks upon "sexual pedagogy" (p. 108 *et seq.*) are also worthy of notice. Dr. Wille was himself for many years the moral head of the large Berlin *Freireligiöse Gemeinde*, and attained great success in this capacity.

Even as our author censures the use of force in education, so does he also condemn its use in the state. Except in a very few instances, the application of violent means is hateful to him. He likewise condemns all imperious authority and governmental tutelage; in short, all efforts to bring reasonable beings to adopt the line of conduct desired, not by means of argument, but through the adoption of other measures.

Dr. Wille denies that benefits arise from the existence of state power. He says with Prudhon, "Let one individual after another ask of the state, 'What benefits do I receive from you, after all? You lay duties on me, you demand military service of me, subject me to all sorts of vexations, to laws and punishments,—now, what

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benefits do you bestow upon me in return?'" He thinks that for most persons, the answer would be an eminently unsatisfactory one. Our author does not even hold that the state preserves "order and peace." He says, "any person who, by his own experience, is intimately acquainted with the life of the mass of the people, with their eager, restless toil, their deprivations, the insecurity of existence, the havoc wrought in domestic life, alcoholism, the mental and moral ruin, the want of employment, the vagrancy on the highways, the workhouses, and penal institutions, the professional jealousy, the strikes, the acts of desperation, in short, the whole proletarian hell, will take no part in this idle talk of order and peace; he will rather look upon the condition of the masses as in the highest degree riotous and deplorable."

Little as Dr. Wille favors the existing social order, yet he finds the ideal of the Nationalists or Social-Democrats equally distasteful. He sees in it nothing but a form of state socialism, utterly destructive of all liberty. He criticises the system in detail; for the most part, his arguments consist of the familar objections raised by the followers of Liberalism, and, to me, many of them seem not to hit Socialism at all. Dr. Wille would preserve "the achievements of Liberalism and give them a further development within the confines of Socialism," and so attain to "a Socialism making for freedom and against authority."

At one time, Dr. Wille was himself an adherent of the Social-Democratic party. It seems that certain personal experiences of his in that party, on the one hand, and the influence of prominent individualists, like Steiner and Nietzsche, on the other, have led him to his present point of view; in my opinion, our author underestimates the difficulties in its way.

As in political affairs the individualistic and socialistic tendencies contend with one another, according to Dr. Wille's point of view, so in his ethics, the egoistic and altruistic tendencies are in a constant state of conflict; for the present the former seems to outweigh the latter,—the bold "Liberty of the Ego" of Max Stiener and the "Law of Might over Right" of Friedrich Nietzsche seem to be triumphant; but since the author, at least so it would seem to me, has not yet definitely taken up his position in regard to these two theories, it is questionable whether his present decision on this point is his final one.

For the student of ethics, the most noteworthy chapter of the book, and at the same time the most expansive one—covering more

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than one hundred and fifty pages—is the twelfth, that on Moral Thraldom. In this chapter, our author indulges to excess his inclination to use paradox. He seems not to perceive that the use of paradoxical construction is also an "impure means." Let me cite some instances. "I set but little value upon conscience, regarding it as belonging to a low grade of morality. The free reasoning being is conscienceless" (p. 103). "Yes, conscience hinders mankind in its development toward perfect reason and liberty. Not conscientiousness leads to the free reasoning being, but—prepare to be shocked, thou moral Philistine—conscienceless ness" (p. 243). "Whoever aims to develop the free-reasoning being, looks with contempt upon conscience" (p. 245). "Maxims of morality, commonly looked upon as the good geniuses of human society, are rather 'spectres,' the diabolic products of darkness and tyranny." "All forms of moral bondage, too, must be thrown off; we must free ourselves from the restraint of duty, of conscience" (p. 253). "My aim is a human society free from moral authority, as it should be free from every kind of mastery and dominion, free from the demands of morality, from duty, from the shackles of conscience" (p. 275). "Mankind will look upon this period (the period of moral rule) much as we regard the monkey-stage of our existence" (p. 276).

It was very ill-advised, because misleading, for the author thus to phrase his real meaning. The object of his attack is not conscience, but the *irrational conscience*,—conscience giving decisions without foundation, blindly following prescribed usage. He attacks the positive morality current in society, which, for the most part, is but an expression of class interests, and pleads for an *ideal* morality.

He says, "The impudence with which morality identifies itself with legality and works in the interest of the privileged classes is but too clearly shown in the fact that the capitalist, the speculator, the exploiter of every kind is a man of honor as long as he remains within the bounds of legality" (p. 274).

"Authority makes *demands*, but *gives no reasons* therefor; even folly and depravity may surround themselves with a halo and thus make demands upon us, but it would be difficult to find a justification of their position in reason. The bath of liberty and reason which I recommend to 'morality' may serve not only to cleanse it, to remove far from it all slavish impulse, but may also act as an aqua fortis to separate the essence of true morality, the really beneficial tendencies, from spurious morality" (p. 277).

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"The orthodox moralist does not understand," says our author, "that I do not propose to suppress good impulses, but that my plea is solely for a purification of morality."

And likewise Dr. Wille's frequently passionate polemic against the idea of "the ought," is not meant to be taken absolutely, since he himself gives currency to it more than once. Near the beginning of the book he says,—*e. g.*, "You glory in the intellectual side of man, his ability to reflect the world in his soul; actually or through his understanding to grasp everything having a real existence. And you do so with justice. But do not underestimate another side of our nature, our power to set bounds to the world, to *will* what *ought* to be" (p. 2 *et seq.*).

And again, "If we wish to attack a form of immorality we *ought* not to apply local treatment to the diseased members, to bring to bear upon them legal and moral recriminations, but we should aim to improve the general condition of the whole body, to remove the original cause of the symptoms of disease" (p. 255).

"Moral priestlings!" thus does he stigmatize those who make imperious demands but give no reasons for them, and he claims to have discovered representatives of this tendency in the ethical movements in America as well as in Germany. In this belief he opposes Professor Felix Adler's assertion, that "it is the duty of the teacher of ethics to lay before his pupils the teachings of morality, but not to engage in a discussion of the principles upon which they rest." Dr. Wille holds that in the domain of ethics, as elsewhere, the child's inclination to ask after the why and wherefore should not be suppressed, but should rather be stimulated as a manifestation of growing reason and independence.

With much in this volume we shall find ourselves at variance. This fact, however, in no way alters our opinion as to its value.

G. von Gizycki.

Berlin.

The Ethics of Hegel. Translated Selections from his "Rechtsphilosophie." With an Introduction by J. Macbride Sterrett, D.D., Professor of Philosophy in the Columbian University, Washington. Boston: Ginn & Co., 1893. Pp. xii., 216.

Professor Sterrett's expository "Studies in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion" have already creditably connected his name with Hegel's. In the present volume (one of the "Ethical Series," edited by Professor Sneath, of Yale) Professor Sterrett undertakes

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the difficult and necessarily rather thankless task of the translator of Hegel. The introduction, after a brief bibliography, sketches Hegel's life, summarizes Hegel's ethics, indicates his relation to previous systems of ethical doctrine, and makes some technical remarks on his vocabulary. Hereupon follows a partial translation of the "Rechtsphilosophie," with summaries of omitted portions of the original text, and with the insertion of a few supplementary passages from Hegel's other writings.

Of the execution of such a task it is almost necessarily unkind to say anything at all severely critical. The job undertaken is one of the hardest of its kind. That one man's translation of Hegel cannot wholly please another man is almost axiomatic. And, on the whole, this translation is certainly conscientious and literal. Yet Professor Sterrett's work is blotted by a few unnecessary failings here and there, some of which might be corrected in a further edition. Of these but two or three instances can here be cited. On page 110 the translation runs: "An old proverb says, 'A stone flung from the hand is the very devil.'" Although the text hereabouts is referring to the fact that a man must not excuse his mischievous acts by saying that they have resulted in more mischief than the doer had intended, the reader may wonder what the precise point of this proverb may be. But as Hegel quotes it, "Rechtsphilosophie," p. 157, the proverb runs: "Der Stein, der aus der Hand geworfen wird, ist *des Teufels.*" Surely a word (here even the case of a noun) makes much difference for a translator. Nor can this easily be a mere misprint. If so, why was the word "very" inserted? Or again, in the immediately following paragraph of the translation, § 120, we have an example of an unnecessary obscuring of Hegel's meaning. Professor Sterrett translates: "The right of *Intention* is that the universal quality of the act be not only implicit, but be fully known to the one doing the act, as having been the real purpose of his will. On the other hand, the right, as regards the external form of the act, is the right of its being considered as something known and willed by a *rational* being." Now, what student would soon gather from this translation the thought that is pretty obviously present in the original? Hegel simply means to point out to us that whoever wants his acts to be judged by the intentions which they embody (and not by their accidental effects) must be also prepared to remember the reciprocal truth that a man of sense, who is capable of having any intentions at all, must prove the fact precisely by

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virtue of his responsibility for what his acts really effect. The unquestionably crabbed and barbarously condensed passage in German runs ("Rechtsphilosophie," p. 158): "Das Recht der Absicht ist, dass die allgemeine Qualität der Handlung nicht nur an sich sey, sondern von dem Handelden gewusst werde, somit schon in seinem subjektiven Willen gelegen habe; so wie umgekehrt, das Recht der Objektivität der Handlung, wie es genannt werden kann, ist, sich vom Subjekt als Denkendem als gewusst und gewollt zu behaupten." One may, with the insertion of two or three explanatory parentheses, translate thus: "The intention [*sc.* of any responsible agent] has this right [the right, namely, to be judged by the fact], that the character of the act, on the whole, shall not be a mere external fact, but shall have been known to the agent, and shall have been premeditated by his subjective will. But on the other hand, the act [once done] has the right, as one may say, of its objectivity,—viz., the right to declare itself to be the deliberate deed of the subject who *meant* it." The sense of all this is perfectly clear. A man pleads that you must judge him by his intent, not by his outward deeds. Hegel answers to such a man: Do you want to be treated as a responsible agent? If so, then your deed must have its rights as well as your intent. Your intent, on the one hand, pleads its rights. But the "objectivity of the deed" must equally maintain its own rights, saying to the responsible subject, "I am what you meant, if you were *denkend* and meant anything."

Perhaps this meaning is actually expressed by Professor Sterrett's phraseology, but the present reviewer finds the English, at this point, a little harder than the German.

Again, on page 189, Professor Sterrett translates: "The State has its immediate existence in the ethical life and in the self-consciousness of the individual; in his knowing and doing (in his knowledge and activity) it has its mediated existence, just as the individual has his *substantial freedom* in the State as in his own essence, seed, and product of activity." The German passage runs (§ 257): "An der Sitte hat er [der Staat] seine unmittelbare, und an dem Selbstbewusstsein des Einzelnen, dem Wissen und Thätigkeit desselben seine vermittelte Existenz, so wie dieses durch die Gesinnung, in ihm, als seinem Wesen, Zweck, und Produkte seiner Thätigkeit, seine substantielle Freiheit hat." The translation is inaccurate in three places, and unintelligible in one. Hegel's statement is: "The State has its immediate expression in

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the corporate ethical life; and its mediated expression in the self-consciousness of the individual, in his knowledge and in his activity. Just so, the self-consciousness of the individual [*dieses* can only refer to *Selbstbewusstsein*], by virtue of its sentiment [of loyalty], gets its substantial freedom in the State, which is the essence, the end of this self-consciousness, and the creature of its activity."

These passages are certainly not specimens of Professor Sterrett's best work, and one does not wish the translation to be judged by them alone. On the whole, the principal difficulty of this volume lies in the deliberately-chosen plan of a literal rendering, which Professor Sterrett has, in the main, pretty closely followed. But a literal rendering of Hegel must needs occasionally seem too much like a translation from the speech of Gog into the tongue of Magog. A class that shall use such a text will in some passages need a teacher who can once more translate the translation. How many of us can find it easy to do this? On the other hand, this obscurity does not by any means *always* beset the text of the "Rechtsphilosophie." Extended passages of it are, indeed, quite intelligible to any sufficiently prepared student. And Professor Sterrett's introductory discussion is lucid and well stated. The modest devotion of the earnest disciple is everywhere apparent. But the present reviewer is moved to express the cordial hope that Professor Sterrett, who has labored so self-sacrificingly for Hegel, may ere long be moved to speak more fully in his own name. One is led to anticipate that when he does thus more fully speak, his self-expression will prove even more admirable than his previous self-abnegation.

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ETHIC: Demonstrated in Geometrical Order, and divided into five Parts, which treat (1) of God; (2) of the Nature and Origin of the Mind; (3) of the Nature and Origin of the Affects; (4) of Human Bondage, and of the Struggles of the Affects; (5) of the Power of the Intellect, or of Human Liberty. Translated from the Latin of Benedict de Spinoza by W. Hale White; translation revised by Amelia Hutchinson Stirling, M.A. (Edin.). Second Edition, Revised and Corrected, with New Preface. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1894. Pp. cv., 297.

Elia once made the confession "that the names of some of our poets sounded sweeter, and have a finer relish to the ear,—to mine,

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at least—than that of Milton or of Shakespeare." They are more choice: they are not so "staled and rung upon in common discourse." There can be little doubt that the choicest name in modern philosophy is that of Spinoza. He can hardly ever be vulgarized, as even Kant or Hegel may. Perhaps it is partly for this reason that he is the object of a warmer devotion than any other. He is as well named *Benedictus* as the apostle of "God, Freedom, and Immortality" was named *Immanuel.* He is the one philosopher who is not followed, but who is loved and worshipped. The present edition is an illustration of this fact. It is evident that it is work of one for whom, as for Goethe or Shelley, Spinoza is much more than an expositor of metaphysic. He is a believer in the Spinozistic life, as there used to be believers in the Parmenidean. For though Spinoza is sometimes claimed as an advocate of the view that philosophy is a mere study of truth, with no bearing on practice, there is in reality none who serves better to refute that view. He is one of those with whom the philosophic and the prophetic are most finely blended. Mr. White's appreciation of this gives an interest to his edition.* While he has a quite competent understanding of Spinoza's theoretic position, and of his relations to other philosophers, he adds an insight into the Spinozistic spirit. His translation is probably the best that has yet been made, and altogether the edition is one that deserves to be warmly welcomed. The new preface is a solid and valuable piece of work. It is a pity that it does not contain fuller references to the Spinozistic literature, at least in this country. Perhaps, when another edition is called for, some reference of this sort may be added.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

LA SCIENZA DELL' EDUCAZIONE. Di Roberto Ardigo. Verona: Fratelli Drucker, 1893.

The readers of this little book may be interested to learn something of its author. Professor Ardigo was formerly a priest, a learned canon of Mantua, his native city. One fine day he was inspired with the desire to defend ancient philosophy and faith against the impious attacks of modern criticism. But, like St. Paul on the way to Damascus, he was dazzled by so brilliant a light that

* *Cf.* also, for an appreciation of Spinoza from this point of view, Delbos's "Le Problème Moral dans la Philosophie de Spinoza" and Brunschvigg's "Spinoza."

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when he recovered he found himself a convert to that very science which he strove to controvert. He threw off his frock and devoted himself henceforth to study and teaching. From the royal lyceum of Mantua he was transferred to the University by means of the boldness of one of the ministers, Dr. Baccelli, who had him nomidated, in 1881, Professor of the History of Philosophy at the University of Padua. Here he also had charge of the department of Pedagogy for two years. The book here presented is made up of lectures given in these two years and collected and published by his scholars.

If Ardigo surrenders to modern science and to modern Positivism, he does so with discretion, for he has an irresistible tendency to an independent judgment of his own, and his equipment of philosophic study is greater than that of many eminent positivists. He has carefully studied the Patristic writers and knows St. Thomas thoroughly. Nothing therefore can be further from the truth than to assume, as many have, that this Italian philosopher is a close follower of Spencer, whereas he does not follow any one, and has his own ideas and philosophic system. There are, indeed, many points on which he is not in accord with the doctrines ordinarily held by contemporary Positivists. If this were not borne out by his numerous books,* it would be proved by this course of lectures on Pedagogy, which is purely the outcome of his scientific activity, and differs most completely from any other treatment of the subject, as will be seen in the brief *résumé* here presented.

In the introduction, the author distinguishes pedagogical doctrines from Pedagogy and pedagogical science, which is a *complexus of rules deduced from principles.* Pedagogy is a science of the facts of education, which facts, being distinct from all others, may well be the object of scientic study (p. 10). In order to know how the facts of education are obtained we need to study its constituent parts, which he enumerates as follows: 1. Activity; 2. Exercise; 3. Habit; 4. Education. There can be no education if

* The principal publications of Ardigo are "La Psicologia come scienza positiva;" "La Formazione naturale nel fatto del sistema solare;" "La Morale dei positivisti;" "La Sociologia;" "Il Vero."

The following writings are also important: "Pietro Pomponazzi;" "L'Inconoscibile di H. Spencer;" "La Religione di T. Mamiani;" "La Studio della Storia della filosofia;" "La Relatività della Logica umana;" "La coscienza vecchia e le idee nuove;" "Empirismo e Scienza;" "Il fatto psicologico della percezione."

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habits are not formed, no habit without exercise, no exercise without activity (p. 45).

Activity, in its general signification, is the condition which a body assumes by means of force communicated to it (p. 49). Through psychical activity this force becomes an external or internal stimulus which, being irritated, causes a consumption of cerebral-nervous substance, followed by sensation; this, however, must not be confounded with the former phenomena, which are purely physiological (p. 58). The author then goes on to speak of the effects of activity, and deduces practical applications that are of importance pedagogically, relating to the duration and variety of exercise, and to the necessity of keeping account of pleasure and pain (p. 87), to which subject he devotes a number of pages.

Proceeding to discuss the stimuli most adapted to develop mental activity, he arranges them in two classes,—general and special. General stimuli are intuition and speech. Special stimuli are those which need to be adapted to the state, the age, and the general condition of the pupil. The fundamental stimulus which calls forth the conscious activity of the child is the circle of things surrounding it. The merit of modern pedagogic science consists in having substituted the intuition of things for the words that represented them. The author points out the distinction between direct and indirect or symbolic intuition, and divides direct intuition into natural and artificial. The surroundings in which the individual is born and lives determine the natural direct intuition of which Nature, Art, and Society are the expression (p. 109). While "direct natural intuition" is that experience which every one can gain according to the circumstances in which he lives; "direct artificial intuition," on the other hand, is that by means of which we can draw profit from the experience of others and of humanity as a whole (p. 119). The chief opportunity for getting this kind of intuition is the school, which serves as a means of adding the experience of mankind to that which each can attain for himself (p. 120).

Whenever, for the sake of instruction, it is necessary to have recourse to figures, drawings, tables, etc., then there is "indirect intuition," which, like "direct intuition," applies to all things, all science, all morality, all language. The chapters that treat of these three kinds of intuition, together with those which refer to general stimuli, namely, language and oral teaching, constitute the most important part of the book. I should mention as of special interest

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those pages which deal with the exemplification of the abstract, abbreviation, and anticipation wherein the author is in agreement with Comte, and the consideration he accords to the social factor in education. In the following chapters on methods (pp. 247–273), the author concedes to the deductive method its legitimate position.

Passing to "Exercise," which takes up the second part of the book, the author considers its effects in special chapters entitled: (1) exercise strengthens the organs; (2) removes injurious impediments from the organs; (3) renders them more energetic; (4) produces new connections and new contact between the organs; (5) makes the organic automatic; (6) creates and develops the organ by adaptation; (7) forms the will.

In speaking of the will, the author reaffirms the doctrine set forth in his other writings. "It is a mistake," he says, "to believe that the will precedes organic motion. If I lift my arm by an act of my will, it might be thought that the psychic act of willing comes first, and then the physiological fact of raising my arm. The fact is precisely the opposite. It would be strange if one were to say that a pain in the abdomen precedes an irritation of the intestines. In one word, the sense of will, like all the other senses, takes place after the relative organic irritation (p. 344), and is a product, an effect of the activity of a special organ. In like manner the senses of sight and hearing are dependent on the activity of special organs." This is followed by some important chapters treating of the development of the will from an educational point of view. If, indeed, the education of the will is dependent on the *exercise* of the will, then we can appreciate the indignant protest of the author to the views of those who assert that all education depends on the number of cognitions that are acquired. Instead of this, he desires the pupil willingly to perform many and varied exercises, to become accustomed to laying great stress on the approval of his comrades, that he be accustomed to hygienic precautions, that the body be inured to fatigue and physical endurance, that the pupil learn to appreciate the practical necessities of life and understand the economic means for sustaining it.

The true value of "exercise" is to be found in the acquisition of "habits." By means of habits "education" is attained. This is the subject of the rest of the book. Since these two are interdependent, the author devotes the third part of his book solely to the consideration of habit, treating of it in seven chapters: 1. Re-

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flex Action. 2. Energy. 3. Inhibition. 4. Will. 5. Attention. 6. Instinct. 7. Habit.

In the explanation of the formation of habit, concludes the author, is demonstrated how and why it is the central fact of education, and for the very simple reason that education itself is nothing more nor less than habit. For what may be said to constitute education? Not merely the simple enumeration of things to be learned, but rather that exercise which produces the intellectual habit and that second nature by which the crude and incomplete man, as yet uneducated, is perfected. But if education is habit, it does not follow that any kind of habit may be called education. Education means only good and improving habits.

This *résumé* can give but a faint reflection of the contents of a book that treats the subject in an entirely novel manner, and that contains philosophic theories that cannot be passed by without careful thought.

NICOLA FORNELLI.

UNIVERSITY OF NAPLES.

THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS. By Thomas Fowler, D.D., President of Corpus Christi College, and sometime Wykeham Professor of Logic in the University of Oxford, and John Matthias Wilson, B.D., late President of Corpus Christi College, and sometime Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Oxford. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1894. Pp. xxi., 138; ii., 370.

This is simply a reprint, in a single volume, of the work previously issued in two. It contains, however, a number of corrections and improvements not embodied in the text, but given separately on pp. vii.–xii. It also contains a new preface. The work itself is too well known to require any special notice here.

J. S. M.

SCIENCE AND CHRISTIAN TRADITION. Essays by T. H. Huxley (Vol. V. of the Collected Essays). London: Macmillan & Co., 1894.

I think that to most readers of this JOURNAL Mr. Huxley's republished controversies will retain, in their controversial aspect, but little interest. Yet they are brilliantly written, and the essay on the "Value of Witness to the Miraculous" is a remarkable study of some mediæval minds. But the question for most of us

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will be, I should think, not a question of New Testament criticism, but a question of the import to be attached to the entire process in which this criticism is an incident. To such an issue Mr. Huxley is quite alive, and in the essays dealing with Agnosticism, in the Prologue with its antithesis of Naturalism and Supernaturalism, and in the preface which sums up his personal relation to the movement, he refers to it from various points of view. Few things, indeed, could be more humorous than the argument in the preface, between Mr. Huxley and the "still, small voice,"—which one generally imagines to stand for conscience,—in which the objections of the "voice" are triumphantly confuted, and it meets the fate of other disputants who have been so bold as to enter the lists with Mr. Huxley. It is not for me to argue that Mr. Huxley has done wrong in choosing a controversial career. He has done what his hand found to do, and done it with his might. But perhaps, regarded as a worker in the cause of enlightenment, he has been a little unfortunate. Compare his almost vociferous argumentation about miracles with Hegel's saying, that miracles should not even be discussed, for to discuss them implies a doubt whether reason may not have to accept its religion from authority. Criticism, for most of us, has been, I imagine, only the foam and fringe of a great world-wave; the fuller intellectual apprehension of man and nature as a spiritual unity, which has come during the last hundred years to console us for an enfeebled art and a mechanical civilization, and to herald, as we hope, a better future, has been the focus of our interest; and we have hardly cared to consider whether the world, as we have been trying to understand it, is to be called natural or supernatural, or both, or neither. So that, when Mr. Huxley assures us that the future of Supernaturalism is the Controverted Question of the age, we feel, I should imagine, that in its literal sense the question no longer appeals to us, while, if it is to affect the nature and reality of our spiritual world, we prefer to hear it stated in more appropriate terms.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

LONDON.

PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY. Historical Philosophy in France, and French Belgium and Switzerland. By Robert Flint. New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1894. Pp. xxvii., 706.

About twenty years ago the author of this volume published in book-form a series of studies in which he described the principal

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attempts that had been made in France and Germany to give a philosophical explanation of the history of mankind. Since that time he has greatly enlarged the scope of his work, and has now undertaken to present in successive volumes a comprehensive philosophy of history relating to the intellectual development of the four great nations,—France, Germany, Italy, and England. The first in the proposed series to appear is the present volume, which deals with the historiography of France, French Belgium, and Switzerland. In its lengthy introduction are set forth the purpose and extent of the philosophy of history, the origins of historical narrative in the oriental world, and the fundamental ideas towards the scientific growth of history among the Greeks and Romans. The philosophy of history in France is then traced from the beginnings of its historical philosophy with Bodin, in the historical reflections of the seventeenth century, of which Bossuet is chosen as the chief exponent, and through the historiography of the eighteenth century by an elaborate discussion of the doctrines of Montesquieu, Turgot, Rousseau, and Condorcet. In the French historical philosophy of the nineteenth century a treatment by a judicious division into schools is adopted. Separate chapters are thus devoted to the ultramontanist and the liberal Catholic schools, the socialistic schools, the spiritualistic movement (so-called eclectic and doctrinarian historical philosophy), the democratic historical school, historical philosophy of naturalism and positivism, and the historical philosophy of the critical school. In a concluding chapter there is discussed the historical philosophy of Belgium and Switzerland.

An excellent table of contents makes considerable amends for the absence of an index.

BENJAMIN RAND.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE KINGDOM OF GOD IS WITHIN YOU: OR, CHRISTIANITY NOT AS A MYSTICAL DOCTRINE, BUT AS A NEW LIFE-CONCEPTION. By Count Leo Tolstoï. Authorized translation from the original Russian edition by A. Delano. London: Walter Scott, Ltd., 24 Warwick Lane, Paternoster Row, 1894.

Count Tolstoï attempts a justification of his well-known doctrine of the non-resistance of evil. His method is threefold: 1st, the quotation of similar views; 2d, the examination of criticism; 3d, the citation of instances in which the "violent" enforcement of

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existing law has been shocking to the moral sense of the community in which it was enforced.

The argument is that, as the "Kingdom of God," which it must be the aim of every Christian to realize, is "within," *i.e.*, of the spirit, it cannot be brought about by the enforcement of "external" law. Its only law is the law of love. War, which is for Tolstoï "organized murder," is incompatible with love; the legal punishment of wrong doing is "violence."

It will be, perhaps, sufficient comment on the book to quote two expressions from its author.

(1) It is a doctrine of absolute anarchy: "For a Christian to promise to subject himself to any government whatsoever—a subjection which may be considered the foundation of state life—is a direct negation of Christianity."

(2) It is a doctrine of moral agnosticism: "If the same Father had permitted us to use violence towards wrong-doers, *as there is no infallible rule for distinguishing the good from the evil*, every individual or every community might class its neighbors under the head of evil-doers."

The book comes as naturally from the Russia of to-day as the French Revolution came from the France of a hundred years ago. In the form of his earnest and justifiable protest, Count Tolstoï is repeating the mistake of the English Puritans; he is not seeing the right relation of the law that is within to the outward organization of life in the law of the state. He forgets that the law is the school-master that brings the community to Christ—*i.e.*, the law of love. Instead of educating his school-master, he would dismiss him.

M. S. GILLILAND.

LONDON.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. Première Année, 1893. Paris: Hachette, 1894.

After the discontinuance of the *Critique philosophique*, ably sustained for many years by MM. Renouvier and Pillon, the *Revue philosophique* was the only organ of philosophy in France.

In spite of the commendable impartiality of its director, M. Ribot, this review has contained too many articles of a positive, scientific character. Without absolutely excluding the pure metaphysicians and moralists, it has published chiefly studies in experimental or physiological psychology, like those of M. Taine, M.

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Pierre Janet, and M. Ribot himself. A certain number of young philosophers thought it expedient, therefore, to found a new review devoted to philosophy proper, to that which is neither "*ancilla scientiarum*," nor "*ancilla theologiæ*," proposing to "call public attention to those general theories of thought and action, to which the *Revue philosophique* has for some time paid no attention, but which, however, under the discredited name of metaphysics, have always been the only source of rational belief." To give the reader an idea of the purpose of this review, one cannot do better than to reproduce the passage in which it defines the sort of influence it would like to exert on contemporary thought.

"It seems to us desirable and well—well for the future and well for the present—that philosophy should make an effort to again take possession of its own field. The time is full of unrest. The conditions even of mental and moral equilibrium are wanting; the best minds disagree and separate. Some, losing confidence in the intellect, are returning to the familiar altars, or going back to the path of tradition, and taking refuge—in dreams—in a Christianity very simple, very sweet, and very sad. Others are dreaming of surprising revelations; and still others are burying themselves in special studies, and are working like machines at the task begun. Meanwhile, society seems about to be shaken to its foundation by the action of blind and terrible forces. In the midst of these uncertainties, between the current positivism that stops at facts and the mysticism that leads to superstitions, the light of reason is as feeble and as vacillating as ever. It may be impossible for it to throw light upon the work of the mass of humanity; but, at least, let those approach each other in whom it burns silently like the evening study lamp; let them together increase its flame; let them try to make it shine from the heights, visible to all who wish to be guided by it."

The *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* has already been in existence more than a year, and it has faithfully fulfilled its purpose. Among its most remarkable articles may be mentioned "Métaphysique et Morale," by M. Ravaisson; "La Problême moral dans la philosophie de Spinoza," by Delbos; "Spir et sa doctrine," by Penjon, etc. It is to be regretted, however, that metaphysics has the lion's share, and that more space is not given to Ethics.

E. Boirac.

Paris.

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THOUGHTS FROM THE WRITINGS OF REV. JOHN C. LEARNED. Selected by one of his Friends. St. Louis: Nixon-Jones Printing Company, 1894. Pp. 63. (Obtainable by addressing Mr. Wm. A. Bradenberger, 2348 Hickory Street, St. Louis.)

The late Mr. Learned, of St. Louis, was known during his life as a man of mark among the liberal clergymen of the West and of this country. The present collection, made from unpublished sermons by an editor whose name is not given, is intended to appeal principally to the circle of Mr. Learned's friends. It consists of brief paragraphs, sometimes rather too obviously torn from their context. Among the more noteworthy expressions of Mr. Learned's personal attitude are the following observations, which must be regarded merely as a very few chance specimens:

"We have no objection to one-idea men, for there ought to be more of them; but [we object] to *partial*-idea men. The great trouble is, men have no whole ideas, but fractions of ideas, which they mistake for the whole, and use as such." . . . "For myself I have no doubt that too much advice is usually given. It is only the word in season that can be of any avail, and the word in season seldom or never comes to those whose minds are constantly harrowed up and irritated by words out of season." . . . "The most imperative want, looking toward civilization, is law, is obedience." . . . "No man is an infidel who believes in a single virtue." . . . "No more in religion than in mathematics should any proposition be said or sung that does not embody verifiable truth" [a proposition which one might venture to call Mr. Learned's razor of the hymn-books]. . . . "The new attempt to disparage individualism in theory, and wreck it in practice, though doubtless men believe that thereby the good of society is to be served, is the revival of an old assault upon human freedom." . . . "Humanity must seek to mitigate the blow of fate. It must give sympathy where that is lacking. Nevertheless, humanity, however widely extended its charity or good will, cannot reverse the law of nature as some have feared. The unfit must perish." . . . "Any loss of faith in individual manhood is radical. Not long will men work for the race, for collective humanity, when this nerve is cut."

The healthy individualism thus suggested is closely connected with the stress that Mr. Learned everywhere lays upon inner spiritual culture, which he makes the primary feature of the moral life. Service, usefulness, social activity, the recognition of the universe as a moral order,—all these gifts follow, in his opinion, as a natural expression and embodiment of the inner cultivation, without which they apparently have, for our author, little meaning.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

[NOTE.—"Man and Woman," by Mr. Havelock Ellis, will be reviewed in the next number.]

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BOOKS RECEIVED.

A STUDY OF ETHICAL PRINCIPLES. By Professor James Seth. London and Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons, 1894.

LECTURES ON HUMAN AND ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY. By Wilhelm Wundt. Translated from the second German Edition by J. E. Creighton and E. B. Titchener. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1894.

IS THE ORDER OF NATURE OPPOSED TO THE MORAL LIFE? An Inaugural Address delivered in the University of Glasgow on October 23, 1894. [A Reply to Professor Huxley's Romanes Lecture.] By Professor Henry Jones, M.A. Glasgow: James MacLehose & Sons, 1894.

DIE SITTLICHKEITSLEHRE ALS NATURLEHRE. Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1894.

PSYCHOLOGISCH-ETHISCHE UNTERSUCHEN ZUR WERTHTHEORIE. Von Dr. Alexius Meinong, 1894.

WEISMANNISM ONCE MORE. (A pamphlet.) By Herbert Spencer. Reprinted from the *Contemporary Review*, with a postscript. London: Williams & Norgate, 1894.

PRACTICABLE SOCIALISM. Essays on Social Reform. By the Rev. Canon S. A. and Mrs. H. O. Barnett. Second Edition. Revised and Enlarged. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1894.

THE USE OF LIFE. By the Right Hon. Sir John Lubbock, Bart., M.P., F.B.S., D.C.L., LL.D. New York and London: Macmillan & Co., 1894.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA, as contained in the First, Second, and Fifth Parts of the "Ethics," and in extracts from the Third and Fourth. Translated and edited with notes by George Stuart Fullerton, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Pennsylvania. Second Edition, enlarged. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1894.

PERSONALITY, HUMAN AND DIVINE. The Bampton Lectures for the year 1894. By J. R. Illingworth, M.A. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1894.

THE RELIGION OF MOSES. By Adolph Moses. Louisville: Flexner Bros., 1894.

ANIMAL RIGHTS, considered in Relation to Social Progress, by Henry S. Salt; also an essay *On Vivisection in America*. By Albert Leffingwell, M.D. New York and London: Macmillan & Co., 1894.

THE VACCINATION QUESTION. A Letter addressed by permission to the Right Hon. H. H. Asquith, Q.C., M.P. By Arthur Wollaston Hutton, M.A. London: Methuen & Co., 1894.

INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF SCIENCE AND METAPHYSICS. (Part III. of "The Principles of the Critical Philosophy.") By Professor A. Riehl. Translated by Dr. Arthur Fairbanks. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1894.

THE IMITATIONS OF BUDDHA. Quotations from Buddhist Literature for each Day in the Year. [A beautiful little book, containing an excellent collection of moral injunctions and reflections.] Compiled by Ernest M. Bodwen. With Preface by Sir Edwin Arnold. London: Methuen & Co., 1893.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL HISTORY. Edited by Herbert B. Adams. No. 14. *The History of Education in Connecticut.* By Bernard C. Steiner, A.M. No. 15. *The History of Education in Delaware.* By Lyman

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P. Powell, A.B. No. 16. *Higher Education in Tennessee.* By Lucius Salisbury Merriam, M.D. No. 17. *Higher Education in Iowa.* By Leonard F. Parker. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1893.

Proceedings of a Conference on the CARE OF DEPENDENT AND DELINQUENT CHILDREN in the State of New York. New York: State Charity Aid Association, 105 East Twenty-second Street, 1894.

SOCIOLOGY IN INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING. A Report of the Seventh Section of the International Congress of Charities, Correction, and Philanthropy, Chicago, June, 1893. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. London: The Scientific Press, 428 Strand, W. C., 1894.

THE ECONOMIC REVIEW. Vol. IV., No. 4, October, 1894. London: Rivington, Percival & Co. [CONTENTS: "The Co-operative Ideal," by the Rt. Rev. Lord Bishop of Durham, D.D.; "Compensation and the Licensing Question," by J. J. Cockshott; "Prediction as a Test in Political Economy," by William D. McDonnell; "Adulteration in Groceries," by a Wholesale Dealer; "Two Views of Social Progress," by the Rev. Frederic Relton, A.K.C.; "The Plea for a Living Wage," by the Rev. L. R. Phelps, M.A.; Nicholson's *Principles of Political Economy*, by Sidney Bell, M.A.]

THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL. Vol. IV., No. 15, September, 1894. London and New York: Macmillan & Co. [CONTENTS: "The Annual Meeting of the Association—Political Economy and Journalism," by Prof. J. S. Nicholson; "Ricardo in Parliament," Part II., by Edwin Cannan; "Theory of International Value," Part II., by Prof. F. Y. Edgeworth; "The Report of the Labor Commission," by L. L. Price; "The Commercial Supremacy of Great Britain," Part I., by A.W. Flux; "Mr. Charles Booth on the Aged Poor," by C. S. Loch.]

THE FREE REVIEW. A Monthly Magazine. Edited by John M. Robertson. Vol. III., No. 2, November, 1894. [Containing the following articles: "The Great Sin," by Geoffrey Mortimer; "The First Popish Plot," by S. Barker Booth; "Trade-Depression and its Remedy," by R. B. W.; "The Moral Education of the Young," by Mary S. Gilliland; "Fragments of Correspondence on Philosophy" (I. Mr. Balfour's "Philosophy"; II. Mr. J. S. Mackenzie on the "Self"), by Robert Scott Moffat; "An Introduction to English Politics," by the Editor; "Professor Jebb on Journalism," by Scotulus; "Sociological Notes".] London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY for the Systematic Study of Philosophy. Vol. II., No. 3, Part II. [CONTENTS: "Green and his Critics," by W. H. Fairbrother. "Symposium—The Relations between Thought and Language," by Miss E. E. C. Jones, J. S. Mann, and G. F. Stout; "Epictetus," by R. J. Ryle; "Symposium—The Nature and Range of Evolution," by H. W. Carr and G. D. Hicks; "On the Immortality of the Rational Soul," by Dr. Gildea.] London: Williams and Norgate, 1894.

Books to be reviewed should be sent to one of the following addresses:
Prof. E. Boirac, 27 Rue de Berlin, Paris, France.
Prof. G. von Gizycki, Nettelbeckstrasse 24, Berlin, Germany.
J. S. Mackenzie, M.A., Trinity College, Cambridge, England.
Prof. Josiah Royce, 103 Irving Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

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INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

APRIL, 1895.

SELF-ASSERTION AND SELF-DENIAL.*

THROUGHOUT the whole course of ethical speculation, and throughout the whole history of the moral life of mankind, a certain opposition between Egoism and Altruism has constantly tended to appear, and sometimes the one and sometimes the other has been taken as the basis of the moral ideal. There have, indeed, been certain periods at which the opposition between the two has almost vanished; and at all times there have at least been efforts to reconcile them. In the Greek city-state a man's duty to his country and to himself seemed almost to coincide. A happy life was scarcely thought of otherwise than as a life of civic usefulness. Yet even here contradictions soon began to emerge—such contradictions as are illustrated by the "Antigone" of Sophocles, (in which different forms of social duty are seen to conflict), by the teaching of the Cynics (in which the social life itself is opposed to individual self-sufficiency), and by various other familiar facts. In more modern times the conflict has generally been more obvious, if not more intense; and all that has been possible has been an effort to reconcile the contending interests, to show that it is possible to effect a compromise between them, or that in the long run they can be seen to coincide.

* Read before the London Ethical Societies, February 18, 1894.

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The writers of the moral sense school, for instance, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, such writers as Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Butler, sought to show that enlightened self-love leads to the same results as benevolence, and that, consequently, in the language of Pope, "true self-love and social are the same." This conclusion, however, was seldom reached by a consideration of the results of conduct within the actual world of our experience. It was thought necessary to postulate a future life for the complete solution of the problem. And this is the view which seems to be most in accordance with the common sense of the modern world. Most thoughtful men would agree with Dr. Sidgwick and Mr. Leslie Stephen (quite apart from any reference to their hedonistic principles), that it is not always best for the interests of an individual to act in the way that he believes to be best for the interests of the world as a whole. There is at least an apparent conflict between these two important ends; and it is a question of some practical moment, as well as of considerable speculative interest, to discuss the way in which this conflict ought to be dealt with.

The most obvious way out of the difficulty is to deny that one of the two apparent ends has any claim upon us; and in an age like ours, in which social claims are paramount, it is the egoistic side that can most easily be set aside. This is substantially the view of Comte. Egoism, according to him, is to be crushed out, and altruism as far as possible developed. This is also substantially the view of ordinary Utilitarianism. "The greatest happiness of the greatest number" is to be aimed at. The happiness of the individual, except as a part of that sum, is of no importance. "In the light of our highest reason," says Dr. Coit, as quoted with approval by Professor Gizycki,* "rational self-love can make no claim to be on a par with universal love; therefore there is no dualism, as it has been called, in the practical reason, no doubleness, no conflict between the moral right of self and of society. For self makes no claim whatever when it is lost in devotion to universal

* International Journal of Ethics, vol. i., No. 1, p. 122.

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welfare." This is also sometimes said to be the great lesson of Christianity. The highest good is to be found, according to this view, in complete self-renunciation, in absolute devotion to the whole or organism of which we are merely members.

But however powerfully such an ideal as this may appeal to the reason and to the heart, yet the apparently opposite conception of self-realization as the moral ideal is found continually recurring both in ethical speculation and in the ordinary moral consciousness. It comes up, moreover, not merely in such writers as Hobbes and Helvetius, whom a high-toned moralist might feel justified in waving aside as out of court, but also in many of those whom we cannot but recognize as among the most serious ethical thinkers and the most conscientious servants of the right. Nay, further, the idea of self-development has a curious way of coming up in the moral life and in ethical speculation just at the point at which the apparently opposite idea of self-devotion or altruism is most strongly marked. A few illustrations may make my meaning clear. We may begin with one from Aristotle. At no point, I think, does Aristotle emphasize self-love so strongly as when he is speaking of self-renouncing friendship. He asks whether, in true friendship, a man loves himself or his friend the best; and he decides that, though a good man may renounce much for friendship, yet after all he loves himself most, and reserves the highest good to himself. "Such a man," he says,* "will surrender wealth to enrich his friend: for while his friend gets the money, he gets the beauty of the thing; so that he has the best of the bargain after all." Similarly, the stoical doctrine of "philanthropy" is taught along with, and even rests upon, the idea that the supreme good lies in the realization of individual virtue, the production of the typical "wise man." It is scarcely necessary to refer to the parallel case of Christianity. Here, again, the renunciation of selfish interests, the universal "charity" towards all mankind, was accompanied by the most fervent "self-love," whether in

* "Nicomachean Ethics," IX., viii. 9.

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the coarser form of "other-worldliness"—the desire of personal happiness in another life—or in the finer form of an aspiration after "holiness," the perfection of the individual character. In the ordinary types of "pietism" these two sides—the side of self-renunciation and the side of self-assertion—are sufficiently apparent; but, perhaps, it is even more striking to observe how they survive in the moral consciousness, say, of the eighteenth century, when the more peculiar features of Christianity had become largely extinct. Take, for instance, the ideal of a Christian gentleman as conceived by the novelist Richardson—an ideal, be it remembered, which was widely accepted not only in this country, but perhaps even more emphatically in France and Germany. Take the famous Sir Charles Grandison, and observe how the more he approaches the morally sublime, the more does he combine the two seemingly contradictory sides of self-denial and self-assertion. One passage is particularly striking, in which the two opposite ideas are brought together in a quite paradoxical form, without any apparent consciousness on the part of the writer that there is a paradox involved. It is where Miss Byron says, "Let me tell you that Sir Charles does not look to be so great a *self-denier*, as his sister seems to think him, when she says, he *lives to himself*, and to his own heart, rather than to the opinion of the world." Here "living to himself" is spoken of as practically synonymous with self-denial. And shortly afterwards Sir Charles says of himself, in the proud consciousness of his own virtue, "I live not to the world: I live *to myself;* to the monitor within me." Here, again, *living to himself* is understood to mean something the very reverse of selfishness. Finally, I may instance Goethe himself, the apostle of objectivity, the man who taught us to escape from ourselves by the way of concrete interests. Goethe, with all his objective interests, with all his recognition of the importance of renunciation, yet describes his supreme aim as that of rearing "the pyramid of his existence" as high as possible.

Now, it might be possible, no doubt, to turn the edge of every one of these examples and make them all look insignificant. Thus, with reference to Aristotle's remark, it might

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be urged that the desire to keep "the beauty of the thing" to oneself is not compatible with the highest kind of friendship. True friends would like to see one another excel in virtue as well as in all other happiness. If this is not obvious in ordinary friendship, it is at least clear in the case of the love of parents for their children; and if other forms of love were equally disinterested, we should see it in them, also. Tennyson would not want to surpass Hallam in any form of moral beauty. It might be urged, further, that the man who is conscious of any particular beauty in the sacrifice which he makes for a friend, has not attained to the highest friendship. The true friend is not merely self-*denying*, but self-*forgetting*. His interest is absorbed in the good of another, and he does not care for the beauty of his own attitude. The love of love, as distinguished from the love of a person,—such love as that which George Eliot describes as aiming at its own perfection, —is not love, but sentimentalism. And thus we may still maintain, against Aristotle, that true self-denial does not involve self-affirmation. As for the Stoics, again, they may easily be disposed of. Their thin philanthropy, it may be urged, is the fitting counterpart of their spiritual pride. The "philanthropist" is no doubt a self-lover; self-forgetfulness is found in the love of *men*, not in the love of *man*. It is an affair of passion, moreover, and not of mere reason. And thus the Stoics may be safely set aside. Christianity, perhaps, will not yield quite so easily: but here, also, it may fairly be maintained that the idea that the good man is primarily interested in the saving of his own soul involves a confusion. That the coarser form of this belief is erroneous—the form which is known as "other-worldliness"—would now, I suppose, be universally admitted. But even in its finer form of the concentration of interest in personal "holiness," it seems clear that the self-conscious type of character which was produced by this belief is not the highest type. Such characters, so to speak, "lack body;" their concrete interests evaporate; and if they only persist long enough in looking inside, they will soon discover that there is nothing there to look at. And with regard to the distilled Christianity which we find in

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Richardson and other eighteenth century writers, is not that, it may be asked, merely the culmination of self-conscious sentimentalism, admirable perhaps in the "age of diaries" (as it has been called), but simply loathsome as soon as we emerge to a freer atmosphere? In short, not to trouble ourselves with needless refinements, it may be asked bluntly, Was not Sir Charles Grandison a "prig"? And finally, with regard to Goethe, there are probably some bold spirits who would venture to criticise even him, and to suggest that Mazzini may have been right in regarding him as merely the most refined of egoists. We may be reminded, too, that Goethe was after all the creator of Werther; and it may be maintained that though by this creation he to a large extent purged out the disease which it represents, yet he never quite escaped from that self-conscious attitude,—never quite escaped, in short, from eighteenth century individualism,—never quite escaped from that undue self-concentration by which even the fine enthusiasm of a Thoreau was so much more manifestly narrowed and corrupted. Thus every one of our illustrations may be set aside.

Now, I am far from denying that there would be force in these contentions. But even if we were to grant that they are sufficient to overthrow all our instances, it would still, I think, be somewhat disingenuous to suppose that this ideal of self-realization may safely be let slip. Even if every illustration could be met in this way, we should hardly be justified in such a conclusion. When there are many arguments in support of a particular view, it is generally a mistake to suppose that you can overthrow that view by simply overthrowing each particular argument. Ghosts, for instance, cannot be satisfactorily disposed of by pointing out that, in this case, the appearance was due to a peculiarly shaped bush; in that case, to the folds of a curtain; in another, to the rays of the moon; in another, to conscious deception, and so on. It remains to inquire why so many different phenomena give the same results. So in the present case. Even if every illustration could be explained away, we should still have to ask why there has been so persistent a tendency to present the moral

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ideal in some form that involves self-realization. We must admit, I think, that there is a real problem in the antithesis between self-assertion and self-denial. Admitting this, then, I wish to lay before you a few considerations which may help towards a solution of the problem.

In that extraordinarily brilliant book, Professor James's "Principles of Psychology," there is frequent use made of an important distinction which, I think, will be found useful to us here,—not a distinction that is peculiar to Professor James, but one which he has perhaps emphasized more than any one else, and which he expresses by the contrast * between "I" and "me," between the self as subject and the self as object. I must try to make this as clear as I can. Let us begin by asking ourselves what exactly we mean by *selfishness*. If you reflect on this conception, you will see, I think, that the idea of self is a little puzzling. What constitutes a selfish man? A natural answer would be that a selfish man is one who thinks a great deal about himself, and acts a great deal with reference to himself. Now, this may be true; but is it clear? Is it the case that a selfish man is particularly self-conscious? Reflection will, I think, convince us that it is not so. There is even a certain antagonism between the two things. Selfishness is associated with hardness of moral fibre; while self-consciousness implies sensitiveness, if not sensibility. The man who is keenly self-conscious may naturally be retiring and modest; but he need not be specially selfish: he may "do good by stealth, and blush to find its fame." Or, again, he may be self-conceited. But even self-conceit is not the same as selfishness. Every one would, I suppose, regard Byron as very self-conscious; and some might say that he was also self-conceited. But few would describe him as notably selfish. Most people would regard his impulses as having been on the whole generous. Wordsworth also might be regarded as self-conscious, but hardly as selfish. Yet we might fairly say that he thought a great deal about himself, and acted a great deal with reference to himself. On the other

* Due originally, as I understand, to Professor Everett.

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hand, a good case could probably be made out for regarding Napoleon as selfish; though he could hardly be said to be specially self-conscious. In fact, literary men generally, men who are much given to reflection, are naturally more self-conscious than other men, and are perhaps often more self-conceited; but surely they are not, as a rule, more selfish. Even a psychologist may not be altogether destitute of generosity. In fact, selfishness is associated rather with a certain brazenness, a certain want of reflection. We should hardly expect a very selfish man to keep a diary, or to be much given to introspection. In what sense, then, may a selfish man be said to think about himself? Reflection on this question ought to lead us to see that there is a certain puzzle in the idea of self; and it is this puzzle that I must now try to solve by means of Professor James's contrast between the "I" and the "me."

Perhaps a metaphor may help us here. Bacon compared the human mind to a mirror in which the world is reflected; and many other writers have repeated the same image. It may be of some use to us now, provided we remember that it is only an image, and that it is not in all respects a good one. Let us suppose, then, that each one of our heads contains a mirror inside it. Within this mirror is reflected all that we know, all that we feel, all that we desire, all our interests and inclinations, the whole content of our self-conscious life. This mirror is the "I:" it is the subject to which every object is presented. We need not trouble ourselves at present with the consideration that it might be necessary for some purposes to have a number of mirrors reflected into one another. Thus, when we think of our own past lives, the "I" of a former state becomes an object to us now; and we might represent this by saying that a mirror somewhere back in the past is reflected into the mirror of the present. But, as I have already said, this whole image is finally unsatisfactory; and perhaps a single mirror will be sufficient for most of our purposes here. That mirror, then, is the self. Now, it is evident at once that this is not the self of which we think when we are selfish. The psychologist studies that self. The introspective saint, who has what we call "self-knowledge," is

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conscious of that self, in so far as he thinks of his mental and moral life as a whole. The self-conceited man may also be aware of it, though often it scarcely enters into his view; and the same applies largely to the man whom we describe as unduly "self-conscious." But the selfish man, as such, does not think of himself in this way. If he were in the habit of doing so, he would probably cease to be selfish. If he thought enough about himself, he would put himself in his right place. If, then, the term "selfish" is really a significant word at all, there must be another sense in which we can speak of the self.

This other sense is the sense in which the self is a "me" rather than an "I," an object rather than a subject. A good illustration of this is found in our bodily organism. It is sometimes said that "my body is rather mine than me;" but the fact that it is counted necessary to state this, shows that we are in the habit of thinking of it as "me." If our clothing were not frequently changed, we should no doubt come to regard it also as part of ourselves,—as perhaps some people do. Anything which is intimately and constantly associated with our individual consciousness comes in this way to be identified with the self. But if we are to call this "self," it is self only in the objective sense. It is not the self that is conscious, but the self of which we are conscious. This is the self as object, the "me." It is not the mirror, but one of the things reflected in the mirror. In so far as we are conscious of it, therefore, it lies within the "I." Or, to use another image, we may say that the "I" is a large circle, and the "me" is a little circle within it. The "you," the "it," the "them," the "us," would be other little circles, all falling within the large circle of the "I," or all reflected within that comprehensive mirror. The "me," then, is the individual self, regarded as one object among others. It is not, of course, necessarily confined to our bodily existence. Our habitual interests and desires, our characters in so far as we are aware of them as facts within the world of our knowledge, are forms of the "me." In a sense, the "I" itself may be turned into a "me," in so far as the whole content of our

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consciousness at any time can be regarded as an object. This happens, for instance, when we think of a past experience in its entirety. Thus, as I have already said, a mirror standing in the past is reflected as a whole within the mirror of the present. Such a reflected mirror is, of course, only one object among others within the mirror in which the reflection takes place. Such, then, is the contrast between the "I" and the "me."

Now, it seems clear that selfishness must mean *me*-ishness rather than *I*-ishness. If we reflect upon it, I think we shall find that it means the concentration of our attention upon objects more or less directly related to our individual personalities to the exclusion of others equally important, but which have not the same direct relation to our individual selves. This relation is not simply relation to the "I." Whether we are selfish or unselfish, the "I" is equally present. The generous man is interested in objects that lie within his own world, just as the selfish man is; and if he is truly generous in his nature, the objects appeal to him with the same keenness of personal interest as the other objects do to the selfish man. Each is interested in some part of the content of his "I." The difference consists in a difference of content. In the one case, the content is the "me," or some objects intimately connected with the "me." In the other case, the content may be altogether remote from the "me." It may be a "you" or an "it" in which we take, to put it paradoxically, a *disinterested interest*,—*i.e.*, an interest which belongs simply to the "I," not to the "me." We can never get outside of the "I." If I am interested in anything, *I* am interested in it; if I know anything, *I* know it; if I desire anything, *I* desire it; if I decide to do anything, *I* decide to do it. Everything that means anything for me at all must be focussed, so to speak, for my particular point of view, must come within my world, be reflected on my mirror, lie within the circle of my interests. If I affirm myself, it is *I* who affirm. If I deny myself, it is *I* who deny. It is all my "I," but it is not all my "me." The "me" is a circle within the "I," a narrow circle of particular interests clustering round my individual personality. It is the

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circle of my animal appetites, the interests of my particular physical life, that life which I know more intimately than I know any other, but which I may affirm or deny, just as I may affirm or deny any other, that life which is emphatically *mine*, which is emphatically "*me*," but which is equally emphatically *not* "*I*." *I* stand above it; *I* know it; *I* approve it or disapprove it; *I* affirm it or deny it. If I affirm it too exclusively, I am selfish, I am *me*-ish. But I cannot be anything else than *I*-ish. I am "I."

This distinction between the "I" and the "me" helps us, I think, to see through the common puzzle with respect to "self-interest." Certain schools of moralists tell us that men's actions are always guided by considerations of self-interest. Sometimes they mean by this that the motive of our action is always an anticipated pleasure to ourselves. But sometimes they seem to mean little more than that all our actions are relative to the "I," that they are all dependent on interests that lie within the circle of our self-conscious nature. This is a truism. But to say this is not to say that our actions are selfish. This would mean, not that they are relative to the "I," but that they are relative to the "me;" and this, I think we may safely say, no one has ever seriously attempted to show. Similarly, when it is argued, in political economy, that men's industrial activities are governed by "self-interest," this does not necessarily mean that men are selfish in their actions. It means primarily nothing more than that men seek to realize, in the most direct way, the satisfaction of those interests which are dominant within the world of their self-conscious lives,—those interests which, as we say, they have "most at heart." Such self-interest may be selfish or generous, or it may be simply neutral. It may be an interest in the "me," in the "you," in the "us," or even in the "it." Even the pursuit of money, as Cliffe Leslie pointed out in his admirable Essay on "The Love of Money," may represent all sorts of different interests, from the most sordid to the most benevolent and heroic. But in all cases alike, we may be said, in a certain sense, to be governed by "self-interest." No interest can fall outside of the "I." It is the focus at

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which they all meet, the mirror in which they are all reflected. But selfishness, in the proper sense, is interest in the "me;" and this is certainly not that by which we are always guided. If we were always consistently guided by it, we might in some respects be wiser and better men than we are; but, in the main, we should simply be narrower and blinder. "Wisdom" would be, by some entrances, "quite shut out." Our interests would have an exclusiveness which, even in the meanest of men, they scarcely have at present. It is this exclusiveness of interest, this narrowing of it to the single point of the "me," that is properly meant by "selfishness."

It follows from this that selfishness is essentially *negative*. It is an exclusive interest; and the essence of it lies in its exclusiveness. It is really *no-other*-ishness. It is not that we are interested in the "me," but that we care for nothing else. The generous man may be quite as much interested in the "me" as the selfish man is; but he is interested in other things as well, and puts the "me" in its right place. It may even be his superior interest in the "me" that makes him conscious of its wider relations. We do people too much honor when we call them *self*ish. We ought rather to call them *nothing-that-is-not-me*-ish. We ought to insist on the negativity. It should be observed, also, that there are degrees or stages of selfishness. The earliest stage is that of simple absorption in particular animal appetites. This, as Butler pointed out, cannot properly be described as self-love; since the appetites are directed towards particular objects, and we do not at this stage specially think of them as *ours*. It is a stage higher when we regard our individual lives as a whole, and form a more or less definite conception of what constitutes their welfare. At this stage, however, we are necessarily carried to some extent beyond ourselves. The welfare of a self-conscious individual must include interests in objects more or less remote from his own animal existence. It can scarcely fail, indeed, to include some interest in other persons, though he may be interested in them only as means to his own happiness. Here, as elsewhere, the selfishness consists in the negativity. The important point is that outside interests are

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excluded, except in so far as they bear on the happiness of the individual life. But we may advance still further, without altogether getting rid of the element of negation. Even love has been somewhat cynically described as "selfishness for two." Similarly, a man may be benevolent with regard to his family, but selfish towards everything beyond. Even patriotism—I mean genuine patriotism, not merely "the last resource of a scoundrel"—may become selfishness. Exclusiveness is, throughout, that which constitutes the essence of selfishness, in so far as selfishness is a vice.

On the other hand, so far as selfishness is *positive*, so far as it means interest in the "me" and not merely the absence of interest in that which is not "me," it is not a vice but a virtue. In fact, we may say that it is inchoate benevolence. If love is "selfishness for two," self-love is at least benevolence towards one. It is a real step forward when a man gets above the mere gratification of his particular impulses, and begins to take an intelligent interest in his own life as a whole. It is then that wider interests become possible. The man who cares nothing for his own "me" is not likely to care much for any one else's. "A poor thing, but mine own," is not an altogether ignoble sentiment. On the basis of such an interest in that which is immediately connected with ourselves, many things may be built up. Such an interest, indeed, involves a kind of self-denial: it involves a certain transcendence of those particular animal impulses which are the first expression of the "me." The interest in the self becomes mean only when it is ossified; when it refuses to grow; when, in short, it becomes negative or exclusive. It is then that the words are true,

> "Unless above himself he can
> Erect himself, how mean a thing is man!"

But he would be still meaner if he could not even erect himself *to* himself, which an animal on the whole cannot do, and which even many men fail to accomplish. *Me*-ishness, in short, is, properly speaking, good: it is only *nothing-that-is-not-me*-ishness that is bad: but it is this latter that is meant in ordinary discourse by "selfishness."

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Now, if selfishness is essentially negative, it follows that self-denial is essentially positive. If the one means the absence of interest in anything that is not "me," the other will naturally mean the *presence* of an interest in something other than "me." And reflection seems to show that this is actually what it does mean. There is, indeed, a kind of self-denial which is properly negative. Asceticism is, in the main, of this nature: it is simply an effort to snub the "me." But even this effort is generally made, at least at first, with a view to the realization of some positive end, to which the "me" blocks the way. But asceticism pure and simple is merely a sort of spite against the "me;" and, in this sense, it is a vice—a vice which is the counterpart of selfishness, if it may not even be called a species of selfishness. It is a kind of negative interest in the "me;" and such a negative interest may exclude the interest in other things quite as effectually as a positive interest could. Indeed, it is probably more effective. A positive interest in the "me" leads almost inevitably, as I have said, to an interest in other things; whereas a negative interest as inevitably excludes this. But, of course, asceticism, in this purely negative sense, is rare—at least in modern times. Such asceticism as exists is generally with a view to some positive end; and, so far, it may be good. It is hardly necessary to warn people against standing on pillars or walking on peas: yet we do still find some who think themselves bound to abstain from certain enjoyments simply because they like them; and it may be as well to remind such that they are on the negative road—the road to the desert, to negative selfishness, to the emptying of life of its interests, even the poor interests in the "me." Of such self-sacrifice Mr. Bradley remarks* that it "is too often the 'great sacrifice' of trade, the giving cheap what is worth nothing. To know what one wants, and to scruple at no means that will get it, may be a harder self-surrender." True self-denial, in short, is positive. It starts from the "me" and works outward, taking in the "you" and the "it." It does not busy itself with the suppression of the "me," but rather

* "Appearance and Reality," p. 6.

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quietly sets it aside in the corner. It was of this kind of self-denial that St. Paul was thinking when he said, "Though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." He meant that asceticism is morally valueless without a positive interest in things beyond ourselves. Selfishness is a stagnant pool that can never be let out by drainage; but a flood of larger interests sweeps it at once into the ocean.

Now, if this is true, if self-denial is essentially positive, it might almost equally well be described as self-affirmation. All our interests, as I have said, lie within the circle of the "I." Everything that exists for us at all comes to focus there, is reflected within that mirror. Whether we are egoistic or altruistic—*me*-ish or *you*-ish—we are necessarily *I*-ish. But the selfish man limits his "I." His mirror is clouded. It shows only one corner with any clearness. What is not directly related to the "me" fades away in a mist. Thus the man who confines himself to the "me" narrows and obscures the "I" The self-denying man, on the other hand, is one who polishes his mirror, and sees things in their true relations. His "me" may be somewhat crushed, or it may not; but his "I," at any rate, is well developed. If, therefore, self-assertion means the assertion of the "I," it seems clear that the most self-denying man is the one who asserts himself most. Self-denial, in the positive sense, means almost the same thing as self-assertion. It is only the point of view that is different.

Here, then, we seem to have arrived at a solution of the problem with which we started. The difficulty was to understand how it is that self-assertion can be accepted, as it has so often been both in theory and in practice, as a form of the moral ideal; and, in particular, how it comes that self-assertion is often taken as the moral ideal at the very moment at which self-denial is being emphasized. The paradox involved in this seeming identification of self-affirmation and self-denial is seen to be a plain statement of the fact as soon as we define our terms. And having done this, I think we may now see the significance of some of the illustrations that were previously given. Thus, we may understand how it is that the

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man who gives up his wealth to his friend may be described as self-loving; not, indeed, because he keeps "the beauty of the thing" to himself, but rather because he keeps the money. Depend upon it, the man of whom Aristotle was thinking was not such a fool as he looked. He was simply taking money out of one pocket to put it into another. It is true, the one pocket was his own, and the other was his friend's; but no doubt his view was wide enough to take in both. At least one cannot but hope that this may have been the explanation; for if he only got "the beauty of the thing," I am afraid he would not grow very fat on it. A man will not gain much by gloating over the beauty of his own actions. Perhaps we may also understand in this way the passage that I quoted from "Sir Charles Grandison," whose self-denial was spoken of as if it were the same thing as living to oneself. The paradox vanishes if we substitute "me" and "I" in their proper places. Miss Byron's remark will then run as follows:—"Let me tell you that Sir Charles does not look to be so great a *me-denier*, as his sister seems to think him, when she says, he *lives to his 'I,'* and to his own heart, rather than to the opinion of the world." There is no paradox here. To live to the "I" is certainly to deny the "me;" or rather, more strictly, it is to deny *the denial of everything that is not "me;"* it is to deny *selfishness*. And Goethe's saying about the "pyramid of his existence" is equally easy of interpretation. It was his "I" that he wanted thus to exalt; it was the world of his objective interests. Similarly, we might deal with the cases of Stoicism and Christianity. And similarly we might understand the declaration of Walt Whitman, "that the young man who composedly perilled his life and lost it, has done exceeding well for himself; while the man who has not perilled his life, and retains it to old age in riches and ease, has perhaps achieved nothing for himself worth mentioning;" and many other declarations of a like strain that might be multiplied almost without limit from the writings of the prophetic teachers of mankind. We were wise, therefore, not to reject such illustrations, merely on account of a little superficial criticism. They contain a problem, which it was worth while to try to solve.

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I am far, indeed, from meaning to imply that we have now reached a complete solution of this problem. The whole opposition of the "I" and the "me" bristles with psychological and metaphysical difficulties, over which I have been sliding in the most reckless way. The "I" and the "me" are ghosts that haunt us in many forms. The psychological student, in particular, often finds his candle burning dim as these apparitions come before him. It will be long, in all probability, before we can find any incantation that will finally lay them. There is one point, however, on which I ought, perhaps, still to touch. I have remarked already that the "I" may be turned into a "me;" and this it is important to remember. They are somewhat like Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. The hero of our tale may be transformed into the villain; the "I" may be made to masquerade as a mere "me." We may, that is to say, take the circle of our interests as itself an interest, make the mirror into one of the objects that are reflected, turn the subject into an object. As a general rule, we do not think much about the "I;" we think about particular objects in which we are interested, not about our interests as a whole, as making us into personalities of a particular kind. But it is possible to think about ourselves in this way. It is possible, to carry on our image, instead of studying the reflections in the mirror, to interest ourselves in the polishing of the glass and in putting it in a gilt frame. This is scarcely the same thing as selfishness. It is only self-consciousness. Our interest in the mirror can never be without a reference to the objects reflected in it, and consequently is never properly selfish. Selfishness consists in narrowing our interests to a particular "me;" whereas, this of which I now speak consists simply in taking the "I" as if it were a "me." We do not in this way narrow our interests, but rather dim them by not looking at them with sufficient directness. It seems to me that this is probably the defect of which many people are conscious in Goethe. Goethe was surely quite right to raise the pyramid of his existence as high as possible; but it may be that he was too constantly aware that his existence was a pyramid. In comparison with Shakespeare, or even with a

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much smaller man like Scott, there seems to be a certain want of directness in his study of the world. This may be the explanation of a certain haze that we seem to find there, which makes his world a moonlit world in contrast with Shakespeare's sunlit one. He regards the world, perhaps, too much as if it were there merely to be ground into paint for his canvas. This, however, is a point of literary criticism, and I do not know how far it is true. I merely give it here as an illustration of what I mean. Most poets, I fancy, in contrast with Shakespeare, illustrate the same point. They are conscious that the view of the world which they give is *their* view, and are interested in it as being *theirs*. They do not let themselves go, and forget themselves in their objective interests. It would no doubt be correct to say that this is simply the final form of selfishness,—a "last infirmity of noble minds." But what is important to notice is that in this form the "I" and the "me" almost come together.

And this suggests another point, which is perhaps of more practical importance. In general, our view has been that goodness consists in keeping the "me" within due bounds, and thus enlarging the "I." But our last point suggests that even the "I," as such, may be unduly emphasized as against its own content. This leads us to ask, further, whether it may not sometimes be right to sacrifice the "I" as well as the "me." Now, this is a subtle problem, which, I believe, often comes up in the highest forms of the moral life. Let me try to explain how it arises. Let us take the case of such a man as Cromwell,—a man engaged in some work of political revolution and reconstruction. Such a man has probably, as a general rule, no very clear idea of what the outcome of his action will be; and perhaps when he gets into the thick of it, and his time for reflection is more and more circumscribed, his perception of the good and evil consequences of what he does may become dimmer and dimmer. Perhaps, also, in the heat of the struggle, his own character may be somewhat warped. He may habituate himself to the use of questionable means for the attainment of the ends he has in view, and the keenness of his discrimination between right and wrong

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may become gradually blurred. Still, he may be, on the whole, convinced that the work in which he is engaged is the thing that he has to do, and that he is bound to go on with it. He is losing his "I," the mirror within him is darkened and narrowed, and the interest to which he is devoting himself is not clearly presented within that mirror at all. He is, to a great extent, taking a leap in the dark.* Yet is it not a noble leap? Is it not well worth while to sacrifice even the "I" on such a shrine? The case would become still stronger if we suppose that some other career is open, and perhaps it might appeal to us more if we took an instance more directly from our own surroundings. Suppose a man with high artistic and poetic gifts, who by the cultivation of these might attain to a high form of self-development; and suppose he becomes convinced, after careful reflection, that some political or social reform is urgently wanted, and that he is called upon to inaugurate it. Suppose, for instance, he becomes a revolutionary socialist. In the prosecution of this ideal he may have to sacrifice a large part of his artistic development, and he may never attain to any very clear view of what socialism means, or of what are the best means of its realization. He may simply have a general idea, according to his best attainable light, that the one important thing is to agitate in season and out of season, believing that in this way he is starting a movement which is sure in the end to work itself out to clearness. If he supplies the fire, the light will come. Such a man loses much and perhaps gains nothing. His "I" is more and more narrowed and confused, and he does not clearly see where he is going. Yet must we not say, on the whole (assuming that he has taken due care in deciding that this is his best course), that he is acting nobly, and that the world may gain more from his self-devotion than it could have done from his art or poetry? The ultimate result will be a better world, though not a world that will ever clearly exist for the reformer him-

* Cromwell himself said that we never go so far as when we do not know where we are going. Goethe also used to speak of the "dæmonic" element in genius. But even in ordinary moral action we require, to some extent, to "walk by faith."

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self—except as a kind of Pisgah sight. Is it not worth while, in such a case, to sacrifice even the "I"? Now, this is a casuistical question, and such questions cannot, I think, as a rule, be satisfactorily answered by any purely theoretical considerations. But the general principles can be laid down on which a solution would depend. In this case the answer seems clearly to be that if in the end the "I" is sacrificed, the conduct cannot be right; but one must not too hastily conclude that such a sacrifice has been involved, for the "I" is not quite such a simple affair as we have tended to represent it. It is a growing thing, and for this reason alone cannot be satisfactorily represented by a mirror; or, if we do so represent it, we must say that it is possible to break up the mirror without sacrificing the "I," provided we are breaking it up to put a larger and clearer one in its place. Such a broken mirror ceases to be an "I" for us at all. It is only a "me;" and, though at one time it was all the world for us, yet in the end the destruction of it may be "the world well lost." It is in this sense that we

> "may rise by stepping-stones
> Of our *dead selves* to higher things."

But in such a rise there must always be something of an adventure. In any great forward movement, and even in many small ones, we cannot quite clearly see where we are going. We can only judge* whether the direction in which we are moving is, on the whole, that in which progress lies. To decide this, in any particular case, is a question for individual judgment, guided by the best traditions of the race; and it is in the exercise of such judgment that much of the highest interest of life consists. The merely theoretical student, therefore, had better not seek to pronounce any final decision with regard to the action of Cromwell or the socialist; he must leave it to them and to sympathetic biographers, who have the concrete conditions of their lives before them. The

* Of course, in the instances I have given, I have been assuming that this judgment is based on a consideration of the best attainable light. In such cases even the best attainable light can never be quite clear.

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interest of the question for us here is merely to observe how closely in such a case the "I" approximates to the "me;" and how, even here, it is the "me" that must be surrendered and the "I" maintained.

Another point that might help to bring this out is the consideration of what we mean by "self-reverence." Goethe says in *Wilhelm Meister* that "self-reverence is the highest form of reverence;" and this is a truth that is worth insisting on as against what Mr. Bosanquet has called "sentimental Agnosticism"—the worship of the Unknowable. To worship anything that is quite outside our world is a low form of reverence—indeed, strictly, is not reverence at all. At the same time, what we reverence can never be the "me." Even the most self-conceited of men can hardly be said to reverence himself in this sense; and, of course, Goethe did not in the least mean this. He distinctly says that "self-reverence," in this sense, is the best safeguard against self-conceit. Neither, however, did he mean reverence for the "I." At least, I do not see how that could be called "the highest form of reverence." The meaning seems to be rather that which Goethe elsewhere expresses by saying that we take as our object of worship "the best that we know." Now, the best that we know is what we may call our ideal self. It is not any particular object in our mirror, nor is it the mirror itself; it is rather the most perfect world of which we can think, reflected in the clearest of possible mirrors. Such an object raises us, in a sense, above both the "I" and the "me;" and yet, in a sense, it does not raise us out of ourselves. We do not think of it as unknowable, or foreign to our self-conscious nature; but only as what we might be if the world of our self-conscious lives were enlarged and clarified. The possibility of reverence for such an object—which seems to be not merely "the highest form of reverence," but even the only possible form of reverence—depends on the fact that we were progressive. We have not merely a reflection of mirrors behind us, but also, so to speak, an inchoate image of a mirror in front of us. We know not only what we were and what we are, but also what we might be, what, as we say, we "ought to

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be." It is on this fact that reverence depends. But this leads us to think of *three* selves—the "me," the "I," and the "I" to the second power, the heroic "I." Tennyson's weighty lines in *Œnone*,—

> "Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control,
> These three alone lead life to sovereign power,"

seem to convey this distinction. The self that we control is the "me;" we have to keep it in its due subjection. The self that we know is the "I," the subject with its world of contents. The self that we reverence is the ideal self, the highest impulses that we have, our deepest insights, "the best that we know."

And here it may be well to pause. These last examples ought to convince us that the distinction between the "I" and the "me" is far from being a simple one. In fact, having at first, for the sake of a sharp outline, begun with a somewhat rigid antithesis, I am now disposed to correct myself by saying that there is no such hard-and-fast opposition to be found. What is the "I" at one level becomes a "me" for us at a higher level. We enlarge and clarify our mirrors, and the old ones remain for us only as reflections. On the whole, therefore, it may be best in the end to throw aside our "I's" and "me's," our mirrors, and other questionable paraphernalia, and try to state, in plain English, what the gist of the matter is.

The essential point is that self-development and self-devotion are very nearly the same thing. We can only develop ourselves by devoting ourselves to objective ends; and, on the other hand, the only valuable kind of self-denial is that for the sake of objective interests, by devotion to which we are developed. There is, indeed, a certain opposition between the two things. Sometimes our efforts to raise the pyramids of our existence as high as possible may lead us to neglect important social ends; and sometimes our zeal for public duties may involve a real sacrifice of our individual development. Such conflicts between distinguishable aspects of the ideal life are inevitable; and it is only a complete consideration of the concrete circumstances before us that can enable us to judge, in any particular case, what it is best for

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us to do. But it remains true, nevertheless, that on the whole the ideal life is one. On the whole, each one of us finds himself in the midst of important ends which call for our devotion. By accepting these ends and applying our best powers to them, we at once lose ourselves and find ourselves. We die to our merely selfish interests: we live anew in the fuller discovery of what our faculties are fit for, and in the larger development of them. At every step, indeed, we are beset by dangers. There is first the coarser danger of succumbing to our animal inclinations, being overcome by "the world, the flesh, and the devil." This is selfishness, but not self-assertion. On the other hand, there is the danger of losing ourselves in particular ends; of hastily giving ourselves up, for instance, to the struggle for political and social ideas which we do not fully understand, and in the effort after which we are personally perplexed and injured. This is a kind of self-denial; but, if we are finally lost in the process, it is not a wise self-denial. On the whole, just so far as we are personally impaired by it we are not socially serviceable. Finally, there is the danger of undue self-assertion, of becoming absorbed in the sphere of our personal interests, so as to lose consciousness of the wider world beyond. The evil of all these courses is fairly obvious; though, no doubt, it requires great care, tact, and insight to avoid being entangled in some or all of them. But this is a practical difficulty. It is not the difficulty of seeing that they are wrong, but only that of avoiding them. We can hardly avoid them entirely. Our balance is, in general, little better than a swaying, now to this side, now to that. But, in the main, it is true that, so far as we are faithful to our vocation, wherever it may call us, our following of it is a continual process both of surrender and of development, almost in exact proportion to one another; and that the farther we advance in our devotion to it, the more nearly are we likely to regard those two sets of words as synonymous—"stirb und werde," "die" and "live," "self-assertion" and "self-denial."

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MORAL FORCES IN DEALING WITH THE LABOR QUESTION.*

THERE are no doubt many who see little connection between morals and the labor question. Morals means, to their mind, to be temperate, to be chaste, to keep one's promises, to do one's work faithfully, and they hardly see what this has to do with the struggles of the laboring world, save in so far as working-men by practising these virtues might get on better than some of them do. The labor question has a far-away or else a disagreeable sound to their ears; it seems like a class question turning on squabbles over wages; it brings up thoughts to their minds of dissatisfied, restless people,—perhaps of angry people, ready to do violence. They do not find the discussion of it edifying, nor see why mention should be made of it from the pulpit or platform, save in the form of a rebuke to violence or of counsels to peace. Such is no doubt the feeling of some good, but not overthoughtful, or instructed, persons.

Then there are others who have thought some on the question, but who are convinced that it is a purely economic question, with which ethics has nothing to do. They think that all that happens in the world of industry is governed by certain laws; that it is useless to interfere with them; that the wages of labor, like the prices of other commodities, are determined in this way, and that it is as foolish to try to raise them or to prevent their falling by making demands or forming combinations or entering on "strikes," as it would be to interfere with any of the laws of nature by the same means. They would, perhaps, like to see laborers better off than they are, but they say it is impossible, or only possible, in case they better the quality or increase the quantity of their work. Hence it does little good, they think, to talk of justice and love and brotherhood in this connection, and in times of social

* The substance of this paper was given before the World's Fair Labor Congress, August 31, 1893.

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excitement they may even deprecate or resent it, for these are sentiments, they hold, that apply to the private or inner, not the business, life of men. They will readily admit that ethics is very good for the family, for friends, and as a personal ideal for men; but the world of industry and business, the world to which the labor question belongs, is a world apart and has its own laws and rules. Such is the opinion of not a few who have given some thought to the labor question.

On the other hand, there are those who take what are called radical views on the question, who think that ethics has little to do with it. They believe that the inevitable trend of things is toward socialism, that the march of events is bound to give working-men more and more power, that ultimately the present possessing classes will be dispossessed, the expropriators, as Karl Marx * said, be expropriated. I remember the cool, nonchalant way in which August Spies † once in my hearing in Chicago dismissed ethical ideals as without appreciable influence on the economic order and development of society. Morality, he thought, was dependent on economic conditions, and had little power to change them; it might be a fruit of the tree of industry, but was not a root or a cause in any proper sense of the word. And so he coincided with the view before mentioned, only holding that things would take a new turn in the future, and that the contradictions of the present order would inevitably in time give birth to a socialistic order in which working-men would have an advantage which they have not now.

Now, as against these views, I can only say how the matter appears to me. My idea of morality is different, and my idea of the laws of the industrial world is different, from those I have described. Undoubtedly a certain sort of morality has little to do with the labor question; but it seems to me conventional rather than real morality. Undoubtedly there are laws of the industrial world, and there may be some necessary

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* "Das Kapital," Erster Band, S. 790.

† Editor of the Chicago *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, and afterwards hung for alleged complicity with the Haymarket bomb.

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laws, but the laws that regulate the remuneration of the laborer are not necessary laws, so far as I can see,—laws, that is, which moral impulses and ideals are powerless to affect.

I cannot imagine a morality that is not as much a social matter as an individual matter. I recognize all that is summed up under the head of personal morality; but the essential principle of morality is justice, and justice is as much social as personal. We cannot limit ourselves and say *we* will be good, however we treat others. Our treatment of others is a measure of our goodness. In dealing with others we must be just, and justice consists in giving them their full dues, in respecting them on their own account, in remembering that they have the same nature and the same ends of existence as ourselves. Hence, wherever two men are dealing with one another, the law of justice—the law of mutual respect and regard—applies; it applies just as much in a business dealing, in buying and selling, in fixing wages, as in any transaction between friends or between members of the same household. It is impossible, then, to set off the industrial world as a field by itself, and say that the transactions that are going on there are beyond the scope of true moral principles. Practically speaking, moral sentiments may have little enough influence there; but it will not do to say that they are inapplicable.

And what really are the economic laws against which these sentiments are supposed to be powerless? The laws now in question are of course those bearing on the remuneration of laborers. So far as I can make out, these laws (or law) amount about to this: That one in selling anything he has in his possession endeavors to get all he can for it, and that one in buying anything endeavors to pay as little as possible for it; or, to make an application to the matter in hand, those who hire labor want to get it as cheaply as possible, and those who sell it want to sell it as dear as possible. As the motive of self-interest urges persons to act in this way, and as self-interest is so deep and tolerably constant a motive in men, this way of acting may, if we will, be called a law of action. But can we say that moral impulses are powerless against it? The

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law, it must be remembered, is not something outside man, but a law of man, a law of his will; to say, then, that this law cannot be interfered with is to say that there is but one motive that can possibly influence man (that of self-interest); which is to say, in turn, that a man cannot act for others as well as for himself, that human nature is somehow such that thoughts and impulses of justice and love cannot get a place or exert an influence within it. Now human experience belies any such notion. I cannot stop to prove this. But every one knows it. Individuals now and then act unselfishly, and sometimes whole communities are animated by an unselfish enthusiasm. In the family, any one would be thought unnatural who always considered simply his own interests and never acted for the benefit of wife or child, of husband or parent. Professional men and women sometimes give their services away; persons in business sometimes do what they would never do if their concern was for themselves alone. The law of buying as cheaply as one can, or of selling as dear as one can, is not a necessary law any more than any other law born of self-interest; thoughts of equity may interfere with it, thoughts of the situation and needs of others, thoughts of what one would like were he in the place of others, thoughts of what is due to those with whom we are dealing as our fellow-men and our brothers. I do not say that the economic law now under discussion is thus commonly interfered with; but I do say that it might be interfered with, and it is simply absurd, simply indicates confusion of mind, to speak of it as absolute and unchangeable in any such way as the law of gravitation is.* The law is born of the human will and the will can change. What moral forces are *going* to accomplish, I do not undertake to say. I am now concerned only to maintain that there is room for them,

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* *Cf.* the mystical language of Professor W. G. Sumner: "Supply and demand are together the ultimate force or fact to the economist. They are to him what gravity is to the astronomer or chemical affinity to the chemist. We want to know the mode of their action, but *the reason of it is beyond our reach.*"—*Princeton Review*, November, 1882, p. 250. (The italics are mine.)

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possible play for them; that they are not barred out in the nature of the case, as some would think.

And now—briefly, and yet as clearly as possible—what do we mean by the labor question? It may, of course, mean many things; but what I have in mind now is the problem how the laborer can share more fully than he ordinarily does in the wealth he helps to produce. The problem has many branches and covers many details; but this, as I now use the phrase, is the gist and the upshot of it. How can the laborer as he is,—and not by becoming a different being from what he is,—how can the laborer as he is, and performing the useful function in society that he does, get more of the wealth he helps to create, and what part can moral forces play in contributing to this result? This is the subject to which I address myself.

In the first place, I think that the forces of conscience might help by making men feel that there *is* a labor question. I do not think that there is any wide or deep sense of it at the present time, any more than there was a wide or deep sense of the slavery question a century ago. Of course, we all know that laborers often seek for better returns for their labor, and sometimes are very obstinate in their demands. But so do landlords often seek for more rent; so do leaders in business enterprise often seek for more profits. We do not therefore speak of a landlord problem or an employer problem; and why should we *merely for a reason of this sort* speak of a labor problem? The fact is, we can only speak of a labor problem, in the real sense of the word, if the laborer not merely fails to get what he would like, but if he fails to get what, according to some standard of right, we think he is *entitled* to. Working-men must be not merely an unsuccessful class, but in some way a wronged class, if public sentiment is to dignify their situation by viewing it as giving rise to a problem. A problem hardly arises simply because a man does not get all he wants in this world (*i.e.*, any other than a personal problem for the individual concerned).

Now, the notion of any right in this matter, the notion of what the laborer is entitled to, is very vague in the public

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mind. Some think he is entitled simply to what he can get,—*i.e.*, that there is no rule in the matter. Others think he is entitled to what he agreed to work for, whatever the circumstances in which he made the agreement. Some among laborers themselves seem to think they are entitled to all that is produced. Between these extremes the sober view that every one who contributes to the wealth of society is entitled to enough to enable him to live a properly human life, is yet to find any extensive following. The basis, thus, for any deep sense of a labor problem hardly exists. With the working-men, personal or class interest is apt to urge them on. But the outside world can hardly see why working-men should have more wages than why employers should have more profits. Many there are who hold that every one should accept the lot in life which seems assigned to him by Providence; that one should bear poverty as one does the other ills of life. Others would like to make out that poverty is a blessing rather than an evil. There is no clear general perception that the end of life is the development of the total humanity that is in us, and that these possibilities are precious in all men. For if this is true, there is no (so-called "Providential") lot of men with which they should be content, short of one in which they are progressively realizing the possibilities of their natures. If this is true, wealth comes to have a meaning and purpose beyond itself, for it is a means for setting men free and enabling them to live for something beyond the satisfaction of their animal necessities; and it is just as important that one person should have it (or be able to acquire it) as that another should.

A fundamental clarification of moral ideas is therefore necessary. "Good" people are as deficient in this respect as others. Most good Christian people saw no wrong in slavery until comparatively recent times, and when they *were* moved, it was more, I suspect, by hearing tales of suffering than by the thought of wrong. "Goodness" is a matter of instinct and habit, a more or less irrational thing; it needs to be put on a rational basis, in which case it might be a much more extensive quantity and have a more extensive influence. For

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if all men should have the opportunity to live a developed human life, if a part of the rational meaning of goodness is in seeking such a consummation, then it must become nothing less than shocking to the moral sense that large classes of men should be shut off from this opportunity and sacrificed for the benefit of others, as many working-men are now. Meagre wages and long hours of labor are wrong not merely because the laborer does not like them; he may be so demoralized by them that he loses the spirit to strive for anything else. They are wrong because they prevent his living, save in exceptional cases, more than an animal life (and not even that for as long a period as others, the mortality among the poor being exceptionally great). Meagre wages means not merely that it is impossible to provide properly for the material basis of existence, but that to develop and nourish the mind, to feed one's sense of beauty, and to give one's self the surroundings that a human being ought to have, are equally out of the question. Long hours of toil mean that one is fit for little but toil, that one's higher capacities are deadened or never brought into play. One with a clarified conscience is driven to ask *why* large classes of his fellow-men are compelled to live under these conditions; he explores the causes, he searches out remedies,—in other words, the labor problem is already upon him; his ideal convictions have brought him face to face with it, whether he wishes to face it or no.

Conscience, if awakened and rationalized, might thus perform a service in bringing it home to the general consciousness that there is a labor problem. If working-men were contented with existing conditions and demanded nothing, there would be a labor problem all the same, or rather all the more,—for then a part of the problem would be, to arouse the working-men to a sense of their dignity and responsibility as human beings.

But there is a still closer connection between morality and the labor problem. A true moral sense not only makes us aware of the problem, it makes us see that in essence it is a moral problem. Undoubtedly what share of wealth working-men can receive has necessary limits, which morality is power-

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less to affect. I even admit that it does not of itself follow that, because all men should live developed human lives, all can. Nature may not be generous enough in providing resources, or human wit may not, at any given time, be equal to the task of successfully appropriating or developing them. This is only saying that there may not be wealth enough to go round. But this is not the state of affairs in modern civilized communities. Even in Russia there is probably wealth enough. But everywhere the laborers get proportionally a small share of it. They are as essential as employers, landlords, capitalists, generals, and kings; but these classes, by some means or other, get, if not all they want, all they could in conscience well ask for, while working-men, as a rule, get little more than enough to enable them to live and propagate their kind. Inequity would thus appear to be stamped on the face of modern industrial society. It is sometimes urged that this is natural and inevitable. But, as I hinted at the outset, this is just what is not true. Profits, rent, interest, salaries of State and other officials are not any more than wages determined by laws over which men have no control. They are all the result of human bargaining or convention. Men may take more or they may take less for their services. No one in his senses can imagine that there is any natural law which obliges a railroad president to take $25,000 or $50,000 a year as his salary. Nor is rent determined by any natural law,—any law over and above the will of the landlord, I mean. Landlords are simply apt to take all they can get. So with interest and profits. There may well be limits beyond which these cannot go; but if one is willing to take a return of four per cent. instead of six per cent. on his investment, there is no law—natural, human, or divine—to prevent him. Talk about inevitable economic laws governing the distribution of wealth is economic rhetoric rather than science.

The simple fact is, that landlords, capitalists, and employers are, as a rule, in a position of advantage, and working-men are at a disadvantage, in making their respective bargains. The quantity of land, the quantity of capital, the quantity of employing or business talent, is limited; while the quantity of

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labor, particularly of the lower grades of labor, is, comparatively speaking, unlimited. But to whatever extent there is a limited supply or monopoly of a commodity, the owner of it can take advantage of those who want to use or purchase it; while to the extent that a commodity is abundant and the competition sharp between those who offer it for sale, to that extent they may be taken advantage of, however useful their commodity may be. The competition between laborers being then so great as to be practically unlimited, they may be taken advantage of to a practically unlimited degree,—or rather the only limit of the lowness of the amount they receive for their labor is in what they must have to sustain themselves upon and perform their labor. Hence riches on the one hand and poverty on the other. And all this is summed up by saying that the separation between the two classes of society, instead of being a part of the natural or normal or Divine order, is, speaking generally, and leaving out of account exceptional cases, the result of some taking an advantage, and of others being taken advantage of,—that is, of injustice.

This is what I mean by saying that the labor problem is in essence a problem in ethics. Working-men do not have what they ought to have to enable them to live developed human lives, and what now at least—taking into account the wonderful advances of the modern industrial world—they might have; and the reason why they do not have it is that, being many, they are weak, and are taken advantage of by the other members of society. "We are tired of working to make other people rich," said a factory girl once in Chicago, who was out with others of her class on a strike. Here, in every-day language, is the gist of the labor problem. The labor of the working-class is for others' benefit rather than their own; the employer gains by it, the landowner gains by it, the capitalist gains by it; but the laborer frequently gets from it only the pittance which enables him to refresh his vital forces and go on working. He allows himself to be thus taken advantage of because he cannot help it,—because, whether wisely or foolishly, he would rather live on whatever terms than not live at all. By no means do I say or imply that the employer does

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not do a service, or that the landlord—so long as the private ownership of land is permitted—does not do a service, or that the capitalist does not do a service. I do not see that in principle either profits or rent or interest are wrong. I hold that those among working-men who say that all that is produced is rightfully theirs, are extravagant and deluded,—though over-estimation of one's self has sometimes more of the promise and potency of life and progress in it than a submissive under-estimation. I simply say that the laborer renders a service along with the rest, a service equally necessary to the social organism and equally honorable with that which others render, and hence, that he should be rewarded in something like the same way, on something like the same scale, with the rest. In other words, there should be a substantial equality of conditions, and the cause of inequality (I do not mean absolutely, but to the extent it exists and has generally existed in the world) is not nature or God, but, to put it quite tersely, greed, —as Menander hinted in giving a counsel, on which Matthew Arnold enlarges, "Seek equality and eschew greed." *

But if the labor problem is at bottom a moral problem, the only radical solution of it must be a moral solution. This does not mean that external changes may not have their place, —changes in law and custom, changes in the machinery of the social system. But the moral solution must come first and be their precursor. "Without a change of principles," exclaimed Marcus Aurelius, "what else is there than the slavery of men who groan while they pretend to obey?" † It might be better that some men should be slaves than that they should do grave harm to the social organism; at the same time the best service, both morally and economically, is always willing service. By a moral solution of the labor problem I mean a change in the thoughts and dispositions of men: I mean new ideas and ideals, new ambitions, new motives and rules of action in the private heart. I confess that so long as men in general have the grasping spirit, so long as they want all they can get

* "Mixed Essays," chapter on "Equality."

† "Meditations," ix. 29.

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hold of, I do not see how it can matter much what the forms or machinery of society are; in effect, we shall have about what we have now. Until men are democratized at heart, the forms of democracy count for little, as we are coming to learn in our own country. We have "triumphant democracy" talked of here by those who might more intelligently speak of the unparalleled opportunities for greed in democracy.

In the nature of the case, law or any species of compulsion can only be effective against a minority. The majority of men (yes, the large majority) must be revolutionized in their sentiments, "transformed by the renewing of their minds," before any greatly beneficent social revolution or transformation can take place. I must speak frankly; to have labor, unmoralized, on top would not be a great improvement on the present *régime*, in which capital is on top. The way of service, of concession, is the only way to peace. Society does not want new bosses, but the abolition of the spirit of bossism, and an order of men and women who will make the service of the community their daily duty,—their religion, or part of it. The consuming thought must be that of brotherhood, of an equal realization by all of the great ends of existence; in the spirit of the holy Buddha, we must learn to say, "Never will I receive private salvation;" and with a modern poet find consolation for the present low state of society in looking forward to

> "One common wave of thought and joy
> Lifting mankind again." *

Will the moral forces of society arouse and clarify themselves, and win the strength that is possible to them in dealing with the grave problem now under discussion? The history of slavery in this country should make us sober.

> "We prayed for love to loose the chain;
> 'Tis shorn by battle's axe in twain!" †

The German peasants made a few innocent demands in the time of Luther; we should all of us now assent to their

* Matthew Arnold, "Obermann Once More."

† John G. Whittier, "Poetical Works" (Household edition), p. 357.

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justice. But they were refused. The Protestant conscience was not clear enough, the Catholic conscience was not clear enough, or, if clear, neither was strong enough, as against the mass of prejudice, of unjust custom and law, on the other side; hence the Peasants' War. Yet who will set limits to the possible development of moral power? There is the incalculable, the unforeseeable, in human nature. For whom is it not enough to know that there are possibilities of victory in setting out on any noble enterprise? Who demands certainty in advance? Who is not willing to let it stand, that

> "No good is certain, but the steadfast mind,
> The undivided will to seek the good:
> 'Tis that compels the elements, and wrings
> A human music from the indifferent air." *

The better instincts of human nature are against this disposition to take advantage of one another, which gives the key to our existing social order, and the fruits of which, though they are everywhere, are shown most plainly in the condition, circumstances, and low estate of those who do the manual labor of the world. Why cannot these better instincts be brought into play? Here is a question which goes deeper than any special reform, though special reforms all have their place; it touches the root of all reform. Why cannot a new spirit arise in the world? What an inspiring moment was that in the history of the French Assembly of 1789, when, on the night of the 4th of August, one noble after another arose to propose the abolition of some ancient privilege, when men almost rivalled one another in enthusiasm and willingness to sacrifice for the public good! What an inspiration was it which prompted the first Christians to part with their private possessions and turn the proceeds into a common fund, from which distribution should be made to all according to their needs! I do not think it is demanded of men that the system of private property be given up. I think it most important that we should be sane in our enthusiasm; but what possibilities of

* George Eliot, "The Spanish Gypsy," p. 123.

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disinterestedness in human nature does such a fact as this of primitive Christian history reveal to us, and how slow should we be to set a limit to what similar forces may accomplish in the future in dealing with the problem now in mind!

It is a part of the religious traditions in which we have all been educated, to look ahead to a brighter day for humanity, to a victory of the nobler forces in the human spirit. The religion of Israel looked forward to a kingdom of heaven, when right and not might should rule, and Christianity took up the same strain. There is a profound truth in the attitude of the earnest Christian, who ever turns his thoughts to a better country and treats but lightly the ties that bind him to the present world. The present world is not fashioned according to right and justice, and cannot satisfy any true man. As some one has said, "Conscience and the present constitution of things are not corresponding terms; it is conscience and the issue of things which go together." * Conscience thus forces us to look ahead, else it is in danger of becoming a mere dream and dying from lack of sustenance. The modern world must take again the ancient attitude,—the attitude of an Augustine whose eyes and heart were fixed on a "City of God," the attitude of a Jesus who held that the meek,—*i.e.*, the suffering and lowly, or, in to-day's language, the working-people —should yet have their share of the inheritance of the earth, the attitude of an Isaiah who pictured the time when men should help every one his neighbor, and every one should say to his brother, Be of good courage.†

Already there are signs that may encourage us. The church is waking; society is waking; great voices are making themselves heard for justice and for brotherhood; the world of labor is itself getting a new consciousness, is disciplining itself, is learning within its own ranks the lessons of solidarity and mutual help. May the new spirit spread everywhere and bring some worthy consummation at last!

WILLIAM M. SALTER.

PHILADELPHIA.

* Davison, quoted by Matthew Arnold, "Literature and Dogma," chap. xi. § 4.
† Isaiah xli. 6.

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THE ETHICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE DOCTRINE OF IMMORTALITY.

THE personal aims of man, as well as the comparative strength of different motives of his actions, must necessarily vary, according to his conception of life as limited to the bodily existence on earth, or as continued after the decay of the body.

If I am sure to continue my existence after death, and if I have some clear ideas as to the conditions of that continued existence, then every act of my life has in my eyes influence not only on this life, but also on the future life, and the presumed consequences of an action on the state after death may influence my decisions more than the effects expected in this earthly life. The mere addition of certain consequences beyond those universally admitted to take place on earth would necessarily lessen the influence of earthly motives. The man who believes in immortality may have all the motives known to the unbeliever, but he has also a certain number of motives unknown to the man who does not care about the future life. The additional motives may be contradictory among themselves, or contradictory to the earthly motives, but at all events they must divert to some extent the attention that would otherwise be paid exclusively to earthly motives; so we must admit, as a general truth, that the belief in immortality, enlarging, as it does, the horizon of our motives, must lessen the importance of the earthly motives of action. This alone would give a great ethical importance to the opinions that men hold about immortality, and this importance is augmented by the fact that our fear of death is one of the most powerful earthly motives of action. Many of our most important practical decisions are made with a view to preventing our death or the death of those dear to us. Now, the belief in immortality does not necessarily imply that death is not fearful, but historically such a belief has been accompanied by an absence of fear of death, and the believers in immortality

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have generally asserted that death has no terror for them. It is easy to see, from some extreme instances, how indifference to death might modify the conditions of life. If we look, for instance, at the greatest struggle of our age, the war between labor and capital, we see the working-men beginning a strike because they wish to obtain higher wages and such comforts of life as can be afforded by the higher rate. So long as this is their aim, every strike is conditioned by the material means at the disposal of the strikers, because a strike that would lead to the wholesale starvation of the strikers would miss its original aim of obtaining for them better conditions of life. But let us suppose, in some society very different from our own, the only reason for a strike to be the opinion of the strikers that they do not get a fair share of the results of their labor, and that they ought to get more, no matter what use they would make of the increase of their wages, and no matter whether better conditions of life are desired by them or not. Such strikers, were they indifferent to death and certain of their continuous existence, would prefer starvation to the unjust distribution of the products of their labor, hating injustice more than they loved earthly life. To prevent the physical suffering caused by starvation, they might resort to suicide rather than be compelled to work for unfair wages. In this case a part of them would die, and the remainder would have the greater chance of obtaining whatever they demanded, supposing, of course, their demands left something in the way of profits to capital.

This paradoxical instance, though not likely to occur actually, shows how far a certain view of death might react on our conduct. The improbability of such an occurrence in real life does not weaken our argument, but merely shows that the real working-men generally have not the opinion here supposed, or that the people holding such an opinion are not usually working-men. But in the life of working-men, as well as of other people, it occurs frequently that the mere fear of death acts as a very strong motive, and brings them to decisions which they are well aware are not satisfactory from the stand-point of morality. The preservation of one's life—

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and more so of the life of one's wife and children—is frequently an argument in favor of some action which otherwise is looked upon as not quite moral.

Although the doctrine of immortality is thus naturally calculated to have a twofold influence on man's conduct, first by adding new motives to the motives taken from earthly experience, and then altering all the motives connected with death, it must be admitted that this influence is not very much noticed in the actual life of religious people who profess to believe in immortality. We see here a problem that requires psychological and ethical explanation. We know that though the belief in immortality is generally asserted among Christian nations, the motives, taken from the conception of a future life, appear very exceptionally in our every-day experience, and he who might advance such motives in a public discussion would expose himself to the risk of ridicule. This is to a certain extent explained by the observation that the existence and influence of motives, taken from the consideration of a future life, are often concealed by motives taken from earthly experience. The first teachers of immortality soon found out that it is not easy to bring this belief into close connection with man's every-day decisions, and they have often indicated earthly motives strong enough to keep men in the required line of conduct. For instance, if a believer in immortality is restrained from doing wrong by the consideration that the moral consequences of an unpunished wrong action extend far beyond earthly life, he can urge upon weak believers that even in this life every bad action may come, sooner or later, to the knowledge of living men, and arouse contempt and indignation, and cause some kind of punishment. In almost every case we can reduce a consideration based on belief in immortality to the form of an argument touching upon the possibilities of this life, because the social interests of this life require from us nearly the same line of conduct as our personal interest in the future life.

This parallelism of moral means in this and the future life does not signify that the consideration of all the motives taken from our earthly experience could enable us to find a line of

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conduct equally convenient for this and the future life. He who considers the eventualities of a future life does not, as a rule, ignore the experience of this life, and therefore he can satisfy the exigencies of both epochs of his existence. But if one looks only at his experience in this life, he is liable to misunderstand the relative importance of motives, because certain of the earthly motives gain very much in strength by the supposition of a continued existence after death.

The general religious acceptance of this supposition ought therefore to result in a higher standard of conduct than we see in practical life. The contrast between the professed opinions about a future life and the practical conduct ruled chiefly by earthly motives requires further explanation. We see that in every-day life motives taken from the idea of immortality are practically excluded. The great majority of men act as if there were no other life than this; they do not think about the consequences in a future life of their actions here. To understand this contrast we must look at the logical value of the popular belief in immortality. It is a belief originally based on authority, and not on any kind of logical reasoning. To a large number of Christian people the doctrine of immortality is as void of sense as the fourth dimension of space. They are accustomed to think of the existence of man only as conditioned by the state of the body; they identify their persons with their bodies; all their thoughts are constantly occupied with these bodily conditions, and with such actions and effects as can be observed by means of the senses; they cannot imagine any existence in other conditions; and so they never think about it, and it can never have any influence over their actions. These are the indifferent majority, who, though they profess to belong to some church, and act apparently according to the rules of this church, do it only by custom and tradition, and have no personal interest in the religious teaching of immortality. They do not seem to be unbelievers, because they never deny or discuss the official teachings of the church, not caring, indeed, to occupy their minds with such abstract ideas. They frequently, for the sake of what they regard as public opinion, seek to promote the

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prosperity of the church, and occasionally show some indignation against atheists, or frank unbelievers, because they see in them enemies of the church. They associate the church as an institution with some of the most important material institutions, without which they could not enjoy the material advantages which they esteem above everything in life. It is a somewhat strange psychological phenomenon that these "unconscious unbelievers," as they could be named, being probably the largest class in every contemporaneous community, are entirely unaware of the fact that they do not belong to the church to which they profess to belong. They never think about religion, but they maintain that everybody ought to do as others do, and ought to avoid conflict and conform to the customs of society by observing the external forms. Each one thinks his own indifference an exception, and he credits the majority, which is formed of beings like himself, with influence over his own customs, manners, and religious observances. It is as if a company of smokers, being in a place where nobody is smoking, abstain from smoking because each thinks that the others would object to it. For a similar reason the unconscious unbelievers act as if they fully believed in the doctrines of the church, and fail to observe that the majority, to which they look for rules of external conduct, is composed of such men as themselves, who care for nothing about a future life, or any other religious doctrine. It is clear that among such unconscious unbelievers we could not find examples of the effect of the doctrine of immortality on conduct in this life.

But there are reasons why, even among believers, it is not easy to ascertain the whole ethical influence of the doctrine of immortality. By believers I mean those persons who not only profess to belong to some church, but who are also interested in religious teachings and believe earnestly in a future life.

Their thoughts are frequently occupied with this doctrine, and they ask about their future state more questions than can usually be answered by any church. Their belief has the character of a general hope of something better in a future life, to be obtained by those deserving it in this life. So the

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idea of a future life has a general influence over their conduct, in so far as it is supposed that a better conduct prepares better future conditions. Such a general idea is hardly commensurable with the detailed motives of every particular action, and so long as detailed motives are all taken from earthly experience, the clearness and distinctness of these well-known motives overshadow the vague general idea of the consequences of our actions after death. The ordinary religious believers are unable to say in what particular way any immoral action is likely to produce any particular unpleasant consequence after death. This explains why persons who really believe in the immortality of the soul frequently fail to take the consequences of this belief into consideration, when called upon to decide upon some particular action which seems to them to refer only to earthly life, and to imply no consequences beyond that. Moreover, the religious belief in immortality, as it is usually professed, does not affect the general fear of death, because, according to the prevailing ideas on this subject, the state after death depends essentially upon the moral state at the moment of death, and no Christian can be sure that he will not die in a state of mortal sin. Only an exceptional person, free from every sin, could rely, according to the general belief, upon the future being better than the present life. As such absolutely virtuous persons are very few, death remains, for the great majority, always a fearful event, and the fear of death frequently prevents them from acting according to their convictions. Still, in a few of the best representatives of religious belief we can observe the full influence of the doctrine of immortality upon conduct. These are chiefly the passionate religious teachers and moral agents, who never think about themselves, and live only to improve the life of others. They are never afraid to die, and have generally a stronger conviction of men's immortality than the average believer.

If we consider all believers, the true and the apparent, we see that the doctrine of immortality does not influence human action to such an extent as, from its logical consequences, it would seem right to expect. To find the full illustration of

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the relation between this doctrine and human conduct, we must direct our attention to such persons as are able, not only to draw the consequences from every hypothesis, but also to give to their opinions a more permanent foundation than *belief* in religious or other authority. Such persons, true philosophers, are fewer in number than the leaders and believers in religion, but their opinion as to immortality is no longer a mere general belief; it is a well-founded *knowledge*,* and answers many questions that remained unanswered by religion. The assertion of a perfect knowledge on this subject may seem over-bold, as there are still to-day, as there were several thousand years ago, certain philosophers who deny the possibility of such a knowledge, or of a scientific proof of immortality. But since Plato† the number of those professing a knowledge of the soul's immortality has been so great, that it is no longer extravagant to assert such a knowledge. Nevertheless, in these difficult questions, words and terms have been so frequently abused, that it is absolutely necessary to point out what kind of knowledge and what kind of immortality are here supposed, and how a philosopher can and must proceed from belief to knowledge in regard to the question of his own continuous existence.

The only scientific basis for a theory of human personality

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* See my paper, "On the Difference between Knowledge and Belief as to the Immortality of the Soul," in vol. xxii., No. 4, of the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, Dec., 1893.

† Plato's opinion about immortality has been very much debated among philosophers. Among the most recent historians of philosophy, Zeller chiefly represents the view that Plato taught immortality, while Teichmuller strongly protests against it, and attempts to prove that Plato, as an idealist, could not admit personal immortality. The truth is, that it is not indispensable to suppose that Plato always had the same opinion upon this subject; and, if we distinguish between early and later dialogues, we easily recognize that Plato, in his later works, altered the views he expressed earlier. Since Lewis Campbell laid, in his Introduction to the Sophistes and Politicus (1867) the first durable foundations to the chronology of the Platonic dialogues, subsequent researches have confirmed the view that Sophistes, Politicus, Philebus, Timæus, Leges, are the last dialogues of Plato, written in his old age; and precisely in these works we find an emphatic assertion of the immortality of the rational soul, but without a full conception of the human personality.

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is given by the metaphysical study of existence in general. Every school of philosophy began early to distinguish between apparent and real existence, and all agreed in this respect, that every apparent existence is explained and caused by a real existence, that there is no appearance without some reality, though the reality may be very different from the appearance. The first truth of any metaphysics is that there must be some reality, some true existence, behind all appearances. This truth, in its simplicity, remains still a very important step in philosophy, and leads us out of scepticism. It is a necessary truth, on a par with the mathematical axioms, because we are unable to conceive that nothing exists. So long as we admit any appearance, the notion of appearance has a meaning only as contrasted with reality. Some philosophers have thought they could reject the assertion of a reality as producing the appearances and make them appear only to the perceiver, without outward basis. But in this case the reality producing the appearance would be the perceiver himself, so that the most extreme idealism could not deny the existence of some reality, without falling into the contradiction of making appearances realities. So the first premise of our argument, "There is some true existence," stands beyond a doubt.

Now the idea of true existence in opposition to the apparent world implies the permanence of such true existence, because any existence that could cease to exist would seem to have been an appearance. This consequence is admitted equally by the materialists and the idealists, and is expressed in various ways: as the indestructibility of matter, by those who look at matter as something truly existing; as conservation of force, by those who think of force as truly existing; as eternal existence of ideas, of God, or of the universe, by idealists and pantheists. Whoever admits anything as truly existing, admits its eternal, permanent existence. Deeper thinkers state this truth in another way: they say that time itself being an appearance, a form of perception, the reality must be out of time, and cannot have beginning or end in time. But such an expression does not change the meaning of our generally-received truth, that the truly existing thing or being

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cannot cease to exist. The truth, supported by the whole history of philosophy, is only a detailed expression of the first truth that there is something truly existing. An appearance is, justly speaking, an appearance because it ceases to exist, and only when it ceases to exist does it prove itself an appearance. The cessation of existence, at least in our imagination, is the peculiar mark of apparent existence as opposed to real existence. So we may take for granted, as a basis of further reasoning, that the true existence, or the truly existing thing or being, cannot cease to exist.

Now, having this representation of true existence, we have to find the concrete object corresponding to this definition. While our notion of true existence is an *a priori* concept, not based on experience, our knowledge of the object corresponding to this notion can be gained only by experience and observation. In this way the most obvious objects of our experience are material bodies observed by the senses. It was a very natural conclusion of the older philosophers, that matter is the only true existence, and that every appearance is caused by the action of matter. But in two different ways philosophy and science were led out of this first and natural hypothesis. On one side, the study of matter led gradually to the decomposition of this matter into atoms, which are in no way perceived by the senses, and which seem to have smaller claims for true existence than the gross matter which they compose. It may be very difficult to explain to a farmer that his cows and sheep are products of his own active imagination, acted upon by something essentially different from cows and sheep; but it is becoming more and more easy to bring a learned naturalist to the conclusion that the atoms with which he deals, and which explain to him all the changes occurring in the appearance of cows and sheep as well as in the appearance of stars and clouds, are only concepts of the human mind. This conclusion is to-day really admitted, under the influence of philosophy, by most investigators in natural science, and there are now few who imagine their material atoms to be as solid and objective as the smith does his iron. Another way led to the same idealization of matter;

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as, on one side, physics and chemistry decomposed matter into atoms and molecules, so, on the other side, physiology easily found out that our sense-impressions do not depend entirely upon our senses, and that the full activity of the eye or ear does not imply seeing or hearing. Gradually the cause of our sense-perceptions was carried within from without. Colors were first supposed to be in outward objects, then in the light coming from these objects, then in the eye that perceives this light, then in the nerve acted upon by the eye, then in some part of the brain acted upon by the nerve, and a very small step remains to enable us to understand that the brain itself is unable to perceive colors, and that every sense-perception is an activity of mind, while every physical or physiological causation of sense-perception is essentially different from it. In this way physics, chemistry, physiology, have contributed gradually to deprive matter of its first position, and to prove that it is only an appearance. In more recent times psychology has brought us farther, because it has shown by experience that sense-perception is possible without any action of the senses. I know there still are some psychologists who deny telepathy, but I know also, from their own confessions, that they have not studied the facts on which the modern concept of telepathy and mental suggestion is based. In fact, it is impossible to make a thorough study of the literature of this subject, and to persevere in simple experiments * in telepathy, without admitting thought transference to be just as well observed and certain a fact, as, for instance, light polarization, with the difference only that the conditions of light polar-

* I mean thought transference of single numbers and letters. I have oftentimes tried these test-experiments, and always with success, so that I dared to introduce them in my lectures on psychology at the University of Kazan without any more hesitation than a chemist would have in showing his audience the production of hydrogen by the action of sulphuric acid on zinc.

It must be borne in mind, however, that psychological experiments have other conditions than chemical experiments, and that a result showing, for instance, three hundred cases of thought transference in one thousand experiments is fully satisfactory, since the mathematical probability of guessing any one number out of ten is only one hundred in a thousand trials. See Ochorowicz, "Suggestion Mentale."

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ization are much better known than the conditions of thought transference. The recent scientific study of telepathy has shown that we can perceive outward appearances exactly in the same way without our senses as with them. This is a deadly blow to all materialistic metaphysics, and leads every philosopher to see true existence outside of the world of material appearances.

In the history of human thought several objects have been named as corresponding with the idea of real existence, but if we differentiate between knowledge and belief as to these things, we are obliged to admit, with Descartes, that there is nothing beyond us that we can know better than ourselves. If I am the best known thing to myself, and if I am perfectly certain of my own existence, that is, if I am conscious of being myself the *cause* of my actions, I cannot but admit that I am a true being, and, if I am a true being, I can never cease to exist. Frequently this simple and clear conclusion has been obscured by the representation of the human person as composed of soul and body. But the body is not a part of myself; it is only something belonging to me and ruled by me, though quite as foreign to my own substance as any other external object. I am conscious of existence as a simple being and have no parts. I can easily attain the same control over other things as over my body. If I play a musical instrument, this instrument is quite as much under my control as can be any part of my body—it could be looked at, indeed, as a part of my body. The same can be said of any other instrument fully mastered by man; it becomes gradually more and more a part of his body. On the other hand, we do not always have more control over the body than over other things, and frequently we have the impression that the body shows just the same resistance to our efforts as any other part of the outer world. If we consider this, we come to understand that one is only what is commonly called a soul, that is, one's self. It is not quite right to say that I *have* a soul as I have a body. In reality, I *am* a soul *reigning* over a body, and therefore any one, by asking what or where his soul is, proves only that he does not understand what is meant by soul. His soul

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is not something within—it is simply himself—and so long as he speaks of himself in the first person he has not the right to say that he does not know anything about his soul. I would ask him what he means by uttering the word I, and tell him, that this "I" is his soul, or that he is himself a soul. This definition of a soul as identical with the experimental idea of "I" leads us to a more definite and clear explanation of the meaning of our continuous existence. It is no more the abstract idea of the permanence of a soul; it is the perfectly clear representation of *myself* as existing independently of my body, and after the death of the body. Everything that I have been used to look at as myself participates in this immortality, which is the only true immortality of souls. That means that I shall remain myself, with every faculty, knowledge, feeling, acquired by myself in this life. Sometimes there may be at first an uncertainty whether some activity of my mind is not dependent on parts of my body: as, for instance, many physiologists have thought that memory, imagination, and thought itself are necessarily connected with the existence of a brain. But if I ask only my own consciousness, I have no doubt or hesitation as to whether memory is a faculty of myself or not. It is most certainly something necessarily connected with myself, and I could not have an idea of continuous existence without memory. Then I must retain memory after death, as well as every faculty that I am conscious of as belonging to myself. The relation between brain and memory, if there is any, is very much more difficult to understand and to explain than the simple psychological relation of my memory to myself. Everything that I feel to be my personality, all my thoughts, my feelings, have to remain with me, and can be altered after death only in the same gradual way as in this life.

This is the strong conclusion from the knowledge of myself as a truly existing being, and of real existence as permanent. This conclusion is quite as sound and logically as strong as any other knowledge, but it is not equally obtainable by all living men, for the same reasons that many other scientific truths, well proven, are accessible only to a few. The knowl-

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edge of immortality is perhaps more difficult to obtain than the knowledge of the highest mathematics. Just as many persons are unable to realize certain mathematical ideas, so we see a great many educated persons unable to realize that they *are*—that they are true beings, or, at least that they know nothing that is more truly existent than themselves. This weakness of self-consciousness, hesitating to recognize itself as truly existing, is by no means a peculiarity of untrained minds; it can claim for itself the highest authorities in the history of philosophy. All the pantheistic and idealistic philosophers have recognized something else as more truly existing than themselves, and themselves only as an appearance of this something truly existing, and they have usually given to the one truly existing thing the name of God. We find, even to-day, especially in England and America, many highly estimable thinkers of this class. Nevertheless, the consciousness of the true existence of human personality has grown in modern times, not only in pure philosophy, but also in legislation, politics, and religion. It would be an interesting historical investigation to show this development of human self-consciousness from the "Discours de la Méthode" of Descartes to the "Mikrokosmos" of Lotze, but I intend here merely to show what influence this knowledge of our own real existence, or of our immortality, has on conduct. Having acquired such a knowledge, and looking at it as not less certain than any other part of scientific knowledge, I may regard calmly not only the death of myself, but also the death of my nearest friends, because I know that they continue to exist, probably under better conditions than at present. This hope of better conditions is well founded on the experience that most of the present evils are caused by the imperfections and wants of our body. The greatest crimes are done for the sake of material advantages. If now material independence or wealth frequently appears as a condition of intellectual and moral activity, this will change at the moment of death, because we then become independent of our bodies.

Looking at death as a kind of progress, we cannot be afraid to die, and we look at this life chiefly as at a field of exercise

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for our intellectual and moral faculties. The differences of rank and fortune disappear or change in our eyes, because we understand that these differences have only a relative importance in the short time of our life on earth, and that at any moment they may be modified by means of death. The poorest man, if he is a philosopher, may, after death, be more independent than the richest millionaire. This difference between the apparent and the real rank of men has been described by Plato in a masterly manner in many of his dialogues (*e.g.*, Gorgias, Republic), and it is always present to the eye of the philosopher who knows that neither he nor other men cease to exist. It has a considerable influence over the attitude towards the powerful and the rich. He looks at them as at other men, and will do nothing to flatter them, nor will he keep silent if he sees that they abuse their power or their riches. The knowledge of immortality leaves us no other fear than the fear of our own injustice, and if we are always certain that death cannot bereave us of our intellectual and moral wealth, we do not mind the danger of death in the war with oppression, injustice, and crime. It gives us a victorious self-consciousness, and we do not lose our courage if we see a momentary and apparent triumph of evil. If we know that we have eternity before us, we have no necessity to be in a hurry, and to run, regardless of others, for the attainment of our personal aims in this life. We learn to understand that it is better to do a little work to perfection, than to do apparently much, but nothing soundly. The sorrows as well as the joys of this life appear less, and we take a deeper interest in the sorrows and joys of others, helping them not merely for temporal ends but so as to promote their moral and intellectual progress.

Those who do not recognize their own eternal existence may object that if we think always about our future life we lose gradually every interest in this life. But for the philosopher there is no such contrast between this life and the future life. The one is the continuation of the other, and he expects to remain the same person in both parts of his existence. A careful study of the relations between himself and his body

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shows that the popular belief exaggerates the importance of the body in this life, and that most of the activity ascribed to the body belongs to the mind. If my mind is able, for instance, to see and hear everything without the use of the senses, then the loss of the sense organs may, after all, not be so unfortunate. The only great change occurring at the moment of death will be the interruption of our influence on our friends who remain here. Numerous witnesses deny this interruption, and claim to have communications from the dead, but so long as they are unable to give clear indications as to the conditions under which such communications might be obtained by everybody, their claims remain trustworthy only to themselves. Still, it is important to observe that there is no scientific reason whatever to deny the possibility of such communications. That something does not occur in everybody's experience is by no means a sufficient reason for declaring it to be impossible. If we are certain of our own and other persons continuous and conscious existence after death, we cannot deny the possibility of communication with them, though we are not obliged to admit the reality of such communication if we have not satisfactory evidence as to its occurrence. The question of the possibility of our communication with the dead, if it could get a satisfactory solution, would, of course, show an increased influence of the doctrine of immortality on men's conduct, especially because it would give to the majority a more accessible proof of immortality than the above-named metaphysical proof. But it is not necessary to establish continuous relations between dead and living to show the full influence of theoretical knowledge about immortality on the practical conduct of men. This theoretical knowledge is much stronger than any evidence gathered from spiritualistic séances, because it does not require darkness as a condition of its production. A detailed consideration of the influence of such a knowledge on conduct would show us that, while the motives taken from ordinary experience do not always agree with the motives created by the knowledge of immortality, these latter always show a remarkable coincidence with the line of conduct that

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brings to us the best enjoyment in this life as well as the best training for the life to come. Every action that prepares humanity for a better state in the future secures, at the same time, a better life for the present. The moral law of this and the future life is the same law of love taught by the highest knowledge in the universe.

W. LUTOSLAWSKI.

DROZDOWO, RUSSIA.

PHILOSOPHICAL SIN.

FEW questions have more greatly exercised the minds of moralists than the accurate definition and adjustment of the responsibility for sin. A wrongful act may be so committed that its sinfulness may not justly be imputed to the actor, or may be fairly entitled to mitigation through infinite gradations. Ignorance, for instance, is admitted as an extenuation: he who has not the knowledge of good and evil is not to be held guilty for the infraction of a precept of which he has not or cannot have had cognizance, and theologians have exhausted their ingenuity in defining the various degrees of ignorance, with their corresponding responsibilities, from the invincible or inculpable ignorance which wholly excludes the idea of intentional sin, to the crass or culpable ignorance which increases guilt through wilful avoidance of enlightenment.

Among the speculations of this nature, which have largely attracted the attention of writers on what is called moral theology, is the degree of advertence and consent in the act of sinning requisite to cause imputation of the sin. Naturally these questions have been the subject of keener disputation among Catholic authors than among Protestants or free-thinkers, for in Catholicism they have a most important practical bearing upon the daily decisions in the confessional, where the priest should be prepared to pass judgment on every act of the penitent, not only in its objective relations, but in the accompanying subjective conditions which may serve as

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an aggravation or extenuation. They have therefore been exhaustively debated, and a rapid sketch of the development of the Catholic doctrine as to advertence may not be without interest to the student of ethics.

The problems involved were discussed at least as early as the time of St. Augustin. He limits sin to the action of the will, and says that it is admitted by all that sin must be voluntary, but he will not listen to the excuses alleged by modern theologians. When the philosophers argued that consent is necessary to sin, he indignantly rejected the proposition as subversive of all morals and as opening the door to all crimes. Nor does he admit that the gust of passion can extenuate the offence; if the flesh rises against the spirit, the spirit is not responsible, but if it yields it becomes the slave of sin.* That there is inconsistency in these utterances only shows the inherent intricacy of the subject, and that even a mind like St. Augustin's, when viewing it at intervals from different stand-points, could be led to contradictory conclusions. The dominating opinion of the Church of the period was wholly averse to framing excuses for trangressions of the law. In 415 the council of Diospolis, assembled for the trial of Pelagius, emphatically condemned the proposition that ignorance or oblivion (inadvertence) releases from sin by depriving it of its wilful character.† Gregory the Great is not quite so rigid; he requires consent, but does not wholly relieve the flesh from responsibility; the evil spirit suggests the sinful act to the mind; if no delectation follows, there is no sin; if the flesh experiences pleasure, sin begins; if deliberate consent follows, the sin is perfected.‡

When we turn to the schoolmen, who endeavored through their dialectics to solve in the minutest detail every problem of the moral and spiritual world, we find the greatest of them all, Aquinas, discussing with his accustomed thoroughness how far the imputation of sin is modified by passion, or

* S. Augustini de Vera Religione cap. xiv.—Contra Academicos Lib. III. cap. xvi.—Retract. Lib. I. cap. xiii. n. 5.

† Concil. Diospolitan. ann. 415, cap. xviii. (Harduin. Concil. I. 1212).

‡ Gregor. PP. I. Regest. Lib. XI. Epist. lxiv. Interrog. 11.

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rather, in the scholastic terminology, how far passion influences the character of the sin and renders it either mortal or venial. He admits freely the mitigating influence of passion in depriving a man of the use of reason and inducing temporary ignorance through absence of advertence, but to relieve an act of sin the passion must be such as to subvert the will and render the act wholly involuntary. If the will precedes the passion, the greater the passion the greater the sin; if the passion is antecedent, the greater it is the less the sin; an act suddenly performed without reflection may be venial when if committed with deliberation it would be mortal.* These were somewhat hazardous admissions, and in hands less careful as to limitations were calculated to lead to somewhat dangerous deductions. In fact, in less than a century, Robert Holkot, a Dominican and doctor of theology in the University of Paris, propounded the doctrine that no matter what evil a man existing in charity may commit, if it is done through passion which impedes or obscures the use of reason, it will not be imputed to him as a mortal sin.† Dr. Peter Jeremiah, a celebrated preacher of the period, is not willing to go quite so far: a mortal sin committed through human infirmity or fragility, as by the impulse of passion or fear of death, has claim for pardon; but this claim he reduces to a minimum, for he says that if the sinner dies without repentance his punishment will be in hell and not in purgatory,‡—that is, the sin will be imputed to him as mortal and not as venial.

When Thomas of Walden, at command of Eugenius IV., took up the cudgels against Lollardry and Hussitism, he was forced to more dangerous definitions in his efforts to answer Wickliffe's gibes at the inability of the confessor to distinguish between mortal and venial sins, and he endeavored to differentiate them by classing as venials those which are committed without premeditation or through preoccupation

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* S. Th. Aquinat. Summæ II. 1. Q. vi. Art. 7; Q. lxxiii. Art. 6; Q. lxxvii. Artt. 2, 6, 7.

† D'Argentré Collect. Judic. de novis Erroribus I. 1. 340–1.

‡ Pet. Hieremiæ Quadragesimale, Serm. xxii.

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as lacking the necessary assent of the will.* Chancellor Gerson wrestled with the same insoluble problem as to the distinction between mortal and venial sins, and admitted that there is no precept so imperative but that it may be sometimes venially transgressed through impulse or lack of formal consent.† St. Antonino of Florence, whose authority in the fifteenth century was of the highest, will only admit that a sin committed through passion is less grave than one committed through malice, and he asserts that lack of consideration is itself a sin.‡ Cardinal Caietano shows the progressive development of opinion when he requires full advertence and deliberation to constitute mortal sin, but he limits this somewhat when he says that one who through lack of consideration does what he knows to be forbidden is excusable, provided he would not have done it had he paused and considered—a rule somewhat difficult of practical application, in which he is followed by Bartolommeo Fumo.§ Towards the end of the sixteenth century Cardinal Toletus goes still a little further. In describing how mortal sins may become venial, he says that sins to be mortal require full liberty of the will; a sudden impulse of vengeance or other passion deprives the will of its full freedom; there may even be brief delay, implying negligence, and yet the sin is venial.‖

Probabilism and casuistry were now beginning to invade the region of morals, and the efforts of the rising school of theologians were directed rather to finding excuses for sin than to increasing its responsibility. In 1595, Pedro of Aragon holds that homicide committed without consideration at the sight of an enemy is not imputable as a sin.¶ About 1600 Carbone tells us that passion diminishes transgression; thus in lust the sin of youth is less than that of an old man, and a man

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* Thomæ Waldens. de Sacramentis cap. LVI. nn. 3, 7.

† Jo. Gersonis de Cognitione Peccatorum venialium et mortalium Consid. II.

‡ S. Antonini Summæ P. I. Tit. ii. cap. I, § 3; P. II. Tit. v. cap. II.

§ Caietani Summula s. vv. *Delectatio*, *Inconsideratio*.—Armilla Aurea s. v. *Inconsideratio*, n. I.

‖ Toleti Instruct. Sacerd. Lib. III. cap. ii. n. 2.

¶ Petri de Arragon de Justitia et Jure Q. LXXXVIII. Art. I.

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who yields to the advances of a pretty woman is more excusable than if she is plain.* Father Sayre follows in the same direction, but more cautiously: passion diminishes sin but does not change its character, and he who yields to a strong temptation of the flesh sins less than he who succumbs to a slight one.† Soon after this Tomás Sanchez, the most distinguished theologian of his age, discusses the question fully. For mortal sin perfect deliberation is requisite; it would be unworthy of divine goodness to condemn a man to hell for imperfect deliberation, and it is an attribute of human weakness that it does not always have full advertence even of that on which it deliberates, so that any sin may thus be converted from mortal to venial. A man may think of everything else concerning a proposed act, but if he does not happen to advert to its wickedness it becomes venial. There must also be full freedom of will and plenitude and perfection of consent, without which there cannot be mortal sin. Inadvertence moreover is divided into the same gradations as ignorance.‡ Still these lax opinions were not universally held. About this time Jacopo de' Graffi asserts that drunkenness is no extenuation of sin; a drunkard committing homicide is guilty of homicide.§

Sanchez was followed by the probabilist theologians, whose teachings were rapidly becoming predominant. Marchant tells us that full advertence is required not only of the act but of its malice, and inadvertence may arise from ignorance, forgetfulness, lack of foresight, distraction, disturbance of the mind, haste, preoccupation, violence, or fraud. Even the devil is called into play, for God frequently allows him to control the imagination, and then the sinner is no more responsible for his acts than are those who are actually possessed.‖ Busenbaum, whose *Medulla Theologiæ Moralis* during more than a hundred years passed through two hundred editions, defines

* Carbonis Summæ Summar. Cas. Conscient. T. I. P. I. Lib. iii. cap. 7.

† Sayri Clavis Regiæ Sacerdotis Lib. II. cap. x. n. 4.

‡ T. Sanchez in Præcepta Decalogi Lib. I. cap. i. nn. 6, 7, 8, 13; cap. xvi. n. 8.

§ Jac. a Graffiis Decis. Aureæ Cas. Conscient. P. II. Lib. II. cap. xix. n. 15.

‖ Marchant. Tribunalis Animarum Tom. I. Tract. III. Tit. ii. Qq. 1, 2, 3.

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sin as requiring will, freedom, and advertence; vehement impulses of wrath or lust which disturb the reason and take away freedom of will excuse from sin. This liberty and advertence must be actual and not virtual or interpretative, so that a man who sins without thinking of it does not sin, and crimes committed in intoxication are not imputable to the perpetrator.* Tamburini, another leading moralist of the middle of the seventeenth century, was therefore justified in teaching that habitual sins are not sins and need not be confessed.†

The development of theories so dangerous to practical morals and the conduct of life had not been allowed to pass without some protest. The Gallican school, whose rigor finally grew into that indefinable heresy termed Jansenism, had already in the sixteenth century found a mouth-piece in Michael Bay, among whose errors, condemned in 1567 by St. Pius V., in 1579 by Gregory XIII., and in 1641 by Urban VIII., was included the proposition that the evil desires to which the reason does not consent, and which man suffers against his will, are prohibited by the commandment "Thou shalt not covet," and that a man feeling them but not consenting transgresses the commandment, even though the transgression is not imputed to him as sin.‡ This refinement of speculation was scarce practical, but the condemnations repeated at intervals through three-quarters of a century show how persistent was the protest against the growing laxity of the fashionable theology. The protesters were not numerous, but they were formidable through their resolute energy and the respect inspired by their austere virtues. Under the guidance successively of Cornelis Janssen, Antoine Arnauld, and Pasquier Quesnel, they maintained themselves for nearly a century against their principal enemy the Society of Jesus;

* Busenbaum Medullæ Theol. Moral. Lib. v. cap. i. Dub. 1.—Cf. Laymann Theol. Moral. Lib. 1. Tract. iii. cap. 5, n. 13.—Jo. Sanchez Selecta de Sacramentis, Disp. XVIII. n. i.

† Tamburini Method. Confess. Lib. II. cap. iii. nn. 23–25.

‡ Urbani PP. VIII. Bull. *In eminenti*, Prop. 50, 75 (Bullar. Roman. T. V. p. 369).

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when for a time defeated in France in the quarrel over the bull *Unigenitus* and the question of the sufficiency of attrition without inchoate charity, they founded the still existing schismatic church of Utrecht, and to the influence of their teachings may largely be attributed the suppression of the Jesuits in France in 1762 and the dissolution of the Society by Clement XIV. in 1773. The rigorists of Port Royal were not likely to leave unassailed doctrines so deplorably lax as those of Marchant and Busenbaum. When Pascal wrote his crushing "Letters of a Provincial," one of his chief sources of material was a little book of wide circulation entitled *Somme des Pechez* by the Jesuit Father Bauny, who taught that to render one's self guilty in the eyes of God it is necessary to recognize that God forbids a proposed act and nevertheless to perform it —or, in other words, that unless before committing an act there is full advertence that it is prohibited by God there is no sin in the commission. Pascal of course had no difficulty in deducing the consequences of such a doctrine, and his epigrammatic exposition of them is not the least effective passage in his merciless assault.* In reply to Pascal the Jesuits issued anonymously a work by Father Georges Pirot entitled *Apologie pour les Casuistes contre les calomnies des Jansenistes*—a book which perhaps enjoyed the honor of more condemnations by the Holy See, by universities, and by bishops, than any other on record. In it Father Pirot placed the excuse for sin rather on the ground of ignorance than of inadvertence, for his proposition is that if hardened sinners have neither light nor remorse while plunging in debauchery, if they have no knowledge of evil, then all theologians agree that they do not sin while committing acts that are more bestial than human.†

Thus except among the Gallican rigorists it became the accepted theory of the theologians that to constitute actual (or, as it is called, formal) sin there must be actual advertence that the act is sinful and that it is a violation of a precept of

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* Provinciales, Lettre IV.

† Ant. Arnauld, Morale des Jésuites, p. 375.—De Backer, Bibliothèque des Écrivains de la Compagnie de Jésus, VII. 321.

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God. Sin thus became divided into what was designated as theological and as philosophical, based on a remark of Aquinas that the theologians regard sin principally in respect to its being an offence to God, while moral philosophers consider it in relation to its antagonism to right reason.* The *Peccatum Philosophicum* thus was recognized to be a sin against reason, but as the sinner does not advert to the transgression of the laws of God it is not an offence to God, and therefore not theologically a sin. Caramuel, however, argued that though it is not an offence to God as a legislator, it is an offence to him as a creator, and that therefore he can punish it if he sees fit.†

The Holy See had repeatedly condemned the refined speculative rigorism of Michael Bay, but it seemed to find nothing objectionable in the practical laxity of the deductions from the doctrine of inadvertence which were everywhere current in the schools and in the confessional. In 1665 and 1666 Alexander VII. and in 1679 Innocent XI. condemned long series of propositions, mostly derived from the writings of the casuists, but they were silent as to the use made of the necessity of actual advertence. The doctrine seemed to have won its way to general toleration, if not acceptance, outside of the narrow circle of Jansenism, and it is therefore not easy to understand the clamor which arose when in 1686 a hardy Jesuit happened to clothe it in a form but little more explicit than that everywhere current. Father Dereux, president of the Jesuit college at Dijon, in preparing theses for disputation, included one which was defended by Étienne Bougot setting forth that *Peccatum Philosophicum*, or moral sin, is a human act incompatible with rational nature and right reason. *Peccatum Theologicum*, or mortal sin, is free transgression of divine law. The *Philosophicum*, however grave, in a man who is ignorant of God, or who in the act does not think of God, is a grave sin, but is not an offence to God, nor a mortal sin sundering friendship with God, nor worthy of eternal punishment.‡

* S. Th. Aquin. Summæ II. 1. Q. lxxi. Art. 6 ad 5.

† Caramuelis Theologia Fundamentalis, Fund. XII.

‡ "Peccatum Philosophicum seu morale est actus humanus disconveniens naturæ rationali et rectæ rationi. Theologicum vero et mortale est transgressio

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Although this was merely putting into concrete shape the teachings which had passed almost unchallenged since the beginning of the century, yet when thus nakedly expressed it afforded a fair mark for Jansenist attack. The Jesuit Le Tellier tells us that Antoine Arnauld, wearied with the perpetual condemnation by Rome of almost all the books issued by his sect, sought to create a diversion by raising an outcry against a new heresy which he professed to have discovered in the thesis and issued a violent attack against it. Yet at the moment the Jesuits evidently did not feel that they could afford to treat the affair so lightly, for they made haste to disclaim responsibility. François Musnier, the professor under whose auspices the thesis had been defended, protested that the matter had only been treated hypothetically, in which sense it was publicly accepted in the schools and held by theologians and not condemned by the Church, but that, so far from holding it to be a practical doctrine, he had elsewhere declared in formal terms that the ignorance and inadvertence which would render sin purely philosophical were morally impossible. Yet not long afterwards, in December, 1688, in the Jesuit college at Louvain, there was a thesis defended asserting that a man could be inculpably ignorant of God.*

The promptitude of the Jesuit disclaimer of the Dijon thesis is probably attributable to the fact that in 1687, under pressure from Innocent XI., one of the few Jesuit anti-probabilists, Thyrsus Gonzalez, was elected to the generalate of the Society, and that he, in conjunction with the pope, at once undertook to effect a change in the lax doctrines promulgated by his brethren. Innocent died in 1689, but his successor, Alexander VIII., followed a similar policy; the times were not propitious for speculations of this nature, and it seems to have been felt that the Dijon thesis offered a favorable oppor-

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libera Divinæ legis. Philosophicum quantumvis grave, in illum qui Deum ignorat vel de Deo in actu non cogitet est grave peccatum sed non est offensa Dei neque peccatum mortale dissolvens amicitiam Dei, neque æterna pœna dignum."—D'Argentré Collect. Judic. de novis Error. III. II. 355.

* D'Argentré, loc. cit.—Le Tellier, Recueil historique des Bulles, etc., concernant les erreurs de ces deux derniers siècles, pp. 455–9 (Mons, 1697).

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tunity to make an example. Accordingly in 1690 it was condemned by Alexander, not as heretical, but as scandalous, rash, offensive to pious ears, and erroneous, which was quite sufficient.* The *Peccatum Philosophicum* as such had but a short career. The Jesuits disavowed it, and in 1691 there appeared a work entitled *L'Erreur du Péché Philosophique combattue par les Jésuites*, which defied any one to produce a single Jesuit who had not distinguished between culpable and inculpable ignorance, or who had not taught that the former does not excuse for evil which has thus been ignored through criminal negligence,†—which was a mere evasion of the question.

For all this, the Jesuits did not allow the condemnation of the thesis of Dijon to modify their practical teachings in the slightest degree. It is true that they avoided allusion to the question whether or not the sinner in the act of sinning thought of God, but this was merely a form of expression, for they continued to inculcate the doctrine that full advertence of the sinful nature of the act is requisite for the commission of sin. Arsdekin, in the latest revision of his standard work on theology, in which a reference to the decree of Alexander shows it to be subsequent to that utterance, asserts that when a man inculpably does not think of the wickedness of his act, he does not commit sin, although he may act with full deliberation and the action may cover a period of long duration. No matter how grave the sin, full advertence is required for imputation; imperfect advertence excuses it. If the malice of the act is twofold and only one aspect of it is considered, that sin alone is committed; if a thief steals the sacred vessels and thinks only of the theft, he does not commit sacrilege.‡ The Holy See itself does not seem to have attached much impor-

* Alexand. PP. VIII. Decr. *Sanctissimus*, 24 Aug. 1690.

† Père Daniel, Entretiens d'Eudoxe et de Calliste.—In this labored reply to Pascal, published in 1694, Father Daniel admits that Pascal's quotation from Bauny's *Somme des Péchez* is accurate, but he endeavors to evade the responsibility by showing that elsewhere Bauny taught that culpable ignorance is no excuse for sin and that the will in sinning may be either actual or virtual.

‡ Arsdekin Theol. Tripart. P. III. Tract. I, cap. I, Princip. 15.

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tance to its condemnation of the *Peccatum Philosophicum*, for when, in 1696, there appeared in Rome a posthumous work by Cardinal Sfondrato, the *Nodus Prædestinationis dissolutus*, in which it was argued that savages knowing nothing of God do not sin mortally, for, as sin is essentially an offence to God, where there is no knowledge of God there can be neither offence nor sin nor eternal punishment, five French bishops, with Cardinal Noailles and Bossuet at their head, addressed to Innocent XII. a memorial asking its condemnation. Innocent responded civilly with a promise to have the matter examined by theologians, but nothing was done; the book was never put on the Index, and inferentially the assertion of the *Peccatum Philosophicum* by Sfondrato may be regarded as approved.*

If the papacy was thus disposed to gloss over the merely speculative question as to inculpable ignorance of God, the Gallican rigorists were not content to lose the results of their victory as regards the more practical aspect of the question. Among the errors which Colbert, Archbishop of Rouen, in 1697 compelled the Jesuit Father Bouffier to revoke, after breaking down his obstinacy by imprisonment, was not only that condemned by Alexander VIII., but also the doctrine of the *Peccatum Philosophicum* as taught by the Jesuits to the effect that actual advertence is requisite for the imputation of sin, and he was forced to admit that hardened sinners committing homicide, adultery, and other crimes without adverting to the offence against God or to the infraction of the natural law are nevertheless guilty and are not excusable from mortal sin.† How these doctrines worked in practice is indicated in a manual by the Carmelite Cristóbal de San Josef, printed in Rome in 1711, in which a penitent confesses to various sins of omission and commission; when asked by his confessor whether in the acts he had fully adverted to their malice he replies in the negative, and receives the comforting assurance that he has committed no sin.‡ The result

* D'Argentré, III. II. 394–400.

† Ibid., loc. cit. pp. 400–1.

‡ Concini, Storia del Probabilismo, Dissert. I. cap. 5, n. 38.

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of this teaching is conveyed to us in a memorial by the Jesuit Camargo to Clement XI. in 1706, complaining that these doctrines were universal in Spain, so that every one believed that there was no sin in what he thought to be right or did not think to be wrong, or in what he regarded as doubtful, which was essentially the same as the condemned *Peccatum Philosophicum;* in practice there was scarce anything considered to be prohibited, and people were not accustomed to trouble themselves to ascertain the righteousness of what they desired to do.*

It is true that the Jesuit Viva, in his commentary on the proposition condemned by Alexander VIII., argues that it is morally impossible that such ignorance of God and of the natural law can exist as to render the *Peccatum Philosophicum* possible; it is therefore the same as the *Peccatum Theologicum,* and a belief in its existence is moreover scandalous, for it leads to the deduction that sins committed in the heat of passion need not be repented or confessed.† Yet Viva, when teaching his students, held to the doctrine that full advertence is requisite to mortal sin, and he agrees with Juan Sanchez and Tamburini that children and common people are rarely guilty of mortal sin, because they do not advert to the obligation of considering the gravity of their acts and have only a confused apprehension of the malice involved.‡ It is therefore not surprising to find among all the theologians of the laxer or probabilistic school the definition that full deliberation and advertence of the malice of the act are requisite to constitute a mortal sin, and that when passion or concupiscence is sufficiently strong to divert the intellect from considering the nature of the act the requisite degree of free will is lacking to render it mortal.§ Even the more rigorous theologians

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* Döllinger u. Reusch, Moralstreitigkeiten in der römisch-katholischen Kirche, I. 265–7.

† Viva Comment. in Prop. alteram Alexandri VIII. nn. 1, 12.

‡ Viva Cursus Theol. Moral. Tom. I. P. II. Q. 1, Art. 2, nn. 5, 6.

§ La Croix Theol. Moral. Lib. I. n. 549.—Herzig Man. Confessar. P. I. nn. 65, 67–8.—Reiffenstuel Theol. Moral. Tract. III. Dist. ii. nn. 5–8, 15.—Roncaglia Theol. Moral. Univ. Tract. I. Q. ii. cap. 3, Q. 3; Tract. II. Q. i. cap. 1, Q. 2.

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accepted the doctrine, though in somewhat varying degrees. Antoine and Wigandt will admit no excuse from inadvertence which could or ought to have been avoided.* Habert only says that advertence should be sufficient to constitute mortal sin.† Piselli is more liberal; he requires full advertence, and admits that wrath and lust may so divert the reason that it does not recognize the malice of the act.‡

Of course there are elaborate distinctions of the various grades of inadvertence and advertence—nice definitions which enabled the theologians to play fast and loose with their own rules. *Inadvertentia affectata*, or intentional inadvertence, affords no excuse for sin, while invincible or involuntary inadvertence, also called *inadvertentia naturalis*, suffices as an excuse. Advertence is usually divided into full or actual, virtual, and interpretative; that which exists at the time when the act is decided upon is full or actual; that which is lacking at the moment, but had previously existed and is considered as continuing, is virtual; that which the actor has not and did not have, but which he could and ought to have had, is interpretative. Yet how little purpose these distinctions may serve is illustrated by Peter Dens. After enunciating the rule that interpretative advertence suffices to constitute mortal sin, he puts the case of a man who knows that it is a fast-day and intends to fast, but in the distraction of his affairs eats meat. Now here there is not only interpretative but virtual advertence, yet Dens calls it natural inadvertence and asserts that there is no sin imputable to the offender.§

St. Alphonso Liguori, who is the great modern authority on which the current moral theology of the Church is based, is scarcely more coherent in his exposition of the subject. He tells us that the general opinion of theologians is that actual advertence is requisite to the commission of mortal sin, but

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* Antoine Theol. Moral. Tract. *De Peccatis*, cap. IV. Q. vii.—Wigandt Tribunalis Confessar. Tract. IV. n. 50.

† Habert Comp. Theol. *De Vitiis et Peccatis* cap. IV. Q. ii.

‡ Piselli Theol. Moral. Summæ P. I. Tract. ii. cap. 5, § 3; Tract. xix. cap. 1, 2.

§ Petri Dens Theol. Moral. T. I. n. 45.

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he thinks this too lax, for inadvertence may be voluntary through negligence or passion, and he who acts through passion is to be held responsible for the results of his acts. Yet in another passage he assumes that error or ignorance is invincible and therefore inculpable when at the moment of action there occurs to the mind no doubt or recollection as to the sinful character of the act. This is in substance the *Peccatum Philosophicum*, and he manifests an uneasy recognition of the fact when he endeavors to reconcile his views with the decree of Alexander VIII., for he asks what there is in common between the *Peccatum Philosophicum* and an act in which there is no advertence, even confused, of its malice, —a question which he puts but wisely forbears to answer. Elsewhere, again, he adopts and defends the general opinion of the theologians that express advertence is requisite to sin, and he explains that the condemnation by Alexander VIII. only means to deny the assertion that the *Peccatum Philosophicum* may be not *Theologicum*. Yet with all this he assumes that in habitual sin the sinner has a confused cognition which suffices to render it imputable to him.* Evidently the labors of the theologians have served only to render the obscurity of the subject more impenetrable.

The supreme authority of Liguori was not recognized until more than half a century after his death, and there continued to be opposition to the laxity of his opinions. Cardinal Gerdil, for instance, asserts that indirect volition is sufficient for the imputation of sin, and this occurs when the result of an act can and ought to be foreseen; a man voluntarily intoxicating himself is accountable for any sins committed during intoxication.† Alasia argues that virtual advertence suffices for the imputation of sin, since otherwise the wicked would be entitled to immunity, for their very recklessness would shield them from responsibility, and he assumes that the decree of Alexander VIII. condemns the doctrine that actual advertence

* S. Alph. de Ligorio Theol. Moral. Lib. v. nn. 4, 11.—Istruzione Pratica, cap. I. n. 4; cap. III. nn. 24, 25, 32; cap. VIII. n. 8.—Dichiarazione del Sistema che tiene l'Autore, n. 11.

† Gerdil, Saggio sul Discernimento delle Opinioni, § 4.

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is required.* In the gallant though futile struggle for reform led by the Jansenist Bishop Ricci of Pistoia in 1786 under the guidance of Leopold of Tuscany, it was inevitable that the question of inadvertence should be treated from a rigorist stand-point. Ignorance, inadvertence, and probability are classed together as affording no excuse for sin; the imperfections of our intellect are the result of sin and cannot be adduced as extenuating it, for man is obligated to use every means to discover truth, which is the sole standard of human acts.† In this the Church saw nothing to object to, and it escaped condemnation in the bull *Auctorem fidei*, issued by Pius VI. in 1794, which so fully and laboriously enumerated all the Riccian errors.

Stapf, a very moderate probabilist, yet admits that wrath and lust may prevent the use of reason, and that where there is no consent there is no sin; he who unintentionally permits himself to be carried away by them incurs diminished imputation of sin, while he who excites them that he may the more ardently pursue his object greatly increases his guilt.‡ Since his time, however, modern moral theology has become completely dominated by the Ligorian school; yet we have seen how confused and contradictory were the utterances of St. Alphonso on the subject, and consequently we need not be surprised to find his disciples not wholly in accord with each other. Gousset and Guarceno do not speak positively, but incline to the view that virtual advertence suffices for the imputation of sin.§ Gury and Bonal require full or actual advertence.‖ Martinet tells us that the doctors dispute as to the grade of advertence requisite to sin, some of them requiring actual, others virtual, and others again interpretative, but that they are by no means in unison as to their definitions

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* Alasia Theol. Moral. *De Peccatis* Diss. I. cap. vii. Art. 1.

† Synod. Pistoriens. Sess. III. § 13.

‡ Stapf Epit. Theol. Moral. § 56, n. 1 (Oeniponti, 1832).

§ Gousset, Théol. Morale I. 221–3.—Varceno Comp. Theol. Moral. Tract. VI. cap. ii. Art. 2.

‖ Gury Comp. Theol. Moral. I. 150.—Bonal Institt. Theol. Tract. *de Peccatis* cap. i. nn. 12, 13.

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of these grades. For himself, he follows Liguori in holding that virtual suffices when the lack of actual is the result of negligence, of passion deliberately followed, of habit or of absence of consideration, and the grade of these defects regulates the grade of the sin. Yet subsequently he manifests the confusion attending all these speculations by insisting that full advertence of the malice of the act or of its doubtful character is requisite for the imputation of mortal sin.* Liguori's latest expositor, Marc, explains that if a man commits evil to which he does not advert, even confusedly, the sin is not formal, but only material, and thus is not imputable to him; for formal sin at least virtual advertence is requisite, and the opinion is untenable of those who hold that interpretative suffices; but then Marc's definition of these grades is different from what has been stated above, for his virtual advertence is scarce distinguishable from actual—that which exists when the cause of the wrongful act occurs. Practically, therefore, the current doctrine of the present day is that actual advertence is required for the imputation of sin, with the saving clause that although passion may be so strong as to prevent the intellect from recognizing the turpitude of the act and the offence to God, such cases are rare.† From all this the deduction is natural that sins committed during intoxication are not formal sins, and therefore not imputable, unless there has been a predetermination to commit them.‡

Perhaps, after all, the only truth to be gathered from this prolonged debate is the incompetence of the human intellect to define the relations which may exist between the sinner and his God.

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* Martinet Theol. Moral. Lib. I. Art. xv. §§ 2, 5.

† Marc Institt. Moral. Alphonsianæ nn. 291, 317–18.

‡ Kenrick Theol. Moral. VII. 81.—Gury Casus Conscient. I. 1, 2.

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NATIONAL CHARACTER AND CLASSICISM IN ITALIAN ETHICS.

In the first part of this article * we tried, through a review of the history of philosophy, to bring out into clearness those doctrines which, having their origin in Italy, seemed to us to correspond to a scientific consciousness of the most marked characteristics of the Italian mind on the side of its intellectual development. We pointed out the splendid initiatives furnished by our philosophers in the Middle Ages, and especially at the time of the Renaissance, the influence exerted by them on the development of philosophy in other nations, and, finally, the want of originality on the part of the speculative thinkers of Italy in modern times. While recognizing that no tendency of thought has ever been altogether lacking in Italy, but, on the contrary, that all are to be found, now scattered among the different thinkers of the country, now admirably condensed in those of them that best represent the genius of the people, we called special attention to the fascination exerted on our minds by the sensible beauty of the world, and to the strong general inclination to enjoy and represent it; and we saw that this resulted in a tendency to prefer the external, active life to the internal meditative one, and to follow the practical instinct in its various manifestations, artistic and poetic, scientific and civil,—a fact which accounts for the relative deficiency of the effort necessary for the profound study of the thinking subject, its functions and laws, and hence, in the main, for the want of broad, original views in philosophy. Thus, as we saw, it has come to pass that the Italian mind, firmly bound to the objective world, seems to have approached metaphysical speculation only to bridle it with a sense of measure which recalls in part the artistic tendency, and in part the constant adherence of the Italians to

* "National Character and Classicism in Italian Philosophy." October number, 1894, vol. v. p. 63.

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classical traditions, with this difference, however, that our nature, standing related, as it does, in origin, to both the Greek and Roman races, has not inherited, in equal degree, either the faculty for ideal syntheses which belonged to the former, or the power of political organization which characterized the latter.

It is impossible that these traits of the Italian intellect should be extraneous to the doctrines or views in which, to a certain degree, its ethical consciousness is mirrored. At the same time, we shall find that they do not all reappear, with equal force, in that part of this article in which we purpose to point out rapidly those of them which in our moral and political writers correspond to dominant concepts respecting the principles of practical life.

I.

In his discourse on the Moral Sense of the Italians, Mamiani remarks that in the Latin, and especially in the Italian races, the subjective life, if lacking a certain depth and continuity, finds, nevertheless, a compensation for this in an æsthetic idealism, under whose forms the feeling of the Good awakes and unfolds, and that this identification of the Beautiful with the Good, which to the Greeks seemed so intimate and natural that they called them both by the same name, manifests itself to the multitude in Italy by a direct intuition; and, after calling attention to the fact that, being more fond of celebrations and festivals than other peoples, we generally prefer those forms of civil and religious life which, like our sky, are full of gladness and splendor, he calls to mind the height to which our ancestors, following in the steps of Plato, carried the conception of love, in the deification of the gentler sex, and goes on to reprove the Italians for their tendency to selfishness, envy, and discord, telling them that the only way to lift them out of that quagmire is to hold up before them an object lofty, generous, memorable,—in a word, something ideal and poetical.

We believe that the history of moral ideas in Italy affords a confirmation of this judgment, though not without certain

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reservations. This history reveals to us a kind of moral reflection, which, without being at variance with the tendencies of life formulated in the doctrines of Hedonism, Egoism, and Social Utility, is most usually guided by the ideas of perfection, of beauty, of divine happiness or blessedness,—in a word, by an ethical idealism in which the æsthetic principle is superimposed upon the absolute good and upon duty.

This tendency, which, within certain limits, subordinates morals to æsthetics and to eudæmonism, and conforms to the instincts of our race, does not, for all that, owe its origin to Italy, but has passed from Greek philosophy into our thought through the medium of classical tradition. It is needless to call to mind that the influence of this classical tradition in our philosophy begins with its history; it appears at the very beginning of the Middle Ages in Boëtius and Cassiodorus, and passes from their writings into those of leading philosophical thinkers, all the way down to Dante and Petrarch, reviving in fresh form in the teachings of the Renaissance, and continuing without interruption down to our own day. Now, if in all this period there is any moral doctrine which has received special development in Italy, and which, from its character and psychological relations, may be called at once classical and Italian, it is that which makes the Beautiful the means of ascent to the Good. But, first of all, let us deal with what may be called a prejudicial question. Let us ask how Platonism, which, as we saw in our previous article, exerted so long and powerful an influence on Italian metaphysical systems, yielded its sceptre to Aristotelianism in the Ethics generally taught in our universities, and expounded by the greater part of our older moralists and political writers. Let us see in what manner, and to what degree, the æsthetic form of the Good, and the love of the Divine Ideal, reappear in the Ethics of Aristotle, and how far they have succeeded in sharing with Platonism its influence on Italian moralists, and contributing, through them, to bring out one and the same element of the ethical consciousness of the people.

The struggle begun by Petrarch against the Aristotelianism of the Schools, and vigorously continued by the philosophers

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of the Renaissance down to Telesius and Bruno, put an end to the exclusive rule of Aristotelian metaphysics and physics, but did not discredit Aristotelian Ethics in Italy. This ethical system continued to hold sway in the schools and in books, along with the most ideal part of Platonic morals, even after the revolution which, in Galilei, Descartes, and Locke, turned philosophy in the direction of the sciences. But the opposition seems to us explicable in several ways. Neither Plato nor his principal followers ever offered a systematic exposition of morality. In the dialogues of the Master it appears in fragments, whereas Aristotle's treatise presents us with a body of doctrine methodically arranged and well adapted for instruction. In a science bearing so deeply on life, this circumstance is one of great moment. Nor is it apart from our purpose to reflect that the Ethics of Aristotle was considered by St. Thomas to be reconcilable with the Christian faith, and accepted by the Church. It is, further, noteworthy that the educational centre in which it longest maintained its hold was the University of Padua, subject to the Venetian government, the most conservative in Italy; although, on the other hand, we may observe that, in a region as exposed to change in its political regulations as was Tuscany in the Middle Ages, the Ethics of Aristotle was no less cultivated than at Padua and Bologna, and that, too, not only by men occupied with education, but also by writers participating in affairs of state. What, then, can be the reason of this spontaneous and prolonged agreement? Without excluding other influences, we believe that the principal causes must be sought in the agreement existing between the Ethics of Aristotle and that of Plato, in regard to the Divine Ideal which is their supreme principle, in the persistent effort on the part of the Italians to hold together and harmonize the two higher forms of philosophic classicism, and, finally, in their tendency to see the Good in the Beautiful, rather than to recognize it in itself and apart from Beauty.

This view readily finds confirmation as soon as we recall to mind the nature of the chief parts of the Ethics of Aristotle and their relations to the aptitudes of the Italian mind, or to the

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circumstances of our civil and religious life. The idea of the contemplative life, and the corresponding felicity, which Aristotle sets up as the ultimate end of man, coincides with the bliss promised by the Church in reward for virtue, and with the rules of the monastic orders most devoted to contemplative mysticism. On the other hand, the picture which Aristotle draws of the human faculties in his ideal type of ethical life, arranging hierarchically their operations and ends, is as harmonious as a work of art, as complete as reality, as conciliative as the demands of practical life require. It is easy, therefore, to understand how historians and statisticians, like Segni, Varchi, and Paruta, found in the Ethics the perfect expression of the principles that ought to regulate social and political life. Aristotle's very definition of virtue as the mean between two extremes, could hardly keep falling in, better than any other, with their notions of prudence. We must not stop to enumerate all the writers who, from Brunetto Latini and Dante down to Jacopo Stellini, have for ages commented, developed, and applied the Ethics of Aristotle in Italy: the list would be too long. What deserves notice is the characteristic of ideality and beauty which marks its supreme principle and which it has in common with that of the Ethics of Plato. The methods of the two supreme philosophers are different, but their end is substantially the same,—the Divine Ideal. Plato's moral dialectic rises, indeed, to the absolute Good on the two wings of intelligence and love, while that of Aristotle rises to the same height through the action of the intellect and will. Both, nevertheless, are idealistic; both unite in principle with religion; both attain to an order of ends, which in Aristotle is determined as a number of types of practical and intellectual virtue, in Plato as a scale of objects of contemplation, a series of grades of beauty. "The Nichomachean Ethics" and Diotima's discourse in Plato's "Symposium" furnish proof of this.

Given, then, these points of resemblance between the two systems of ethics and their relation to the character of the Italian mind, we are able to understand their influence on the philosophic literature of the peninsula. This has differed

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with the temper of the different minds that have cultivated them. According as these have tended more or less to the practical or the artistic, the mystical or the positive, they have cultivated the one or the other and presented us in their writings with results which must be taken as a manifestation of the national moral consciousness. But if we are to balance against each other the different weights to be attributed to these two influences, we must by no means make them out equal, or even regard them from the same stand-point. The fact is, if the Ethics of Aristotle has ruled for six centuries in our schools in connection with theology, under the high dominion of the Church of the traditional authority of the Greek philosopher, this long influence has been due, in great measure, to political and ecclesiastical power, and thus on account of these official relations does not reveal to us the spontaneity of the Italian moral consciousness, as does Plato's doctrine of love, which in no other country has had a development equal to that which appears in our moralists.

Love and the ideal have so conspicuous a place in our literature that they cannot fail to strike any one who is even but moderately acquainted with its history. Indeed, we have but to utter the names of Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio, to find in this triad the roots of the twofold ramification of a literature essentially devoted to subjects of love and divided between the idealistic and realistic tendencies.

Let us pass over the host of novelists who do not belong to philosophy, and let us name merely the Christian hedonism of Valla, in order to recall the fact that, at the beginning of the philosophical Renaissance, the sensuous form of love assumed a place in scientific morals,* and let us glance, in passing, at the names of Muratori, Genovesi, Gioja, and Romagnosi, who, making happiness the chief end of man, laid down pleasure and utility as the basis of an eudæmonistic morality, —the first two subordinating it to theology, the second two treating it independently. But, while we assert that no one

* See Lorenzo Valla, "De Voluptate."

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of the principal forms of ethics is foreign to Italian speculation, and no one of the integrating elements of ethical life has been absent from the consciousness of our nation, let us remember that this fact does not help to bring out the points in which our ethics differs from that of other nations. What constitutes this distinction is the idealistic tendency above referred to, and especially the form which Neoplatonism has, directly or indirectly, impressed on the works of the poets, the moralists, the writers on æsthetics, and the metaphysicians, and on their relations to Italian life. Our best lyric poets exalt love in deifying woman, penetrate, with singular subtlety, into the most secret windings of the passion of love, and, not satisfied with expressing in exquisite verses the psychology of it, like Cino and Guicinelli, they elaborate the physiology of it, as Cavalcanti did; not to speak of Dante, who, with superior mind, makes it the basis of his philosophy. He places it at the apex of the universe, unifying it with God the "primal love," which "moves the sun and the other stars," like the desire and will of man (*desire* and *velle*); he infuses it, under the form of natural appetite, into the elements; he makes it the spring of virtue, as he makes its opposite the spring of vice. In a word, for Dante, love is at once a moral and æsthetic faculty and a theological and cosmological principle; but this universality was already vaguely expressed in the prophecies of Joachim of Flora, that herald to the nations of a renovation of the world under the reign of the Holy Spirit, and had manifested itself, in a wonderful way, in the consciousness and the actions of St. Francis of Assisi. A psychological study of this extraordinary man would perhaps serve to exhibit him as, more than any one else, the type of those profound relations which in the Italian mind exist between the feeling for the Good and the feeling for the Beautiful. For this divine founder of a religious order, destined to restore the Church and Christian society to the life of the gospel, has no other power whereby to succeed in his attempt than an active, boundless faith in love; a force at once human and divine, capable of the greatest sacrifices, susceptible of the most various forms, and exemplified in Christ. United

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to its true object, the amorous soul, according to the rule of St. Francis, detaching itself from material goods and from desires, gains, through external poverty, internal riches, and recovers the expansive virtue which divinely drives it to seek the food of men, to live and to work for them. He makes perfect joy consist in perfect self-abnegation: in his fancy poverty becomes a poetic myth, is idolized as a lady whom he serves as a mystic knight, and to whom, as widowed for so many ages by the death of Christ, he wishes to bring back the whole of Christendom, the life of the Church. The extent of his affection is so great that only an exaggeration of the mystic tendency can account for his strange idea of fraternizing with other creatures to such an extent as to seek to free the wild beasts from their fierce instincts and convert them to harmony and universal peace. We must not forget, in this connection, to mention an important document, the "Song of the Sun." This famous hymn, written by St. Francis in praise of the creatures of God, contains the expression of the universality of love, along with an ingenious conception of cosmic finality, in which all the creatures are represented as instruments of divine love, and of its creative and providential power.

The two tendencies—the optimistic and the æsthetic—perhaps appear nowhere else so spontaneous and so well fused as in the writers who, in prose or in verse, wrote treatises on moral and religious philosophy for Italians: the pessimistic note reflected from the depths of Christianity is scattered through those writings on the wretchedness of the world and on contempt for it, which appeared in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, not excluding even that of Petrarch ("De Contemptu Mundi"). Nevertheless, set on foot by the Franciscan movement, the doctrine of love left numerous marks on the writers of these centuries. That morals have an æsthetic source is shown in Bambagioli and Fra Giordano da Rivalta, not to speak of others. In both, love is the source of the virtues; but in the second, who is more learned than the first, it is combined with philosophic thought, and, under the influence of St. Bonaventura, St.

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Augustine, and the Pseudo-Dionysius, becomes identical with the principle of creation.

II.

If we could stop long enough to determine the bonds that, in the history of Italian philosophy, unite the moral doctrine of love with metaphysics, we should find opening up before us a wide field for consideration in the study of the rise and progress of the Platonic Academy of Florence. The writings of Christopher Landini, Marsilius Ficinus, John Pico della Mirandola, Benivieni, Lorenzo de' Medici and Diacceto would furnish us with ample proofs of the influence of these doctrines on philosophic culture, on art and on religion; but since we have several times already alluded to this, in the first part of this article, in speaking of the aptitudes of the Italian mind, we shall hasten to return from the theoretical aspect of the question to the practical side, and to look, in the applications of the doctrine of love made by Italian moralists, for a confirmation of the important part it played in the life of our nation. We shall not follow it through the two poems of Francis of Barberino, who in his "Documenti d'Amore," and his "Reggimento e Costumi di Donne," presents us with a practical ideal of female virtue, sometimes going into particulars in view of age and conditions, sometimes bringing out what is common and essential. Though the one is more speculative and the other more practical, both substantially reduced the virtues to love, making the vices so many manifestations of its opposite, and, in conformity with the ethics of the time, they find in God the spring and the supreme object of love. Let us hasten to add a few remarks on the time of the Renaissance, in which the doctrine of love and beauty could not otherwise than fall in with the change of culture completely dominated by Classicism, and with the marvellous development of the arts and sciences. The truth is, we find it represented in the courts, which vied with each other in power and luxury. It reflects the enlarged sense of propriety and elegance in the manners and customs of the time, and generally the æsthetic development of forms in public and private life.

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At the end of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth, the doctrine of love is the chosen theme of the prose writers who are most famous for the elegance of their classical imitation. Above all others, Bembo, Castiglioni, and Casa make use of it to delineate ideal types of beauty and of love, in which the thoughts of the "Phædrus" and "Symposium" of Plato, works already commented on by Ficinus and his school, reappear, now enhanced by new fragrance, now diluted by subtle and otiose distinctions. Written for the elegant society of the courts, the "Courtier" of Castiglioni and the "Asolani" of Bembo are real treatises on practical morality for the use of knights and ladies—treatises in which the substance of the Good is wonderfully clothed in the forms of the Beautiful, when it is not conspired against and betrayed. We have no intention of attributing to this revived Platonism so much influence as to make it accountable for the corrupt manners of that age; but we may certainly see in it an element which contributed to its moral weariness, as well as a tendency to exaggerate the æsthetic form at the expense of the Good. This excessive classicism could not fail to bear fruit, and the dread with which it inspired Savonarola and his followers were not unfounded. The æsthetic moralists were not all so well balanced or so wise as Casa and his "Galateo," that school of good habits and fine manners; they did not all limit themselves to following the classical authors in their search for the perfect proportions and harmony of moral and physical types, as did Alberti,* Da Vinci, Raphael, and Michelangelo; but, separating the Beautiful from the Good, not a few of them contributed to the destruction of the balance between the æsthetic faculty and the moral sense, and to the decay and loss of liberty. All these philosophers of the Renaissance failed to evolve any serious moral psychology, and perhaps it could not be otherwise, until thought, freed from the shackles of platonic and Aristotelian commentaries, had turned back upon itself, and had

* See his "Governo della Famiglia," and his treatises on Painting and Sculpture.

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derived from direct observation of the human mind that which it lacked, especially the true conception of the moral law and its absolute value. In spite of some hints pointed out by Spaventa in the works of Giordano Bruno, it is impossible to credit the philosopher of Nola with a clear conception of the volitional function, or its relations to obligation in the moral consciousness.*

In a half page of his "Eroici Furori" † we find a distinct expression of the power of the will; but the power of love is the subject of the dialogue as a whole, and gives an impress of passion to his character and his life. Of the two forces that create heroism, it is not the cool, calculating, and tenacious will that leads him to martyrdom, but impetuous, boundless affection. The infinite ideal of the True inflames and transports him in an irresistible way. That "Infinitude of Love," about which, in the same century, Tullia of Aragon and Benedetto Varchi dispute in a dialogue bearing that title,‡ is really felt by him, and allows him no rest save in death. In the works of Campanella, likewise, we meet the same fluctuations between will and love. Sometimes the two words are distinguished, while the things are confounded, as well when he treats of the "primalities" (*velle*, *nosse*, *posse*) which are unified in the divine Essence, and form the substantial basis of created things, as when he applies them to determine the idea of the City of the Sun,—an invention condemned both by experience and by reason, as are all the Utopias which from Plato's day to ours have set more value upon a fantastic type of beauty than upon the law of the will and its authority in the whole practical order.

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* Before the Renaissance, St. Thomas and the Thomists admitted, indeed, a natural law; but, by subordinating it to the divine, revealed law, they rendered its authority relative, and dependent on the external source of theologic dogmatism.

† See "Eroici Furori," vol. ii. p. 305 (edit. Wagner); B. Spaventa, "Saggi di Critica Filosofica," p. 187 (Naples, 1867).

‡ See "Della Infintà d'Amore," Dialogo di Tullia d'Aragona. Milan, Duelli, 1864.

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III.

In the last century and the early part of this, the ethics of the Italians, like that of other nations, underwent the influence of French and English sensism; but in general, it was informed by the principles of idealism, in which we may distinguish, at least, three forms of moral philosophy,—(1) the theological, which sets out with revelation and the notion of the divine will, (2) that which has for its basis an ideal of divine perfection, and (3) that which rests on the idea of duty. Widely as the first was diffused in the national education, it belongs to the religious spirit of the Italian people, as governed by the Church, rather than to the spontaneity of its moral consciousness. It is true that the third, though admirably described and applied by our historians, did not arise in modern philosophy through our efforts, but through those of the nation which, being more inclined than those of the South to the subjective life, succeeded, through the Reformation, in emancipating its own religious consciousness, and in bringing it back, through direct study of the Gospels, to its norm and principle. With the genius of Kant the idea of duty reappeared in all its splendor. But this happy return would have been impossible without those psychological and critical studies which developed all the way from Descartes and Locke down to the philosopher of Kŏnigsberg. Then, and only then, when it was shown that the moral Imperative does not rest upon an authority external to the reason, and is not directly bound up with either instinct or affection, but with the rational faculty of willing, was it possible for Galluppi and Rosmini to subordinate the idea of happiness to that of the Absolute Good, and to distinguish the science of the one from that of the other, or for Joseph Mazzini to remind the Italian people, with the authority and consciousness of truth, that it had not only rights but duties, and that both are bound up, in the universal order, with divine justice. Then also the ideal of life, which through the imagination, determining it either rightly or illusively, according to its relations with the intellect, as the object of love, found its true office, which is to

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complete morality, not to lay its foundation. Kant has demonstrated, with great clearness, that no end, however elevated or sublime, can be placed above the internal legislation, which, through universal and inviolable maxims, prescribes the ends and means of our conduct, imposes itself upon the will, and regulates love. Everything must have its place. Deprive the moral law of its rational independence, and subordinate it to a revelation, and you strip it of its universal authority, and place the criterion of morality outside the human conscience, separate entirely the law from the divine ideal, and the will from love, uproot from the human spirit the thought which elevates it above vulgar interests, and quench the flame of the great virtues and noble heroisms. Religion and æsthetics are not the lords of morality, but they are associated with it and complete it. Without them human morality differs but little from Egoism.

IV.

But it is time to look, in the civil history of the Italian people, for some confirmation of the reflections drawn from the history of philosophy with respect to the manifestation of its ethical tendencies. What thoughts, then, does the history of the Italian people suggest with regard to the relations between its moral life and the ideas of country and nation? what judgment has been delivered on its political and religious character? We make no claim to treat adequately this vast subject in the brief space that remains to us. We shall limit ourselves to a few observations merely.

In the first place, let us observe the great difference which exists between the historical process which has resulted in the creation of other European nationalities, and the altogether special circumstances which for so long have retarded that of Italy. Here, after the fall of the Western Empire, the conquest struck no lasting roots as it did in Gaul. This was due either to the relative weakness of the races that successively undertook it, or to the effects of a southern climate upon northern races, or, finally, to the special conditions of the conquered, who were superior to their conquerors in civilization,

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and different from them in historical traditions and in religion. Too well known are the obstacles which the ambition of the popes placed in the way of the various attempts at Italian unity which were made by conquerors, princes, and nations in the course of the centuries; and no less known is the affection which the people of the peninsula preserved for the institutions, and especially for the principles, of Rome. The memory of the empire never altogether faded from their minds, and the prestige of an immense dominion, supported by the sense of the advantages which had accrued from it, naturally exerted such an influence upon them as made them ready to accept its return, even if this was brought about by foreigners, and at the same time inspired the latter with cupidity and ambition. It cannot be said that, in times gone by, the Italians were deficient in love of country; but circumstances, so to speak, broke up its object, and divided the feeling in such a way as to render the history of the peninsula full of conflicts and disasters, and almost chaotic, during the unhappiest part of the Middle Ages. The differences among Italian races and localities, being far deeper than those which distinguished the peoples of Gaul, Britain, and Germany, expressed themselves in the municipalities and municipal institutions, in which these races found the immediate and practical object of their aspirations, and which they not only persistently preserved and developed, but also defended with enthusiasm and heroic virtue. In the memorable struggle between the Communes of Lombardy and the Emperor of Germany, we seem to see, not so much a conflict between two contradictory ideas, as a battle between feelings determined by different circumstances and interests of which the sentiment of country and race is not the least important. The municipal franchises were defended against the empire, which had ceased to stand for feudalism, and had become a power protecting privileges incompatible with them: there was no intention of overthrowing the imperial authority, but only of resisting the despotism of the emperor. In any case, an ideal of classical origin shaped the new form of patriotism, and was not foreign to the long party struggles of the Ghib-

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belines. The Guelphs, on the other hand, found in the papacy an authority as far superior to that of the emperor as the divine is superior to the human. The grandiose element of these ideas is, in some way, involved in the glory and in the shame of a people, which, more than any other, presents to us the sad spectacle of interminable discords and fratricidal wars, but which was also a teacher of culture and civilization through the rivalries of its republics and principedoms. In order to realize the extent to which divisions multiplied among the Italians, we have only to call to mind those verses of Dante, in which he sets a mark of infamy upon the sanguinary strifes of those whom

"One wall encloses and one moat."

But how could the masses escape the influence of the cosmopolitan ideal, just referred to, when even the loftiest intellects of the time were in thraldom to it? To be sure, in the writings of Petrarch, the notion of country begins to free itself from the shackles of cosmopolitanism, and to call aloud for the independence of Italy; and a time is coming when Italy will rise to a clear and distinct consciousness of herself. This great fact, the condition of her regeneration, was virtually pre-existent in her spirit, and only waited for the events which should be the efficient causes of its realization. The fact is, in treating of the character of a people, we must bear in mind that the time necessary in order to know it from its effects is measured by ages. In its development, the phases of its manifestation are necessarily very various and proportioned to the importance and complication of the collective life. If we consider only the ages which intervene between the end of the Carlovingian empire and that of the republic of Florence, the outburst of patriotism which will render forever memorable the epoch of the Communes, strikes the eye, like a light flashing across a darkness deepened by the political passions of the succeeding age, in which, if the virtues that flow from fruitful emulation impart a glory to the cities of Italy, to the benefit of the peninsula and the world, in arts, commerce, and industry, as well as in science and letters;

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yet, on the other hand, the vices to which it gave birth by its aberrations, degraded its conduct, darkening the love of glory by unbridled ambitions, the sentiment of liberty by continual unrest, and its own independence by the oppression of others. In this uncurbed municipalism of the Italian Middle Ages, disinterested love of a common country, imprisoned in the municipality or stowed away in some noble individuality, disappears often as a general phenomenon. Envy, covetousness, revenge, and triumphant treachery form a sort of moral chaos, a consoling contrast to which will one day be formed by the new feelings of the Italian peoples, as they crowd to the banners of Victor Emmanuel and Garibaldi, to form a single nation, free and independent.

To be sure, the individualistic and collectivist principles are still, in the legislative and administrative vicissitudes of the new kingdom, looking for their best form of harmonization, and in order to combat the ancient defects, and especially jealousy and envy, there are needed the sagacious and incessant efforts of an enlightened and patriotic government; but already the progress in the way of good is visible and comforting. Those populations of central Italy which the diplomacy of the first half of this century represented as altogether undisciplined and undeserving of liberty, take their part, like the rest, without resistance, in the sacrifices imposed by the levy, and in the heavy weight of taxation demanded by the needs of a young state which exerts itself to keep pace with its elders in organization and development.

And it would be nothing less than unjust to judge of the political honesty of the Italian people from the record of those times in which faithlessness to sworn compacts, smart practice and means suggested by astuteness and hypocrisy, dressed up under the pompous title of reasons of state, were common to weak, divided Italy with the most united and powerful monarchies. A famous name, and an expression of political and moral significance derived from it,—Machiavelli and Machiavellianism,—have been frequently adduced as designating the political consciousness of the Italians. We neither intend, nor are we able, to discuss at length the question, already set-

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tled by historical criticism, in regard to the truth and falsehood of the judgment which represents Machiavelli as the theorist of political immorality. At present, the most impartial critics have made it evident that he does not confound honesty with its opposite, but that, despairing, in times of great corruption, of securing the greatness of his country through virtue alone, he has shown what force can do in the way of restoring to health a social body enfeebled and incapable of rising again in any other way. He has not hesitated to appeal to the cunning of the fox and the violence of the lion, or to embody them in a type of prince whose irresistible will should overcome every obstacle, and render his country united and feared. The society of his time was not such as to inspire him with confidence in the good: a vein of pessimism finds its way into the writings of this profound observer of characters and states, who sees round about him nothing but weakness and impotence, and who aims, above everything, to elevate character once more. Moreover, what is well founded in the charges made by the moralists against Machiavelli, and what is true in Machiavellianism to the discredit of the Italians, is largely counterbalanced by the writings of Paul Paruta, who, reuniting politics and morals which the Florentine secretary had separated, rejects the idea of an art of government devoid of scruples. It is certainly true that the politics of Machiavelli has none; but is not the same thing true of the politics of the states of all times? In spite of the protests of the moral sense, a cunning diplomacy continued to prevail in international relations, until public opinion, supported by science, compelled governments to recognize the duties which limit the right of war and peace between nations, and rendered the violation of them more rare.

Moreover, despite the darkness of his times and his empiricism, Machiavelli did not deny the possibility of virtue, and, if he threw doubt on its efficacy, *his* glorification of force, in contradistinction to that of Hobbes and Spinoza, had for its motive love of country, and for its end the acquisition of independence. He too aspired to an ideal, sometimes to that of a republic after the Roman fashion, sometimes to an absolute

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monarchy, and his writings clearly prove that the ideal, without the counterpoise of the moral consciousness, leads finally to the application of the sophistical maxim that "the end justifies the means."

V.

The slur of disloyalty has been unjustly attached to the Italian character in political as well as scientific matters, on the bases of single facts generalized and interpreted with partiality. The Italian philosophers of the Renaissance have been accused of hypocrisy, because at the end of their least orthodox and most audacious writings they declared themselves ready to submit in all things to the authority of the Church. Must the use of the conventional formula, not in all cases devoid of sincerity, prevent us from recognizing their profound love of truth, and the sacrifice of freedom and of even life, which the most famous of them made for its sake? In the martyrology of science, is the place occupied by Italian thinkers so small? Whether theocratic or political, it is the despotism which clips the wings of thought that is responsible for the artifices to which the free spirit resorts when it finds itself stripped of all other weapons in the presence of overwhelming force. Even Jesuitry has flourished in Italy, caressed by the despots; even it has contributed to confuse the moral consciousness by multiplying superstitious practices, and attributing to external forms the importance which belongs only to feelings and to the idea. Shall, therefore, the native country of Gioberti be accused of Jesuitry, a plant of another soil? It is, however, only too true that the fatal influence of the followers of Loyola, finding its way into politics through the channel of religion, and combining the two into a hybrid compound, has greatly contributed to the ambition of the priesthood, and has bolstered up the claim which it makes to unite in itself the two authorities, by which, according to Dante, "it befouled itself and its burden," and to which, according to Machiavelli, we Italians owe the decay of religious faith.

We do not deny it: the multiplicity and minuteness of

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religious observances, and especially the exaggeration of trapping and pomps in worship, for which the Jesuits are generally held responsible, would not have found favor so readily among the Anglo-Saxon and Germanic races as it did among the Spanish and Italian, which are so much less inclined to a subjective life, and so much more immersed in the external and the sensible. In this JOURNAL,* Professor Barzellotti has admirably shown the variety of influence exerted on the development of Christianity and its modes of worship by the natural character of the peoples that have embraced it. The essentially artistic spirit of the Italians showed opposition to the Iconoclasts from the first moment of their existence, nor did it ever sunder its religious feeling from the poetic faculty which represents the objects of it in images and other symbols. And this was a great piece of good fortune, not only for Italy, but also for those very nations among whom, at the advent of the Reformation, the worship of images was abolished; for otherwise they would have been left without the chief masterpieces of religious painting and sculpture. How, indeed, would they have been possible with any other direction of the mystic faculty? If even the artists of Germany were able, on their canvas, to represent the marriage of the human and the divine, and in Holbein to emulate the genius of Raphael, this, after all, was the result of the common direction given to Catholic worship in the country which cradled modern art. At the same time, the Anglo-Saxon and Germanic spirit, with a mysticism more spiritual than ours, rebelled against the excess of the representative element, from which we were not able to defend ourselves, and by which, unquestionably, superstition was fostered among the masses of people, under an ecclesiastical government, which was perhaps more anxious to discipline them than to purify their piety. It is useless to blink the fact: the substitution of the external for the eternal in the acts and objects of worship could not, where it took place, be uncon-

* July, 1894, vol. iv. p. 445; *cf.* also his article in *Nuova Antologia*, June 16–July 1, 1891.

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nected with the sensuous tendencies of our people; and we are not sufficiently excused by the fact that our aspirations after purification of worship, and our by no means infrequent attempts at religious reform encountered in the Church, enthroned in the heart of the peninsula and supported by brute force, insuperable obstacles; the truth being that the history of the papacy is, in too large measure, our history. Perhaps the fairest thing that can be said in favor of our ethical character in this matter is that, if the internal feeling of the divine and the holy did not among us succeed in emancipating itself from symbols, as it did among other nations; if we have been forced, in our outward worship, to put up with the effects of our native tendencies; yet, at least in other parts of the religious institution, the practical, moderate good sense of our people has supplied us with a moral substitute. We refer to the Italian founders of religious orders and to the theory of cases of conscience. Indeed, from Cassiodorus and St. Benedict down to Antonio Rosmini, the religious orders founded by Italians have preserved a certain moderation in the practices of mysticism sanctioned by their rule, and, above all, they have tried to combine them with science and social utility. The Trappists, with their hideous rule, certainly did not originate here; whereas the character of the Theatines and the Oratorians, two of the most noteworthy orders having their origin in Italy, bear the mark of the temperate mysticism of Gaetano Thiene and Filippo Neri.* And as to casuistry, although it has a history in Italy extending from St. Thomas to Alfonso de' Liguori, we find in it no Escobars or Sanchezes such as called forth the sarcasms of the author of the "Lettres Provinciales."

Let us now sum up our thoughts on the Italian moral character,—of course within the limits of the philosophic consciousness as it appears in the writings of our principal

* The name of Filippo Neri is sufficiently well known. Of Gaetano Thiene, we will merely say that, along with the celebrated Gaspare Contarini, Jacopo Sadoleto, Giovanni Dati, and other men distinguished for knowledge and virtue, he founded in Rome, under Leo X., the Society of Divine Love, in order to reform the manners of the paganized city.

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moralists and political writers:—Yes, in the southern nature of the Italians, feeling and imagination are more potent than in that of the northern peoples. In the expression of our moral life, and in its relation to civil and religious life, it often happens that, overcoming reflection and will, they command instead of obey. Emotion and fancy have sometimes roused in the Italian mind the loftiest ideals, and rendered it capable of great things. There is no sphere of human activity but furnishes proofs of this, if we consider the total life of the nation, or, better still, that of the states into which it was so long broken up. In the struggle for the independence of the Communes, in the renascence of culture, in the Franciscan movement, in all the changes that were effected in that age with a view to liberty and national unity, there appears a solidarity of mind and a common aspiration towards a lofty end, whether scientific, artistic, religious, or political. The histories of Florence, Venice, Piedmont, and Genoa furnish splendid examples not only of individual virtue, but also of heroisms on the part of whole peoples; and at critical moments, when liberty was at stake, there was no lack of magnanimous efforts in Sicily and Naples. But wonderful as such enthusiasm is, its results are not lasting; when the heat of passion has cooled down, when the end is reached or missed, the spirit readily sinks back into discouragement and inertia, if not sustained and upheld by force of will; and, what is a greater misfortune still, the common aspirations after the Good give way to indifference, or, worse, to individual interests and the calculations of selfishness.

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THE MOTIVES TO MORAL CONDUCT.*

EVERY principle that aspires to dominance among mankind must make it its first aim to gain over the convictions, to win the intellectual adherence of men; only from this point, by a gradual growth inwards, can it conquer their hearts. It must make its appearance, not indeed with a scholastically pruned and petrified dogma, but with a clear and luminous conception to be taught to the world. For the single sympathetically disposed mind this is not, indeed, necessary; considered, however, from the point of view of society at large, the victory of the doctrine must precede the victory of the sentiment. It is my unalterable conviction that this holds good of the principle of ethical culture. We must endeavor to reach a definite formulation of our attitude towards fundamental questions. To these fundamental questions belong in especial the following three: first, the ethico-social question how society should be constituted in order to render the moral will possible to all; secondly, the question, in many respects so infinitely difficult, as to the specific demands of the ethical law; thirdly, the question as to what impulse of the will we must regard preponderant and decisive in accordance with the constitution of human nature in the establishment of moral sentiment.

As long as no considerable concurrence of opinion is attained with respect to these fundamental points of doctrine, the ethical movement cannot, in my belief, be accounted a mature reformatory principle in which the future of mankind is wrapped up, but only as the promising germ out of which, some day, as we all hope, the principle of human regeneration will grow. Whoever fails to perceive this, and fancies that we need only secure emphatic and repeated recognition for the demands of ethics, however they be interpreted; whoever fails to accept the necessity of reconstructing ethically the foundations of the social order, and of establishing the

* Paper read before the Berlin Section of the German Society for Ethical Culture on Sunday, April 15, 1894.

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existence of a natural motive to morality among men, exposes himself to a just reproach which has found an apt, if not courteous, formula in the epithet of "moral clericalism."

To put a mite in contribution, then, towards preparing the way for this deeper agreement, at least in respect to *one* of the questions in point, is the purpose of the present address. No one can be more impressed than I with the difficulty of undertaking even thus to prepare the way for such an agreement; no one more intimately persuaded that we have not here a matter in which everything can be achieved by one magical stroke; no one more certain that there is here a call for that untiring labor which, as Schiller so magnificently says:

> "Zu dem Bau der Ewigkeiten
> Zwar Sandkorn nur um Sandkorn reicht,
> Doch von der grossen Schuld der Zeiten
> Minuten, Tage, Jahre streicht."

Let us address ourselves to the special question, whether there is any motive which can, according to the constitution of human nature, primarily or even exclusively be relied upon for the establishment of morals. It is the question to which Schopenhauer's apt saying refers: "To preach morality is easy; to reason out its foundation, hard."

In order to secure the proper basis for a reply to this question, we must first of all try to attain a comprehensive survey of the chief acts in which moral will or sentiment actually appears, of the chief motives to morality that present themselves in experience. Then, perhaps, by testing these actual elements of the case, we can extricate from the complex mass that motive which has the deepest warrant in human nature. We have thus to adopt at first the procedure of natural science, as it were, a procedure, complete as possible, of mere description and report, that afterwards, with the view of the facts thus obtained, we may apply a critical standard, and in the multiplicity of the actual detect the unity of the normal.

I.

When, now, we look about among the actual motives to the Good, our attention is arrested at the outset by the most

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conspicuous of them—one operative in some cases with an exceptional intensity—I mean *religious conviction.* Not every religion is morally effective. The first prerequisite for the moral effectiveness of a religion is that the demand which the Deity imposes upon man should not merely have for its content certain ceremonial attestations of honor or morally indifferent, still less morally culpable, actions, but that it should coincide in content with the moral law. Here, also, there are two grades: a lower, on which the Deity is conceived as contented with certain *external* marks of justice, goodness, and charity; and a higher, on which the saying applies: "We human creatures see what is before our eyes, but God sees the heart;" where, accordingly, the demand is for a moral regeneration of *spirit.* A further gradation appears in religious faith in the varying cases where we see operating in feeling and will as the ground of submission to the divine command, now the fear of avenging displeasure, now gratitude for benefits received, now even the mystical craving to become one with the Source of Being. In all these cases, however, the fundamental prerequisite for the establishment of ethical relations by religious means is that the will of the Deity should be conceived as an ethical will—such a will as requires of man not so much certain special acts as a general assiduity in moral courses.

A second point of view finds expression in the formula that we must do good for good's sake. The motive of moral conduct, according to this principle, is in no sense one's own profit, be it ever so ennobled and spiritualized, but the profit of others. It is the principle of *selflessness* in its strictest sense; whoever acts according to it does not pursue his own interests, his own happiness; he acts, as it were, out of the mind of others, makes the desires, endeavors, and motives of others his own. He has passed, as it were, out of his own integument; he is, lives, and strives not in himself, but in others.

Some ethical philosophers locate the motive of moral conduct, as it were, in the logical understanding, regarding an immoral act as a blunder of logical judgment. This conception has been advanced in different forms, of which the most

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celebrated is Kant's Categorical Imperative. Kant bases the moral law upon the need on the part of reason to keep free, even in action, from self-contradiction: to order action so that one can desire the maxim of one's own course to become a universal law. Self-contradiction, so intolerable to the theoretic reason, is thus made a motive for a course of action moving in the direction in which the agent desires that the general action should move.

A fourth motive is that of *individual profit* in the fullest sense, in especial, the expectation of reciprocal action from others. It is the point of view of the *do ut des*, of the *Eine Hand wäscht die andere*. It starts from the assumption that every one sees that he cannot get on alone in the pursuit of his interests in the world, but is thrown at every step on others for assistance. From this point of view the human community appears as a great incorporation for the performance of reciprocal service, for the universal insurance of reciprocity; a man's moral action is action for his own profit; above all, it is a perpetual means of courting a return of service. His motive is his own well-being in the large sense, especially the hope that others will be shrewd enough to see that a return of service is demanded for their own advantage.

A fifth and highly important motive to morality is sympathy. Early in the higher animal nature we find this faculty of recognizing the painful situations of other creatures,—whether by the accompanying manifestations of feeling or by the perception of the painful character of the situation itself,—of entering imaginatively into the state of feeling or the imperilled position of the other, and, moved by the distress thus engendered, coming to its assistance. As soon as intelligence and imagination are sufficiently developed to allow of a creature putting itself in another's place, and emotion sufficiently sensitive and undistracted to enable it to *feel* what is imagined, attempts of animals to come to the relief of each other will make their appearance. It is almost exclusively in the form of sympathetic *suffering* that sympathy leads to ethical actions; only indirectly and by accident can sympathetic *pleasure*, such as pleasure in the

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improved estate of another which is not yet actual but only conceived, give rise to action for his well-being.

Still another motive we have in a force that powerfully determines the will from the very beginning of life,—the growth of habit. "Habit is second nature," runs an old and true saying. Numerous influences have a habit-forming effect, those especially which shape the still plastic and youthful mind—example and model, experience and romance, the approval and the disapproval of authoritative persons exercised directly on the sentiments and acts of him who is to be affected, or on those of others who fall within the range of his thought, and, last of all, censure and punishment. The more receptive and plastic the individual is himself, and the more emphatic and lasting the habit-forming influences, the more deeply and indelibly will the process of habituation do its work. The acquisition of moral habit is one of the most powerful causes of whatever moral elements are actually present in civilized mankind. There can hardly be an individual in the civilized world who grows up wholly without influences that tend to form in him moral habits.

The part that habituation plays in the *single life* is played in the *race* with an infinitely extended scope by that precipitate from the formation of habit through whole series of generations, which by heredity is converted into *impulse*. If the theory of heredity be a true part of the doctrine of evolution, as we cannot doubt, there takes place through inheritance a cumulative strengthening of the qualities proper to civilization, and especially, too, an advance of the *moral*, or, as the unhandsome but now adopted phrase of Comte's has it, the "altruistic" *impulses*. With some optimistic exaggeration, the thought of the inheritance of moral impulse was uttered already in the saying of Goethe:

> "Wenn nur die Eltern erzogen wären
> Sie könnten erzogene Kinder gebären."

Still another source from which some portion of moral good flows among mankind is subjection to the dominant custom. I do not speak here of this subjection where it is simply the

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work of habit, or where it springs out of fear of social disadvantages, still less where it is the result of conscious moral subordination. The case to be considered here is that in which the rule is observed for the sake of honor, or, as the characteristic phrase is, for shame's sake; that is, from reluctance to incur the deprecatory judgments of others. If we count subjection to the dominant custom as morality, we must not have in mind the observation of external social forms. These do, indeed, in their original meaning express moral sentiments; but they have so far sunk in their transmission to the level of mere forms, that we can hardly ascribe to them any longer the significance of moral actions. We know only too well that politeness in society is in many cases nothing but the disguise of the human brute, and only in the best case an expression, even then exaggerated, of actual sentiments. But the reluctance to incur social disesteem surely leads also to acts which really belong to the sphere of the moral; to acts, for instance, of accommodation and helpfulness, of benevolence and generosity, of temperance, chastity, and decency, of respect and deference, and to the avoidance of the opposite vices.

With the subjection to custom from unwillingness to incur the disrespect of others, we have already approached the important group of motives which take their origin from our need of self-esteem. This need of holding ourselves in good esteem, of inquiring into our individual justification for existence, and of requiring that our being shall be a thing of some consequence, marks off man as a rational creature and distinguishes him from the animals. If I fear to be despised, —not on account of the social disadvantages connected therewith, but on account of the disesteem of others in itself,— then I fear at bottom, because, primarily, I make my own self-esteem dependent on the esteem of others, and because I am unwilling to sink in my own esteem, or even to doubt about my own value. This same need of gaining one's own esteem, primarily, as a reflection of the esteem of others, finds a higher and a positive manifestation in the need of honor and recognition on the ground of positive achievements and services. We do that which brings us honor, not only

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for the sake of social advantages, but also from the profound and urgent impulse to acquire *value*, since we make our own valuation of ourselves depend on the estimates, real or supposed, of others. That the love of honor, however, and the craving for honor in considerable measure bear *moral fruit*, and that on this account the love of honor must be taken into consideration as one of the motives to morality,—this does not, I presume, require any further argument.

Akin to the love of honor is the "sense of honor." The "man of honor" led by the "sense of honor" makes the law of what is becoming and seemly the direct law of his self-assessment; that is, he bows to it even where his conduct is hidden from the pronouncement of others; he bows to the law of honor in the fear of losing self-respect. To maintain this self-respect, resting as it does on agreement with a social code of honor, he will make the extremest sacrifices in substance, blood, or life. The man of honor seeks to have standing. not in the sight of others, but in his own sight; but, nevertheless, he measures himself by the established standard of a certain circle of society. This standard, however, has in it always more or less an element of the moral; for instance, integrity in business, courage, firmness of character, fidelity to conviction; hence the sense of honor, also, must be acknowledged as a motive to morality.

From the need of self-esteem, however, must also be derived the noblest and most significant among the really effective motives to morality—I mean *conscience*. Conscience is a mental and moral phenomenon not yet explained with any sort of unanimity; enigmatical in its nature as in its significance, not even unquestioned in its existence. When I am asked: Does any such thing as a conscience form part of the actual equipment of human nature? I answer: "Yes, in the exact measure in which man, as a rational creature, feels the need of ascribing a value to himself, and of gauging this value not in dependence on the judgment or standards of others, but directly and immediately by the one true standard of moral sentiment and moral intent." Conscience is the craving for value, the craving for self-esteem in the highest and purest

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stage of its development, in which value is not recognized save in that which alone possesses it truly,—the good will. He is in the highest sense conscientious who desires to be able to esteem himself, but only on the ground of this one absolutely justified standard of value. Thus conscience becomes a judge not merely of the acts, but of the most secret inclinations of the heart. The bad conscience with its retributions is the condemnation of self as valueless or worse than valueless, measured by the standard of goodness of will. The good conscience is the sense that measured by this standard one is *not* valueless. Thus conscience becomes a strong motive for the choice of the good as that which alone can impart value.

II.

Thus there is, in point of fact, a great multiplicity of motives present in human nature, which lead to the willing and executing of the good. When we turn now to our second chief question, the question whether by chance one of them should be singled out as that which is truly normal in man, there arises a preliminary query. Have we really any interest in searching for such a single motive possessing a sanction for all men? May it not rather lie in the nature of the ethical movement to throw the mantle of charity over the manner in which the good comes to be; to welcome to our midst all who bring to us a fragrant flower or precious fruit of ethical will and deed, and, as Frederick the Great would let every man be saved in his own fashion, to take our stand on the principle that with us every man may become virtuous in his own fashion?

Undoubtedly this does belong to the nature of our movement; but we should "do the one and not neglect the other." We welcome every one whom the ethical interest leads to us, but we should not, in fulfilling our nearest and simplest duty, forget our remoter and more difficult one, the duty of seeking luminous and convincing insight into fundamental ethical questions; and to these fundamental questions belong precisely the quest for that impulse of the will which is more

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especially influential in the establishment of morality. Such knowledge is in the end necessary for the individual among us, that his inner life may be made sure of itself, and for the movement as a whole, that its justification for existence may be definitively made good. I cannot hope to offer a result convincing to all, but it is surely something gained, even if nothing more is done than perpetually to point to the great problem and to keep the stream of discussion flowing.

What, then, is the standard by which we have to test existing motives? It is a threefold requirement that the true motive must satisfy. First, in regard to the arrangement of the world and the laws of the world's course, it may not make fantastic, visionary, and fabulous assumptions, but such as are sober and correct. Secondly, it must have a strong hold in the constitution of human nature; it must rest upon a strong need of our nature, so that it emerges in its effectiveness and attractive force wherever human nature unfolds itself in a normal development. Thirdly, it must not lead only to isolated manifestations of morality, but to the fulfilment of the moral requirement as a whole; and since this covers not only a multitude of outward acts, but also the inward unity of the moral sentiment, the impulse we are seeking must be capable of producing the will to shape the whole conduct and life conformably to the moral requirement.

It is possible only by the briefest indications to exhibit according to this threefold criterion the value of the several motives.

On the *first* of these three conditions the *religious motive* founders. If we find ourselves unable, on a true scientific view of the world, to look upon it as the work of a wise and good will, which at the same time prescribes for the human will the law of its behavior, then the world-basis ceases to be a determining factor in morality.

The formula "good for good's sake" is negatived by the thoroughly egoistic constitution of human nature. Beyond question, in the life of every superior human being there are moments of exalted, enthusiastic, ecstatic feeling, in which every personal interest sinks down to abysmal depths before

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an emotional life irradiated by a higher light; where the soul, snatched away out of itself, finds the centre of its existence in some revered being, in those it loves, in its nation, in all mankind, in some sublime idea; where, beside this high end, its own life is a very nothing. Nay, there may be inspired angelic natures with whom this self-transcendence is the abiding state in which they live. But these extraordinary states are not every-day matters; they are a holiday garment, which we must soon lay aside again; and these angelic natures are rare jewels, the conditions of whose existence afford no rule for the great body of mankind. Just as in the ecstatic community at Jerusalem there was not wanting the worthy couple who prudently held back for private use a piece of money from the field they had sold, so in the inner life of the individual, amidst the cymbal-beatings of enthusiasm, there is not wanting the sober partner who thriftily counsels one to bring one's own lambs in out of the wet. The principle of selflessness is no principle for daily life, no principle for the sensible, sober majority, who wrestle grievously in the struggle for existence.

Still, the force of impulsion that really sways the will is less flagrantly lacking to the principle of enthusiastic escape from self than to the principle of logical reasonableness. The consistency of our ideas is for our *theoretic* mental life of decisive importance; upon sentiment and practical conduct it cannot exercise this determining influence.

Thus these two last-named motives do not answer to the second criterion, the condition of proceeding from an actual propensity of universal human nature. On the other hand, this second criterion is favorable, though not always in the same degree, to all the other motives that we have to consider.

As for the principle of personal profit, it is true, as Frederick the Great so aptly said, that our own Ego is the secret object of all our endeavors and self-love the hidden principle of all our actions, which enlightens the dullest as to his interests. Even that fellow-feeling by which we feel the suffering of another as our own, and are impelled to put it, like our own,

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out of existence, has a strong and permanent hold on human nature. Custom, too, is no less something real and actual. Does not man, in Schiller's well-known words, call habit his foster-mother? Can any one tear himself wholly free from the leading-strings of custom? Nay, do not many remain life-long altogether abandoned to its bonds? The saying, "Jung gewohnt, alt gethan," points to a law of human nature that, rightly applied, may prove of infinite importance for the moralization of our conduct. But the power of custom falls, to be sure, to wavering when man turns his mental eye to the conscious comprehension of his being, and the independent guidance of his action. Even he in whom habits are most firmly implanted will and should sometimes raise the questions, Why and Wherefore; and then the moment has come when habit must be supplemented by an independent principle of personal knowledge and self-gained conviction.

The inheritance of altruistic impulses, too, is undoubtedly a part even of the present condition of mankind and forms the ultimate support and deepest foundation of all the tendencies that make for the moralization of mankind. The power of this impulse among mankind to-day is, however, by no means so great that on the strength of it we could proclaim the dawn of a golden age, in which the saying would apply: all that pleases is allowed, for only that can please which is becoming. The altruistic impulse is, in respect of strength, incapable of measurement, at all events not sufficient for itself; operative, moreover, in different individuals with infinitely different degrees of strength. If we should give ourselves up to the hope that by a progressive accumulation of inherited habits the work of moralization of the nature would reach an approximate conclusion; this surely would be but a draft on a far, far distant future; and even in such a future we could expect our draft to be honored only if just those arrangements could be found which would inaugurate a steady, progressive ennoblement of human impulses, and an effective equalization of men.

The four principles still remaining have this in common, that they rest on the basis of our *instinctive need for self-*

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esteem. He who submits to custom fears in the disrespect of others the loss of respect for himself. He who is devoted to his honor pursues, in the honor in which others hold him, the assurance of his own possession of value. He who acts in accordance with the feeling of honor does, indeed, measure his sentiments according to the testimony of his own consciousness, but he takes the standard for his own estimate from whatever may happen to be the views of the circles for him authoritative. Not until we come to him who is guided by conscience have we one who runs after no phantom form of value such as mirrors itself vaguely and shiftingly in the opinion of others, but strives for that true justification for existence which can be realized only in the will bent on bestowing happiness and blessedness on others. If among the deepest cravings of human nature the craving for self-esteem has a dominant place, if conscience is an endeavor to acquire genuine value for one's own personality, then to conscience, by the test of derivation from a strong and true natural craving, belongs the precedence and the palm as a motive to morality.

Still, there remains, for all those motives that have proved themselves among the realities of human nature, a further test in the condition that they must bring forth comprehensively and without restriction a complete moral fashioning of the will. Here the principle of enlightened egoism and reciprocity can advance, if prosecuted consistently and with the most refined sagacity, to the point of an unexceptionable choice of the good, since every good whatsoever done to others may redound to the good of oneself. Just one thing is denied to this principle: it cannot advance so far as to say, "I will do good because doing good as such seems to me true profit for myself." It will have good always solely on account of the various advantages, pleasures, and endowments that it brings for me in its train. The same foresight and calculating sagacity that lead here to the choice of the good, would lead elsewhere, with the same strictness of consequence, if guided by other opinions on the connection and course of human affairs, to a consistent desire for the evil. It is not the good

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itself that here appears as a worthy end, but the various gains which we know as its concomitant phenomena.

Sympathy, moreover, would always find its confines and limit in self-interest. However powerful may be our sympathetic pain at the suffering of others, the conditions of one's own fortune work with a far more elementary force on the feelings and the will. Neither he who is in anxiety and want, nor he who is permanently embittered by the hard strokes of fate, is capable of sympathy. More than this, the sympathetic will is not in reality directed to the well-being of another, but only to the removal of its own oppressive and displeasing state. Should the object of the sympathy by a sudden annihilation disappear from the world, the motive of the fellow-feeling would be quite as much set at rest as by the cessation of his suffering.

Habit may become of universal importance for the desire and achievement of the good. As regards its effectiveness, there is in principle no limit set to it, though it will probably never, by human force, be brought actually to this pitch of perfection. Only one thing it lacks. It is a passive principle, a power which does not break forth from the inner nature of the personality. It cannot rise to a maxim. Who would make for himself the maxim: "I will act as I have been used?" Thus it remains, for the establishment of morality, a provisional factor which awaits the completing and definitive factor.

Wholly incalculable in respect of the range of the resulting good is the *altruistic impulse* of our nature. Only in rare and exceptional natures, whose selflessness is an innate characteristic, in whom virtue is vested, as Plato says, by a divine dispensation, can it arrive at an all-sufficient completeness.

Inadequate and doubtful as regards the ends pursued are the principles of *subjection to moral custom*, of *devotion to honor*, and of *the sentiment of honor*. None of the three ever seek the good save in special and disconnected forms; all three may, under circumstances, as chance surroundings decide, be diverted just as easily to the indifferent and worthless, nay, to the perverted and the vile, as to the genuinely good and salutary.

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The good itself, that which makes for the salvation of others—the good in full compass without exception or restriction—is sought only by the motive of *conscience.* A will bent on all that is salutary to others counts here as the only thing that can impart to us, to the very kernel of our personality, value and sanction for existence. To strive by good will and deed after this personal value—this it is to which conscience urges us.

Let us now look at the outcome of this whole inquiry. *The strongest among the motives of higher human nature* is that which arises from our craving for self-esteem; its purest and best-sanctioned mode of operation is that which, aimed directly at the source of the real value of our being and endeavor, we find in *conscience. The most perfect and unstinted disposition to goodness*, again, is attained by the endeavor to acquire *in conscience* a true value for oneself, a true warrant for one's existence. If we wish, then, to have a maxim to guide our willing and doing consciously and deliberately towards the good, it can be only this: to entrust that craving to impart a true value to one's existence which manifests itself in the judicial voice of conscience, to give it unrestricted mastery over our purpose and endeavor. True value can attach to our being and striving only through their significance for the welfare of others; the endeavor to make our existence truly worthy will lead us the most forcibly to all good.

This sole dominance of conscience will, however, have strongly in its favor, from youth up, the by no means contemptible aid of habit. If habit, blindly operating with the power of a second nature, as well as the conscious endeavor towards true personal value which the law of conscience enjoins, exert themselves in the same direction for good, there cannot but arise from this double but united force a full measure of the desired effect. Habituation to goodness and a clearly conscious desire of goodness as the satisfaction of the craving to justify one's existence—this is, in my conviction, that combination of motives which will serve best and most surely to realize the ideal of the ethical man.

The philosopher Schopenhauer possessed an album in which

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but one leaf was written upon. The leaf was from the hand of Goethe, and the inscription read:

"Willst du dich deines Wertes freuen,
So musst der Welt du Wert verleihen."

This saying contains, in the first place, the precious reminder that it is a strong need and interest of human nature to rejoice in its own value. But also a way is pointed out in which this end can be attained. To the great poet the means of gaining a joyful consciousness of one's own value was to confer value upon the world. He intends to admonish the young philosopher, morosely contemptuous of the world and men, that we ourselves are nothing else than a bit of the world and of mankind, and that we cannot possibly esteem ourselves if we misprize and scorn the world and mankind to which we belong. We could, however, in a freer rendering, understand the conferment of value on the world as consisting in the bestowing of valuable gifts and endowments on mankind through our ethical will. So understood, the apothegm would agree with the fundamental thought of these remarks; still more perfectly would it express this thought if, by an easy change of the words, we read it:

"Willst du dich deines Wertes freuen,
So musst dir selbst du Wert verleihen."

But the thought would attain still more distinct expression if we read,

"Dir selbst wirst wahren Wert du leihen,
Kann deines Thuns die Welt sich freuen."

It is a feeble attempt to formulate in the narrowest compass a long cherished conviction on one of the deepest problems of ethics that I have offered you to-day. In the accomplishment of the great task of the ethical movement, the production of a systematic conception to be taught to the world, may it prove not wholly unfruitful.*

A. DÖRING.

UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN.

* A fuller development of the thought contained in this paper may be found in my book entitled "Philosophische Güterlehre. Untersuchungen über die Möglichkeit der Glückseligkeit und die wahre Triebfeder des sittlichen Handelns," Berlin, 1888.

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DISCUSSIONS.

"RATIONAL HEDONISM" AGAIN.

IN the recent discussion, in the pages of this JOURNAL, between Professor Mackenzie and Miss E. E. C. Jones, an interesting point has been raised, on which I should like to say one word. The point is the definition of pleasure; in particular, the propriety of Mr. Mackenzie's definition: "pleasure is a sense of value." * I am unable to accept either Mr. Mackenzie's position or that of Miss Jones; but it is Mr. Mackenzie's phrase I wish to examine, because, while differing from him in this particular, I am in close sympathy with his point of view as a whole (so far as I understand it), and look to him as a doughty leader.

I think the phrase, "pleasure is simply the sense of interest or value for consciousness," † objectionable chiefly for two reasons.

1. It takes the products of development and ascribes them to the undeveloped consciousness. Mr. Mackenzie denies that "sense of value" implies judgment of value. Yet he remarks that it "is an implicit judgment of value." The phrase seems, by the use of the word "sense," to whittle away the idea of judgment very thin (though by the use of the very complex idea of "value," the wording becomes perplexing), but take the idea of judgment wholly away, and what is left?

The phrase, too, seems to imply a reference to a self. How can there be a "sense of value" without any notion of a self for whom the particular feeling has value? "Value," too, contains surely the idea of a system or scale of comparative worth, an idea possible enough to a creature conscious of even the most elementary self, but surely wholly impossible to many creatures capable of pleasure, in the sense of agreeable feeling.

2. The phrase defines what is but an aspect of one mental element (feeling) in terms which attribute to it the characteristics of the two other elements (intellect and will). This is apparent from Mr. Mackenzie's own explanation that he meant "implicit udgment" and "unreasoned choice." Moreover, these explanatory phrases, if they make the original phrase "sense of value"

* Mackenzie, "Manual," p. 107.

† Ibid., "An Introduction to Social Philosophy," p. 217.

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more acceptable as a definition of the pleasure of the undeveloped consciousness, make it less satisfactory as a definition of the developed; *e.g.*, the philosopher's pleasure in finding and giving a correct definition.

I am not clear as to the Hedonistic implications which I fear the phrase contains, and shall not therefore urge them. But I would ask, does not Mr. Mackenzie, in the January number of the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, page 222, make "the measurement of value" equal "the measurement of pleasure"? and is that not to adopt the Hedonistic conclusion? In this point and in his distinction between subjective and objective values, Mr. Mackenzie seems to assert that at least the sentient consciousness is Hedonistic. It is difficult to understand "subjective value" as, in any sense in which it does not simply mean "illusion of value," opposed to "objective value," and yet not think of value as pleasure.

It would be interesting to know why Professor Mackenzie declined to follow the lead of Aristotle, Kant, Lotze, and others who have defined pleasure in relation to its conditions. Kant's "Vergnügen ist das Gefühl der Beförderung; Schmerz das einer Hinderniss des Lebens," * seems to mean very much what I take it Mr. Mackenzie means, but it avoids the difficulties which attach to what Mr. Mackenzie says.

If the Kantian definition be too wide, will not the limitation by Lotze † meet the facts? "If the advantage and harm be momentary and local, the exceptions seem to disappear." ‡

MARY S. GILLILAND.

LONDON.

MR. MACKENZIE'S REPLY.

I find myself in agreement with most of what Miss Gilliland says. I have all along been perfectly well aware that the phrase "sense of value" is open to the objections which she urges. My only defence is, that it is the best phrase I can find. It seems clear that *any* attempt to define so elementary an experience as that of

* Kant, "Anthropologie," Book II., p. 549, ed. Hartenstein.

† Lotze, "Medicinische Psychologie," 1852, pp. 237–239.

‡ Mr. Bradley, "Mind," xiii.

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pleasure and pain * must lead us into difficulties. It can only be defined in terms of experiences that are more complex than itself. This is a difficulty, however, which comes up also in other parts of the study of psychology, and, indeed, in other studies as well. It is doubtful, for instance, whether any account can be given of the sense-experiences of a merely animal consciousness, except by referring to the more fully developed human consciousness, and then pointing out what must be supposed to be absent in the case of the more elementary experience. Similarly, I am disposed to agree with the Master of Balliol † in thinking that religion is best defined by reference to its most developed form; though in that case we have to recognize that in its earlier manifestations much that we include in our definition is only implicitly present. I suspect that this is the case with nearly every developing object. The earliest manifestation of such an object does not reveal its full significance, and we can only explain what it is by saying that it is implicitly something else.

In the case of pleasure and pain it may be said that we require no definition. The algedonic experience (if we are to use Mr. Rutgers Marshall's phrase) is so simple and well known that it requires no further explication. Yet, for certain purposes, we do require a definition of these terms, as of all others,—*i.e.*, we require some general statement of the relationship in which the experiences denoted by them stand to the other leading elements in our experience. Now there are, broadly speaking, two ways in which this might be done. We might state the relationship between the feeling aspect of our psychical life and the other aspects of it,—*i.e.*, we might express the relationship between pleasure (including pain) and such other aspects of our experience as sensation, knowledge, desire, emotion, will; or, on the other hand, we might state the relation between feeling and some extra-psychical form of existence,—*e.g.*, the processes of our organic constitution. The former was what I attempted; the latter is what Miss Gilliland suggests as preferable. There are difficulties involved in either

* I do not know why Miss Jones complains that I take no account of pain. I have always supposed that pain (in the only sense in which we are here concerned with it) is simply the negative (in the mathematical sense,—*i.e.*, the positive negative, the contrary) of pleasure; and that in dealing with the one I was also dealing with the other. Pain, in the sense of the organic sensation of pain, would of course be quite irrelevant to the present discussion.

† "Evolution of Religion," Lectures II. and III.

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method; but, on the whole, the difficulties appeared to me to be less when we confine ourselves to the content of the individual consciousness than when we go beyond this and introduce considerations that are physiological or psychophysical. This is, roughly, my answer to Miss Gilliland; but it may be well to reply to some of her points a little more in detail.

1. I admit that if you take the idea of judgment wholly away, it would be difficult to say what is left in the feeling of pleasure. But in the same way I can hardly tell what the objective experiences of an animal consciousness would amount to apart from the implicit forms of judgment by which objects are constituted. I can only suppose, in a general way, that many things can be present in consciousness in a rudimentary form before the judgments that give them their ultimate significance have been definitely evoked.

Similarly, I fully admit that the idea of value involves the idea of a self for whom the value exists; and I think it desirable to avoid the implication of a self as far as possible in the definition of pleasure. It was for this reason that I rejected Mr. Bradley's definition of it as the feeling of self-realizedness.* But I have expressly endeavored to explain (though, perhaps, not with sufficient fulness and clearness) that in speaking of value in this connection I am using the term in an anticipatory sense. I conceive that we may in this way speak of value even with reference to a plant, if we interpret the facts of plant life in a teleological sense. Now, wherever there is pleasure and pain there is a kind of teleology. The painful is avoided, the pleasant is sought; and this long before there is any conscious idea of an end. Wherever there is pleasure and pain there is a kind of choice, though not always a rational choice. There is the acceptance of this rather than that; and this implies some sort of end in view, though the idea of the end

* Which is open to the further objection that there are different selves in consciousness, and that the feeling of pleasure does not always accompany the realization of the highest of these. I ought to add, however, that in his article on "Association and Thought" ("Mind," vol. xii.), Mr. Bradley seems to me to have stated his view in a way that is free from these objections. In that article he seems fully to recognize that the self to which reference is made must be understood in an anticipatory or proleptical sense. Perhaps the least objectionable definition is to say that pleasure is the vague consciousness of a harmony of the particular content of a psychical state with the form of the group within which it is included. But this would require a good deal of explanation. I still think that "sense of value" is the simplest phrase to express what is intended.

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may not be consciously present. The consciousness of the end and the definite recognition of the value of different objects with reference to that end would involve a consciousness of self; but it seems legitimate to speak of the implicit presence of an end, and the implicit appreciation of value, prior to the development of any such consciousness. I admit that there is a kind of prolepsis in such a mode of statement; but I do not see how it is possible, except proleptically, to make intelligible statements with regard to any psychological processes that are not intelligent.

2. I have already explained that I have adopted one of two alternative methods of defining feeling (pleasure-pain), viz., that of showing its relation to the other leading aspects of our conscious life. Hence I do not see much point in the complaint that I have represented it as involving an "implicit judgment" and an "unreasoned choice." It is probably true, however (and this is a point which has also been brought out by Miss Jones), that I have not made it sufficiently clear that I regard feeling of pleasure and pain as the purely subjective side of these activities. Judgment and choice of course involve an objective reference, and so include much more than the mere feeling of agreeableness or disagreeableness. This feeling is merely the sense of harmony or disharmony which constitutes the purely subjective side of such judgments and choices.

3. I am a little amused to find that Miss Gilliland seems to suspect me of a leaning to Hedonism. If I am too hedonistic for Miss Gilliland and not hedonistic enough for Miss Jones, I may perhaps hope that I am somewhere not so very far from the mean. But what is the precise point of Miss Gilliland's accusation? What I have said in the January number of the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, p. 222, is not that the "measurement of value" is equal to the "measurement of pleasure," but that the only way to "make sense" of the "measurement of pleasure" is to interpret it as meaning the "measurement of value" as implicitly apprehended without reason (or at least not necessarily with reason). Among economists, Professor Marshall has, I think, now fully recognized that what is really measured in the so-called measurement of pleasure is value as estimated by human beings in the expenditure of their money and other industrial transactions (in this case, therefore, not entirely without reason). In taking a similar view of the only intelligible meaning that could be given to the measurement of pleasure generally, I am surely very far from identifying myself with the hedonistic position. I should be somewhat surprised that such a

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misconception as this should have been possible, were it not that my experience of controversy has led me to think that it is on the whole rather the exception than the rule for any person to understand any other.

Also, I do not affirm that the sentient consciousness is hedonistic. On the contrary, at all stages of consciousness I should distinguish between the subjective and objective aspects, and should hold that on the whole it is in all cases the objective aspect that is valued, while the subjective aspect merely represents the fact that we do value it. Perhaps Miss Gilliland is right in thinking that "it is difficult to understand 'subjective value' as in any sense* opposed to 'objective value,' and yet not think of value as pleasure." But I would remind her of the saying, *Ardua quæ pulchra.* Perhaps, if she will try very hard, she may succeed even here. Would it help her at all if I were to substitute Meinong's expressions, *Werthhaltung* and *Werth*† (or say, in English, estimation and value), for subjective and objective value?

If it would interest Miss Gilliland to know why I did not follow the lead of Kant, Lotze, and others‡ in the way she suggests, it will not take very long to explain the reason. It is, briefly, that I think the idea of a "sense of value" is somewhat clearer and less ambiguous than that of a "feeling of the promotion of life," even when the latter is qualified in the careful way in which Lotze has explained it. It would, I think, take some time to explain what is meant by "life," and what is meant by its "promotion;" and, indeed, I am not sure that, in defining the latter expression, the conception

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* I observe that Miss Gilliland has now added "in which it does not simply mean 'illusion of value.'" I do not think it *simply* means "illusion of value." If I value anything, I do value it; though I may be wrong in supposing it to have objective value. In any case, I value *it*, not the pleasure of it.

† See his "Psychologische-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werth-Theorie," Part I., Chapter III. I may say here that this book seems to me to contain much the best discussion of the whole subject of value from the point of view of psychology and ethics. I hope to have an early opportunity of explaining in what respects I cannot regard it as altogether satisfactory.

‡ I observe that Miss Gilliland has added the name of Aristotle in the proof. Aristotle's view, as I understand it, was that pleasure is the accompaniment of the perfect functioning of an organ. This is not so much a definition of pleasure as a psycho-physical statement with regard to it; and it would require a good deal of straining to make it applicable to intellectual pleasures. My own aim was not to give a psycho-physical explanation, but simply to state what pleasure means for the consciousness that feels it.

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of value could be altogether kept out. But if Miss Gilliland will explain how we are to define "life" and "promotion" in a way that will be generally intelligible, and that will avoid the difficulties which I admit are involved in the proleptic introduction of the idea of value, I should be deeply grateful, and should have no hesitation in accepting the definition,* believing, as I do, that it would then mean nothing different from what I have sought to express.

I should have wished to take this opportunity of adding a few words on the points referred to by Miss Jones in the January number; but I fear that I could not open up these questions again without multiplying explanations in a way that would carry me far beyond the limits of a discussion note, and that might very likely in the end bring us no nearer to a mutual understanding. I suspect that our points of view are too far asunder for discussion to be profitable. Perhaps I may just be allowed to make two remarks. 1. When Miss Jones defined pleasure as feeling "judged in itself desirable," it certainly did not occur to me that she meant "judged by Butler, Spencer, and one or two others." I assumed that she meant "judged by the consciousness that feels it." With this I was disposed to agree, except that (1) I doubted the legitimacy of the introduction of the conception of an explicit judgment, which seems not to be always present in the feeling of pleasure; and (2) I doubted whether it is the pleasure in itself that is judged to be desirable, and not rather the objective content felt as pleasant. I did not, of course, mean to deny that some people have judged pleasure to be desirable; but it certainly surprises me that such a fact as this should be introduced into a definition of pleasure. 2. When I referred to the ends contemplated by such writers as Spencer and Stephen, I was, of course, not referring to the hedonistic element in their teaching, but to their attempts to define such objective ends as the adjustment of organism to environment, health, or, to use Professor Alexander's phrase, social equilibrium.

I hope that these remarks may help in some degree to clear up my own views on this subject. My experience of the general

* At least with one slight reservation. I do not think I could, in any case, define pleasure as a feeling *of* the furtherance of life, but at most as the feeling which *accompanies* such furtherance. On the other hand, it *is*, I think, a sense *of* value, in the meaning now explained.

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results of controversy in such matters is not such as to afford any ground for hoping that anything that I may say will carry conviction either to Miss Gilliland or to Miss Jones.

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"RATIONAL HEDONISM."—NOTE BY MR. BRADLEY.

Every one interested in this subject will, I am sure, be grateful to Miss Jones and to Professor Mackenzie for their instructive discussion. I am not venturing to express an opinion on the controversy as a whole, but there is a point on which, if Miss Jones were willing to develop her views, I think others as well as myself would receive them with attention. The question to which I should welcome an answer is this: Why should the Hedonist seek to deny worth of everything other than pleasantness? If it is admitted (as I, for example, can admit) that the pleasant is the good and the good pleasant, and that the better is more pleasant and the more pleasant better, why should the Hedonist desire to go further? As soon as I allow that nothing without pleasure has worth, and that the more valuable is more pleasant, and that pleasantness may be used as a measure of goodness, how is the Hedonist interested in trying to force me to deny worth of all else but mere pleasantness? Practically, I am sure that this denial will in some minds always cause moral repulsion, and theoretically I cannot see what it brings in except difficulty. It entails in any case the task of making good an abstraction which is so extreme that, even if it were true, I do not see how we could show its truth, and which, even if really self-consistent, seems hardly self-evident. And in the case of those who hold with Miss Jones the trouble seems increased. If reason is in the end in some sense to qualify the end, can it be rational to set up first the end unqualified and to strain oneself to deny worth of all else but this abstraction? Or, again, can reason qualify the end and yet add nothing to it? for reason hardly, I presume, can consist in mere subtraction. And if the end really is not the end unless qualified by reason, surely something beyond mere pleasantness has been from the first included in the end. But I am well aware that it is dangerous to make inquiries where one does not understand, and my question perhaps rests on a complete misconception, towards the removal of which I have no right to claim assistance. Still, others may be more or less in the same case with myself, if not with regard to reason, at least with regard to the

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abstraction of pleasantness. And a further explanation on this point by Miss Jones might tend (it seems to me) at least to narrow the field of controversy. For myself, I am even sanguine enough to hope that I might be permitted to go on believing that pleasant life, and not mere pleasantness, is what in the end has worth, and yet that, having recanted some early errors, I might be allowed, if I pleased, to call myself a Hedonist. I may be wrong in this, but I should find it most interesting to learn from Miss Jones whether a Hedonist really is bound to deny worth in the end of all but mere pleasantness, and, if so, what theoretically or practically is taken to be gained by this denial.

F. H. Bradley.

Merton College, Oxford.

"Rational Hedonism" concluded.

In answer to Professor Mackenzie's remarks, I should like to say that in accepting the definition of *Pleasure* according to which it is *Feeling judged to be desirable*, I mean *judged desirable by the person feeling it*. It may no doubt be so judged by one who does not accept the Hedonistic End, but I think that any one who does accept that end, must also have accepted the proposed definition; for (1) Pleasure is Feeling. (2) If it is *ultimately desirable*, it is of course *desirable*.

Mr. Mackenzie had said (International Journal of Ethics, January, 1895, p. 218), "It is a disputed point whether feeling . . . is ever judged to be desirable at all." It was in answer to this that I referred to Clark and Butler, and Hedonist moralists generally, as persons who do judge some feeling to be desirable.

With reference to Mr. Mackenzie's point (1), I do not see that the definition of Pleasure above referred to makes it necessary to suppose that all pleasant feeling is accompanied by an explicit judgment of desirability; point (2), as far as I understand, while seeming to admit that pleasant states of consciousness are judged desirable, raises again the question whether it is the *pleasant feeling* in such a psychosis, or "the pleasant" *object of feeling* that is judged desirable. If it is *quâ* pleasant that the object of feeling is judged desirable, this is all that I contend for. If the object is judged desirable in virtue of some other characteristic, that other characteristic needs to be indicated before the question can be discussed. Should we hold *any* objective content to be in itself desirable, if inseparable from intense pain?

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In Mr. Bradley's Note there seems to me to be three things to consider: (1) Mr. Bradley's own position with reference to Hedonism; (2) his view of my position; (3) my view of my position.

As regards (1), Mr. Bradley says that the pleasant is good and the good pleasant; the better is more pleasant and the more pleasant is better; nothing without pleasure has worth; the more valuable is more pleasant; pleasantness may be used as a measure of goodness; pleasant life is what in the end has worth.

(2) As I understand, he considers the weak points of my position to be, that while accepting a Hedonistic End, I maintain (*a*) that *pleasure in the abstract* and not *pleasant life* is the end. (*b*) That this end is pleasure "unqualified" by reason.

(3) In my own view, my position is not open to either of these objections. I do not see how a mere abstraction *can* be taken as the end of life, and certainly, by saying that happiness is the end, I mean no more and no other than that happy life is the end.

Again, I hold that the first question of the Hedonistic (as of any other) moralist must be, What is it that is good or right or reasonable for men to do? and hence that the end which *he* accepts *must* be an end sanctioned by reason; it can only be because regarded by him as reasonable, that he can accept happiness (or happy life) as the end—the ultimately reasonable end. It could only be for sensitive creatures without reason (if even for them) that pleasure divorced from reason could be the "end." It seems to me that for creatures, rational as well as sensitive, such an end is a mere chimera—as much a chimera as any end for man which ignores pleasure and pain. And yet, while admitting that it is only reason that can really consider ends at all, and that a reasonable creature cannot accept any except a reasonable end, I do not see how it can be said that reason itself *is* the end, or even is *part* of the end in at all the same sense in which it is said that pleasure or happy life is the end. It seems to be reason that is guide and ruler and chooser—that points out and determines, and thus in a certain sense *qualifies*, the end. For the Universalistic Hedonist, too, the end is, the happy life of others as well as of self; it is happiness on the whole, and as much happiness (or happy life) as possible; so that not only is the end chosen, and so far qualified by reason, but it seems to be also in an important sense constituted by reason. If we set out with admitting that the end is ultimately and intrinsically good, and that what is ultimately good is ultimately reasonable, I do not see how it could be maintained

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that in the end chosen by the Hedonist as (in his view) reasonable, reason is not, in a certain sense, "included in the end."

If I do not mistake Mr. Bradley's meaning, Hedonism, as I understand it, includes all that he would demand. For, the very clear and explicit statements of his as to the worth of pleasantness, which have been already quoted, seem to me to exclude the attribution of *ultimate* and *intrinsic* worth to anything except *happy life as the end approved by reason*,—though no doubt everything which in any way or degree contributes to that end has its own worth and its own place, and though no means or conditions of the end can be excluded.

I can only hope that in this hasty attempt to answer Mr. Bradley's remarks I have not misunderstood or misrepresented any of his statements, the meaning of which appears to me to be very clear.

E. E. C. Jones.

Girton College, Cambridge.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Man and Woman: A Study of Human Secondary Sexual Characters. By Havelock Ellis. 8vo. London: Walter Scott, 1894. Pp. xiv. + 409. Illustrated.

When we generalize in regard to social questions we assume that there is a measure of sameness in human kind, and we modify our judgments as we recognize the importance of racial and other differences. But the most fundamental of differences is that between the sexes, which must be taken due account of if our judgments are to have precision. The difference is indeed recognized by us all, but oftener instinctively than rationally, and by many in a manner which betrays ignorant prejudice, or even superstition. At this, however, we cannot wonder, for, even to those who have wished to know, accurate information as to the differences between man and woman has not hitherto been readily accessible. It is so now, thanks to Mr. Havelock Ellis.

The search for an understanding of the differences between man and woman has led some to face the problem of the origin and evolution of sex, but, although something has been gained by

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inquiry in this direction, many of the results are still in the speculative stage. Others, again, groping here and there, have fastened eagerly upon some particular fact, or supposed fact, such as that men have heavier brains than women, and have reasoned or acted on the strength of this item,—of course, erroneously. The search has led Mr. Havelock Ellis to a laborious induction, to collect and sift information for a dozen years, and a welcome must be given to the result. For his book is a work of marvellous erudition and unusual carefulness, refreshing in its cautious restraint and in its appreciation of the complexity of the problem. The author is absolutely impartial and undogmatic; he has labored to winnow the wheat of fact from the chaff of inaccuracy; but he has no secret to tell us, no recipe for perfecting the relations between men and women, no general advice except the old one,—that we must base our judgments upon facts, and be sure that we get them, and that we need not try to fight against Nature.

In presenting a brief summary of Mr. Havelock Ellis's more important conclusions, we must notice that they are in no case assertions; they are inductions based on carefully sought-out evidence which in some cases is quite encyclopædic in its fulness. And if it seem that the mass of evidence sometimes yields exceedingly little result, it must be remembered that to show this frankly is part of the author's purpose.

Among primitive peoples, the men are fitted for and undertake work involving violent and brief muscular effort; the women are usually better able for prolonged and more patient exertion. "They are the universal primitive carriers." "The militant side of primitive culture belongs to the men, the industrial to the women." But as the means of subsistence became more secure, and life less militant, men began to take up women's industries, and to specialize them. Nowadays, the artificial sexual differences are being removed, men and women are working together, but there are deep natural differences which seem likely to remain.

The deepest of these differences is that between maleness and femaleness, but the author restricts himself (in purpose, at least) to considering the contrast as it is expressed in secondary sexual characters. "A human secondary sexual character is one which, by more highly differentiating the sexes, helps to make them more attractive to each other," so favoring reproduction. As standards of comparison two are used: on the one hand, the anatomical and physiological characters of the child; on the other hand, the characters of the ape, the savage, and the aged human creature.

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As regards growth, three general conclusions are reached: women are more precocious than men; in women there is an earlier arrest of development; as a result of these two facts the proportions of women tend to approach those of small men and of children. "The greater youthfulness of physical type in women is a very radical characteristic, and its influence vibrates to the most remote psychic recesses."

The evolution of the race has implied a growth of brains, and increase in the development of the head; but this demands an expansion and development of the pelvis,—a movement in which women are the natural leaders. Man's skull, contrasted with woman's, is nearer the savage, simian, and senile; woman's is less far removed from the infantile. As to the brain, there is no anatomical or physiological warrant for attributing superiority to either sex, though the reverse will probably be stated for many years to come.

Nor do experiments bear out another popular impression, that women have, on the whole, keener and more delicate sense-perceptions,—an error probably due to confusing sensibility and irritability. For women respond to stimuli, psychic or physical, more readily than men; their vaso-motor and muscular systems are more readily stimulated; in short, women show greater irritability or affectability.

There seems no reason to believe that women are inferior to men in forming accurate sense-judgments, while, when the hand is concerned, they are usually, for obvious reasons, at an advantage. In regard to intellectual impulse, it seems almost impossible to generalize. "The artistic impulse, however, is vastly more spontaneous, more pronounced, and more widely spread among men than among women." While the industries arose in woman's hands, the arts are man's. This is in part traceable to the important fact that man, like other males, shows a greater variational tendency. His curve tends oftener to diverge from the mean.

Woman varies less, but this has its compensations. She remains, as it were, younger. Yet to speak of woman as undeveloped man is altogether misleading. "The infant ape is very much nearer to man than the adult ape; the human infant bears precisely the same relation to his species as the simian infant bears to his." (We think that the author somewhat exaggerates this good point.) Woman is child-like only as genius is child-like. "The progress of our race has been a progress in youthfulness." Man follows woman, the little child leads both.

"Nature, as Humboldt put it, has taken women under her special protection." For as woman has the larger share in the work of securing the continuance of the race, she has a firmer grip of life. Man is, after all, the weaker vessel, but he has compensations.

"A broad and general survey of the secondary sexual phenomena in humanity brings us at last into a very humble and conservative attitude

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before the facts of the natural world." Artificial or conventional differences between the sexes arise and disappear, and are replaced by others. But the ancient sexual differences remain, "and it is safer to trust to the conservatism of Nature than to the conservatism of man." But within certain limits the natural differences are modifiable, only the limits can hardly be known until they are reached. The respective fitness of men and of women for certain work or privileges can hardly be tested except by experiment. And we need not fear experiment, for Nature has a broad base. "The world is not so insecurely poised."

Mr. Havelock Ellis has been too cautious to lay himself open to much criticism. But we wish, we hope not ungraciously, to criticise his caution. In the first place, because he has too much restrained himself from practical applications. It may be, as he says, that his investigation does not give the definite solution of definite problems, but it sheds light at least on some, and the people perish for lack of knowledge. In the second place, we think that the author would have strengthened his work by taking more account of the primary constitutional difference between the sexes. For, after all, the big fact is surely that man is a male and woman a female. This is the primary difference, with psychical as well as physiological content,—a difference which began with the Protozoa, and which cannot be understood apart from its pre-human history.

Of course, we see that the author has deliberately refrained from considering this primary contrast, and there may be better reasons for his reserve than we are aware of. But he is not consistent; many of the differences in metabolism which he skilfully expounds are not, even on his own definition, secondary sexual characters. Nor is the greater variational tendency of man, which he justly emphasizes. But we do not wonder that the author could not confine himself to secondary sexual characters; they are so ill-defined.

The matter presents itself thus to our mind. A germ of a certain protoplasmic constitution becomes a male; another germ of a certain other constitution becomes a female. (What originated and determines the difference is another story.) They have much in common,—namely, the general specific characters,—and they have each their sex-peculiarity. This sex-peculiarity is expressed in the development of essential sex-organs, in the growth of important accessories, in correlated trivialities, and in the characteristic physiological and psychological diatheses of the man or woman, so far as these are not artificially induced. Now, among these outcrops or expressions of the constitutional sex-peculiarity

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there are many, at various levels, which are of value in mutual attraction or preferential mating. Some of these are called secondary sexual characters. But there are other characters which appear to arise differently, not as necessary outcrops of the particular sex-constitution nor as correlates of such, but as germinal variations which owe their growth and persistence to their utility in mutual attraction. These form another group of secondary sexual characters. In short, what are called secondary sexual characters are of mixed origin. It seems ungrateful to grumble, but we cannot help wishing that so lucid a writer and thinker as Mr. Havelock Ellis had helped us on a little with the ætiology of the problem.

J. ARTHUR THOMSON.

EDINBURGH.

EVOLUTION AND ETHICS AND OTHER ESSAYS. By T. H. Huxley. (Vol. IX. of the Collected Essays.) London: Macmillan & Co., 1894. Pp. xiii., 334.

"The latter (the primitive savage, or man as mere animal) fights out the struggle for existence to the bitter end like any other animal; the former (the ethical man, the member of society or citizen) devotes his best energies to the object of setting limits to the struggle." To this passage, which occurs on page 203 of the present volume in an essay (date 1888) entitled "The Struggle for Existence in Human Society," the author appends a note, "The reader will observe that this is the argument of the Romanes lecture in brief." The Romanes lecture on "Evolution and Ethics" (date 1893), and its prolegomena of 1894, are the papers of chief interest in this volume, and, as the author indicates, carry out the argument of the passage above cited. It would even appear that Mr. Huxley's views are developing in this direction, when we compare the Romanes lecture with the tone of his utterances on "General" Booth's social scheme, which also are here republished. I need not apologize, I believe, to readers of this JOURNAL for treating the antithesis thus stated as the gist of the work before me, which is full, of course, of the familiar excellences of Mr. Huxley's writing, and contains an interesting discussion of capital from the biologist's point of view.

In Plato's analysis of society, it will be remembered, the ethical process is regarded as consciously adopting for its aim the principle which had blindly operated through the whole kingdom of

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nature and the first unions of mankind; that is to say, the maintenance of a system in which individuals are fitted by positive qualities to co-operate as members of a whole. The philosopher was well aware that the maintenance of such a system depended upon conditions, the negative or selective operation of which was no less essential than their direct influence. He had not Darwinism to guide him, but there is no reason to conceive of him as denying that the selective process, which in his scheme would be an aspect of competition in the service of society, might under the blind government of nature be accompanied by terrible suffering and apparent waste. But that society could prosper if human existence was to be encouraged without protest, independently of the actual or probable manifestation of human qualities, would scarcely occur to him as possible.

Such having been the sense of natural unity in the first social philosopher of the West, we cannot but be surprised when a scientific leader of the nineteenth century A.D. feels obliged, as it were, to "cut in two with an axe" the continuity of the world-process. Society compared to the plant and animal world, he tells us, is like a garden compared to a moor,—natural selection is repressed in it, and the direct modification of conditions replaces the individual's struggle with his surroundings. But the comparison comes to a stand-still for want of a social gardener to exercise the artificial selection without which no garden exists, and which Mr. Huxley, for no reason that I can see, regards as opposed to the cosmic process (page 33), instead of admitting that it belongs essentially to the same line of advance, that, namely, in which existence depends upon qualities. A garden that is its own gardener is what we need to complete the comparison; and society, as such a garden, will surely be able, if not to encourage the better stocks, at least to refrain from encouraging the obviously worse. The difficulty arises in part from Mr. Huxley's negative idea of morality, as though it were a mere inhibition of presocial activities and not a development of positive achievements and capacities. He therefore seems to forget the competitive side of co-operation, and that it is no light matter to fill a place in a civilized community, and further, that, apart from misdirected artificial selection, any stock unable to fill such a place must in one way or another cease to be perpetuated. While, on the other hand, he equally neglects the aspect of co-operation involved in competition, and seems almost to think that we do *nothing but* harm to our neighbors in taking the most efficient

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part that we can in supplying the world with commodities (page 211). Thus, as it appears to me, misapprehending the double-edged bearing both of co-operation and of competition, he naturally is unable to see the continuity of the cosmic process, in different sections of which different aspects are more apparent. We need a wider experience and a deeper analysis.

B. BOSANQUET.

LONDON.

THE MESSAGE OF MAN. A Book of Ethical Scriptures gathered from many sources and arranged. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

Our age waits dumbly for its poet. Meantime we are glad to cover the nakedness of our souls, and stay the craving of our hearts for the expression of Beauty by what scraps we can gather, as most fitting our need, from the abounding richness of the past. Beauty is eternal, but she is also ever fresh and ever young, and we shall not be satisfied till we shall have found our own expression of her. In no region are we barer than in our literature of the inner life. Those who have felt the need—and they are many—will receive with gratitude this book. It is a collection of golden sayings "from many sources," selected with very fine feeling and arranged with great skill. The pious compiler evinces a spirit of passionate devotion to moral beauty and of passionate sympathy with the needs of his fellows. His method of selection has been faithfulness "to his own personal want and sense of truth," and with a fine feeling of kinship he offers the "grains of gold" he has gathered, hoping they "may prove precious to many."

The book is a notable comment on our time. It is strikingly rich in moral and humanitarian enthusiasm, strikingly devoid of unity, whether artistic or philosophic. This is true in spite of the rare skill with which quotations from widely-different sources are interwoven, so that each separate chapter reads like the utterance of one thinker. But there seems no reason why, if the compiler had had time, he should not have added indefinitely to the ninety-two chapters in which his book is arranged. Neither can one say why any one of these comes where it does, nor why any other has been placed before or after it. One part does not grow out of the other, nor has one a sense of completeness in the whole. The book, too, is wanting in buoyancy; its spirit lacks wing. This is because its golden sayings are for the

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most part didactic or hortatory. Seldom—if ever—are they the utterances of ecstatic joy; nowhere have we the notes of a triumphant and jubilant faith. Yet surely moral enthusiasm and human sympathy are but wind and rattle and the delusion of an empty dream if the universe be not for us. But if the universe be for us, what can be against us? Either the "Message of Man" is not worth the paper it is written upon, or it is a message from the very heart of reality, the assurance to us that what is is Love. May we not hope that this same "messenger," with his fine skill and wide sympathy, will, in the future editions which his book so richly merits, give us some token of this joyous assurance.

M. S. GILLILAND.

LONDON.

HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND. Translated, with five introductory essays, by William Wallace, M.A., LL.D., Fellow of Merton College and Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Oxford. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894. Pp. cciv. + 197.

It may seem ungrateful to begin an account of what Professor Wallace has done by complaining that he has not done more, and yet we cannot help regretting that he did not add to the obligations which he was conferring on students of Hegel by translating the "Zusätze" included in the collected works, instead of confining himself to the original text. In many cases the reports of what Hegel said in lecture are considerably clearer than the paragraphs on which he was commenting, and the result of the omission is that the student of Hegel in English remains at a considerable disadvantage. The increase in the bulk of the translation might have been a distinct gain, if it had forced Professor Wallace's own work out of the subordinate position in which he has placed it. His commentary is a good deal more than an introduction to his translation, and to have had it in a separate volume would have been a convenience to many readers to whom the translation is unnecessary.

Of the five essays, which occupy rather more than half the entire volume, the first and most important is entitled, "On the Scope of a Philosophy of Mind." The relation of Hegel's philosophy to ethics and to religion is treated with very great felicity of thought and expression. Not only is the subordination of subjective *Moralität* to objective *Sittlichkeit* brought out, but justice is done to

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an even deeper characteristic of Hegel,—the subordination of all morality, even in the wider sense, to religion, as compared to which it is only an inferior and imperfect realization of Absolute Mind. Between Hegel and the philosophers who deify Duty there is a great gulf fixed; a fact which has perhaps not been sufficiently recognized in England. The emphasis with which he has asserted that morality is imperfect till it is embodied in social life has possibly made us forget the further doctrine, of which Professor Wallace reminds us, "that the social order, however omnipotent it may seem, is limited and finite, and that man has in him a kindred with the Eternal" (p. ccxxiii.).

The treatment of Hegel's relation to revealed religion is also very interesting, and lays sufficient weight on the difference between his stand-point and that of orthodox Christianity,—a difference which is sometimes ignored by commentators in an excess of religiosity.

Religiosity, however, is a danger against which Professor Wallace is always on his guard. It is the fear of it which has led him to translate *Geist* by Mind, instead of by Spirit. It is no doubt true, as he remarks, that "to average English minds the word spiritual would carry us over the medium line into the proper land of religiosity" (p. l.). It might be added that spirit is rather apt to suggest either an independent reality above individuals as their creator or a mere substance out of which individuals are formed, rather than a unity which only exists in differentiation, and which is a unity only because it is differentiated. There is always a danger that Hegel will be misinterpreted in the direction of crude theism or of crude pantheism, and that individuals will be degraded into mere creatures, or mere modes of the Absolute, and this danger is certainly lessened if we take mind instead of spirit as the name of the ultimate reality.

This course, however, is not free from disadvantages. The word mind would cause many readers to lay too much stress on the individuality and multiplicity of finite persons, and to forget that Hegel only holds them to be real and individual in so far as they are held together by a unity compared to which an organism is a loose and superficial bond. And to say that all reality was mind might be misinterpreted as an identification of Hegel's position with Berkeley's,—a mistake which would be less likely if we spoke of spirit. And if spirit suggests a resemblance between Hegel's philosophy and orthodox theology, which does not really

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exist, it points out, far more clearly than the alternative rendering, that Hegel regarded his system as doing all, and more than all, that orthodox theology had aimed at.

Certainly it is now more often held that Hegel ignored experience than that he never went beyond it, and for this reason Professor Wallace's choice must be regarded as correct. But it must be taken rather as an emendation of Hegel's own exposition than as equivalent to it, for, whether rightly or wrongly, it is always the side of unity and universality on which any over-emphasis in the original falls.

The second, third, and fourth essays deal with various points in Hegel's psychology, especially in connection with ethics. Professor Wallace remarks on the strange unwillingness of "transcendent" ethics to acknowledge the full and complete connection between the world of ethics and the world of nature,—an unwillingness absolutely incompatible with Hegel, although occasionally found in connection with what has been called Neo-Hegelianism (p. cxix.). And he also reminds us that ethics, if taken as a science, will, as much as psychology or the physical sciences, construct an unconscious and uncritical metaphysics of its own, which will be as incomplete as the other two, and may be more practically dangerous (p. lxi.).

The fifth essay is largely occupied by an account of the "Criticism of the German Constitution" of 1802, and of the "System der Sittlichkeit" of the same date. The interest of the latter is considerable, as showing that, however marked Hegel's affection for the Greek view of the state is in his systematic works, it was much stronger in the earlier part of his life.

On the whole, the volume must be considered as a very important help to the study of Hegel. It is to be hoped Professor Wallace will not be weary in well-doing. Much of Hegel still remains inaccessible to the English reader, and no one is better fitted to act as an interpreter.

J. Ellis McTaggart.

Trinity College, Cambridge.

The Natural History of the Christian Religion. By William Mackintosh, M.A., D.D. Glasgow: James MacLehose & Sons, 1894.

Dr. Mackintosh essays to construct a "natural," as opposed to a "supernatural," history of Christian doctrine. His general

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position may be said to be that of ordinary historical science. The certainty of science is held to involve the impossibility of miracle, and accordingly any true account of the Christian religion must have an anti-supernatural basis. Even though the special genius of Jesus be admitted as fully as is necessary, nevertheless the gradual growth of his doctrine may be traced in the history of Israel, just as its further development may be seen in the history of Christian dogma. The general idea of development may be applied to the Christian religion in exactly the same way as to any other part of history. But, while using the idea of development without giving to it a very precise signification, Dr. Mackintosh endeavors to cut the Christian religion clear of metaphysics. He holds strongly to the absoluteness of scientific law; but he does not attempt to give any account of the meaning of law or any metaphysical justification of it. His stand-point is avowedly scientific rather than philosophical. "We may dismiss at once every form of religious belief which is at variance with a single well-ascertained scientific fact" (p. 79). But while science may "in a certain sense lay claim to finality," arriving at "results which can never be overturned or set aside," there can be no such finality in speculative philosophy, and consequently we cannot base our religious opinions upon any philosophical system. It is thus a great satisfaction to Dr. Mackintosh to be able to maintain that Jesus was not a philosopher nor the exponent of a system. "The distinctive doctrine of Jesus rested on facts of his consciousness, and was therefore independent of any recognized theory; but, like every doctrine resting on fact and giving a true reflection of fact, it was capable of entering into combination with, and finding a place for itself in, the true theory of the universe, whatever that might prove to be" (p. 81).

It is impossible, however, thus to run away from metaphysics, and, with the best of intentions, Dr. Mackintosh cannot help being a metaphysician,—or, at least, using metaphysical principles. Nothing can be claimed, whether for science (natural and theological), for common knowledge, or for practice, except upon more or less definite metaphysical grounds. Dr. Mackintosh does not fully systematize his views; but his stand-point indirectly implies such metaphysical positions as that facts are given and absolute, while theories are constructed and changing, or, more generally, that there is (in religion or elsewhere) a permanent which is entirely outside of all change. Otherwise the distinction which

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he draws between the finality of science and the absence of finality in philosophy has no meaning.

The chief feature of the unchanging or "fact" element in the doctrine of Jesus is what Dr. Mackintosh (following E. von Hartmann) calls the "autosoteric" method of deliverance from evil, the method of salvation by the exercise of personal freedom. The opposite, or "heterosoteric" view, he regards as a later development in Christian teaching and as closely connected with the supernatural conception of Jesus. Into a discussion of this it is impossible here to enter, but it seems to me that Dr. Mackintosh is inclined to lay too much stress on an abstract freedom of will; on the "need, in the last resort, for an act of decision on the part of the individual himself," in addition to all that may come to him through his "organic connection with the race" of which he is a member (p. 150). The truly autosoteric view must not exclude heterosoteric considerations, nor must it merely be "qualified" by them; but, in one way or another, it must be shown to transcend them and to include them within itself. Thus, in dealing with the forgiveness of sins, Dr. Mackintosh gives an interesting account of *self*-forgiveness as a kind of noble, spiritual self-assertion, but we find no satisfactory explanation of the forgiveness of others.

The plan of the book is to give (1) the general basis of the author's "anti supernatural position," (2) the consequences as regards the doctrine of Jesus, (3) the gradual development in Israel of the ideas of righteousness and of the kingdom of God, and the modifications which Jesus made in these ideas. Upon this there follow (4) an account and discussion of the death of Jesus and the appearances to the disciples, and (5) the gradual development of Christian dogma through mythical tradition, and afterwards through Pauline, Petrine, and Gnostic influences, while a concluding chapter refers briefly to later thought. On the whole, the book is one of much ability and learning, and, in spite of its somewhat cumbrous style, it cannot fail to interest all who desire a reconstruction of Christian dogma. Its close affinity with the Ritschlian school of theology, now dominant in Germany and already influencing the thought of other countries, may further commend it to the attention of English-speaking readers.

ROBERT LATTA.

UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS.

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ELEMENTARY COURSE OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. Based on the Principles of the Best Scholastic Authors. Adapted from the French of Brother Louis, of Poissy. By the Brothers of the Christian Schools. New York: P. O'Shea, 45 Warren Street, 1893. Pp. xxx., 539.

This text-book of Catholic Philosophy is, as might be supposed, almost throughout an exposition of the Thomistic doctrine. Whatever material in the book is not pretty directly derived from St. Thomas, consists of references to modern philosophy and to recent scientific and theological issues, of a few historical notes, and of a certain amount drawn from the general stores which form the common treasury of all scholastic writers. The American translators have added here and there to their French original, which the present reviewer has not seen. The work of both translator and original author appears to be done, so far as the present writer ventures to judge, with a characteristic submissiveness and modesty, but with a technical skill that is certainly enviable. The manner of statement, the tone of the discussion, are agreeably influenced by the spirit of the master himself, of whom Cajetan, the commentator of the "Summa," happily declared that his was that fashion of writing *ubi nulla judicem turbet invidia.* In short, this text-book is not one of controversy, but of exposition, and of positive teaching in the spirit of St. Thomas. It will hardly make converts; it cannot make enemies; it is worthy of a place on every student's shelf, so far as one may feel the need of a compendious reference-book of the principal theses of the Thomistic philosophy.

The extensive array of ecclesiastical approbations, including a laudatory letter from the Pope to the French author, can interest us who stand without but moderately. What attracts us most is the completeness and minuteness of this bird's-eye view of the universe as St. Thomas conceived it. This synthesis (one of the most ingenious in the history of thought) of so many strangely-united elements,—of Neo-Platonic mysticism (as introduced into later theology through "Dionysius" and through others), of the principal Aristotelian conceptions, and of the distinctively orthodox theology of the church,—this wonderful organism which St. Thomas developed, and which has shown such marvellous vitality, is presented to us here in what seems to be an absolutely faithful and an extraordinarily complete miniature. Catholic text-books have very generally the advantages, very often also the defects, of

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books written under authority, and with a large tradition behind them. Where such books are polemical, in the usual sense, they only weary us. St. Thomas himself, with his method of impartially presenting all views before deciding, is far above mere polemic, and, even if one is no scholar in mediæval thought, one reads his Latin with a constant delight in his ingenuity, his kindliness, and his many-sidedness. It is one of the principal good deeds of the present Pope that, in changing the current of theological discussion in his church, he has relieved us of a great deal of painful controversial literature by setting the thinkers of his faith at work in the spirit of a profound philosopher who, among other things, was quite as much a gentleman as he was a saint, and who was also quite as fond of thinking, just for thought's own dear sake, as he was of victoriously confounding the infidels. The Catholic philosophizing of a recent generation often wrangled with us, complained of us, and was bitterly controversial. The Catholic thinking of the moment remembers the angelic doctor, who might or might not be convincing, but who always kept his temper, and loved truth precisely as did Aristotle, because it was beautiful to look upon. To think in this fashion is certain to advance the cause of mutual understanding.

Of course, the present book is but an introduction to the Thomistic doctrine, and we must confess that the ethical division seems to us, from the point of view of a scientific criticism, the least impressive and satisfactory portion of the work. Nevertheless, viewed in its limitations, this text-book is still admirable, in so far as it is not, like some other scholastic summaries, a statement of the letter of the master, but reads as something conceived in his spirit. The guarded and more or less distant references to current scientific topics, such as hypnotism, or to the problem of the origin of species, might well have been omitted. After all, it is useless to call upon the angelic doctor concerning matters that were not to be comprehended in his terms. Our authors are very reserved, as it is. Would not entire silence have been better here?

JOSIAH ROYCE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

AGAINST DOGMA AND FREE WILL, AND FOR WEISMANNISM. By H. Croft Hiller. Second Edition. London: Williams & Norgate, 1893. Pp. xvi., 300.

This volume is one of those intemperate and dogmatic applications of scientific theories which excuse and explain the reluctance

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of many thoughtful persons to accept the theories so crudely and rudely flung at their heads. Those who can overcome their dislike to the manner of the book will find a good deal that is suggestive, not, indeed, of solutions, but of problems, in regard to social and political ethics.

D. G. RITCHIE.

PHILOSOPHY AND DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION: Being the Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Edinburgh, 1894. By Otto Pfleiderer, D.D., Professor of Theology, University of Berlin. In two volumes: Vol. I., PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION; Vol. II., ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIANITY. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1894. Pp. 331, 356.

These volumes contain probably the most solid results that have yet been produced by the Gifford foundation in Edinburgh. Indeed, it is scarcely too much to say that, with the exception of Caird's "Evolution of Religion," they contain the only results, so far, of the Gifford foundation in Scotland that are likely to have any permanent interest. Much of the material, however, which is contained in them, lies altogether beyond the scope of our JOURNAL. The second volume contains an historical sketch of Christianity, interesting (as coming from a Professor of Theology) from the frank way in which the Christian traditions are admitted to be mythological, and from the bold vindication of the theme that

> "What never and nowhere as fact did hold,
> Is that alone which never can grow old!"

But in other respects this volume does not concern us,—unless it be for the account which it contains of the ethical teaching of the Apostle Paul. The first volume is rather more within our province. At least, it contains several chapters which can hardly be without interest to the readers of this JOURNAL; notably chap. ii., on religion and morality, and chap. vi., on the revelation of God in the moral and religious order of the world. The former is one of the best attempts that I have seen to demonstrate the essential relation between religion and morality. The most essential point, perhaps, is that brought out on p. 59, where the question is raised:

> "Whether in the case of many, and even the most earnest, representatives of religionless morality, the professed irreligiosity is not rather more apparent than real? They repudiate the religion exhibited in the definite form of the ecclesiastical dogmas in which they have learned to know it; but does it follow from

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this that religious belief, or piety, is extraneous to them in every sense? In the case of men of truly moral sentiment we may well doubt the possibility of their total irreligiousness; for the upright man who is earnestly interested not merely in the appearance of the good or external legality and respectability, but for the good itself, cannot but attribute to the good the highest right in the world, and therefore must demand its victorious assertion and accomplishment in reality. But in demanding this, and feeling the right of this demand, he will also have the courage to believe in its truth, to believe therefore in the good as the true power over the world, or in such a constitution of the actual world that it must serve as a means for the realization of the good."

Dr. Pfleiderer's discussion of the relation of religion to reason seems to me good. If any one has been misled by Mr. Benjamin Kidd's views about the "ultra-rational," these volumes might serve as a useful antidote. The tone of the book is perhaps too much that of a preacher; but on the whole it supplies a temperate statement of some of the best results of modern speculation on such matters; and while neither for its philosophic nor for its literary power can it for a moment be compared with Professor Caird's book on the same subject (to which, in its broad outlines, it bears a strong resemblance), yet it is possible that its more cautious and eclectic spirit may commend it more to a certain class of readers. The translation does not appear to be very satisfactorily done. Some of the sentences are thoroughly German in structure and idiom, and a few of them are scarcely intelligible.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF.

LECTURES ON THE BASES OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF. Delivered in Oxford and London in April and May, 1893. By Charles B. Upton, B.A., B.Sc., Professor of Philosophy in Manchester College. [*The Hibbert Lectures*, 1893.] London: Williams & Norgate, 1894. Pp. xii., 364.

In his preface, Professor Upton says that the aim of these lectures is "to find a natural and rational ground for Theism in the normal self-consciousness of mankind." "The philosophical writers," he adds, "whose works have had the greatest influence on the composition of these lectures are Dr. James Martineau and the late Professor Hermann Lotze; and the position of these two distinguished thinkers on the basal question of the Freedom of the Will is accepted and expounded." Like "his revered teacher in philosophy," to whom this volume is fittingly dedicated, Professor Upton appeals in the last resort to the intuitions of the individual

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consciousness, though there are many passages which seem to show that he has departed from the individualist or "idio-psychological" thinking of Dr. Martineau farther than he would, perhaps, admit. Like Lotze, Professor Upton admits the untenableness of a "pluralist" metaphysics; though, like Lotze, in criticising "Absolute Idealism," he seems to fall back on a pluralist manner of envisaging the universe. On page 226 we read, "In the case of our own self-consciousness, it is just because we are not merely individual minds, but are through the immanent Divine reason indivisibly united with the eternal life of God, that we are able to pass from the merely personal to the universal point of view, to impartially compare ourselves with others and pass judgment upon our worth." Such a passage reminds one of T. H. Green. Yet, on page 322, it is urged that "Idealism cannot allow to the individual man the possession of a real and permanent Self, to whom a certain independent causality and freedom of action is delegated by the Eternal;" and on page 307, God is spoken of as waiting "to see the issue of that moral freedom which He has conferred on us," so that "the relation between the individual soul and God is of perpetual and ever-new interest to the Eternal as well as to man." Similarly, on page 334, Professor Upton quotes, approvingly, some rather doggerel verses of Browning:

> "God, whose pleasure brought
> Man into being, stands away,
> As it were, a hand-breadth off, to give
> Room for the newly-made to live,
> And look at Him from a place apart
> And use his gifts of brain and heart."

Such language is undoubtedly in accord with the usual picture-thinking of popular religion; but is it in accord with the admission of an immanent divine reason? If in any strict sense the individual human soul is "a *real* and *permanent* Self," and if "God" has to wait to see what will happen, is not this a system of pluralism (or, as we might call it, polytheism), which, in Lotze's phrase, will have to give place, for those who try to think coherently, to a deeper "Monism" behind it? And if the name "God" be used in philosophical discussion, must it not be reserved for the Reason which, if the universe is ultimately a rational system, is immanent in both the "waiting God" and the souls to whom freedom is "delegated"? If there is no such immanent Reason in the last resort, the universe is not a rational system, but chance or fate is supreme. It is very

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clear that the dogma of "free will," surviving where most other dogmas have been discarded, is what keeps back Professor Upton from accepting an Idealist solution. The question cannot be discussed in this brief notice; but may one ask Professor Upton, and those who like him demand "a real free will," to believe that the cautious determinist does not believe in fatalism, and that moral responsibility seems inexplicable to him except on the supposition that motives are "causes" of actions exactly in the same sense (and in the same sense only) as that in which one physical phenomenon is called the cause of another?

The volume may be cordially recommended as, among other things, an interesting, temperate, and lucid exposition of the free-will doctrine.

D. G. RITCHIE.

MONISM, AS CONNECTING RELIGION AND SCIENCE. The Confession of Faith of a Man of Science. By Ernst Haeckel. Translated from the German by J. Gilchrist, M.A., B.Sc., Ph.D. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1894. Pp. viii., 117.

It is doubtful whether it was worth while to translate this little essay. The tone of it is somewhat offensively dogmatic; the speculations of the author in departments of science other than his own strike one as being a trifle crude; and some of the remarks, such as that "every religious dogma which represents God as a 'Spirit' in human form, degrades Him to a 'gaseous vertebrate,'" are in questionable taste. Still, the high reputation of the author gives his book a certain claim to attention, and, no doubt, it will be of interest to some readers of this JOURNAL. Fortunately, it only occupies a little over a hundred pages.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

PLATO'S REPUBLIC. The Greek Text. Edited, with Notes and Essays, by the late B. Jowett, M.A., Master of Balliol College, Oxford, and Lewis Campbell, LL.D., Emeritus Professor of Greek in the University of St. Andrews. In Three Volumes. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1894. Pp. xv., 490; xxxiv., 356; 512.

These three handsome volumes are chiefly interesting to the Greek scholar rather than to the student of Ethics; and they cannot here be reviewed at length. They impress one, however, as being one of the most solid contributions to philosophical

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scholarship made by the late Master of Balliol. The notes are copious, and often highly characteristic in their quaint suggestiveness. Taken along with the translations, they form a very satisfactory completion of a great work. The Essays are, for the most part, the work of Professor Campbell.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

REPORT ON THE CHICAGO STRIKE OF JUNE–JULY, 1894, BY THE UNITED STATES STRIKE COMMISSION, appointed by the President July 26, 1894, under the provisions of Section 6 of Chapter 1063 of the Laws of the United States, passed October 1, 1888. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1894. Pp. 53.

The facts brought out in the above Report are tolerably well known by this time both in Europe and America. The present notice must content itself with a brief reference to the principles involved.

The appointment of the United States Strike Commission was a significant event in our industrial history. According to a view more or less prevalent heretofore, strikes are private affairs with which the public has no concern save as they involve breaches of the peace. The causes of a strike—disagreements of some sort between workingmen and their employers—are not supposed to come under the purview of the public authority. This view finds expression in such language as the following from one of our ablest weekly journals, *The Nation:*

"Labor disputes are generally very simple, and nobody can possibly settle them but the parties to them. . . . *The interference of outsiders, unless asked for by both sides, ought to be a gross impertinence.*" (November 22, 1894. Italics are ours.)

The same journal, in commenting on the United States Attorney-General's report on the Chicago strike, as contrasted with that of the Strike Commission, said,—

"Attorney-General Olney's report brushes aside the merits of the Pullman strike, and takes up simply the duty and activity of the government in view of the lawlessness that grew out of it. *This was all the authorities at Washington had any occasion to consider carefully at any time*, and it is really all they need to consider now." (December 13, 1894. Italics are ours.)

Apparently the chief executive of the nation took a different view. The violence connected with the strike was at last dealt with by him in a decisive manner. He directed no special inquiry into

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this aspect of the strike. The Commission was appointed by him "to *examine the causes of said controversies*, the conditions accompanying the same, and the best means of their adjustment," and he cited as authority for creating such a commission Section 6, Chapter 1063, of the laws of the United States, passed October 1, 1888. He used additional language as follows:

"The said Commission is hereby directed to visit the State of Illinois and the city of Chicago, and such other places in the United States as may appear proper in the judgment of the Commission, *to the end that it may make careful inquiry into the causes of any pending dispute or existing controversies*, and hear all persons interested therein who may come before it." (Italics are ours.)

In other words, the authorities at Washington do *not* hold that the only thing they need to consider carefully in a railroad strike is the lawlessness growing out of it.

The Report itself is a creditable public document. Its substantial truth and accuracy have not been questioned save by interested parties, and, possibly, those who in general distrust any utterance that reflects on corporations. The *Nation* (November 22, 1894) called it "reasonably complete and impartial." The recommendations, however, with which it concludes, have not been received with favor. The *Nation* pronounces it (probably from this point of view) "a very disturbing document." And it must be admitted to *be* disturbing (so far as it is likely to have practical influence) to those who believe that government should have nothing to do with the internal management of corporations. The gist of the "recommendations" is that some public tribunal should investigate a railroad strike in the future (whenever "the public peace or convenience is involved"), should report, and, if necessary, render a decision, which decision should be binding on the railroad company, though not necessarily in the same way on the employees of the company. This latter provision has an air of inequality and injustice, and leads the *Nation* to speak of "Carroll D. Wright's absurd scheme of one-sided compulsory arbitration—in which the government always forces the employer to yield, but never the employee." (December 6, 1894.)

The injustice, however, is more apparent than real. Injustice is not in treating persons unequally, but in treating *equal* persons unequally. Railroad companies have, it must be remembered, certain high privileges conferred upon them by the public (the right of eminent domain, for instance). In turn they have certain obli-

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gations to the public. Unlike private firms or individuals, they must, for example, continuously do business, having no right to "stop their cars for one hour, much less one week or one year" (*cf.* Judge Gaynor, In the matter of the application of Loader for a writ of mandamus *v.* The Brooklyn Heights Railroad Company, January 24, 1895; also, The People *v.* N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 28 Hun. 543). The employees of railroad companies, however, have no special privileges, and they have no special duties above those of other private individuals. They are not beholden to the State, and they may not be controlled by the State, —that is, in the same way that the State may control its own creations. If the employees of a railroad company were a part of it, having the benefit of its franchises and profits, the situation would be different; but as it is, they are simply hired by the company, and have not even the right of continuity of employment. For the government to compel them to work at a certain wage would, then, be an extraordinary invasion of natural liberty (which could only be justified if the government gave them some extraordinary protection or privilege). And, it may be added, that to compel *private* employers to pay a certain wage would be an equally extraordinary proceeding. But public or semi-public corporations stand in a different category. From the very fact that they are the recipients of peculiar privileges from the government, government has a right of control over them that it has not over private persons—unless, of course, in creating the corporations it contracted with them not to interfere with their liberty. The present writer believes that the sober second thought of the American people will recognize this distinction, and that the future will regard both the appointment of the United States Strike Commission and the recommendations which it has made, as landmarks in the industrial history of the Republic.

WILLIAM M. SALTER.

PHILADELPHIA.

IF CHRIST CAME TO CHICAGO. A Plea for the Union of all who Love in the Service of all who Suffer. By W. T. Stead. Published at office of "Review of Reviews," 125, Fleet Street, London, 1894.

This is a very startling book, written in the most sensational manner possible. The ancient Hebrew prophets were not more outspoken in their denunciation of the abominations of Israelitish

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life than Mr. Stead is in his denunciation of the abominations—civic, social, and industrial—of the citizens of Chicago. The harassed reader is glad to remember that it is true, not only that righteousness exalteth a nation, but that the common life of a community is made possible only by the goodness of its members, and this suggests the reflection that the shadows in Mr. Stead's picture must be out of proportion to the lights. The work is characterized by brilliant journalistic capacity, by fearless and ruthless frankness, by the marks of gigantic energy, and by striking powers of organization, as well as by qualities of method and taste which are peculiarly Mr. Stead's own.

M. S. GILLILAND.

THREE MONTHS IN A WORKSHOP. A Practical Study. By Paul Göhre, General Secretary of the Evangelical Social Congress. Translated from the German by A. B. Carr. With a Prefatory Note by Professor Richard T. Ely. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1895. Pp. xi., 219.

The original German of this interesting little book ("Drei Monate Fabrikarbeiter") has already been noticed in this JOURNAL (vol. ii., No. 3, April, 1892); and it now only remains to give it a cordial welcome in its English form. It should be read by every one interested in social problems.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

NATURAL RIGHTS. A Criticism of some Political and Ethical Conceptions. By Professor David G. Ritchie, M.A. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

SOCIALISM. By Professor R. Flint, D.D., LL.D. London: Isbister & Co., 1895.

THE MESSAGE OF MAN. A Book of Ethical Scriptures, gathered from many sources and arranged. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

SCIENCE AND ETHICS. Being a Series of Six Lectures delivered under the Auspices of the Natural Law Research League. By W. A. Macdonald. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1895.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF BELIEF. By Right Hon. Arthur James Balfour, M.P. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1895.

THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS. By James H. Hyslop, Ph.D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1895.

INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS. By Marietta Kies, Ph.D. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1894.

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IDEALS AND INSTITUTIONS. Their Parallel Development. By John Ernest Merrill. Hartford, Conn.: Hartford Seminary Press, 1894.

MENTAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE CHILD AND THE RACE. By James Mark Baldwin, M.A., Ph.D. New York and London: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

A COMPANION TO PLATO'S REPUBLIC. For English readers, being a Commentary adapted to Davies and Vaughan's Translation. By Bernard Bosanquet, M.A. (Oxon.) LL.D. (Glasgow), formerly Fellow of University College, Oxford. New York: Macmillan & Co.

COMTE, MILL, AND SPENCER: An Outline of Philosophy. By Professor John Watson, LL.D. Glasgow: MacLehose & Sons; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

LOGIC. By Dr. Christoph Sigwart. In two volumes. Second edition, revised and enlarged. Translated by Helen Dendy. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

LAW IN A FREE STATE. By Wordsworth Donisthorpe. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

THE MELANCHOLY OF STEPHEN ALLARD: A Private Diary. Edited by Garnet Smith. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1894.

DARWINISM AND RACE PROGRESS. By Professor J. B. Haycraft, M.D., D.Sc., F.R.S.E. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1895.

THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE. A Revised Text, with Introduction, Analysis, and Commentary. By Professor Susemihl and R. D. Hicks, M.A. Books I.–V. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1894.

THE PATHOLOGY OF MIND: A Study of its Distempers, Deformities, and Disorders. By Henry Maudsley, M.D. Second edition. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

INTRODUCTION TO PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY. By Dr. Theodor Ziehen. Translated by Drs. C. C. van Lieus and Otto W. Beyer. Second edition, enlarged and improved. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

DEGENERATION. By Max Nordau. Translated from the Second Edition of the German work. London: William Heinemann, 1895.

THE KANTIAN EPISTEMOLOGY AND THEISM. By C. Wistar Hodge, Jr. Philadelphia: MacCalla & Co., 1894.

A SYLLABUS OF ETHICS. By William M. Bryant, M.A. Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co., 1894.

MONISM as Connecting Religion and Science. The Confession of Faith of a Man of Science. By Ernst Haeckel. Translated from the German by J. Gilchrist, M.A.. B. Sc., Ph.D. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1894.

WEALTH AND MORAL LAW. By E. Benjamin Andrews, D.D., LL.D. Hartford, Conn.: Hartford Seminary Press, 1894.

NOTE.—English publications intended for review in the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS should be sent to Professor J. S. Mackenzie, 3 Windsor Place, Cardiff, Wales.

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INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

JULY, 1895.

FREE-WILL AND RESPONSIBILITY.

THE question of free-will and necessity is often spoken of as incapable of solution, and the controversy on the subject is supposed to be interminable. Milton* regards a discussion on free-will as a fitting occupation for the more speculative of his fallen angels,—a refined form of eternal punishment. On the theological aspects of the question, of which Milton was chiefly thinking, I do not intend to say much at present,—the seeming contradiction between the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God on the one hand and the freedom of the individual human being on the other. I do not think that, even in the special region of theological controversy, that question bulks as largely as it did in the seventeenth century. The doctrines of predestination and election nowadays occupy comparatively little thought even among those whose religious ideas are mostly due to Calvinistic theology. I do not suppose that, apart from a few old-fashioned students, many of those who are most zealous about what they call "evangelical truth," consider the differences that separate Wesleyans from Calvinistic Methodists, Presbyterians, Baptists, and Congregationalists. One does not hear of Arminianism as a dangerous heresy at the present time: on the contrary, the de-

* "Paradise Lost," Bk. II., 557, *seq.*

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fenders of orthodoxy seem often to forget that there was ever a suspicion of heresy attached to the assertion of man's free-will. "Free-will" (in some undefined form or other) is usually supposed to be an essential doctrine that the champions of religion and morality are bound to maintain against the doctrine of necessity which is asserted by the champions of scientific thought. The "antinomy," or contradiction in thought, which troubles the modern mind, is not expressed in the form of an opposition between the eternal decrees of the Almighty on the one side and on the other the freedom of the human will, which is supposed to be implied in man's responsibility to God; but in the form of an opposition between the necessity of the causal nexus, which is presupposed by all the sciences of nature and of human nature on the one side, and on the other the freedom of the human will which is supposed to be implied in man's responsibility even to his fellow-men. From a metaphysical point of view the necessity of nature may seem to be only an element in the eternal decrees of God: but it is the requirements of science and not the requirements of systematic theology which seem to trouble the present-day defenders of free-will. There is an appearance of conflict between what is scientifically true and what is supposed to be good moral doctrine. Now an opposition between science and morality, if it is a real opposition, is a very serious matter; and it is an opposition which people cannot escape, as they think they escape the older form of the difficulty by simply disregarding theology and metaphysics as a futile waste of thought. It is worth while attempting to discuss it in order to see whether the opposition is a real one or not, and whether it may not be due to some misunderstanding of the term "necessity" on the one hand and of the term "moral responsibility" on the other. We are always too apt to discuss whether a thing is true or not, without asking first what it means and whether it means anything at all.

First of all, then, let us see what "necessity" means as postulated by science. It means nothing except the necessity of logical sequence: A is the cause of B; if A happens B must happen,—*i.e.*, from A I can infer B. If you throw a ball up

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in the air, it *must* come down again. The "must" here is not the "must" of command, as if there were some despot outside the whole universe who arbitrarily interfered with what, apart from his interference, would be the course of events we might reasonably expect. The "if—must" is simply an expression for the course of events which we may and do reasonably expect. The necessity of natural causation is presupposed by all scientific investigation; but this presupposition is identical with our presupposition that nature is an intelligible whole, a universe, and not simply a chaos of isolated and disconnected events. Our presupposition in interpreting nature is simply that nature is capable of being interpreted. There can be no science of nature unless we do assume that nature is intelligible and coherent. We understand very little of nature as yet; a great deal we human beings may never be able to understand. But all science proceeds on the assumption that phenomena are connected together in such a way that if, and when, we are sufficiently acquainted with the conditions under which an event happens, we can predict the happening of that event, whenever the conditions are fulfilled. The statement of a scientific "cause," the statement of a law of nature, is never strictly accurate unless we put in the "if," or perhaps several "ifs." If you throw a ball up in the air, it must come down again, if nothing interferes with gravitation. If the ball should alight on the roof of a house, or be caught in the branches of a tree, or by the hands of a human being, it may not come down to the earth so long as these obstacles are in the way. If you swallow a sufficient quantity of poison you will die, unless you can have a sufficient antidote administered soon enough; and so on.

Now, if there is to be a science of psychology dealing with the phenomena of the human mind, if there is to be a science of sociology dealing with the phenomena of human society, the principle of "necessity" must apply to the phenomena of human life in the same sense in which it applies to the phenomena of nature, but in the same sense only. When it is said that a frequent experience of two phenomena in immediate combination—say a double knock and the post-

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man delivering letters—will lead to a mental association being formed such that the thought of the one phenomenon tends to recall the thought of the other phenomenon, it is not meant that at any given time you will necessarily think of the postman, but only that if you hear a double knock you will most probably think of the postman, unless you happen to have a playful friend who imitates the postman's knock, or unless there be some other counteracting cause to interfere with the association. So, if it is said that centuries of oppression and misgovernment tend to incapacitate a people from managing their affairs well when they obtain their liberty, it is not meant that any given people must necessarily mismanage their affairs, but that under such conditions, unless their leaders show conspicuous energy and ability, a people are most likely to do so.

The opponents of "necessity" generally confuse it with fatalism. The difference between the necessity which I have been trying to explain and fatalism is just the difference between a statement of what under certain conditions may be foreseen and a statement of what must happen whatever the conditions may be. The necessitarian says, as every reasonable person might say, if you have sufficient ability, and if you have a sufficiently good training, and if you keep your health, you will succeed in your business, unless some particularly unfavorable combination of circumstances are against you. The fatalist or the fortune-teller predicts success irrespective of all conditions—in spite of all conditions. You are born under a lucky planet; you have certain lines on your hand, *therefore* you must succeed. Necessity means an orderly, intelligible world in which like causes produce like events. Fatalism or fortune-telling implies a chaotic world in which events may happen any how, or, at least, in which there are arbitrary interferences with the orderly sequence of events. Fate is thus the very opposite of necessity.

J. S. Mill sought to avoid the misleading associations apt to be connected with the word "necessity" by calling his theory not "necessitarianism" but "determinism." I do not think anything was really gained by the substitution of the latter

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term. It is quite as capable of gathering misleading associations round it as the other. To say that the will is "determined" by motives, and that these are "determined" by the character and circumstances of the individual, and so on, may be misunderstood to mean that some outside force intrudes and overrules the intelligible connection between cause and effect. For these misunderstandings, it must be admitted that necessitarians or determinists are a good deal to blame. They have often spoken as if the laws of nature were some despotic external authority against which man struggled in vain; they have ignored the fact that in so speaking they were opposing man to nature at the very moment when they were professedly reducing him to a part of nature, and ignoring the fact that nature, including human volitions, is not the same as nature exclusive of human volitions.

I pass now to the other side of the antinomy. What is meant by free-will? If we define free acts as those acts (of course, thoughts, volitions, etc., are "acts") of which the cause is in the agent himself,—a definition of "the voluntary" which satisfied Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas,—there is no conflict between necessitarianism, as just explained, and free-will. But such a definition is very wide and general; "the cause being in the agent" is a phrase that needs further analysis: (1) Where the cause of some movement of a person's body is external to the person—*i.e.*, where the person is not properly an agent, but is only a passive object or instrument,—there, clearly, there is not "freedom," nor is there responsibility. If you are knocked down by the fall of some scaffolding, or if you are seized by a couple of policemen and carried off to the police-station, you are not a free agent in falling down or in being carried off, and you are not held directly responsible for falling down or for being carried off, though you may be responsible by going near the scaffolding or for arousing the suspicions that have led to your being arrested. (2) Where the compulsion exercised is not directly a physical compulsion, the case is more complicated. If a brigand holds a pistol at your head and demands "Your money or your life!" your handing over your purse to him is obviously a

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voluntary act in a sense in which we could not apply the term to your having the purse torn from you by force. In the one case *you* do not act, in the other *you* do, though under terror of physical compulsion. Responsibility enters more largely into this second case than into the first. Still, the responsibility does not seem complete. The person who does even wrong or base acts under fear of death or great pain or suffering to himself or to others may be excused in a way in which he could not be excused if these threats of violence were absent. Yet there is no absolute gap between the handing over a purse to the brigand who holds at your head a pistol, which you know to be loaded and which you know he is likely to use, and assenting to a disagreeable arrangement through a remote fear of possible unpleasant consequences to yourself or to other persons; both are voluntary acts, "free" acts, in the sense of being acts springing from your own volition to move your muscles. But both may be called "involuntary" acts in the sense of being acts that you do with reluctance and with a feeling of pain and aversion. (3) We are only said to act quite freely, quite voluntarily, when the act is one that we do "with our whole heart," one that we choose not only in the sense that it is our act, for which we are in some degree responsible, but in the sense that we put ourselves into it, so to speak. For such acts, acts which are the outcome of our inclinations, we are obviously responsible in the fullest sense.

Now, so far as this goes, there is nothing yet to conflict with the statement that our volitions are due to causes in the same sense—and in the same sense only—as any other events are. Fear of pain, inclination towards an object are causes of our volition in the same sense in which rain and sunshine are causes of the growth of plants. "Yes," it may be said, "but the more important cause is left out in these statements. The plant's own nature is among the causes of its growth (a rose will not grow into a thistle), and so the individual in each case is the most important and the real cause. The external circumstances are only the occasion of his acting." But the plant's own nature, the person's own

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nature are not theoretically incapable of further analysis,—however difficult or impossible at present it may seem to understand them. Just as in the Indian mythology the world is supposed to rest on an elephant and the elephant on a tortoise, but there the search for causes comes to an end, so in practical matters we are often contented with a very short exploration of causes. The self-choosing how to act, choosing sometimes against inclination and sometimes with inclination, is the point beyond which we do not go in the ordinary analysis of conduct which is sufficient, *e.g.*, for the procedure of the law courts. When conduct is brought home to a person as the result of his own choice, he is held responsible for it. But where the lawyer may be content to stop, the psychologist and the moralist must go farther; and so must any person conscientiously examining his own conduct. Why did we choose this course rather than the other? We may wonder, perhaps, how we could have been so foolish; but if we are quite candid with ourselves, and have sufficiently good memories and sufficiently clear insight into our own habits of thinking and feeling, we shall discover what it was that made us choose the course we did. There is a fallacy of retrospection, if I may so call it, which is very apt to vitiate our examination of our own conduct in the past. We suppose ourselves back at the moment of choice with the same knowledge and experience that we have acquired since, in part as the result of that choice and of its consequences; and, besides, we suppose ourselves back at the moment of choice with the possible alternatives spread out before us in the same calm, clear light as that in which we are now looking on them. We forget that emotion remembered in tranquillity is a very different thing from emotion as actually felt. Now this familiar fallacy of retrospection seems to me to have a good deal to do with the belief that our choice is something undetermined and arbitrary; we picture ourselves in a calm and indifferent mood, surveying the possible logical alternatives, and we are loath to recognize that *in the frame of mind in which we were at the moment of choice* our choice was the inevitable outcome of that frame of mind, in the same sense in which an explosion is the inevitable outcome of

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a match applied to a cask of powder. If the match had gone out before it touched the powder, or if the powder had had its quality affected by damp, the result would have been different; and so it would have been with our conduct if our frame of mind had been altered. It may be seen here how, not determinism, but indeterminism is allied to fatalism. Indeterminism, like fatalism, supposes a want of continuity between different parts of psychical experience. To say that I must inevitably choose in a particular way, whatever frame of mind I am in, is to assert that the effect is independent of its cause. To say that I am equally able and equally likely to choose in one way or in its opposite, although my frame of mind is of a certain sort, is to assert, also, that the effect is independent of its cause. The necessitarian or determinist theory asserts that, if my frame of mind is of a certain sort, certain consequences will follow; it implies a connection between cause and effect. In other words, the motives of action are asserted to be causes of the same kind, so far as inevitableness of sequence and possibility of prediction are concerned, as the causes of physical events; and it is implied that if we could analyze with sufficient care we should always be able to see how volitions were the outcome of motives, and how motives were the outcome of our character and circumstances, and how our character was the outcome of previous acts and abstentions from acting, and so on.

The opponents of determinism are alarmed by this chain of cause and effect leading backward into infinity, and they try to stop somewhere and to find a real beginning. (1) The boldest attempt is to try to break the chain at the nearest link, and to say that we are able to act *without motives*. (2) Most "libertarians," however, nowadays disclaim this theory of absolute indeterminism, and say that we do not act without motives, but that we can make our own motives. "The will is as the strongest motive is," but it is we who make a certain motive the strongest. Now this sounds much more plausible, and is in less manifest contradiction with science than the first theory. But the assertion that we can determine which motive shall be strongest does

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not necessarily conflict with anything that the cautious determinist maintains. In urging that motives are the outcome of our character as acted on by circumstances and reacting on them, the determinist allows the character of the individual—*i.e.*, the real person—to be a cause of his motives. To assert that you can only tell how a person is likely to act if, and so far as, you know his character, is to assert that the motives are not external forces by which the individual is blindly pulled or pushed, but that they are the outcome of the person's own real self as that has come to be. If, however, the libertarian does not concede this, but insists that we come to an absolute beginning somewhere, he is only putting more elephants and tortoises under the original elephant and tortoise, but is still leaving his world poised upon nothing. He hesitates to assert directly that we can act without motives, but if he practically asserts that there are certain actions farther back, viz., volitions, which are independent of motives, he only kicks indeterminism out at the front door to let it in again at the back. Thus, so far as this second theory differs from that of the determinist, it is only the first theory over again.

(3) There is a third view which is sometimes maintained (*e.g.*, by Dr. Temple in his "Bampton Lectures"), that we are very seldom "free" in the full sense of acting apart from and contrary to motives; but that occasionally a miracle takes place, the chain of causation is broken through, and the will is for a moment free. If this only means that people often do unexpected things, or that by a great effort a person may escape from the bondage of a habit, it is true enough; but the unexpected is not that which happens without a cause, but only that of which the cause has been unforeseen or that of which the cause may remain unknown. Such occasional freedom would be the same thing as "chance"; and for scientific thought chance is only a name for our ignorance. When a scientific biologist allows himself to speak of *spontaneous* or *accidental* variations, he only means variations of which as yet the cause is unknown. If the doctrine of occasional freedom means anything more than the happening of the unexpected, it implies occasional indeterminism. So that

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we have really only one theory to discuss,—viz., that of indeterminism, or acting without motives, in such a way that prediction is not merely practically, but theoretically impossible.

Now, this theory is often supposed to be that of "the plain man," of the person who is unsophisticated by metaphysical speculations or scientific hypotheses. So far from this being the case, it would be nearer the truth to say that the theory was an invention of some of the schoolmen. Duns Scotus and William of Occam asserted that the Divine will and the human will were both "free" in the sense of having an arbitrary freedom of choice. The plain man is led to think that the free-will theory is his theory, simply because he does not face the whole problem; he is content with one tortoise under his elephant, and he stops there. Furthermore, he is repelled by the theory of determinism, because he is made to believe that it means fatalism. In all our actions (including volitions) for which we are responsible, there must be some motive determining our action. If we say a person acted without a motive, and yet hold him responsible for his action, we are speaking inaccurately. We may mean that his motive was not such as would have influenced a reasonable human being; and by this we probably mean that he had no motive such as would have influenced ourselves. That every action for which a person is held responsible must proceed from a motive is implied in the old Roman legal question,—so often misunderstood and misapplied,—*Cui bono?* (*i.e.*, who benefits by it?) If a person is accused of a murder, and it is impossible to see any motive which could have induced him to commit this murder, a presumption is created in favor of his innocence or else—we should add—of his insanity.*

When we find ourselves without a sufficient motive to decide our choice, we may ask some one else to decide for us, or we may "toss up." But our decision to "toss up" is not itself unmotived. It is due probably to the discomfort of

* The nature of insanity I need not here discuss. No libertarian psychologist is likely to wish to rest his case on the conduct of lunatics.

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indecision, the feeling that we are wasting time, or something of that sort. Suppose I am going out for a walk, and cannot make up my mind whether to turn to the right or the left. I may purposely let my decision depend on some mere "chance" in order to start myself definitely in one direction.

In arguing for the truth of determinism as against indeterminism, there is no need to deny the obvious psychological fact of indecision. But it seems rather a strange thing to think that indecision is a necessary characteristic of moral and responsible action. The plain man, who is an honest man, would rather resent being told that, when he found a purse belonging to somebody else, nobody could really tell whether he would keep it or restore it to its owner. If the honest man is a quick-tempered person, you had better get out of his way after telling him that. There are, of course, "doubtful characters;" but those are just the people on whom the police have to keep an eye—in order that fear of the policeman may form a stronger motive than the temptation to pick conveniently accessible pockets. The people who are constantly wavering between right and wrong are, surely, not the only class of persons who can act morally and be held responsible for their actions. As Mr. Bradley has very ingeniously put it, it is a strange way of proving man to be accountable to make him out to be an altogether unaccountable creature.* What we call the "reliable" person is just the person whose actions you can forecast. Would it not be absurd, if the most satisfactory person morally were just the person who through want of indecision was not properly responsible?

Of course, I do not mean that the mere facility of predicting a person's conduct proves that he is responsible. A person subject to some habitual delusion may be quite certain to act in a particular way under a particular set of circumstances. A dipsomaniac may be certain to get drunk when liquor is placed in his way. A suicidal maniac may be certain to cut his throat if knives are left about when the fit is on him. In these cases particular actions follow a particular external

* "Ethical Studies," p. 11.

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stimuli, just as a plant turns to the sunlight or a cat springs at a mouse. The rational will of the man is temporarily or permanently, in certain respects at least, in abeyance. Mere facility of prediction does not necessarily imply responsibility; but the power of predicting conduct is not inconsistent with responsibility. On the contrary, as I have just been urging, the thoroughly upright and responsible person is the person whose conduct can be predicted with more certainty than the conduct of the person of weak and unsettled character.

If we appeal to the plain man,—*i.e.*, to the ordinary experience and practice of people who are not interested in attacking or defending a philosophical dogma,—it is obvious enough that we are constantly in the habit of making fairly successful predictions about human conduct. When we make engagements with some people, we know that they will be on the spot punctually to the minute; other people we know are almost equally certain to be so many minutes late. If you arrange a picnic, you can generally be more certain that the people who have promised to come will turn up than that the day will be fine—in Great Britain. That is to say, we can predict human conduct in some matters with greater certainty than we can predict the weather. When it comes to forecasting the conduct of human beings on a large scale, the risk of failure is diminished. A shopkeeper who lays in a stock of goods for the season is predicting that a certain number of persons, more or less, will desire to purchase a certain quality and quantity of goods. He knows that a certain way of displaying his goods in the shop-windows, or certain forms of advertisement, will increase his sales. The whole huge advertising business, which relieves the ugliness of some of our streets and railway stations and disfigures the beauty of much of our scenery, is a proof of the possibility of predicting human conduct and of the fact that volitions are the outcome of motives.

Some people would, indeed, admit that we can predict the conduct of human beings in the mass or on the average, but would urge that the impossibility of precisely predicting how any particular person will act on any particular occasion

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allows a loophole for free-will in the sense of arbitrary, undetermined choice. Now, it is quite true that the most experienced shopkeeper cannot certainly predict that A or B will buy particular commodities; he may be more certain about what A will do than about what B will do, because he knows A's usual tastes better, or because B is by nature a more capricious customer than A. But on the average he may forecast a sale of a certain quantity of goods. In this uncertainty of particular prediction, however, there is nothing that is peculiar to human conduct. Of a given packet of seeds you may predict that fifty per cent. will come up, of another packet that seventy per cent. will come up, etc., but you cannot predict certainly that any particular seed will come up, though an experienced eye may see that *this* particular seed is more likely to come up than that. The principle of averages applies to voluntary human actions just as it does to any other natural phenomena, and it is vain to look for "free-will" lurking in the holes and corners of incomplete and inaccurate calculations. An argument from the fact that predictions have only a rough accuracy would prove too much; for it would prove that turnip-seed had free-will as much as men and women. As I have already had occasion to say, chance, if we are thinking carefully, is only a name for our ignorance. That we cannot in any given case make a certain prediction does not prove that events happen without a cause, "spontaneously," but only that we do not know the facts sufficiently. More perfect knowledge, which we, of course, may in this particular case never be able to obtain, would make prediction possible. As I said at the outset, the necessity of causal connection means "IF *a*, *then b*," and if we are mistaken in thinking *a* is present, we should of course be mistaken in expecting *b*, unless some other cause were present from which *b* could arise.

It is often supposed that the admission of determinism makes punishment unjust, and necessitarians have often used language which would imply that that was the case. Now, first of all, there need be no practical difficulty in the matter, provided that punishment be understood to have in view, first

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and at the very least, the protection of society from injurious individuals; secondly (what is really a part of the first purpose of punishment), a deterrent effect on the minds of persons likely to be tempted to crime; and, thirdly, when it is possible, an educative effect on the mind of the criminal himself. If a theological necessitarian murderer were to argue, "It was predestinated that I should do this murder," the judge could reply: "It was also predestined that you should be hanged; you must not isolate one event and suppose that to be predestined, while you suppose that other events happen contrary to the plan of the universe as a whole. And, furthermore, you must observe, it was not predestined that you, being a most excellent and valuable citizen, should in some uncaused way commit a crime, but that you, being a dangerous character, should commit this crime, and hence it is expedient for society to have you removed." If our murderer were a psychological determinist, and argued that, his character and circumstances being what they were, it was inevitable he should commit this crime, the judge might answer, "The severest penalty of the law is enforced in order to give a very strong motive to people like you to deter them from yielding to the temptation to do criminal acts." The criminal, the socially injurious person, is a diseased member of the body politic and must be cured or amputated. I do not see that the necessitarian theory raises any difficulty about the rightness and social necessity of punishment; it does, however, call attention to the importance of considering very carefully what kinds of punishment are really the most efficient for the purposes of social well-being. Thus, punishments which are not really deterrent are inefficient punishments; they do not sufficiently protect orderly and law-abiding persons against wrong-doers. Punishments, on the other hand, which are so severe and cruel that they make juries reluctant to bring in a verdict of "guilty," are inefficient punishments, because they enlist the moral sentiments of the community against, instead of in favor of, the laws of the land, and they lead to dangerous criminals being let loose on society by unjust verdicts of acquittal. Again, punishments which make the criminal worse instead of better are

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inefficient punishments. Punishments should be educative, if possible,—*i.e.*, if the protection of society can be sufficiently secured (that is always the primary consideration), it is better to try to turn a bad citizen into a good citizen than to give up the problem. The highest, the divinest form of punishment is the educative, the purgatorial.

Many of the profoundest philosophers have urged that in the ethical idea of punishment the idea of retribution must be present; not vengeance, not the anger of an individual spending itself on the suffering of the offender, but the assertion of the majesty of the whole society against its rebellious part. Retribution, however, as so understood, seems to me only another, and, perhaps, a somewhat misleading, way of expressing what I have called the protective and the educative functions of punishment combined. The society must assert itself against its rebellious member, and, if the rebellious member is to be reconciled to the whole, he must recognize that the suffering which recoils on his head is a just suffering. The only theory of punishment which seems to me irreconcilable with a necessitarian theory of the will is an irrational theory of punishment; a theory of arbitrary and purposeless infliction of suffering; a theory such as may be found in some of the crude popular versions of Calvinistic theology,—the theory of *Holy Willie's Prayer*, according to which the vast majority of human beings are to be tortured forever without being cured of their wickedness, while Holy Willie, being one of the elect, has, with equal purposelessness (provided that some very thorough change did not take place in his character), a happy time in heaven.

On the other hand, no rational theory of punishment seems to be compatible with any acceptance of indeterminism, even in the smallest degree or in the backmost corners of the soul. If a human being can will anything without motives or can will to will without motives, what is the use of supplying him with motives to abstain from evil? If there is anywhere any break or interruption in the causal chain, how can it be just to punish the part of the man that is affected by external and internal causes for what may have resulted from some

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intrusion of an uncaused will belonging to a totally different order of being? Indeterminism makes punishment useless and it makes it inexcusable.

A word must be said here about certain modern theories of crime which regard crime as a form of disease. Probably a considerable proportion of criminals, perhaps nearly all habitual criminals, are persons of abnormal nervous organization. But society must be protected against them, just as it is protected against dangerous lunatics; and, if we drop the name "punishment," we must retain such modes of protection and cure as prove themselves most effectual; and, for the sake of the large number of persons of weak character who need strong motives to deter them from crime, we must have such modes of dealing with antisocial conduct as will serve as an effectual deterrent.

The determinist theory has suffered greatly from the crude and injudicious way in which it has too often been presented. Thus, when it is argued that human volitions are the outcome of "character" and "circumstances," both the advocates of the theory and its opponents are apt to think of these as if they were two determinate quantities which simply needed to be joined together in order to give the result. Now, in the first place, "circumstances" which we may speak of as being "the same" are not the same, as antecedents of volition, to persons of different characters. A purse lying on the road is one circumstance to an honest character and a quite different circumstance to a dishonest or "doubtful" character. Secondly, the character is not something fixed and constant, but is being continually modified, however slightly, by circumstances, or rather by its own reaction upon circumstances; for the character is the real "self," and to say that actions are self-determined is the same thing as to say that they are determined by the character. In speaking of the causal nexus, or the causal chain, we are too apt to be led away by the easy image or picture of a continuous series, as if the movement of causation were all in one direction, and as if causes and effects could always be clearly separated off as antecedents and consequents in time. And to this fallacious simplification of the

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problem we are apt to add another, by thinking of a combination of causes as if it simply meant the adding of two quantities, each of which remained unaffected in quality by the other. Now, this is a false way of thinking about any organic life—even the lowest (I need not here discuss whether it is correct even as applied to inorganic existences). A plant's growth, its "behavior," is not a mathematical resultant of so much soil and air and sunshine added on to a given quantity—the plant's nature; the plant's behavior is the outcome of its own nature as reacting on external stimuli. The environment in which a plant finds itself may determine whether it will have luxuriant or scanty foliage, and, within limits, whether its blossoms are single or double, nay, even whether they are darker or lighter in color; but the environment will not turn a hyacinth into a tulip nor a blue hyacinth into a red one. That is the result of the plant's own nature. The power of variation which some plants inherit is very considerable, but there is a very definite limit. In the case of human beings the power of variation is very much greater, although even here there are limits.

This brings me to the subject of heredity; and it is in the name of the doctrine of heredity that the theory of necessity is often most aggressively asserted nowadays. This is partly the effect of a reaction. In the last century the significance of hereditary differences was too generally neglected in political and social theories. It was too often assumed by the "advanced thinkers" of those days that all human beings were born nearly equal and nearly similar, and that the enormous differences between them were entirely due to difference of education, difference of opportunities, difference of social surroundings. Nowadays, with biological theories in every one's mind, or, at least, biological phrases on every one's tongue, the tendency is rather the other way. Race is often treated as if it counted for everything and training as if it counted for almost nothing. The theory of heredity is often asserted in such a way that it seems only a new form of the Calvinistic doctrine of election. In this there is a good deal of exaggeration. Even among the higher animals below man

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much that is often supposed to be due to heredity is due to education. Thus, pigeons do not succeed in rearing families of young ones unless they have an experienced couple among them to teach the domestic virtues. As we go higher in the scale of animal intelligence, less, relatively, is due to inherited instinct and more to the social inheritance,—*i.e.*, to education and environment. And when we come to man, the use of language and the existence of definite institutions make possible a storing up and transmission of the results of experience which is impossible among the lower animals. The brain of the civilized man is said to differ less from that of the lowest savage than that of the lowest savage differs from that of the highest ape; but the intelligence of the civilized man, his power of thinking, his power of controlling nature to his own ends, excels that of the savage more than the power of thinking of the savage excels that of the highest ape. What makes the difference? It is not mere heredity. It is the accumulated social inheritance of the civilized man, who is the "heir of all the ages." Thus, we think wrongly about human society when we regard its destiny as determined solely by natural selection and by heredity. Man is not the mere product of natural forces: he can think, he can reflect, he can turn round on the natural forces that have produced him and direct them to some extent; he can even defy them with some success. Within limits, of course; and it can only bring disaster to forget these limits set by heredity. As the homely proverb says, "You cannot make a silk purse out of a sow's ear." You cannot make an Isaac Newton, a Darwin, or a Tennyson out of every child at the board-schools, not even if you give them free admission to the best secondary schools, free education at the universities, free access to the best libraries. But what you can do is this: you can make the average child into a more intelligent and more useful citizen than he could possibly become if left unable even to read and write, and without any of the discipline of education. And the same is the case with the effect of moral surroundings. You cannot make every one into a saint or hero, but you can do a great deal to prevent degradation. Till the effect of good, healthy sur-

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roundings is tried, you cannot be certain how much of the vitiated characters you find is due to an incurable hereditary taint, and how much simply to the effect of a bad upbringing. It is moral cowardice and intellectual falsehood to throw all the blame on "nature" without trying all that can be done by "nurture." And even with those who are proved to come of a hopelessly bad stock, cannot something be done by isolating them, to prevent a continual contamination of others and a continual propagation of the unfit? I cannot deal with that problem here. I only wish to point out that there is no real, scientific warrant for folding our hands and leaving everything to what we call "nature,"—which, as thus used, only means nature with the greater and the best part of human nature left out of it. For we must never forget that human thoughts, human aspirations, human ideals are as much a part of the phenomena which make up this causally-connected universe as the instincts and appetites that are common to man and the other animals.

People sometimes speak as if "free-will" were not true, or, at least, were incapable of being proved true, and yet were, in this same sense, a doctrine necessary for morality, a useful lie.* Now this is a somewhat dangerous attitude of mind, which accepts a fundamental contradiction between science and morality. But is it so certain that the free-will doctrine is more favorable to the interests of morality than the necessitarian? Robert Owen urged the doctrine of necessitarianism in the interests of his endeavors after social reform. The free-will doctrine,—the notion that at any moment any human being is "free" to choose between right and wrong, and that all moral evil and a great part of the physical evil in the world are due entirely to the wrong choice of individuals who might equally well have chosen rightly,—this notion has undoubtedly helped to blind people to the necessity of putting individuals in good surroundings, of giving them strong motives to choose

* This is not Kant's doctrine, but a caricature of Kant. Kant admits all that the necessitarian asks for. He only adds, though in a way that is open to many objections, that psychological necessitarianism leaves the metaphysical basis of morality unexplained.

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rightly. The free-will doctrine applied in this way has been bad for society. It is also bad for the individual. The idea that at any moment we are free to choose aright leads to a neglect of the fact that habits are gradually, though silently, growing up which may make it almost impossible for us to choose a year hence in the way in which we may still be able to choose now. We do not expect a plant to grow vigorous and strong under unfavorable conditions. We are too apt to expect human beings to do so. "Lead us not into temptation." What is the meaning of that prayer, if not that surroundings do act upon the will? And those who seek a good life must not only avoid temptations, but must get into healthy surroundings as much as they can. A negative morality is a one-sided ideal, and it is a very inadequate discipline for the soul. The great defect of ascetic morality has been, not its rigid system of discipline (we all need discipline in our lives), but its negative character. The good life is made to seem simply a series of denials, of abstinences. For the average human being this is a somewhat dangerous training,—apt to produce terrible reactions. It is not enough to cast out an unclean spirit and leave the house empty, however swept and garnished. Such a spirit is very apt to return with seven other spirits more evil than himself. Many very devout and serious persons, absorbed in their own religious life, have been slow to recognize this; and that is probably one explanation why such persons have so often failed more conspicuously in bringing up their children than more worldly persons who have had a considerable number of varied and healthy interests. "Satan finds some mischief still for idle hands to do" is an excellent warning even for those who have cast out Satan from their creed. It is a moral duty not merely to avoid evil, but to cultivate varied and healthy interests. And this is also the best way of avoiding evil. A morbid concentration of thought on the things that ought not to be done is apt even to lead to the doing of them. There is a good deal of sound moral doctrine to be got out of a full recognition of the truth which there is in psychological determinism.

At the same time there is an element of truth in the belief

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that free-will is a morally useful idea, an element of truth which is neglected by most exponents of determinism: I mean the importance of getting people to think that they *can* do a thing. The idea of oneself as acting in a certain way becomes a new factor in the mind; it may attract desires and feelings round it, and so become a new motive determining conduct. A man may be turned from idle and evil courses by the image of himself as a good man and a useful citizen, provided, of course, this image of himself as acting rightly is not merely a piece of day-dreaming, but an ideal that stimulates effort. Herein lies the good of examples in morality. That "men of like passions with ourselves" should overcome difficulties and sloth and temptation restores faith in the possibilities of the human nature we share with them. But in all this there is no contradiction of scientific determinism. There is nothing in any carefully understood scientific truth to contradict the enormous modificability and adaptability of the normal human being—within limits, certainly, but limits which we have no right to fix too narrowly till every effort has been made. It is this modificability of human nature which gives so much power to external influences whether good or evil.

Ideas which seem entirely to contradict freedom may have the same beneficial effect as the idea of freedom. The theological doctrine of prevenient and irresistible grace has helped those who have accepted it, and who have felt themselves "saved" by such grace, to change almost the whole course of their lives, believing that it was no longer frail, corrupt human nature that was acting, but God's omnipotence working in them to will and to do that which is good. Probably more persons have been helped to reform their conduct by a sincere belief in some such high Augustinian or Calvinistic doctrine than have been helped by a belief in the arbitrary power of choice at any moment. The latter seems to me only a safe doctrine in the minds of persons of good character who are likely therefore to choose aright, and whose confidence in their freedom is really a confidence in their strength. The theological doctrine of grace in its extreme form has also undoubtedly considerable dangers. It may lead to spiritual pride and

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contempt for ordinary "carnal" morality on the one side and to despair and helpless misery on the other. But it contains in a mystical and somewhat irrational form the important philosophical and ethical truths that man as a moral being is raised above the merely natural; it accentuates just that element which the necessitarian theory, as ordinarily stated, leaves out,—the gap between man and mere unconscious, unreflecting nature. The protest of the advocates of free-will against necessitarianism seems to me a protest, in a mistaken form, in favor of this neglected truth. Man thinks, and therefore his thoughts, his aspirations, his ideals, become a factor in his conduct and raise him above the mere passive instrument of natural (*i.e.*, animal) appetites and impulses. The necessitarian too often represents men as merely passive, as merely a series of events; man is an agent, and is more than a mere series of events. He can act, to use a famous phrase, not merely according to law but with a consciousness of law.

To conclude, I must call attention to the ambiguity in the term "freedom" as applied to the will. Man is "free" in the sense that the actions for which he can be held responsible are the outcome of his own conscious self, and not determined by external causes. But this is only the negative sense of freedom. He is free in a higher sense only when he acts according to the dictates of his reason, when his reason determines the content of his volitions, when motives are not merely motives as distinct from mere impulses, but are such motives as his reason approves. In this sense of freedom there is no appearance even of an opposition between freedom and necessity. Freedom in this sense is opposed to slavery, and is identical with rationality. Freedom in this sense may be described as the end or aim of morality. In the other sense it is only its presupposition. Freedom in this higher sense is the very opposite of arbitrary caprice. It is the freedom, not of lawlessness, but of self-government ("autonomy of the will," in Kant's phrase). We are not self-governing to start with, nor do we become so by being left to "the freedom of our own will,"—*i.e.*, to the blind guidance of instinct and impulse. Self-government, so far as we ever

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attain it, is the result of training and discipline which must at first be given us by others, and can only afterwards be directed by ourselves.

Benjamin Franklin tells us in his Autobiography how at one time he tried to form a band of young men united by no elaborate theological doctrines but chiefly by the common desire of helping each other to lead good and useful lives—an "ethical society," in fact, in one at least of its aspects. To this society he proposed to give what seems to us the rather curious name of "The Society of the Free and Easy." "Free," he explains, "as being, by the general practice and habits of the virtues, free from the dominion of vice, and particularly by the practice of industry and frugality, free from debt, which exposes a man to constraint and a species of slavery to his creditors." Franklin had a somewhat prosaic way of preaching great and good causes, but he brings out in his odd title this important aspect of freedom,—that same aspect which Spinoza was thinking of when he identified "the slavery of man" with the strength of the passions and the freedom of man with the power of the reason. Free-will in the sense of incalculable, unmotived caprice would not be worth having, even if it were an intelligible idea; free-will, in this higher sense, is the will that can only exist by obedience to the dictates of reason. "Where there is no law there is no freedom" is a sound maxim in ethics as well as in politics.*

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* On the difference between the negative and positive meanings of "freedom" in ethics and politics, I cannot do better than simply refer those who are not already acquainted with it to the discussion of the subject in T. H. Green's "Works," vol. ii., p. 308, *seq.*

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THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION.*

I.—INTRODUCTORY.

As the nineteenth century draws to a close, its watchword of "Evolution" is proclaimed in new regions. And though the new regions are in one sense old,—for Evolution was a principle of speculation before it became a theorem of Natural History,—yet their conquest or reconquest, as we may choose to regard it, completely transfigures the law which too often we merely identify with "Darwinism." In metaphysic, in the philosophy of religion, even within the realm of zoology itself, the evolutionary idea is being tested and adjusted anew; and it is an aspect of this process which demands our attention to-day.

If we ask ourselves how the principle of Evolution can aid us, and is aiding us, in bringing home to our minds the nature of Religion, the answer is, in general, that just as in other spheres it is Evolution which enables us to grasp the unity of the organic or inorganic world, so it is Evolution by which alone we can genuinely apprehend the unity of human nature and of man's highest consciousness.

And as an instrument for this purpose the idea of evolution operates in two complementary ways. First, it enables us to interpret the lower phases of mind by the higher, and so to replace classification by life-history. Secondly, it enables us to appreciate the conflict of form and substance, which follows from the presence of the mind, as a many-sided whole, within every mould or outline which gives the general name to a distinct period in religious development.

I will explain the two modes of operation.

1. Wherever the study of evolution reveals a connected chain of forms, from low to high, there is a strong tendency

* In this free sketch or impression of Edward Caird's great work on the "Evolution of Religion," on the one hand, I claim no originality, but on the other hand, I have so far employed my own language and illustrations that Mr. Caird must in no way be held responsible for what is said.

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to treat the higher form as explained by the lower, in the sense of being reduced to its level in value. But the true evolutionary method, recognizing that evolution implies a something which evolves, lays more stress on the opposite result, and sees in the higher form that which crowns the impulse of which the lowest form was the first crude manifestation,—it explains, therefore, the lower by the higher. Thus, it may be urged, "Trace religion back, and you come to the savage belief in ghosts, which originates out of dreams; this, then,—this hallucination,—is all that religion at bottom amounts to." But if we remember that what we are watching is the growth of a form of human consciousness, we shall think it more important to reverse the argument, and say, "Now that we know what a civilized religion is, we can appreciate the need and impulse which led the savage to grope after its satisfaction in a form which, as the earliest, was necessarily the least adequate." And it is ultimately because of the value imparted to these beginnings of intelligence by our knowledge of its completer stages that the student of to-day ransacks the remnants of a savage past for suggestions of ideas and feelings which in themselves have no light or help for a mature human being. There are, indeed, wonderful anticipations, in early times, of the deepest thought of future ages. And this we can well understand. Just so the child may startle the grown-up listener by words that seem inspired. But even the relics of genuine savagery, though nothing in themselves, become something to us as first stammering statements of the riddle which, comparatively speaking, we have read.

And thus the idea of evolution liberates us from the hopeless task of finding a common attribute in all religions by which the nature of religion might be defined. Such an attribute, plainly, would have to be restricted to that which the lowest religions contain,—for what they have not, is not common to all. Religion would thus have to be defined in accordance with the forms which contain it least adequately. But this would be like seeking for the quality of tree-growth in something common to an acorn and an oak, and therefore

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restricting it to that which is to be found no more in the oak than in the acorn. In this review of religion, then, we are dealing not with a row of species, but with the life history of a living being. Its nature is most fully unfolded not at first, but at last. And if we set apart any one of its phases or aspects, and say, "Here is a religion—Buddhism, for example—without a God, which proves that a God is not necessary to Religion," we do so at our peril. It may be that Buddhism marks a long recoil or reaction, for which the conception of a God is none the less a condition because it is an opposite. With the passionate atheism of a recent day this was undoubtedly the case. God meant so much to it, that it could not find Him in what tradition offered. All this vital continuity is sundered and wrenched away if religions are marshalled side by side like specimens in a case, in disregard of the life history of the religious consciousness. Evolution enables us to study their living growth less unappreciatively.

2. It also suggests to us that there may be, and in a sense always must be, a conflict of form and substance, of what man thinks and calls himself, with what he *is*. Thus, no abstract name will at any time express him, and within every "type" or period of religion all the tendencies are present, any of which in another type or period may be uppermost. Hence we are warned not to rely on abstractions, but to note that in antagonistic religious phases analogous impulses will assert themselves. Clearly within the great type known as Christianity there has been a Pagan Christianity of Polytheism, and a Judaic Christianity of Monotheism, and one day there may be a Christian Christianity that believes in a wholly spiritual God. And thus we are led to observe that the great religions of the world interpret our own minds to us. As Plato taught us to see the qualities of our own souls writ large in the features of society, so we may learn the meaning of our own mental conflicts when we see them re-enacted on the vaster stage of religious history. As we first understand the phases of the embryo when we correlate them with the evolution of species which they recapitulate in brief, so we first understand the workings of our own consciousness when

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we recognize them as distinct forces and figures in the pageant of world-history.

II.—A SCHEME OF EVOLUTION.

It is convenient to have a simple scheme by which to marshal the facts which are brought to our knowledge, and I propose to describe and explain the truest outline or sketch of this subject that I know.

When we look at our daily experience as a whole, we note within it a contrast of two principal factors,—the world and the self. If we begin to analyze and refine, we become aware of serious difficulty in separating the two; but in common life we have no doubt that the world in which we are and act, and the self which is and acts, are at least distinguishable. And further, it is obvious that in some way and to some degree we recognize a unity between the two factors. We expect that the world will respond to the self, and that the self will prove able to deal with the world. If this was not so, we should recognize ourselves as impotent either to act or to know.

Thus we have always present with us, though not always clear to our reflection, two modes of experience and their unity. First there is the world, the region of things which we see and hear and touch, which is technically called the "object,"—what is put before us; and again the self—our mind and will and affections—which is called the subject as being what *has* property and predicates, just as we speak of the subject of conversation, *i.e.*, what lies underneath and connects together the whole tissue of discourse; and, finally, the connection or unity of these two, whatever it is that we think of as bringing the world and the self to correspond, making the world to answer to the self, and the self to have faith in the world. This may be called Providence, or Reason, or Design, or the Uniformity of Nature, or the Reign of Law, or the order of the Universe, or, in short, God; and the consciousness of this unity is Religion. The World or object; the Self or subject; their unity, or God; these are the two elements and their connection which, whether we know it or not, make up the hinge of life.

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Now, in order to see how the facts of religious history may be marshalled under such a scheme, we have to bear in mind the distinction of form and substance,—of what man *knows*, and what he *is*. We all have felt that these elements are powerful with us differently under different influences. Sometimes the world is uppermost with us,—we are then wrapped up in what we see and hear, in the crowd of "objects," which every-day occupations surround us with; sometimes, again, the self, the "subject," is most prominent in our mental life—we are full of our aspirations, our will, our sense of right and wrong, what we want and demand, to which the world of objects seems inadequate or hostile; and sometimes we have a glimpse of the unity—in the faith which sees the triumph of a righteous will or an intelligent principle in the surrounding world—which we may call religious conviction or the faith in God as uniting the mind to the world of nature and history. We are aware of these ups and downs even in ourselves from day to day; of these periods when we feel quite differently and think quite differently according to the side of experience which is impressing us most influentially; and persons of differing character and temperament and experience live permanently to a different extent in one or the other attitude. Now in history these phases extend over whole periods of civilization and characterize entire national types; so that roughly and generally we may speak of a certain phase of religious history as "objective," of another as "subjective," and of another, still, as "absolute" or "rational" or "spiritual," when, that is, a true sense of "unity between object and subject" has come to the front.

But this is not all. For, as we insisted above, in every phase from the child to the philosopher, from the savage to the modern European, man is a whole mind, and not merely part of one, nor a mere philosophical notion; he *is* more than he knows. Therefore, even when he knows, or attends to, only the world of objects—first one thing and then another—like the child or the savage, still he *is* a self, and *has* a unity with the world of nature and of his fellow-men. Hence it follows that he gives effect to this unity, that is, to his moral

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and spiritual need, in a mode and fashion prescribed by the sort of experience which is uppermost in his mental life, and from which he cannot escape. Thus arises the conflict of form and substance which creates the degrees of imperfection or of perfection in the evolution of religion, and which pushes religion forward from phase to phase as man's experience becomes deeper. We do not find first mere Object, then mere Subject, and then their Unity. That would mean, first, no self, then no world, and then complete religion springing into existence without previous development. But we find human experience with its two sides and their need of reconciliation from the very outset; at first, however, controlled by one of these mental attitudes, and then by another, and only by degrees forced forward into *recognizing* the true connection between them as elements in a whole, or factors in a unity.

It will be easiest to understand if we proceed at once to illustrate.

III.—THE THREE PHASES OF THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS.

The three principal attitudes of the human mind in religion are marshalled according to the scheme thus suggested to us, as Objective, Subjective, and Absolute or truly spiritual.

We will look at each for one moment. By objective Religion we mean the attitude of consciousness which is observed where man's whole mind, his sense of a unity between himself and nature and his fellow-men, has to find expression within an intellectual phase which does not distinctly recognize any reality but things, or objects, as we say, outside us, and outside each other. How this can be, we may see any day in the minds of children. The child *is* of course in some degree a self and a mind, but he *is aware* chiefly or solely of the things around him; he lives in an attention which passes from one thing to another and never turns in upon itself. Thus, too, it is said of the savage, with at least general truth, that his consciousness is entirely practical. He sees, feels, and acts. He does not pause upon his thoughts, and estimate the claim of his ideas and his will over against the objects and forces of the natural world.

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But yet he *is* a self and a mind, though he does not know it. And being a mind, he must have some centre, some unity, some degrees of importance, to hold his world together. For this purpose it seems to be a chance what object he selects in the world of natural things; only, as a rule, it is not a human being, nor anything connected with mind; rather something strikingly remote from man—a stone, a plant, a river—which for any reason has fettered his attention. The interval between man and God seems at first to take this inverted form, in which some object is deified just because it is remarkable in the world of natural objects, and so alien to man and to mind.

Fetichism.—In a very wide sense, the term Fetichism may be applied to such an attitude,—that is to say, to an attitude of mind in which some one natural object among others is selected for deification. More strictly, perhaps, the name Fetichism may be reserved for what we may call Religion "upside-down,"—that is, for the state of mind in which the savage tries to use the powers of the deified object for his own private interests and purposes, and is not even treating it as representing what he cares for most. Something analogous to this appears, of course, in religion to-day. The prayer of the vulgar mind is now, as always, "*My* will be done."

Morality.—Has such early objective religion any connection with morality? If we take our own morality as a standard, we shall be apt to say that we can find little or no trace of a moral attitude in the mind as thus described. But if not morality, we shall find a germ of morality. For, as we said, the meaning of the importance attached to the object which is worshipped or deified is that it forms a centre, or implies a world; if not a better and worse, yet a more or less important, reaching over a certain connected range of man and nature. The man has a group of human beings connected with him by some kind of kinship; the object, which is important to him,—perhaps a rock or a river or a species of bear or wolf,—is also important to his group. His own conduct, as it concerns the group, also concerns the powerful object, and as it concerns the object,—winning its favor or the reverse,—also

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concerns the group. In serving his god, he serves some man, though reckless of others; in serving some man, he serves his god. Thus we find the unity or connection between the man's self and surrounding nature and his fellow-men, forced into the accidental shape which his intellectual level prescribes. He worships stocks and stones, plants and animals: natural objects, invested with sacredness by the chance which makes them the link between the man and his surroundings, which he has not the capacity to apprehend in any other form. If we will have a common quality to be the nature of religion, this function of a link or centre of unity in man's life comes nearest it.

Ancestor-Worship.—Thus there suggests itself an interesting explanation for ancestor-worship, if we observe the fact that the ancestor worshipped as divine is in primitive religion very seldom a deified human being. If we say, with Herbert Spencer, that the object of worship really came from an actual ancestor who has been deified, we have to explain how in tradition he has turned into a lifeless object or an animal; and this leads us into obsolete theories of names with forgotten meanings; he was called fox for his cunning, so we should have to reason, and is worshipped as fox, tradition having forgotten that he was man. This is theory of an obsolete kind. The savage inference is simple. "This rock or river or animal protects me and my group; therefore it has connection with us; therefore we are its descendants." Blood-relationship was the natural because external form of connection which suggested itself to an attitude of mind wrapped up in the external world; and no objections drawn from the distinctness of species were likely to present themselves. The descent of man from animals or from earth presents no difficulty to primitive thought. It is later, after man has become conscious of his dignity, that he attempts to cut off his poor relations. The god, then, in ancestor-worship is not a god because he is an ancestor, but he is an ancestor because he is a god.

Anthropomorphism.—This connection, so readily accepted, between man and nature, calls for an observation on primitive

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Anthropomorphism. It is not strictly true that savage man endows natural objects with a human mind. He does not level up so much as level down. He deifies no attributes of the human intelligence, on the nature of which he has never at all reflected. The truth is rather that he has not become aware of the difference between mind and nature, and so far from exalting other things to his own level, he rather fails to exalt himself above the level of other things. As we have repeatedly insisted, he *is* a self and a mind, but he thinks of himself, or rather sees himself, as a natural object in a world of natural objects,—as one mere thing among others. But it is a beautiful application of the simple yet subtle scheme which I am describing, that it has room for the development of the sense of self within the shell of the objective attitude of mind. The Greek religion, though still objective, *is* truly anthropomorphic. For it deifies idealized individual man in his sensuous perfection,—that is, as beautiful. It is still objective, for its deities are merely natural objects, man in chief, idealized, and yet regarded as a natural object among others, visible and individual; but it is truly anthropomorphic, for it grasps the great qualities of man's heart and intelligence, and in deifying nature—the sky, the lightning, or the sea—ascribes to it these genuinely human attributes.

Consequently, we are here at a turning-point. When man is deified, although as a mere natural individual object, yet in him, implicitly, the mind or self is deified, and when this implication becomes explicit, the worship of a natural object among objects must give way to the worship of a mind or self which is more than one of a crowd of things in space and time. With Socrates, as we know, the new principle, that man is a mind, and so is more than nature, flashed into the Greek consciousness, at first with a destructive effect; and from his day forward the highest form of objective religion had spent its force, and was ready for transformation. The social bond of the Greeks was in that same generation just passing from kinship to the capacity of civilization. "The name of 'Hellene' no longer indicates race, but rather intelligence," said Isocrates, the later contemporary of Socrates.

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We can speak more briefly of the two remaining phases of the religious consciousness, not because they are of less importance,—for their importance is infinite—but because they are nearer to ourselves, and also because, by contrast, what has already been said serves largely to explain them. Subjective Religion is the name given to the attitude of man's spirit which deifies a mind, a will, a self, a goodness, and a power, beyond and opposed to the world of separate objects which we call external nature. The great examples are Judaism and Mahometanism, both of which bear on their front their antagonism to idolatry and nature-worship. "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven image, nor the likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or in the earth beneath, or in the waters under the earth; thou shalt not bow down to them nor worship them; for I the Lord thy God am a jealous God." This is also the command of Mahometanism. And the other or positive side of this worship is the worship of a mind or law higher than the visible world. "Sacrifice and offering thou wouldest not; then said I, Lo I come—in the volume of the book it is written of me that I should fulfil thy will, O my God; I am content to do it; yea, thy law is within my heart." Here again, however, within this general outline, we have the whole human mind, struggling with its many-sided tendencies, its love of ritual, its sensuousness, its nature-worship, which we see in the history of Israel. But yet the predominant and characteristic attitude here is that in which external nature is felt to be the mere instrument, the mere footstool of God; the Israelite's feeling for nature is the feeling, not for the beautiful but for the sublime,—for that which suggests the divine by its own effort and infinite shortcoming. "The voice of the Lord breaketh the cedar-trees, yea, the Lord breaketh the cedar-trees of Libanus;" "Lebanon is not sufficient to burn, nor the beasts thereof for a burnt-offering;" "He taketh up the isles as a very little thing." "Before the mountains were brought forth or ever the earth and the world were made, thou art God from everlasting and world without end." "What is man, that thou art mindful of him?"

We know this mood and its greatness. It is the spirit of

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the sword of Islam, of the Puritan, and in some sense of the Stoic, as we see him in Horace * or in Campbell; † the mood in which the natural world and the world of art cannot satisfy us,—to which the picture, as John Knox said, is a "pented brod," the organ a box full of whistles, and the liturgy a mummery, and we yearn for an honest man with a will to do justice and bring righteousness. "Create in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me." There *is* something, after all, truer and higher than we can see or hear; and whatever nature may be, there is somewhere a God of righteousness.

It is noticeable that the bond of Israel to its God was not the natural tie of blood-relationship; it was the covenant which demanded righteousness, a spiritual bond, and as such capable of extension to mankind. Being Abraham's seed could give no privilege, if the covenant of righteousness was not kept.

But this faith in a God or self better than nature becomes mere fanaticism or pessimism, as in some forms of the Buddhist faith, if it has no avenue to a deeper truth and reality than the nature-worship which it combated. Kant's axiom, "I ought, therefore I can," is overthrown if it is possible to reply, "I cannot, therefore I ought not." A powerless rejection of the world is a miserable thing, and to reject it rightly can only mean to divine a profounder reality.

Absolute Religion.—Therefore the religious consciousness is forced forward once again, to express itself, if possible, in an adequate form. The unity of man and the world is no longer

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* "The just man—unterrified amid a universe crashing to its fall."

† "Go, sun, while mercy holds me up
On Nature's awful waste
To drink this last and bitter cup
Of death that man shall taste;
Go tell the Night that hides thy face
Thou sawest the last of Adam's race
On Earth's sepulchral clod
The darkening universe defy
To quench his immortality
Or shake his trust in God."

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indicated by the sacredness of a natural object, nor transferred into a mind or will believed in as remote from nature and outside it, if also above it; but it is recognized in its own proper form. For by Absolute or Spiritual Religion it is apprehended as that divinity which progressively reveals itself in the spirit of man and also in the order and beauty of the natural world from which he issues.

It has often been observed that the Founder of Christianity had a disinterested delight in nature, and a true evolutionist's sympathy with its processes. We can hardly ponder too deeply over such a passage as this, "So is the kingdom of God, as if a man should cast seed into the ground, and should sleep and rise day and night, and the seed should spring and grow up, he knoweth not how. For the earth bringeth forth fruit of herself, first the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear." And so with the growth of the mustard seed, and the operation of the leaven or ferment, which we know, though Jesus did not know, to depend upon the growth of myriad tiny plants. These are the types to which he compares the spiritual world. The kingdom of God, he says, comes naturally, slowly, silently; it *is* in the midst of you; it is something which arising in the spirit of man, has the power to realize an ever increasing unity in the human race by a gentle and gradual growth, like the quiet gracious growths of nature, out of which it develops. Christ himself claims his divinity not apart from his humanity, but in it and because of it. The double nature is a figment of theologians; it is the Son of Man who as such is the Son of God. This, we are well told, has always been the voice of religious devotion, though not of doctrinal theology.

With this declaration of a divinity revealed at once in Nature and in Man the fetters of race and rank fall away, and the social principle comes to depend simply on the degree of man's capacities, as realized at any moment, for participation in a common good. Kinship, on the one hand, is no longer a limit to our sympathies; the covenant, on the other hand, is no longer confined to the chosen people.

And one thing more. The Religion of the Absolute, or

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of the recognized Unity between the Self and the World, is not mere Pantheism. If all were equally divine, nothing would be worth worshipping. But the idea of Evolution enables us to understand a progressive revelation. There are degrees of reality, and of divinity, as man more fully apprehends his true humanity and his oneness with the spirit which is in the world. "This long, unhasting, unresting process of the Evolution of Religion is itself the best evidence we can have that there is a divine meaning in the world, and that mankind have not laid the sacrifice of their efforts and their thoughts, their prayers, and their tears, on the altar of an unknown or an unknowable God.*

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

LONDON.

LABOR TROUBLES—CAUSES AND PROPOSED REMEDIES.

MR. WRIGHT'S article in the January number of this JOURNAL † touches upon some extremely interesting points in the labor problem, which are discussed with his usual wide knowledge of practical questions and with an equally commendable sympathy for those who suffer injustice. But, in spite of these merits in his paper, I think a most important point has been ignored, and it leads to such extended consequences that it deserves some notice.

The general ground upon which Mr. Wright seems to base an advocacy of arbitration as a means of solving the labor problem is the assertion that morality in commercial business has greatly increased, and therefore we can rely upon moral methods in dealing with labor disputes. But the fatal defect in this argument is that it does not distinguish between two radically different kinds of morality,—namely, *subjective* morality, which is good will or action from the sense of duty, virtue for its own sake; and *objective* morality, which is action exter-

* Caird, "Evolution of Religion," conclusion. † Page 137.

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nally good or conducive to a stable social order, though the motive may be no higher than prudence or self-interest. Now, the latter kind of morality may have increased, as it is most likely to do with the increase of population and the occupation of natural resources, which greatly limit human liberty and independence. But improvement in conduct which is only a prudent or enforced adjustment to environment is no guarantee that subjective morality exists. This may be wanting as ever, and yet its existence is absolutely essential to the solution of the labor problem, whether by arbitration or otherwise. The broker may deposit the bonds on the desk of his patron with surer regularity and exemption from distrust, but it may not be because he is more honest than formerly, but because under a highly developed social organization with its diminishing opportunities for new business the risks may be too great to attempt fraud. The means of detection may be more perfect than in the past. Conduct in such a case may only *conform* to the moral law, but not be dictated by it. External pressure is the instrument for developing this conformity.

Now, it is of the very nature of our present political and social life to develop the pressure which will regulate conduct more effectively. Population is dense and is making rapid inroads upon all the available resources of wealth and subsistence, and consequently every individual must adjust himself to the wants of the community in which he is placed, or purchase independence in a new country and with the sacrifice of some of the strongest impulses in human nature. This fact increases the restraints upon his conduct, but may not modify the intrinsic nature of his character in the least. Again, modern industrial development, both in the direction of machinery for increasing production and in the direction of transportation to distant points, has been the most powerful of all forces for creating, in the manifold adjustments of business, the greatest solidarity of interests and dependence upon each other for support, and consequently the liberty that would lead to objectively bad conduct of a disastrous kind is greatly restricted. A transportation company lives in constant danger

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of losing patronage, on the one hand, by destroying production, if it exacts exorbitant tolls, and of state interference, on the other, if it disregards public interest. The manufacturer, living under the severest competition, must, unless he has a monopoly, meet the demands of the community. The rates of profit are so reduced by competition that the least suspicion of unfair dealing or dishonesty may mean bankruptcy. This pressure upon the merchant and the manufacturer must result in the severest exactions of honesty and good work from employees, and everywhere we find an enormous organization of forces tending in the same direction,—namely, in the direction of enforcing obedience to a certain code of rules, and they will not care what the motive to obedience is. They demand nothing but external morality. Of course, internal morality will be at a premium in such a system, but, if environment is strong enough, equal in all directions, and sufficiently invariable in its effects, there would be no need of this subjective morality, however admirable it might be. The object of the social organism would be accomplished without it. There is a certain set of actions necessary to the economic and political integrity of society, and it will not matter what the motive may be in securing this result. Hence the improvement which such industrial and social forces may bring about may not reflect any improvement of character, but only an increased consideration of personal interest, or adjustment to suit this interest, and there might not be the slightest element of morality in it, even of the objective kind, unless the forces exerting the pressure to secure a code of conduct, themselves be of a moral nature.

Enough has been said in a general way to define what kind of "morality" it is which characterizes the growth of modern industrial life, and we have found that it is only the fixity of those conditions which restrict human liberty and necessitate adjustment to them as indispensable to the preservation of the strongest interests felt by the subject. Now we may well ask why this environment is not more effective than it is in preventing crime, and the answer is that there are two reasons: (*a*) criminal impulses and instincts are often stronger than any

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pressure that environment may exert; pauper tendencies may also be the same; (*b*) the environment is neither constant nor equal in all directions, so that the same individual varies in his immunities while his character remains the same. I shall not lay any stress at present upon the first of these considerations. It is the second that has the most importance for us. It calls attention to the most significant fact in the whole problem,—namely, the need of internal morality to give regularity and law to human conduct when environment is variable or ineffective. For instance, no amount of vigilance in a bank, short of the constant attention of the officers, can secure it from the risk of embezzlement and fraud except the absolutely trustworthy character of the employees and officers themselves. There is a limit to the expense of the necessary machinery for preventing fraud, and this is the rate of interest on investments. The director cannot watch the book-keeper all the time, and book-keeping may be made so complicated as to absorb a disproportionate amount of profits. Then what is to hinder conspiracy, except a complicated machinery which, while it prevents crime, absorbs profits? Then who shall guarantee the faithfulness of the higher officers themselves who superintend the conduct of others and enjoy on that account a larger amount of freedom? So it is with every form of business. The pressure upon subordinates is not the same for every moment, and the exemption of superiors is often such as to make them practically independent of environment. Under these conditions the only guarantee of justice is good character, while the increased organization in the force and complexity of environment is a proof that this character does not exist. And we have only to look at the demoralization caused by war or an epidemic, or the relaxation of ordinary restraints, to see that this want of moral character is most lamentable, even where we supposed that civilization has reached a high development. It is certain that it does not keep pace with the organization of environment, which is governed more by economic considerations and influences of personal interest than by any moral ideal which ought to regulate human conduct.

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The conclusion from all these observations is that there are two totally distinct forces in the production of morality; one is the organization of power, and the other is the domination of conscience. The former has no necessary tendency to evoke the latter, and when the latter exists there is no necessity for the former. It is apparent, therefore, that the two are not developed in the same proportion in the existing social system, and that we cannot use the improvement of society in objective morality to attest the development of conscience. For aught we know from the conditions described by Mr. Wright, the domination of conscience may not have increased at all. We are inclined to think that it has increased as a matter of fact, but it is neither conditioned by the growth of objective morality nor so prominent among the units of the social organism that we can construct the machinery of society with sole reference to that supposition. Undoubtedly the power which is able and disposed to enforce objective morality may be subjectively moral; but this even is not absolutely essential, because prudence might dictate the same use of power, though we should place more confidence in a social system whose foundation is conscience, for the reason that environment is so changeable a medium that interest may change with it, and there may be no higher principle within to urge the sacrifice involved in respect for a higher law than a momentary interest. Hence, on account of the disparity between the two stages of development, I must insist that we shall not assume methods of social reform conditioned by the domination of conscience, when nothing is proved except the result of a better organized environment, which is no guarantee that conduct can be left to the spontaneity of duty.

When we come to look over the whole field of labor troubles and classify the various causes producing them under some general principle, I think we shall find that they are expressed in defects of moral character which appear in their exaggerated forms in crime and incompetency. But these terms are too well defined and too invidious to employ in the discussion. Instead, therefore, of expressing the obstacles to better economic and moral conditions in terms of crime and incompe-

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tency and the mental qualities that lead to them, we may call attention to a fact which probably no one will deny,—namely, *the universality of the desire to obtain one's living without work, especially of the humble kind.* If this be too strong a way of putting the case, we can say: with the least possible amount of work for the greatest possible returns. This disposition is a moral defect of human nature which manifests itself in a variety of ways, and which requires to be overcome along with a number of other impulses before we can expect any effective remedy for social ills. This ought to be a truism, but it is seldom if ever recognized in the efforts made to ameliorate society. In one form it manifests itself as criminality, in another as vagrancy, in another as scamping one's work, in another as fraud and cheating, in another as miserliness, in another as the exploitation of labor, in another as jobbery in politics, and in a thousand ways by which money may be obtained without giving its equivalent in return. This disposition is one source of all the inequalities of which the laborer complains, and is sufficient to cause all of them, though it is often combined with other qualities which aggravate its influence,—namely, extravagance or expense of his entire income and imprudence in marriage. The latter fact is connected with thirty-five to forty per cent., and sometimes fifty per cent. of all the poverty which society is called upon to mitigate, since this is the proportion of persons under fifteen years of age who require relief. But at present we are concerned only with the influence of the disposition to evade work and to live upon the services of others, directly or indirectly. This influence, coupled with the causes just mentioned and the various defects of human nature, create *the inequality in the distribution of goods*, which is the great evil complained of and which it is sought to cure. But I must contend that the world at large is either wholly mistaken as to the evil of unequal distribution, or wholly at fault in not recognizing that the cause is a worse moral evil than unequal distribution is an economic evil, and hence perpetually look in the wrong direction for salvation from it. As for myself, I must wholly deny that unequal distribution, even

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to the extent of producing an immense amount of poverty, is undesirable. It is the natural and legitimate consequence of moral defects, which ought to result in this way, if the law of desert in ethics is to be recognized at all, which is that a man ought to reap the benefits and bear the consequences of his own conduct, if any correction of those moral defects be possible.

Before discussing this point further, I must establish a principle which must be kept constantly in view in the solution of labor problems. The above fact about the real condition and aspirations of human nature shows, what perhaps every one admits without dispute, but quite as often neglects in its meaning and implication,—namely, *the need of a motive to work*. Possibly this is well enough recognized, but certainly it is not sufficiently recognized that a *particular kind of motive* is absolutely necessary. Now, the motive to work may be either (*a*) *the sense of duty* or (*b*) *personal interest*. The very small extent to which the first of these motives prevails is too well known to require proof, and especially among the working classes. But that the majority of mankind do their work from the love of it and conscientiously with reference to its rightness is a proposition which no student of human nature will venture to assert; and yet until it is done we must rely upon methods of governing man which leave the appeal to duty out of account. Personal interest then remains as the disposition with which we have to deal. But it has little meaning outside a reference to the diversified incidents that affect it and the equally diversified conditions of human nature which determine those incidents. This is to say that personal interests in the concrete world are not the same, or do not seem to be the same. Hence the competition, struggle, and social warfare which we find prevailing. But it would perhaps be better to recognize four classes of influence determining the motives to work, apart from the inherent love of activity. I shall call them *social*, *political*, *economic*, and *natural*. The social influence is the pressure of public opinion which respects and encourages only those who earn their living honorably. Political pressure is the power of government, and would be

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fully realized in the system of socialism where the state would assume all the responsibilities of production and distribution. Economic pressure represents the present system of private property in natural resources, where the pressure is exerted, not by political forces, but by a system which permits the application of agreement and contract. Natural pressure is simply the influence exercised by one's own nature, one's wants, and their relation to the supply of food possible in the world. This last influence cannot be affected by any policy we may choose to adopt. But it is the influence against which human nature cannot complain, for the reason that it cannot modify it, but must adjust itself to it. The system of agencies, therefore, which is to solve the labor problem must adapt itself to this influence as far as possible, in order, human nature being what it is, to achieve the world's work without unnecessary friction and complaint. That is to say, the pressure whose influence will be least resisted and most effective will be that of natural forces or that which acts as nearly like them as is possible. Now, as public opinion, which is wholly a moral influence, is wholly ineffective as an influence except as it supports the appeal to force, it both proves the lack of moral qualities on the part of those who refuse to accept its verdict, unless public opinion itself is not moral, and eliminates it as a sufficient motive to affect work. Hence we are left to choose between political and economic pressure as the instrument for determining production, *purely* natural pressure being excluded by the ratio between population and existing production or the extent to which natural resources are occupied and cultivated.

We find ourselves, therefore, reduced to two alternatives in considering the means of determining the relation that shall subsist between capital and labor. They are the organization of industry, productive and distributive, under political or government control, and the continuance of the present socio-economic system. The former of these systems is socialism, as we have seen, and the instinct of mankind is correct when it chooses this resource as the only alternative to the present system, supposing that there are no alternative questions to

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consider. If the present economic system is an evil to be gotten rid of, and if men are on the average moral enough to manage political industrialism, there can be no doubt that socialism is the ideal polity to adopt. But the laboring man must remember that it inevitably means slavery, or the loss of individual freedom, the right to freedom of contract. If he will accept that consequence, and worse, the consequences of his own ignorance in the selections of his representatives and rulers, there will be nothing to say against socialism. But it must cut off all personal liberty and initiative in the selection of callings and the rates of wages, which will have to be determined by the total amount of production. A thousand other consequences might be named, but as all thinkers are practically agreed in regard to the fatality of such a system, and as the effects of it would disappoint the expectations of its advocates, there is no need to dwell upon the matter. Its concentration of arbitrary power makes it a most intolerable despotism, and hence we require here only to mention this and the other facts in order to see that a resort to it from the present economic system is jumping from the frying-pan into the fire. Well, then, if political organization and power will not solve the problem, do we mean to propose the only apparent alternative of which so much complaint is made,—namely, the present socio-economic system? This is the assumed evil to be removed, and now do we propose to let it alone? Have we only the devil and the deep sea between us in the treatment of this problem?

In answer to these questions I can only say that we shall return to them presently. It is enough to have ascertained that, aside from the moral solution of the problem, we have only external pressure of some kind offered us, and this can be embodied only in government, and the present system of private property and the competitive economic system. If they will not solve it, we must either leave the problem unsolved or seek the solution elsewhere. With these observations we may turn briefly to the consideration of Mr. Wright's proposal of arbitration, and ascertain what may be expected of it.

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Now, arbitration must be either compulsory or voluntary. If it be compulsory, it must involve the application of the whole socialistic principle, and so, when necessary, compel the laborer as well as the capitalist to adopt a course contrary to his desires. No one is so jealous to-day of such power as the laborer, and he cannot expect to exempt himself from compulsion while putting the capitalist under it. Society is not possible under such conditions. It is only the creation of a new caste worse than the one of which the laborer now complains. In fact, no practical man can see his way to recommend compulsory arbitration as a solution of the problem without endorsing socialism in its worst forms. On the other hand, can anything be accomplished by voluntary arbitration? Unless there be power to coerce one or both parties to accept this adjudication of their claims, there will be no obligation to accept the policy. Whether economic interest will induce either party to accept it will depend upon circumstances. Often the interest of either laborer or capitalist will be on the side of refusing arbitration, and the present condition of warfare will remain. Where both sides consent to abide by arbitration, and there is no guarantee that they will ever or always accept the resort and its decision, good effect may follow in terminating immediate conflict, but the adjustment of this *does not remove the conditions which provoked the trouble at the beginning.* This must be accomplished prior to any complete solution of the problem at all. Hence we find ourselves left with the present economic system or political socialism after arbitration has been adopted, and no final results have been reached. Moreover, arbitration aims at an economic solution of a problem that is in reality moral, and must, therefore, fail in default of results that reach the real causes of the difficulty. Where difficulties originate merely from misunderstanding, it will be a very useful and effective policy. But it is probable that the majority of contests do not have their rise in mere misunderstanding. They are more probably the outcome of irreconcilable interests between wills that have no serious purpose of being moral, and in such instances arbitration, unless compulsory, must cut a very poor figure. Consequently

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we are left with the present condition of things or its alternative,—arbitrary and despotic government.

Perhaps it will be said that all this is a truism. We grant it. But we felt it necessary to state clearly and finally the limits to the application of external pressure and the necessity of it in the attempt at the improvement of human conduct. Some form of pressure we regard as necessary unless men suddenly become much more moral than experience shows them to be, and we may choose between government and the present economic system. For my own part, I propose here to offer an apology for the present order and then consider what is necessary for the removal of the evils charged to it.

The fundamental characteristic of the present economic system is its basis upon private property. The nature of this institution is *the distribution of the pressure necessary to produce a motive to work over a larger area than would be possible in government.* This is a most important consideration in that it transforms *political* into *economic* power, a far more safe investiture of external pressure than any that can be placed in the hands of democratic rulers, because it is a nearer approximation to natural pressure, which is always the safest when possible. Private property is the endowment of prudence, the wages of thrift and economy. Nor does it matter how much wealth is thus controlled, nor whether it is obtained by inheritance. As long as expenses do not exceed income, the principle just announced will hold true, though a man spend millions a year in a sheer waste of his means. The maintenance of the system depends only upon the adjustment of expenses to income after it is established, but can be established in the first place only by living *within* that income. As we left the savage state it was necessary to endow the prudent man with superior rights and powers, partly on the ground of his virtue and partly for the reason that it was necessary as a means of providing against the undue increase of population by those who had no means to support it, and of substituting economic pressure for political as a motive to work. This is undoubtedly placing society upon an economic basis, and the policy exposes the individual to all the consequences of such

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forces. But it is absolutely necessary nevertheless, for the simple reason that in the struggle for existence between beings in whom moral and social instincts do not predominate there is nothing to distinguish them except the quality of physical power, or economic prudence. The latter is the nearest approach to a moral qualification—nay, is a moral qualification of a certain grade—that can be chosen for bestowing the right to exert pressure upon the indolent, imprudent, and unthrifty to aid in the world's needed production. Unfortunately, this one virtue of economic prudence may be conjoined with all sorts of vices which make the condition that it determines a very un-ideal one, in that it grants more power and greater rewards to skill, intelligence, and economy than to virtues which ordinarily stand upon a higher level in the estimation of the best men. It seems to confer undue favors upon mere stinginess, as some would call economic prudence, rather than upon conscientiousness, moral honesty, and the various social virtues of a higher type. This is true. But there are quite justifiable reasons for it.

In the first place, the primary necessity, not to say duty, of all life, individual and social, is economic supply, and this can be obtained only by some kind of external pressure where duty is not the dominant motive in conduct. The safest application of this pressure, experience shows, is in the present economic system, with all its evils and abuses,—that is, economic as opposed to political pressure. Nature places a high value upon the saving instinct, or the desire to be prepared for emergencies,—we might say, a higher value than upon any other virtue. It is the only resource by which progress can be obtained while providing for the necessary wants of the human race, unless we discover the prevalence of better motives than mere preservation from starvation. The consumer must be made to supply his own wants, and, if he is too indolent to do so voluntarily, or to seek the development of higher possibilities, we may legitimately exact contributions from him by the pressure which demands that he support an ideal order in some way, if it be only the larger economic supply of society. It may be that the distribution appears

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unfair, but careful analysis will show that this is largely determined by, and proportioned to, the desire for what is distributed. Fashion, fads, vanity, social ambition, and a number of other cravings, which only reflect want of independence, want of prudence, and lack of wisdom to arm oneself against the power of money, are forces that affect distribution and create inequality between men; and hence, when large numbers of the population live on the margin of want, from the failure to prepare for the contingencies of production and exchange, they must expect the world's power to fall into the hands of those who are prepared for such emergencies.

In the second place, when we survey the field of human nature we find that in the majority of cases the ideal of life is almost wholly economic, if not entirely so. The rich man wants wealth for the sake of some form of self-indulgence. This is either true in the majority of cases, or is the general belief of mankind, and serves our argument in either alternative. On the other hand, the great object of the laboring classes is called "an improvement of their condition," though we find on examination that it is better wages, more of the physical comforts of life, more amusement, more leisure, and perhaps more beer and liquor. These are well enough as rewards of prudence and the various virtues of self-control. But the laborer is not so zealous for the virtues that put him on an equal competitive footing with others as he is for higher wages, and as a consequence ought to expect, and ought to be made to bear, the consequences of his folly. In a world *where the ideals are economic*, there can be no other principle for regulating the station and rewards of the individual than economic prudence; and money, not justice, will be the criterion of survival and power. The economic differences of men are but reflections of their moral differences in respect to the one characteristic which determines them, and, as long as their ideals are predominantly economic, it is absurd to cry at the pain that comes from pursuing them. We may have other desires also, but as long as the attainment of their satisfaction is conditioned wholly upon that prudence which equips us for the struggle of exist-

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ence, we must not quarrel with the consequence of ignoring that condition. But even these desires, when they occur, are not only conditioned as we have indicated, but they are in such a minority, or so inferior in influence and prevalence to economic ideals, that the latter must get the first place in the recognition of social life, and evils must exist precisely for the reason that the ideal of life in general does not contain any other object or result as its consequences. The economic ideal is not based upon any other principle than individualism, and man is nothing more than individualistic in his nature,—that is, the majority of the race; and society can reflect only what the majority of its units represent. Hence, with the want of a true social spirit upon which to base justice and equality, the only safe resource for society is the principle of economic prudence with all the competition that it involves; and yet almost every effort to redeem man ignores the moral basis upon which it must be done.

Arbitration, unions, and various other methods of reconciling capital and labor and producing more equal distribution of goods do not get beyond this economic ideal. It may seem very well that wages ought to be higher, that wealth ought to be more evenly, not to say equitably distributed, but in fact this demand for more equal distribution assumes a greater moral equality between men than exists. Men are not morally equal, except in scholastic philosophy and theology. They may be equal in some respects, but not in the fundamental quality of economic prudence and intelligence, which can be the only criteria for the right to use the power—social, economic, and moral—concentrated in the institution of property, a power which is designed in the nature of things to accomplish several important results: (*a*) to distribute the pressure necessary to effect the world's work; (*b*) to relieve the state from the responsibility for poverty; (*c*) to keep some control over the increase of population; (*d*) to give the rewards of life to prudence, self-control, and intelligence, and thus to support that struggle by which evolution seems to be conditioned. We do not confuse wealth with property here, because wealth may be a degenerating force, or it may

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not; but we mean the institution as it affects the welfare and supremacy of the great middle class, who are after all the salt of the earth, so far as it has any salt at all. This prudence is the individual's defence against the neglect and the want of social virtues in others, as well as the claim to economic power, and thus is necessary to insure the survival of the fittest, the importance of which no one at this day can question.

As a proof that the laboring classes are wanting in this fundamental virtue,—namely, economic prudence,—we have only to compare their contributions to population with that of the more well-to-do property holders. Every one knows that these are much greater, that by far the largest additions made to population come from those who forever live on the margin of want. Health and good luck save many from suffering who would be added to the great throng of poor about us, as is distinctly proved by the enormous increase of poverty on the occasion of a commercial panic or other trade disaster. They may possess many other virtues which society estimates highly, but they lack this most important one which nature places above all others, and which reflects self-preservation and independence, while they cultivate a constant *spirit of dependence on others*, a moral defect which would make society impossible, if granted any property or political rights equal to their numerical power. They as constantly weaken their influence and chances in the world by adding to population beyond their power to give it adequate support. Their families absorb all their incomes and help to swell the profits of the rich; and they are either wholly unaware of their situation, or they neglect it and organize strikes against property, as a protection against their own folly and imprudence. Aside from the incidental proof of their imprudence drawn from the consequences of commercial disasters, I may refer to more emphatic evidence in the figures already mentioned regarding the proportion of poor in charge of the State and dependent upon private charity who are children below fifteen years of age. This is reinforced by the figures in nearly all the Charity Organization Reports regarding the "social" state of

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applicants for relief. It is found that the proportion of such applicants who are married, widowed, or deserted runs up to eighty per cent. and in many cases to ninety per cent.; and that the proportion of single persons who apply for relief rarely reaches ten per cent., and is often as low as three per cent. The condition of "single blessedness" is thus a weapon of self-defence and secures chances of survival in the struggle for existence which cannot accrue to the marital state, especially if encumbered with a large family. Hence imprudent marriages only add to the proof of a moral defect which must first be corrected before any solution whatever is possible for labor problems. They add to the competition for labor, and to the numbers who are to receive dividends from the world's production, and both of these must produce conditions which neither government nor arbitration can modify, short of assuming control of population. In the light of this moral defect the whole method or system of methods designed to equalize distribution must fail, and ought to fail, according to every admitted principle of morality. No man deserves economic power who does not possess economic prudence. This does not mean or imply that all who possess economic prudence should possess the power conferred by our present system, but it does mean that it is not safe to intrust it to any one else. A man must have at least that virtue before he is entitled to any consideration in a social system charged with the responsibilities of providing for the world's production and consumption. If he has it not, there is no resource but external pressure which will make him do his duty, and this pressure must be either that of government or the institution of private property. Both will entail evil as long as there are not other virtues to counteract the cut-throat tendencies of competition and mere economic prudence on the part of those who have it and it alone. Equality of moral nature, at least in the instinct of economic prudence, is absolutely essential to any equality of distribution in economic rewards, and until this is secured it is vain to expect redemption by increasing wages or by more equal distribution of wealth.

Instead of strikes, labor unions, arbitration, or any such

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measures, we should recommend the following considerations as more likely to afford relief and improve the conditions of labor. The first of them are purely political measures, designed, not to directly equalize economic distribution, but to equalize the opportunities for it, as far as inequalities of intelligence and character will permit it, and to insure honest government. The immediate pressing needs, therefore, before all other amelioration is possible are: (1) freedom of trade, by which all men will be put upon an equal footing in the competition for a share of the world's production; (2) civil-service reform, by which more trustworthy officers can be obtained for the administration of government; (3) improved methods of selecting government officers. At present every demagogue and scoundrel who wants office can play upon the ignorance, passions, and prejudices of the laborer, outbid the intelligent and honest man for place, and then enrich himself by jobbery and blackmail, the laborer standing by all the while and admiring the politician as his friend! These are political reforms so urgent that nothing can be done for labor until they are effected. All the popular efforts of the day looking to the workman's redemption by increased wages and neglecting the priority of these considerations simply pay out in taxation of some kind what they reap in other ways.

But the most important conditions are still to be noted. They are wholly moral, and after all the previous conditions are fulfilled the problem will remain unsolved unless these are realized. They are: (1) prudence in marriage and family responsibilities, otherwise the laborer simply multiplies the competition which is his source of complaint, and the number of those who must share his product; (2) economy in the use of his income, so as to place him upon a level of competition with the property holder; there is no equality, and ought to be no equality, of economic conditions between the thrifty and the thriftless; (3) co-operative organization against the unjust or supposedly unjust power of capital. We mean co-operative production and distribution. These three conditions are absolutely indispensable to any solution of the question, and any method which ignores them deserves no sym-

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pathy or aid whatsoever. But there is no effort made in this direction adequate to its needs, or proportioned to the amount of money and enthusiasm spent in the wrong direction. If laborers would show the intelligence and character necessary to the successful application of co-operation, they would soon put an end to corporate capital enlisted against them and might bring about the millennium, for they would at once put a stop to that power which they complain of so bitterly. But instead of this they seek to blackmail property, which is the consequence of their own improvidence, to determine their own incomes against the law of desert and without any willingness to share in the responsibility for the world's production, the irresponsibility of capital being nothing but the price paid for the liberty of imprudence, and to sympathize with arbitrary and tyrannical methods which only add political to economic slavery. The real needs are, on the one hand, strong, intelligent, and incorruptible government, and, on the other, as much providence and self-control on the part of the laboring class as it demands justice on the part of the property class. Unless proper and strenuous efforts are made to bring this conception home to the laboring poor, unless our methods and enthusiasm are spent upon showing that the problem is moral and not economic, and unless the poor are made to feel their own share of responsibility for the present condition of things, instead of shifting the whole of it on the injustice of capital, thus cultivating and sustaining the very dependence upon others of which they complain,—unless these things are done, and the various socialistic methods abandoned as playing with fire in a powder magazine, I for one confess that I shall contemplate the growing tendencies to anarchy with much malicious satisfaction.

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AUTOMATISM IN MORALITY.

ONE of the most important questions in current ethical discussion, and of vital interest as well, is that which concerns the automatic character of morality. Has it merely a reflex nature? Is it a matter of instincts and impulses? Is morality without sanction and without obligation? Evolutional ethics view the morality of the individual as the reflex of social consciousness, the categorical imperative as speaking with the accents of the tribal voice; obligation, as the feeling of social pressure; responsibility, as the aptitude for certain kinds of conduct; moral sanction, as the actual realization of the conduct which was potential in the aptitude, with all the consequences that make for the health of society; and, finally, the will itself is regarded as the resultant of a tendency whose component factors appear as heredity and environment.

Such a view gives us true automatism in conduct. There may be an appearance of free determination of the ego, but deeper insight at once dissipates the hallucination. The act of willing appears to be a simple thing. It is really a complex of so many forces that, when resolved by a thorough analysis, a present decision will appear as the result of the manifold experiences of the past, whose roots are in the earliest beginnings of society. Such a position is supported by various considerations, which it is the purpose of this paper to examine.

1. In the first place, there is cited, in support of this view, the unbroken uniformity in the line of development from the lowest order of animals which manifest social instincts to the highest forms of morality in civilized man. There is no gap, nor missing link, but an imperceptibly graded series of increasing complexity. There is, however, throughout, a common element, seen in all stages of this development,—namely, the facts of mutual dependence and reciprocal relations. This is the bond of gregarious animals, of the family, the tribe, the community, the church, and the State. It first arose out of the

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necessities of hunger, common defence, and care of the young. It has developed in many forms, all of which, however complex, give evidence of their common origin,—the solidarity of life-conditions and relations. The marked sociability of animals is the fact which supports the theory. As is well known to every sportsman, there is concerted action among animals to warn the herd or flock of danger. Many birds and some mammals post sentinels, which, among seals, are said generally to be the females. The leader of a troop of monkeys acts as the sentinel and utters cries expressive both of danger and safety.* I have often noticed the principle of a division of labor manifested by a flock of crows apportioning the surrounding country for miles among themselves, scattering in all directions, according to a seeming order and plan; they are again assembled, when food is discovered, by significant caws which one and another repeat until the entire flock are informed. Their cry of warning is quite distinct from that which apprises the flock that food is found.

There are instances, also, of mutual defence and sympathy. The males of some ruminants come to the front when there is danger and defend the herd with their horns.† Captain Stansbury found on a salt lake in Utah an old and completely blind pelican, which was very fat, and must have been long and well fed by his companions.‡ Accepting as a fact that the sociability of animals is akin to that manifested among men, it by no means follows that in the earliest form—animal sociability—we find the sole essence of morality, because that alone is common to all stages of the development. It is here that we enter a vigorous protest. From the stand-point of evolution itself, the earlier, the germinal, is to be explained by the later, and not *vice versâ*. As the seed cannot explain the developed flower and fruit, so also in the genesis of morality we must not consider the minimum as giving a full or satisfactory account of the maximum. The minimum consists of an actual and a potential. Observation can apprehend only

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* Darwin, "The Descent of Man," vol. i. p. 71.

† Ibid., vol. i. p. 72. ‡ Ibid., vol. i. p. 74.

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the actual; the potential escapes observation; and its significance can only be appreciated when interpreted in the light of the finished product, the potential actualized. Dr. Pioger says that, in order to find the basis for morality, you must interrogate the conscience of a Fuegian or Tasmanian, and he insists that you will surely find there no idea of the absolute good or of oughtness.* A pertinent answer to this statement I find in a chance sentence of Darwin's: "I was continually struck with surprise how closely the three native Fuegians who had lived some years in England, and could talk a little English, resembled us in *disposition* and in most of our mental faculties."† This would indicate most certainly a capacity for moral and mental development which the animal lacks, and which the human species can acquire so rapidly, only upon the supposition that there is a potential in man's nature which is in a state of readiness to conform to the higher requirements of mental and moral growth.

2. Again, it is asserted that the development of morality and of society have followed parallel lines throughout their history. Hence, it is inferred that the one is merely a reflex conformity to the conditions of the other. For instance, every growing complexity in social relations has necessitated the widening of the moral sphere of activity. Altruistic instincts were first confined to the family; but, following historical development, they were extended to the tribe, the nation, and, finally, to embrace humanity in its most far-reaching significance. Each enlarging circle has given rise to new relations of a reciprocal nature. Inner response to the outer conditions means strength, health, survival, while tendencies thus evolved are transmitted to succeeding generations, and thus perpetuated. Such a parallel development must, however, be qualified by certain limiting considerations. Along the whole line of this development there is continual conflict between social and individual impulses. The peace of society and the individual

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* *Revue Philosophique:* "Origines et Conditions de la Moralité," Juin, 1894, p. 642.

† Quoted by Schurman in the "Ethical Import of Darwinism," p. 180.

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comes only after a struggle, or, better, after a long series of struggles. The ordinary man, and especially the primitive or savage man, who does not see far and clear, will overlook the relations of reciprocity and mutual dependence; nor will he recognize that the interests of society and his own are one. The proximate end of self-gratification will crowd out the ultimate end of social welfare. Moreover, progress has often been due to a thorough revolution of existing social conditions and customs, and this in turn has been generally achieved through the insistence of the prophet of individualism, whose voice has been raised against the trammels of public opinion and the chains of custom. In such cases the character of the individual cannot be considered merely as the creature of his social environment. He is creator as well as creature; he is both agent and patient. It is impossible to eliminate the individual factor. If it had been possible, we should see greater uniformity than we actually find. It is the personal eccentric which is so prominent as to show the individual tendency to variation; and this tendency is initiated from within rather than necessitated from without. It is the "spontaneous variation" of Darwin's account, "arising without any exciting cause, and depending much more on the constitution of the organism than on the nature of the conditions to which it has been subjected." * The social environment is not the sole factor in the development of morality. The social forces have play in the field of personality, modifying and influencing character in manifold ways; and yet the character is active as well as passive, and reacts upon the social forces themselves. They are not elements related simply as cause and effect, so that the social condition automatically gives rise to the moral law conformable thereto. We have to deal with correlate forces subject to the general law of action and reaction. A subordination giving rise to mechanical automatism is not consistent with the evident facts of our moral nature.

3. It is, moreover, held that moral practices came before any reflection or consciousness of moral law or obligation.

* Darwin, "The Descent of Man," vol. i. p. 126.

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Morality was first instinctive, an adaptation to the existing conditions of life at a time when the world was young and man's needs were few. Therefore, it is insisted, that consciousness of a law of right, and consequent feeling of obligation, are by-products,—secondary, because of later origin, and, therefore, not essential to the fundamental conception of morality. Here it is possible to accept the premise and yet deny the conclusion which implies a second premise that is suppressed in the above reasoning,—namely, that whatever appears in a later stage is extraneous to the essence of the thing itself under process of development. This we have seen to be unwarranted. This is not in harmony with the evolution idea,—namely, that characteristic features of a given stage in the development are present potentially, or in rudimentary form in the preceding. Moreover, our impulses may have a rational basis or an irrational one; it is the province of reflection to make explicit the nature of this fundamental basis. In the case before us, the dawning consciousness of a law of obligation is the explicit realization of that which was present implicitly in the earlier practice. There is a vast difference between the inner compulsion of a rationally grounded impulse, and that which reflection condemns as unworthy the personality in which it had its being. The appreciation of the intrinsic worth of certain kinds of conduct, irrespective of any advantage to be gained, must have arisen quite early in the history of morals, even though such appreciation may not at first have been sufficiently strong to initiate conduct. Ideas of justice, sympathy, and the like, do not arise out of the mere existence of social conditions and relations, but they are the result of an interpretation of the significance of these relations and conditions in the light of an ideal.

4. Some have regarded conscience as possessing an organic and functional character, forming an integral part of the social organism. Dr. Pioger, for instance, explains the genesis of social conscience by a differentiation of the nervous system especially adapted to the reception of social excitations, just as the sense of sight arises from a nervous differentiation peculiarly adapted to the reception of luminous vibrations.

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Morality is then subject to the same laws as the other forms of physiological and psychological activity.* This, however, is a strained hypothesis depending upon a false analogy. Physiological excitations are received by means of the end-organs of sense-perception, thence transferred to the brain, and appear in consciousness as psychological phenomena capable of normal observation and testing. The social excitations, on the other hand, must be received in a manner evading experiment and investigation. Or, if they come, indirectly, along other channels, through force of example, or inherited habits, or dread of social sanction, then it cannot be affirmed that the excitations are subject to the same laws as the other forms of physiological and psychological activity. Moreover, it is taken for granted here that one may pass from physiological to psychological functions without serious difficulty. There is, however, in the latter an entirely new element, a consciousness of one's activity. From unconscious to conscious functioning, we pass from one to another quite distinct sphere. We must have a bridge stronger than analogy in order to pass to and fro at pleasure.

In the same spirit, morality is defined as health; immorality as disease. And yet in such definitions the factor of responsibility is ignored, and it is just that factor which renders immoral conduct essentially different from organic disease. It is easy to use metaphors which are merely question-begging phrases in this regard.

5. Again, it is asserted that individual conduct in itself has no moral significance; activity which abides alone bringeth forth no fruit. It must have its root in society. This ignores the individual which is lost in the universal concept—society. It assumes as answered the very question at issue: Has conduct worth in and for itself, or only as its consequences are felicific as regards the social welfare? In order to preserve the individual integrity, his conduct must have some value for himself alone. His altruistic tendencies must be co-ordinated

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* *Revue Philosophique:* "Origines et Conditions de la Moralité," Juin, 1894, p. 652.

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with a rational egoism. There is a shrinking of the ego whenever its activities are wholly absorbed in altruistic spheres. It must feel the spur of its own needs and deficiencies, or else its growth is stunted, and its altruistic possibilities frustrated thereby. Professor Caird has remarked that

"A man by a natural necessity, as it were, lives out of doors and becomes a citizen of the world long before he learns to dwell at home with himself, and to know himself as having an inner life of his own. Yet, though this is true, it is certain that the most unreflecting man *has* an inner as well as an outer side to his mental existence. He is essentially self-conscious, and this self-consciousness, however little he may reflect upon it, inevitably separates him from the things and beings he knows, even *while* he knows them." *

Such a view is hostile to automatism by means of social excitations to which man involuntarily responds. Moreover, in the thoughts of man which never eventuate in conduct, in that part of his work which no one sees or knows, in that hidden life within the sacred enclosure of personality, there indeed we find a virtue sensible of its own inherent worth, a wrong conscious of its own shame; *there* is the ring of the false or of the true; *there* are the signs of progress, or the marks of deterioration and decay. Character grows in solitude as well as in the stream of the world. It has its history as well as that of conduct. It does not expend itself wholly in action. Its value cannot be estimated in units of utility. It is the reserved force in personality, which, after all, we count of equal worth, if not superior, to that which is manifest in varied activity. And as such it shines in its own light.

6. It is urged that in the life of to-day, generally speaking, conscious activity in the sphere of morals is the exception; that, considerations of law, obligation, etc., disturb the normal workings of instinctive habits. F. Paulhan indicates three stages in moral development,—an unconscious stage, where morality is conserved through natural sanction; an intermediary and reflective stage, where the sanction is applied indirectly and artificially; and the final stage, where there is growing unconsciousness in moral activities, inasmuch as

* "The Evolution of Religion," vol. i. p. 77.

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increased adaptation and deepening habit render the response to social conditions automatic, the corresponding sanction devoid of reflection and retrospection.*

However, the unreflecting following of impulses which give rise to habits instinctively persisted in, marks a line of development essentially different from that whose development is characterized by an intermediate stage of conflict, where reason has corrected or silenced certain impulses, and the emerging habit is one where consideration of an ideal holds all rival impulses in unconscious check. The unconsciousness is one, however, that has grown out of consciousness through a simple psychological law. The highest form of conduct is where the right is followed instinctively, with no deliberation, no struggle, nor even a consciousness of the stress and strain of duty. Yet such conduct contains the essence of all the elements that have combined to form it. There is here a true conservation of energy. As the flower is potential in the seed, so also the essential elements of the seed persist in a transformed state in the flower. When virtue becomes second nature, the process of becoming may be forgotten, but it has played a necessary *rôle* which should not be ignored. The struggle which subdued the old in the development of the new is an indispensable stage in affecting the final harmony where duty and inclination are one. It is both fundamental and formative in its nature. Finally, it must be insisted upon most emphatically that determination by Reason differs radically from determination by impulse, in the sphere of sensibility alone. This distinction saves us from automatism in morals. If we only had one impulse in consciousness at one and the same time, we would then act immediately and instinctively. An impulse without a rival has a motor explosive power to initiate action. A rival impulse, however, gives pause. Such a pause of itself negatives automatism. It means deliberation and a consequent judgment concerning the worth of the contending impulses, which is

* F. Paulham. *Revue Philosophique:* "La Sanction Morale," Avril, 1894, p. 415.

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essentially a valuation according to some ideal. This is in itself a factor in the resulting choice; a factor, too, that cannot be interpreted in terms of the phenomenal series, which presents all existence as correlated selfishness motived alone through pleasure and pain excitations and reactions. There is in consciousness that to which in the last analysis we are constrained to appeal—a feeling of superiority to the sensible series of time and space in its perpetual flux, a something within transcending the phenomena of which we are a part. This feeling has at least a psychological reality of an universal character, and as such it cannot be ignored; it must be explained, rather than attempt to explain it away. For, this alone can explain what, without it, must remain a paradox,—that in the midst of the pleasure-pain phenomena, whose summation is supposed to embrace the totality of existence, we see a person enduring pain, scorning the allurements of pleasure, suffering and yet choosing to suffer all, rather than relinquish his ideal. It is that which renders us dissatisfied when driven by desire even to the full fruition of our wants; for there is a something higher within us which is not satisfied when the lower is appeased. Shame, disgust, and regret, which follow the unrestrained gratification of appetite or passion, are indications that the real self is asserting its claims for higher gratification. It is the divine restlessness of the human soul. In it, we feel the striving of our distinct self-hood, and a conviction that beneath the stream of the phenomenal self-manifestations, there is indeed a "buried life" of an enduring personality.

Matthew Arnold, in his poem on Morality, has very strikingly depicted the essential difference between the involuntary activities of Nature and the voluntary life of man:

> "Then, when the clouds are off the soul,
> When thou dost bask in Nature's eye,
> Ask, how *she* view'd thy self-control,
> Thy struggling, tasked morality,—
> Nature, whose free, light, cheerful air
> Oft made thee, in thy gloom, despair.

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"And she whose censure thou dost dread,
Whose eye thou wast afraid to seek,
See, on her face a glow is spread,
A strong emotion on her cheek!
'Ah, child!' she cries, 'that strife divine,
Whence was it, for it is not mine?

"'There is no effort on *my* brow,—
I do not strive, I do not weep;
I rush with the swift spheres, and glow
In joy, and when I will, I sleep.
Yet that severe, that earnest air,
I saw, I felt it once—but where?

"'I knew not yet the gauge of time,
Nor wore the manacles of space;
I felt it in some other clime,
I saw it in some other place.
'Twas when the heavenly house I trod,
And lay upon the breast of God.'" *

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SOME OF THE USES OF UNEMOTIONAL MUSIC.

PRESENT evidence leads us to accept, with the humility becoming unofficial laity, that the deductions of naturalists are true, and that music existed before speech, and was the primitive expression of courtship among birds and, in a lesser degree, other animals. Whether nature expresses herself through the carol of birds, or in the untutored song of the peasant in wood or field, it is truly the voice of physical joy that speaks, healthily and happily; and within its proper domain it charms us as does the green of spring, the bloom of flowers, or the rime of frost. It is said that musical notes and rhythm were first acquired by the male and female progenitors of mankind, with the intention of charming the opposite sex; these early exemplars have unquestionably had a long line of imitations of their primitive system.

* Matthew Arnold's Poems: "Morality."

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The proportion of natures that respond, consciously or unconsciously, to emotional or, rather, erotic music, will probably ever be greatly in the majority. We can easily convince ourselves that it is a majority, and what its elements are. It will suffice that we join the unreflecting crowd that follows a military brass band, and observe how eagerly, how unthinkingly, they time their steps to the rhythmic procession. Martial sentiments are not the motor that stirs the throng following the soldier band; nor does an active sympathy with a living mourner, nor the lamented dead, augment the numbers marching after the funeral music of our streets. Effective, showy compositions, inappropriately styled dirge-music, usually devoid of the expression of grief,—except by the conventional adoption of a minor mode,—attracts, collects, the multitude; for whom, when all is said, music is as yet an unknown, uncomprehended quantity. The sensuous resonances of the brass tickle their ears; they neither analyze, reflect, nor scarce enjoy; but the pulsating rhythm, color, and noise of the instruments stir some barbaric instinct, and that is usually about all. Take the love song of the tenor, or soprano, in opera or concert; observe the enthusiasm it evolves,—the louder the voice, the fiercer the emotional howl, especially upon a high note, the greater the excitement of applause. It is not that the love song appeals to the unsatisfied but highest demands of the human heart; it is usually but the primitive and barbaric instinct of undeveloped human nature that again makes itself heard.

It is frequently said by unartistic people that musicians—indeed, all artists are generally included in this sweeping assertion—are fanciful, capricious, unbalanced, and most often immoral. Music is also said to have a more direct action upon the nerves than the other arts,—but these conclusions might be better verified if nervous sanity were the rule of our civilization,—or if music had been long enough studied in regard to its action upon neurotic disorders, of the value of which much might be advanced.

I am quite willing to admit all that the primitive origin of music is supposed to imply, and there is no reason why we

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should desire to evade such a truth; in fact, it is one more reason why the development of another and a more intellectual side of musical art should be considered the more urgent. Is there any reason why we should content ourselves with the merely sensuous or erotic suggestion of the oldest and at the same time the youngest and the least developed of the arts?

It is very doubtful whether unbalanced character or immorality of conduct can be limited to any class; certainly, it would be difficult to prove by statistics that the brain-workers are worse men and women than the non-producers. Naturally, the defects of successful artists of every class will be more easily known, registered, criticised, than the exploits of their unendowed brethren. But it is my belief—the result of long and careful observation—that the best brain work will be, with rare exceptions, always accompanied by the best morality. The old accusation of unreflective people of the want of balance in musicians or artists will logically fall to the ground, as higher spiritual and moral teachings permeate general culture, and are not, falsely, reserved for special phases of life, convention, or observance.

I admit what is said about the action of music upon the nerves, and this is another good reason for eliminating emotional excess. Physiologists prove to us that excess, physical or mental, is destructive of vital force; and nowhere is this truer than in regard to music. In a time like this, when neurotic maladies are increased by the artificiality of our social life, it becomes a necessity that nothing pertaining to a great art should lend itself, consciously or unconsciously, to augmenting the present disastrous condition of our so-called civilization.

Nature herself indicates to us with infinite and potent examples that her predominant phases are tranquil. We see this in the budding delights of spring, the ripe, abundant charm of summer, the affluent glory of autumn, the brilliant beauty of winter's frost. Man is sustained, cheered, by the wide, varied range of nature's middle tints; the tragedy of earthquake, the turbulence of blinding storm, is happily but

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the unusual aspect. So in healthy minds, passionate or excessive emotion is and should be the exception.

In art it is the same. As a rule, antique sculpture and painting were devoid of passion, and dealt but sparingly with the passions; they were used with reserve, judiciously, as high lights—up to which the attention was led, as to central points of culminating interest. The larger portion of most classical and mediæval work was created, executed, for what would to-day be disdainfully styled as decoration; and the best talent in those distant and splendid epochs occupied itself with what was honorably recognized as decoration, pure and simple. Think of the gracious forms which grew out of the old myths, all the enchanting variety of gods and goddesses of classic art. These works, full of the vigorous breath of nature, were not troubled by the personalism of most of the work of our day. Take the sacred pictures elicited by the Roman Church from the great painters. Although man's best sense of beauty was appealed to, still, they were usually created as decoration for some special space, and little thought (with very rare exception) was given to emotional energy or religious aspiration, save in the adoption of conventional forms.

A great deal is said nowadays about the need of emotion in art creation. If we observe carefully the achievements of the most productive of all the great epochs, we shall have to admit that the artist did not appear preoccupied by any mere search for emotion. First of all he was sure of his technique, a fact we must sadly accept as not always the case to-day, and, finally, he was directed by a strong, definite, and impassioned purpose; where no sterilizing dearth of ideas kept him anxiously alert to seize unseizable emotions. If the charm of spontaneous creation falls within the wide, tumultuous sea of human passion, or lies beyond, within the calm where no agitation disturbs the spirit, both phases are equally valuable.

Noble emotions have always been the spur to human action; they have the power to enliven the dullest natures for the time; they burn through the grosser forms of commonplace.

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Still, the glow of passion is but brief; it is, perhaps, not intended that it should compete with the unemotive moral forces,—that concrete result formed by the long evolution, selection, transformation of aspirations, of religious faiths, into the principles that finally, like resistent arching bridges, surmount the turbid streams of life. Emotion should be reserved as living fire, to burn upon altars dedicated to some high purpose; be used with reverent care, nor be spent by the first wanton breeze that blows, so that we may centralize its beneficent potency to enrich noble passions and heroic conceptions.

In olden times, before many of our good old Saxon words fell into disuse, a *glee-man* meant a musician; and this signification is the true theory for musical art,—to rejoice man's heart. But why not let it be used intelligently? Because due attention is given to the higher evolution of the brain, that need be no reason why the heart should be undeveloped. What is needed in music is a better knowledge of the theories of construction, of harmony, and, in fact, a general comprehension of musical science. A small minority alone knows now the joy that comes from this intellectual source. Who shall say that the study of harmonic art, with all its theoretic mechanisms, might not be an admirable adjunct for the studies for women,—music has of late years been largely selected for them,—and this would take another of the emotional elements out of her general culture.

There are more reasons than could be offered here why we should be willing to study every aspect of what I might term "decorative" music in contradistinction to emotional. There is a large class of beautiful music, both for instruments and voices, entirely suitable for social life. Everything belonging to theatrical representation should be kept for the stage, with its accessories, its illusions, its preparation; dramatic music without long and serious training is an absurdity. How incongruous in the modern drawing-room is the hysterical wailing of a "Traviata," the typical song of a "Carmen," or the passionate lament of an "Isolde"! Can there be anything in worse taste than the abortively passionate declamation one

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frequently hears in what is termed "cultivated society"? Nothing demonstrates who is the real artist better than the selection of materials.

How many simple ballads, if clearly enunciated, sung with taste, would delight even the audiences of our so-styled "cultured society." What inexhaustible numbers of classical songs—German, Italian—from which to select, and, if possible, always to be sung in the language of the vocalist, unless both singer and audience are well prepared for foreign versions. Another reason for the choice of the simpler class of songs is that amateurs, as a rule, have not large voices, and such songs can give true pleasure, even sung by small voices, if properly trained. I have long thought that nothing could better help this adapting a means to an end than good editions, with suitable translations of the text, of songs suited for home use. Less need be said about selections for the piano-forte, for that instrument has a large, much more intelligent class of masters for its study than has the voice. Yet all the fault does not lie with the teachers,—much of it is the "recherche de la sensation,"—and here this is quite as much the folly of the parents as of the pupils.

One of our great poets wisely says, "It is better that joy should be spread over all the day in the form of strength than that it should be concentrated into ecstasies full of dangers and followed by reactions;" and here we have the right key to the interpretation and emancipation of much of life, and certainly for the true application of music. No satisfaction of a lower quality can excel the serenity, the joy, included in self-restraint; in comprehending this we not only are enabled to perceive the wide horizons that float about and beyond artistic creation, but it enables us also to grasp the great altruistic principles upon which a newer and higher social life must be based.

The alliance and analogy between the arts is so close that the laws and methods that have been held good for the sister arts must apply also to music, which undoubtedly has a great, probably the greatest, future of all the arts. It is only necessary to study its history to see how recent has been the

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development of its present condition, and how very modern the application of many of its laws. With the renaissance of a truer general sentiment much that now prostitutes music will be abolished; and let us timidly hope that it will give us a pregnant and artistic epoch. The intellectual, comprehensive study of the most spiritual, the most elusive, and the most mysteriously suggestive of all the arts will help to hasten this beautiful time, and it cannot be facilitated through a more fitting channel than by a thorough knowledge of harmonic and unemotional music.

By reserving passionate, romantic repression in the background, to await with dignity its fitting moment of utterance, we re-enforce vigor into correct modes of procedure, logically allowing all things to prepare for their appropriate ingress and egress upon life's stage. Might we not through intelligent, progressive processes of selection, breeding, and training finally establish a permanent artistic quality, sufficiently endowed with emotive elements, but fully equipped with love and knowledge of pure form, and of harmony? Might we not secure some more approximate terrestrial analogy to celestial beauty, and might not such conditions counterbalance, equalize, the excessive modern passion for color, for sensuous expression? Finally, might we not in these newer conditions obtain a glimpse into the creative state that permitted the nobility of antique sculpture?

Unemotive art is the healthy, typical direction for the studies of the young. It will carry healing and consolation upon its harmonies for those who are weary with the conflict, sore from the wounds of life's battle; for the rest of mankind it will but help to accentuate, facilitate, the serene contemplation of all the high principles that govern the best evolution and outcome of human effort.

COUNTESS ELIZABETH PHELPS RESSE.

FLORENCE, ITALY.

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DISCUSSIONS.

PROFESSOR HUXLEY ON THE RELATION OF THE ETHICAL TO THE COSMIC PROCESS.

THE position of Professor Huxley in the scientific world gives a commanding importance to his words, whenever he undertakes the scientific treatment of any subject; and when, as in the case of the Romanes address, he chooses a theme of general interest, it is the expected which happens, and there follows a wide-spread discussion, beginning among his scientific peers and filtering down to the general science-reading public.

The interpretations put by different critics on the views advanced in this address are more or less at variance. In the opinion of Mr. St. George Mivart, Professor Huxley, in effect, surrenders the question of the origin of morals to the supernaturalists, since he is understood by Mr. Mivart, as well as by many others, to exclude the ethical process from the evolutionary process; and Mr. Mivart (in common with a great multitude without name) feels it necessary, when a natural explanation of any fact or phenomenon is not forthcoming, to fall back on a supernatural one.

But it is not for a moment to be admitted that Professor Huxley has taken the position to which Mr. Mivart, in an article in the *Nineteenth Century* (presumptuously entitled, "Evolution *in* Professor Huxley") has so patronizingly welcomed him. The quotation from Seneca which serves as an introduction to the address is most significant in this connection: "For I sometimes go over into the enemy's camp, not so much as a deserter, but rather as a spy." Professor Huxley is no deserter from the scientific ranks; but, in this excursion into the camp of the unscientific, he has, to a certain extent, assumed their point of view and adopted their language,—the better, perhaps, to convince them of the hopelessness of their philosophy.

In the opinion of Mr. Leslie Stephen, who has made a most important contribution to this discussion, Mr. Huxley has not fully expanded his meaning—a criticism almost as extraordinary as that of Mr. Mivart himself, for Mr. Huxley's literary style is crystal-clear, and he is wont to leave little room for doubt as to his views. Mr. Stephen also intimates that Mr. Huxley has misinterpreted

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certain of the facts with which the address deals (also an extraordinary criticism), and has thereby arrived at an awkward conclusion —a not too serious phrase, considering the gravity of the subject; and so far as Mr. Huxley's address is open to the interpretation of an attempt to show that the cosmic process, as unfolded in the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest, is opposed (in any deep and final sense) to the ethical process, it has been riddled through and through in Mr. Stephen's trenchant and lucid article in the *Contemporary Review*. But Mr. Huxley has shown, in the notes appended to the original address and in the prolegomena which accompany its publication in a permanent form, that the misinterpretation is on the part of Mr. Stephen, who appears not to have discovered the real bone of Mr. Huxley's contention.

Mr. Herbert Spencer has also favored the public with a brief notice of the address in the form of a few notes in the *Athenæum*, in which he pertinently, albeit somewhat petulantly, asks, "If the ethical man is not a product of the cosmic process, what is he a product of?" But the notes show that he, too, is off the scent, for Mr. Huxley states in a foot-note that "strictly speaking" (that is, scientifically speaking, thus admitting that he has been talking in the language of the Philistines, not in that of the children of light) "the ethical process is a part of the cosmic process"; and so he disposes of his three great critics in a single sentence. In fact, Professor Huxley himself, first or last, withdraws nearly all his own seeming attempts at putting the ethical process on any other than the cosmic basis.

Does the address represent a courteous though futile struggle to adjust modern science to the atmosphere in which the address was delivered? Or is it a covert attempt, on Professor Huxley's part, to wrest the scientific scriptures to the destruction of what he regards as the social heresies of certain of his scientific peers?

Whatever the explanation of the apparent contradictions of the address, it is the object of this discussion to find, if possible, the real kernel of Professor Huxley's argument.

There are probably two chief causes of the disagreements which exist among those who are deeply interested in the subject of morals. First, there is a difference of view as to the real nature of morals,— a difference arising from a different conception of the origin and basis of morality.

Thus, Matthew Arnold says: "We must ever trim between what we ought and what we must;" but it seems to me plain that there

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can be no conflict between necessity and duty, that compulsion destroys the moral quality of an act; he must needs go whom a certain person drives. But Mr. Arnold's words imply a conception of the moral law as an absolute law, not subject to modification by circumstances, and the fulfilment of this law is held to be only ideally possible. Thus the command, "be ye perfect," is scarcely taken seriously, even by those who accept it as authoritative.

The mere statement of the view of the moral law as an absolute law sufficiently indicates the opposite view,—viz., that morality, like everything else with which we are acquainted, is relative.

A second cause of disagreement is a difference in conception of the place of morals in the cosmic order,—in the individual and the social life.

Morality is not in itself an end; it is rather a means to certain higher ends, which may be broadly stated as the completest attainable realization of the possibilities of our being. He who makes a cult of bodily health, of becoming a fine animal, is an object of contempt to the serious; but only slightly less puerile is the ambition of becoming moral as an end and object in itself. In the old Calvinistic creed, "mere morality" was derided as a "filthy rag" in comparison with the sense of redeeming love experienced by the repentant sinner; and there is a germ of scientific truth in this, as in the more formal dogmas of Calvinism, many of which are founded in the nature of things,—in the cosmic process,—and are false only so far as they are clothed with anthropomorphism.

The highest type of man does not live morally as a duty merely, but as the only tolerable mode of living, and as essential to the realization of his highest potentialities as a physical, emotional, and intellectual being. The laws of personal morality are thus the laws of physical and psychical health; and just as physical health depends on the right kind of adjustment to the physical environment, so, also, social morality consists in a certain kind and degree of harmony between the individual life and the social environment. The nature of the environment will thus determine, to a certain extent, the kind of action which will be moral.

There is undoubtedly more or less of conflict between the interests of the individual and those of society as a whole; but Professor Huxley has probably put it too strongly in saying that the practice of that which is ethically best,—what we call goodness or virtue,—involves a course of conduct in all respects opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence,

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since self-assertion is the essence of the cosmic process and unmitigated self-assertion,—pure egoism,—is incompatible with social morality.

Now, while it must be admitted that there is a certain antagonism between an advantageous egoism and the degree of altruism which society demands, this is by no means a unique situation,—it is not peculiar to the moral life. There is, in fact, a constant antagonism between every living body and its physical environment; and the struggle for existence consists in the attempt not only to resist the influence of injurious conditions, but to achieve such an adjustment to all the conditions as shall result in an actual advantage to the individual; and this principle, applied to social morality, involves an advantage to society as well as to the individual. Social morality is not then purely altruistic. The ethical man, no less than the physical man, must adjust himself to his *milieu;* and the result of the struggle is the same in both cases, viz., survival of the fittest. Could anything be more moral, more beneficent in its results, than this?

What do those who object to the survival of the fittest desire? The survival of all, perhaps. But this is not merely to want the earth but more than the earth, since our planet is limited, both in area and productiveness, and will not support an unlimited amount of life. Moreover, the survival of all would defeat the whole scheme of progressive development, which not only results in the weeding out of the less successful, but actually depends on the production of more than can be provided for. This is a positive condition of progress; the opposite condition of the preservation of all, were it possible, must inevitably result in the deterioration and eventual extinction of the species—facts that even the idealist cannot be allowed to overlook. But the real difficulty probably lies in the fact that nature's fittest is not always pleasing, is sometimes *non persona grata*, to the philanthropist, and he incontinently rejects the cosmic product; while nature, meantime, ever reciprocal, brings the pet of Philanthropos to grief.

Fitness varies with the point of view; fitness for survival under water,—*e.g.*, is anatomico-physiological; in a society of cannibals or at Newport, something quite other than this, although it might, in the former case, be a question of muscle and fat and, hence, physiological. I will not attempt to state the case for Newport, but probably heredity, and, hence, evolution may have something to do with it.

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Many of Professor Huxley's statements imply that the struggle for existence is uncompromisingly opposed to even the smallest degree of altruism, the essential quality of which is self-sacrifice; but this is to make both the doctrine of the struggle for existence and the principle of altruism too simple by far. In the higher phases of human life, the struggle for existence is not a mere matter of feeding and mating, although these elements of the struggle are still powerful and not to be ignored; it is not a mere question of physical strength, although this, too, is an important means to the desired ends; neither is it, on the other hand, purely a question of altruism, not even of the degree of altruism required for social morality, although this is an influential factor in the total problem; but the struggle involves the whole nature of man, living not the isolated life of a hermit, but in a community of men having desires and needs similar to his own, and with whom he is therefore in sympathy.

Professor Huxley, indeed, admits this (though only in a foot-note) when he says, again strictly speaking, that "the social life and the ethical process by virtue of which it advances towards perfection are part and parcel of the general process of evolution;" and he compares the ethical process to the "governor" in a steam-engine, itself a part of the mechanism.

That altruism, the passion for humanity, is entirely consistent with the utilitarian doctrine, and the general principle of the survival of the fittest cannot, I believe, be seriously questioned; but, like every other passion, it is likely to become excessive, and thus to defeat its own ends.

Man is a part of nature, and the explanation of his whole being is to be sought in the movement—the flux—of nature; and if Professor Huxley seriously intends the exclusion which some of his statements imply, it behooves him to extend his definition of the cosmos. In a most suggestive little excerpt entitled, "Musings on the Matterhorn," Professor Tyndall, harking back to the nebulous haze in which our solar system is believed to have had its origin, asks,—

"Did that formless fog contain potentially the sadness with which I regarded the Matterhorn? Did the thought, which now ran back to it, simply return to its primeval home? If so, had we not better recast our definition of matter and force? For if life and thought be the very flower of both, any definition which omits life and thought must be inadequate, if not untrue."

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So, any definition of the evolutionary process which omits the ethical process is manifestly inadequate. But Professor Huxley reiterates this idea with an emphasis that is almost dogmatic. "Let us understand once for all," he says, "that the ethical progress of society depends not on imitating the cosmic process—still less in running away from it—but in combating it."

Now this, like many other contested passages, expresses (and that by implication rather than directly) a partial untruth; for the combating of the cosmic process belongs to all phases of life, being nothing more nor less than the struggle for existence, and is not therefore peculiar to the ethical process, as implied by Mr. Huxley. The progress of the vertebrate animal from the cold-blooded to the warm-blooded type, *e.g.*, depended on combating that element of the cosmic process which tends to keep the animal temperature at about the level of the temperature of his environment; but this tendency has been successfully combated—outwitted, so to speak—in the warm-blooded animal by the development of a special mechanism by means of which external cold excites the production of an increased amount of heat in the body with a diminished rate of loss, while external warmth produces the opposite effects, diminishing heat production and providing for continued heat-loss. But does this successful resistance to certain unfavorable conditions of the environment put the development and mode of action of the heat-regulating mechanism outside the range of evolution? On the contrary, it is not only one of the elements of survival, but is directly promotive of a higher grade of life,—it marks an important advance in the animal series. So the progress as well as the survival of the social animal, whether ape or man, is promoted by a due development of the social instincts; and the altruistic sentiment is as distinctly an outcome of the cosmic process as, *e.g.*, the lifting of a weight by means of a derrick is the result of certain of the universal laws of matter, although the ascent of the weight is directly against gravity; and the thesis that the ethical process consists in combating the cosmic process puts it, in effect, squarely on the same ground with the general struggle for existence; *it is a part of the struggle.*

The antithesis implied in the much-quoted statement that "the ethical process is directed not so much to the survival of the fittest as to the fitting of as many as possible to survive," is a mere trick of words, a case of yielding to the temptation of saying something pithy and pointed,—an art in which Mr. Huxley is an adept. But

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there is no real antithesis of ideas in this apparent antithesis of phrases. There is implied rather an extension of survival by means of an extension of a fundamental method of securing survival; the same as that, *e.g.*, which prompts the mother-animal to protect her young;—it is an extension of the individual struggle for self-preservation to others with whom the individual is in sympathy,—a method which appeared long before the human stage of development was reached, and, therefore, does not come within the limits of the ethical process as conceived by Professor Huxley. He admits this view in saying, "It may seem an audacious proposal to pit the microcosm against the macrocosm, and to set man to subdue nature to his higher ends; but I venture to think that the great intellectual difference between the ancient times and our day lies in the solid foundation we have acquired for the hope that such an enterprise may meet with a certain measure of success." So might the megatherium have soliloquized—had the reasoning faculty been sufficiently developed—on the probabilities of success in his struggle against the unfavorable conditions of his environment; there is nothing unevolutional in this.

"Fragile reed as he may be, man is a thinking reed," says Professor Huxley, quoting Pascal; and "in virtue of his intelligence, the dwarf bends the Titan to his will:" that is, he succeeds in the struggle,—in the higher social struggle as well as in the lower physical struggle.

Professor Huxley's position is a conservative one towards what he describes as "modern speculative optimism and perfectibility of the species, reign of peace and lion and lamb transformation-scenes." He has slight sympathy with the enthusiast who anticipates a social millennium, when each shall put his neighbor's interests before his own (to the probable detriment of both), and shall not even prefer one neighbor to another (a namby-pamby, colorless sort of existence).

If egoism has its limitations in the very nature of things, so, surely, has altruism. The altruist must eat; the philanthropist must suffer competition, even in his philanthropy, since philanthropists themselves are not agreed as to what their less fortunate brothers most need. And so the struggle continues in the social as in the lower phases of life; the energies which animate the atoms of the cosmic dust "without haste, without rest," ply on, and the altruistic life, the life of sympathy and love, emerges joyously from the ever-recurring flux.

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Professor Huxley expresses little doubt that they who would trace the origin of the moral sentiments, as of other natural phenomena, to the process of evolution, are on the right track; but he adds that as the immoral sentiments have no less been evolved, there is, so far, as much natural sanction for the one as the other, and that cosmic evolution is incompetent to furnish any better reason why what we call good is preferable to what we call evil than we had before. What better reason could be desired than that which exists in the very nature of what we call good and evil? Science has little to do with reasons in the *a priori* sense,—the reason is to be looked for in the result; and if the tactics of the thief and the murderer (who, as pointed out by Professor Huxley, follow nature just as much as the philanthropist) had proved satisfactory, we should pronounce them good, and, as a matter of fact, there are those among us to-day who have not yet found out to the contrary. But cosmic evolution, in the form of experience, has succeeded in satisfying some of us that "what we call good" is better than "what we call evil." It has developed in us a decided preference for it, especially in other people, and everybody insists that his neighbor shall tell the exact truth. But "good" and "evil" must be defined, and this is just what the cosmic process does for us; it brings out the working relations between egoism and altruism, and defines the limits of both. The final test of all action is the test of utility, the test of survival; but the formulation of the utilitarian principle, as of all general principles, must be a guarded one.

Taken as a whole, I believe that the Romanes address stands acquitted in the main of the criticisms brought against it by Mr. Spencer, Mr. Stephen, and Mr. Mivart; but such analysis of the discourse as I have been able to make brings out two propositions, or rather implications, which seem to be unsupported by fact, viz.:

1st, That the necessity for combating the cosmic process is peculiar to the social—*i.e.*, the ethical—phase of development when, in fact, it belongs to all phases, as the principle of the struggle for existence shows.

2d, That cosmic evolution affords no sanction of the ethical process, when, in fact, *it affords the highest possible sanction—the sanction of survival.*

In his final statement, however, Professor Huxley does not positively exclude the sanctions of morality from the evolutionary

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process; rather he points out that it also sanctions immorality and crime; and this cannot be denied, since they also survive; the wicked flourish like a green bay-tree.

The question then resolves itself into the following: Does evolution tend towards the production of the ethical man as *the highest type?* Is the ethical ideal the one towards which the race is striving?

Professor Huxley himself answers this question in the affirmative by comparing the influence of physiology, psychology, ethics, and political science in modifying the process of life and its manifestations to that of astronomy, physics, and chemistry in their command over the course of non-human nature; and he says that it seems irrational to doubt that the former will work as great a revolution in the sphere of conduct as the latter have done in the material sphere—that he sees no limit to the extent to which intelligence and will may modify the conditions of existence, and that much may be done to change the nature of man himself. In other words, the ethical man has been and is to be still further developed by the same general process by which the physical man and material progress have been evolved,—viz., *by the cosmic process.*

That the rain and the sunshine fall alike on the just and on the unjust is an old grievance, but one is not a little surprised to find a man of Professor Huxley's calibre giving it fresh utterance. However, his address is not only a masterly setting forth of the world-treatment of the problem of good and evil in all ages, but, in the presentation of the problem from his own point of view, the address is both manly and tender; and the ethical ideal of life is held up as that towards which the race is bound to strive. But Professor Huxley, in common with a considerable contingent of society, recognizes the fact that the moral, no less than the other interests of life, have a physical basis; and that philanthropic efforts which deal mainly with the superstructure, leaving the foundations undisturbed, are well-nigh, if not utterly, fruitless.

The scientific view of the higher sociological questions may be, to a certain extent repulsive, and there are those who seem to fear an investigation of the basis and, I will add, the limitations of morals; but in the long run, in calculating the cosmic calendar, a philosophy founded on the facts of existence is the most satisfying as it is the most durable.

Nevertheless, it appears to be a question, in many minds, as to how far it is desirable to know the whole truth of things. Caleb Plummer made his blind daughter blindly happy for awhile in the

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illusion of Gruff and Tackleton's generosity and their own comfortable surroundings, but only to break her heart at last; and some poet (I forget his name—the individual is of small consequence in the cosmic process of appropriating his ideas) with a fine poetic, albeit deeply pessimistic touch, has said, "Whisper me, love, all things that are not true," implying that the illusions of life, the not-true things rather than the realities, are the sources of the highest satisfaction. But as it is a superficial view which considers that the real prizes of life are to be secured by pure egoism, and we regard murder (the grossest possible violation of the altruistic principle) not only as a crime but as a blunder, so we are compelled to believe that a true philosophy is best; that real nobility of soul does not fear to face the real universe; nay, more, that it draws its highest inspiration from an atmosphere of reality; that it is deeply enamoured of truth.

But the bane of moral progress lies in the too common belief that our present knowledge of morals is final. Some lines of Browning's, if not poetical, are at least applicable to this point:

> "Man's the prerogative—knowledge once gained
> To ignore—find new knowledge to press for—to swerve
> In pursuit of no, not for a moment; attained,
> Why onward through ignorance dare and deserve,
> As still to its asymptote speedeth the curve!"

The moral curve has not touched its asymptote; and if I have read Professor Huxley aright, this mathematical figure well expresses his position, since, though infinitely extended and ever approaching each other, the curve and its asymptote never meet.

In the philosophy of Professor Huxley, it is idle to forecast a future in which the lion and the lamb shall lie down together, except in a sense in which the lion will have much the best of it. Such a state of things might appeal to some minds as an ideal state, though such a lion could hardly be regarded as an ideal lion; but we are safe in saying that it is not in the situation, not only from the point of view of evolution, but of morals itself, even were morals considered as *sui generis*, and apart from the general mundane philosophy.

An existence from which are eliminated the elements of struggle, of suppression of the inadequate as well as of the too self-assertive,—in short, of the physically, mentally, and morally unfit,—may have its attractions for the sentimentalist; but the attempt to work such

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a scheme out of the materials at hand would be comparable to that of appending the doctrine of universal salvation to the Calvinistic creed,—the one completely wipes out the other.

The cosmos is a stubborn fact; the cosmic process has undoubtedly come to stay; and it devolves upon humanity to study it,—not merely as an intellectual gymnastic, but in the hope of finding, if possible, an inward reconciliation to it; being products of the cosmic process, we are bound to show it proper respect. In this reconciliation, moreover, is to be found the scriptural reward of peace to our souls,—a cure of the "mad, impotent passion and outcry" described by Mrs. Ward as filling Marcella's heart at a certain stage of her career before she had *settled down.*

Mr. Huxley has undoubtedly set forth a somewhat painful view of life—what Mr. Stephen (in language strikingly in contrast with that employed by Mrs. Ward) has described as an "awkward conclusion"; but this may be fairly offset by another view.

Mr. Stephen has pointed out that morality implies the development of certain instincts which are essential to the race, although they must, in an indefinite number of cases, be injurious to the individual—as when the mother dies in defence of her child. But who is to judge as to what is, on the whole, injurious to the individual? In the example cited, let us appeal from Mr. Stephen to the mother herself; and if all, or even a modicum, of what has been said on this subject be true, she will tell us that a single year of motherhood is worth a cycle of childless existence. The crown of martyrdom has been joyfully worn in more than one good cause, and the example cited is only one of many illustrations of a thesis well worthy of development,—viz., that even the *individual* (who is for the most part represented as playing the *rôle* of a martyr in the evolutionary scheme), that the individual, caught in the vortex of the cosmic process, has no adequate cause of complaint; he has his compensations. I remember once having seen in one of our magazines a most instructive drawing which it might be well to have reproduced in considerable numbers and a copy sent to every college settlement in the country. The picture represented a ragged and reckless-looking colored boy playing with a tin can and a string; and a sympathetic, philanthropic, altruistic, ethic,—in short, *cosmic* —woman (well-dressed withal, and therefore one whose life must have been more or less of a burden) who, being moved to "do something" for the poor cosmic waif, introduced her efforts by asking—"How old are you, my little boy?"

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"Wal," said the boy, "if you goes by what ma says, I's four; but if you goes by the fun I's had, I's a hunderd!"

The mere consciousness of living is pleasurable; the entire group of sensations known as "bodily" is exhilarating; the special sensations, in proportion as they develop on the psychical side, become transcendently interesting; the deep delight of the fundamental emotions, the glow of psychical satisfaction which attends the capture of the Q. E. D., the culmination of psychical happiness in the inspirations of genius are all good, and most of them come in some degree into the experience of all.

But what are they in comparison with the abiding sense of justice, of honor and of duty, which sooner or later become, to some extent at least, integral parts of every individuality? Despair itself, when not purely an expression of some organic disturbance, is but a confession of failure of the realization of one's ideal; *happy to have had that ideal!*

Whatever the outcome, struggle itself is joyous; from it comes sometimes the defeat which rouses the latent residue of energy necessary to a future success; and sometimes the sweetness of victory—not necessarily the egoistic exultation in the overthrow of an enemy (although this also counts) but the finer conquests which belong to the higher ranges of our complex cosmic-human nature—the ascendancy of sweet reason—the full flowering of *the ethical man.*

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NATURAL LAW, ETHICS, AND EVOLUTION.

THE discussion to which the paper of Dr. White is an admirable contribution, seems to me to have reached a stage where it is just as well to supplement controversies over the precise meaning or the bearings of Professor Huxley's address, by a few independent efforts, however imperfect these may be, to deal with the questions. (1) Whether the "ethical process" is a "part of the cosmical process;" and (2) whether it stands in a relation of opposition or of harmony to the tendencies of this cosmical process; and (3) finally, in case the relation of the "ethical process" to the "cosmical process" is one of opposition, what the source of this opposition is. The following paper is a sketch of such an effort.

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The student of nature is trying to reduce observed facts to universal laws. In so far as he can do this, he succeeds in what certain recent students of the Logic of Science (*e.g.*, Mach) have called the description of the facts. The fundamental principle of empirical science is, that you can only tell what a given fact is, in so far as you can describe its nature in universal terms,—*i.e.*, in terms which identify this nature with the nature of other facts. Were all the facts of our experience single, discontinuous, unrepeated even in memory, and as different from one another as tones are now different from odors, or as brightness is different from swiftness, then we might all of us experience the world; but we could none of us describe in the least what it contained. This world might even be allowed to have *one* sort of uniformity in it,—viz., it might be as richly delightful a world as you please, from moment to moment; but it would be not only an uncomprehended, but an unreported world,—a world of whose facts no record could be made. On the other hand, a world where experience can be recorded, reported, described, has two characters: First, there are in it facts whose similarities can be noted,—*i.e.*, there are "wholes" or "groups" of phenomenal elements, which are alike in some respects; and, secondly, the noted similarities are such as permit you, in terms of these similarities themselves, to define certain complex groups of phenomena, as "having the same structure," or as "being built up according to the same rule," or as "exemplifying the same law," so that at least some of the details of each fact noted are "explained" by this law. To "explain" a given phenomenal detail, noted in your experience, say *d*, by the "natural law" which is said to "require" its presence, or to "make it necessary," is simply to point out that the phenomenon *d* is part of a larger whole, a "fact" in the substantive sense,—viz., *abcd*, and that this "whole fact," *abcd*, has a structure, or "make-up," a describable "build," a "typical constitution," which other whole facts of experience, viz., ABCD, or *pqrs*, also exemplify, while this constitution is such as to involve the presence of *d* in case *a*, *b*, and *c* are present, and in case the whole is to preserve the aforesaid typical structure. You then say that, since the whole fact *abcd* resembles ABCD, or *pqrs*, not in its details as such (*i.e.*, in its contents), but in their structural relations,—*i.e.*, in the general type or build of each of these whole facts,—therefore the same rule or law which defines D by its relations to the other phenomena, A,B,C, of its own group, and which defines *s* by its relations to the

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other phenomena, *p*, *q*, and *r*, of the group *pqrs*, can be realized or exemplified when you pass to an *abc* group, only if there is present a fourth phenomenon, *d*, which is such as to have the same structural relation to *abc* in the whole fact whereof *abc* and *d* are parts, as was present in case of the facts ABCD and *pqrs*.

My statement is abstract. But the principle is simple. It means that you cannot describe whole facts,—*i.e.*, that you cannot report, record, verify, or comprehend their structures, without conceiving the phenomenal details of these facts as subject to laws,—*i.e.*, to rules of structure, which are exemplified by other whole facts of experience as well as by the fact that may be, at any time, under discussion. The "uniformity of nature" is thus the *conditio sine qua non* of the describability of her facts. And on the other hand, to report whole facts is, to some extent, to explain their details. It is, therefore, not one thing to describe facts, and another thing to explain the elements that enter into their constitution. But, *in so far as you describe the wholes, you explain the parts of these wholes.* There is, indeed, no *a priori* principle that every experience which may occur to anybody is describable at all. Anybody's experience might be, to any extent, apparently or really unique. In so far as it was unique, science could only ignore it, as being a "private" or "personal" experience. But if an experienced fact is to be described, it must be, in some respect, capable of identification with other facts. And different facts can be describably identical only as regards their structure. But if two facts have the same structure, then their details, the elements of which they are made up, stand in relations to one another which exemplify this structure. Any one element, then, will appear in each fact, as explained by and conformable to the law which links it to the other elements of the whole fact of which it is a part. The presence in the world of various whole facts that exemplify the same structure, is then a condition of the describability of each of these whole facts. But the describability of any whole fact involves what appears as the explanation of the parts or elements of this fact by the law or structure of the whole to which they belong. In brief, the structure actually common to many facts also appears as the law which explains or necessitates the constituent elements of each fact.

Nature then, *in order to be describable,* has to be viewed or conceived as such that the details of every natural phenomenon shall be "subject to," "determined by," or "necessitated by," the laws which describe the structure of the phenomenal wholes of which each

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detail is a part. If any given natural phenomenon, itself a mere fragment (*e.g.*, the petal of a particular flower, the tooth of a carnivorous animal, the total phase of an individual lunar eclipse), is to be conceived as a part of a certain whole, then this part must be *conceived as if* "explained," or "necessitated," by the law which describes, in universal terms, the whole "thing" or "process" of which the fragment is a part. And this is what is meant by the "necessity" of natural events. Natural necessity is an incident of the conceived describability of natural phenomena when grouped in whole facts.

That natural phenomena shall be *conceived as* necessary, or as subject to rigid law, and that the "cosmic process" shall be viewed as one where "mere necessity reigns," is therefore not a belief capable of any but a relatively subjective and human interpretation. Experience comes and goes in its own way. No mortal has ever "experienced" the absolute necessity of any cosmic process whatever. Chance, as Mr. Charles S. Peirce has well observed, streams in through every channel of our senses. Trust then to mere experience, as it comes to any one of us, and such experience can never prove that there are "cosmic laws."

But natural science depends not upon merely accepting, but also upon reporting, and upon recording, the phenomena, upon comparing notes, upon trusting nobody's private experience as such, upon a process, then, of publicly verifiable description of facts. This process—not now the cosmic process, but the process of description—involves noting uniformities, and depends for its success upon our ability to note the latter. The describable uniformities are structural uniformities,—*i.e.*, those expressible in terms of universal "rules of structure" or "laws." The law of structure of a given whole, be this whole a "thing" or a "process," a coexistent whole, or a whole of successive elements, appears, in our slowly formed, socially communicated, and gradually verified scientific conceptions, as determining the necessity of every element of any fact by virtue of the whole to which the element belongs. The only further assumption upon which the doctrine of the *objective* universality of rigid cosmic laws, as distinct from the foregoing subjective and human need for such laws, depends, is the assumption which I have elsewhere examined at some length, *—viz., the

* Cf. the *Philosophical Review* for September, 1894, and "The Spirit of Modern Philosophy," Lecture xii. on *The World of Description.*

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assumption that, in our human experience, *only* the relatively describable data stand for the external or physical world *as such*,—the endless indescribabilities of our experience, the "chance" of Mr. Peirce's account, being viewed, by scientific thinking, as standing for the merely "individual" or "internal" element of our experience, or for the limitations of the individual point of view. For science, as I have just pointed out, is an essentially social affair. The described "cosmical" fact is a fact which others are conceived to be capable of verifying besides the observer who now describes. And as only the describable aspect of our experience is communicable to others for them to verify, and as only the verifiable is, scientifically speaking, to be viewed as "cosmical" at all, it follows that, while private experience is full of what seems to be chance, we all have come to regard the cosmical process as one subject to the most rigid law. But one must carefully bear in mind this genesis and meaning of the whole concept, both of necessary natural law and of the cosmical processes themselves, in any comparison of the "cosmical process" with the "ethical process." Hence our present need for this rather technical summary.

On the other hand, the conception of moral laws, by which given acts are to be judged, and of "ethical processes," such as what is called "Progress,"—processes which involve a gradual approach towards a conformity of given facts to given ethical ideals,—this whole conception of the moral world as such involves an entirely different point of view in presence of human experience. To conceive the "cosmical process" as such, you have to conceive it as in every detail subject to laws,—viz., to precisely the cosmical laws. But you can well view the facts in the light of a moral ideal, while believing that the now existent physical facts run in some ways directly counter to the ideal. Yes, so to view the facts is inevitable whenever you have ideals. For you derive your ideals, ultimately, from an aspect of your experience which has not to do with describing experienced facts, but with desiring ideal objects that are absent when you desire them. It is true that what you rationally desire, you can in general both describe and hope, with the aid of a possible good fortune, some time either to verify yourself, or to view as verifiable by somebody else, in whose interest you desire this object. But you do not desire the object *in so far as* it is describable. And furthermore, just in so far as you desire any object, its presence is not yet verifiable. One desires the absent. The cosmical fact,—*i.e.*, the physical fact, viewed

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as subject to natural law, is, then, an object in so far as it is *both* describable *and* verifiable. The object of our ideal is desirable *not* in so far as it is describable, and, again, *precisely in so far as it is not* yet verifiable. Herein, then, lies a double contrast between the natural fact as such, and the object of desire, as such. The contrast comes out well in case of future facts. The future eclipse, as natural phenomenon, is but an incident in the vast describable whole fact called the process of the solar system. As such, the eclipse can be predicted as something necessary, because this process, as a whole, is conceived as one describable in terms of known and universal law. The eclipse is also verifiable, at the time of its occurrence, by all rightly situated observers. But so far the eclipse is no object of desire. Desire is as vain as would be prayer. The eclipse is to be verified only at the computed time, but then it *must* be verifiable. Science does not aim at the eclipse, nor does she pray for the eclipse. She predicts, verifies, reports, records,—all in due season. But the eclipse is not only natural fact, but interesting experience in the lives of the men who come to see it. *In so far*, one can desire to live to see the eclipse, can make an ideal of being present when it occurs, etc. But in desiring the experience, one does not compute the eclipse, nor does one verify the computation. One desires the eclipse in so far as one still expects but cannot yet verify its coming. And to desire to see the eclipse is simply not to compute its coming, but just to make this sight as such an ideal, and not to view the eclipse itself as a cosmical fact.

In consequence, our present contrast might be stated thus: Phenomena are desired (or dreaded) precisely in so far as they appear to be *interestingly novel.* Novelty, then, is a *conditio sine qua non* of all ideal value when regarded from a temporal point of view. But phenomena are explicable precisely in so far as they are conceived as *not* novel, but as mere cases under law. And again: The desired, or the dreaded, must be, as such, *now* unverifiable. But the explained is known to be such precisely in so far as universal explanations are actually verified. When I recognize something as a case of a "cosmical process," my recognition, as such, involves therefore no desire. One may say, indeed, that the actual can be approved, as conforming to an ideal standard. But, for us mortals, this approval, whenever desires are concerned (and a purely contemplative, æsthetic approval concerns us not here), is the approval of the fact in so far as it *has been* desired. In brief,

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then, the explained or necessary phenomenon of the "cosmical process" is such in so far as it embodies the universal law in a specific case. But the object of desire is such in so far as the law or rule which this desire involves has not yet been embodied in the precise sense in which it here needs to be embodied.

Here is the root of the endless conflict between the ethical view of the world and the explanatory or "scientific" view. For a rational ethical doctrine is simply some universalized system of desires. What the right system may be concerns us not here. Enough if one has an ideal, he bases it on some type of desire. If nothing were desirable, there would be no ideals. A man with an ethical doctrine has simply taught himself what he now thinks to be wisely desirable. But he still desires. Thus desiring, he looks out upon experience. There occur phenomena. These his science "apperceives," recognizes, describes as cases of law, explains, calls necessary. But the very nature of this explanatory or descriptive sort of consciousness is that it says, "these phenomena are not novel." The consciousness of the possessor of ideals, however, essentially asserts, at every breath one draws, "Yet the novel, in so far as it justly appears novel, is precisely what I want." The explaining consciousness insists: "The law is eternally realized. What has been will be. There seems to be alteration. There is none." The ethical consciousness retorts: "The law is not yet realized. In this 'not yet' is my life. I have no abiding city. I seek one out of sight." Meanwhile, of course, it is perfectly possible to point out common territory, where these two views seem to meet without direct conflict. "You must use my insight," says the explaining consciousness, "if you want to realize your ideals. In vain do you desire as ideal what my laws forbid as forever unverifiable." The ethical consciousness must accept this inevitable comment. But it still responds: "Whatever laws of yours I recognize, they become to me not my ideals, but the mere material for realizing my ideals. If I could not interfere with the phenomenal expression that your laws are to get, my work would be utterly vain. You point me the means. But I set the goal. I do not quarrel with your laws. But I use them."

Hereupon, of course, the explaining consciousness makes one retort which does, indeed, appear to be crushing. "Realize your ideals if you will and can," it says; "yet what is your realization but a mere incident of my cosmical process? Your realization, when it comes, will be a natural phenomenon, a part of a whole

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fact, like the rest. I shall explain this phenomenon, and show, whenever it happens, that it is nothing new." To this, of course, the ethical consciousness may make either one of two responses. It may say: "Granted. As a fact, I admit that you are right. My realization of my ideals will itself be only a nature-process, involving no true novelty. I admit that my view is, in the last analysis, illusory. 'Nature is made better by no mean, but nature makes that mean,' just as Mr. Herbert Spencer quotes. Nothing really new ever happens. Hence no ideals, viewed *as* ideals, ever do realize themselves, any more than eclipses come because we hope for them. But still our human experience has its limitations. Some events seem novel. Some desires seem, as such, productive of what nature did not before contain. As a fact, the 'star-mist' contained everything,—good, evil, possible, necessary. But '*Der Mensch, der bewegliche Fühlende, der leichte Raub des mächtigen Augenblicks,' feels* the thing otherwise. I view the world as it seems to active beings; and so I *must* view the world. Hence you have the truth; but I, as practical common sense, must live in my necessary illusions; and it is in *this* sense that I remain forever in opposition to you,—viz., just as an inevitable, if illusory, point of view."

This is what the ethical consciousness *may* say; and it is saying this which, to follow out to their just consequences the views of many writers, ought to constitute what such writers should consistently regard as the true "philosophy of evolution." The real world, thus viewed, is one of rigid cosmical law. In such a world, nothing essentially new ever happens. If we, as scientific observers, could come to comprehend this truth, we should no more talk of a genuine realization of ideals before unrealized in the universe, than we should regard the swing of a pendulum as a dramatic action. The pendulum bob, in its regular vibration, rises and falls, moves right and moves left, moves swiftly and moves slowly; yet all the time engages in but one describable cosmical process, which involves nothing novel at any point. So with the cosmical process in its wholeness. New passions and desires, as well as their significant potency in transforming the world, are and must be illusions, if describable natural law, as such, is universal. From this conclusion there can be no possible escape. For to explain is to see the apparently novel, in all its essential details, as an instance of the old, whose former type is, down to the least genuinely true element, merely exemplified once more in this seemingly novel situation. Either, then, desires, passions, ideals, are not subject

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to the laws of the describable and necessary cosmical processes, or else they, if mere incidents of a describable process, are nothing new, and bring to pass nothing new, in all the universe. What has been will be. There is, then, nothing truly ethical. There is only the cosmical. This, I say, is the only possible "philosophy of evolution," if natural law is an account of the absolutely real world. Evolution, as a process, is in that case the mere appearance of novelties to unwary or to necessarily ignorant observers. It does not and cannot involve anything truly historical. But meanwhile, of course, the philosophical evolutionist of this type could make practical concessions, to his public, to himself, and to the ethical consciousness, so long as he did not forget that these concessions were such,—mere accommodations to human ignorance and to the practical point of view. He could say, "A portion of the cosmical process,—namely, our own voluntary activity, appears as if it were ethical,—*i.e.*, as if true novelty, genuine progress, effective ideals, historically significant passage to something never before realized, were there present." This illusion is human, inevitable, and even useful. When we write on ethics we have to treat this illusion as if it were true; and to do so is as harmless as to speak of the sunrise, remembering all the while the cosmical truth.

Such ethically disposed, but consistent, partisans of natural necessity ought, however, still to admit that the ethical process, when thus abstractly sundered from the cosmical process, of which it is all the while held to be a part, does indeed appear in very sharp contrast to the rest of the cosmical process. In the ethical world, illusory as it is here said to be, it still seems true that the pendulums do not merely swing, that the old does not merely recur, that the creation moves towards some far-off event, divine or diabolical. One now has to talk (although such speech is by hypothesis, but illusory) of progress, which means novel good entering a world that has thus far lacked its presence. One has to treat nature as if she could be made better. One looks to the future with hopes which, for many evolutionists, become rather sentimental. And to do this is to abstract from the fact that the "star-mist" contained it all, and that nothing essentially novel occurs, or will ever occur. But the abstraction is in sharp contrast to the supposed truth. The ethical world is, when conceived, in vehement, even if in illusory, opposition to the natural process; and Professor Huxley's discussion will have done great good, in so far as it leads to the recognition of this inevitable fact. How one states the details of the

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opposition is of small consequence. The opposition itself is deep and universal.

But the ethical consciousness might decline thus to abandon its assertions. It might say, "But, after all, my view is right. I not merely, in the seeming of my ideals, contrast my illusions with a supposed truth, but I rightly, and in the name of truth, oppose my view of the real world to any physical view. After all, does experience prove the real universality of the 'cosmical process'? Certainly, experience, as such, does not. That nothing new occurs is a proposition directly opposed to the seeming of every individual experience. Why may not this seeming be well founded? Why may there not be true novelties, effective ideals, genuine progress, transformations, evolution which is not a mere seeming of growth, spiritual processes which were not present in the star-mist in any form?"

To these queries would, of course, come the reply: "Supernaturalism, this,—base supernaturalism." "But, no," one might retort; "not what that word usually suggests to some people, but merely what Kantian idealism long ago made familiar, and distinguished from all *Schwärmerei*,—this alone is what we mean."

As a fact, the assertion of the universality of the rigid cosmical process, and of what I have elsewhere called the reality of the "World of Description," is unquestionably a human, and, as I myself should affirm, a distinctly social theory for the interpretation of one aspect of our experience. Take human experience from that special point of view, and *then*, indeed, you have to conceive the world of experience *as if it were known to be* one of cosmical processes, which are the same yesterday, to-day, and forever. In that world, the only philosophy of evolution is that all evolution is to be called appearance. The only ethical process observable is one which is to be received as unreal. There is no question of warring against the cosmical process. But there is question of an undying opposition between the inevitable but illusory ethical consciousness and the hypothetically true cosmical consciousness; for the one forever looks to the future for the novel, the coming, *das Werdende*, conceived as the possibly progressive; the other knows that all *Werden* only manifests the changeless truth of the cosmical process itself.

But now, the other view of human experience, the one which regards the universe as what I have elsewhere called "The World of Appreciation," is, as a fact, equally true to experience, and

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equally inevitable. For nature we know, as a fact, only through our social consciousness,* and the social consciousness is ethical before it is physical, appreciates more deeply than it describes, recognizes nature for reasons which are, in the last analysis, themselves ideal, and is conscious of novelty, of progress, of significance, in general of the human, in ways which, in the last analysis, make the whole cosmical process a mere appearance of one aspect of the moral world. Yet this doctrine is not "supernaturalism," because the true opponent of the natural is not the "supernatural," but the human. The "cosmos" in the sense of empirical science is a conceptual product of the human mind. Man is indeed but a fragment of the absolutely real universe. But that genuine universe of which he is a fragment is not the world of description, but the world of appreciation,—a world at which the phenomena of nature indeed richly hint, but which they do not reveal.

It is true that, when viewed in the light of such a doctrine, the facts of evolution get an interpretation, not here to be expounded, which does away with much of the opposition between the ethical and what had seemed the cosmical, in the sense in which we have so far used that word in this paper. And it is true, I think, that the reconciliation in question would contain and accept most of the positive considerations which Dr. White's paper has so well expounded. Meanwhile, I should still hold that, as points of view, the view for which the ethical process exists at all is very sharply opposed to the view which, in the sense of physical science, deals with cosmical processes as such. Call the whole matter one of phenomena and of human opinion, and then indeed this opposition need lead to no misunderstandings. It will then be *merely* one of points of view, no assertions of ultimate truth being made on either side. But if it be a question of a philosophy of reality, then one must choose between the two points of view, or else reject both. There is no chance of reconciling the metaphysically real and ultimate universality of the so-called cosmical, *i.e.*, physical processes, or processes according to describably rigid laws, with any even remotely ethical interpretation of the same reality.

The questions asked at the outset are then to be decided thus: (1) Conceive the "cosmical process" as one of describably rigid law, as all explanation in natural science does, must do, and ought

* I may be allowed to refer again to the before-mentioned paper in the *Philosophical Review.*

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to do, and *then* the "ethical process" can form no part of the "cosmical process." (2) In essence the "ethical process," in so far as you conceive its presence at all, is utterly opposed to all "cosmical processes" when they are thus physically conceived. (3) The nature of the opposition lies not in any world of "things in themselves" at all, but in the peculiarity of the ethical point of view which, in dealing, as both this view and its rival concretely do, with mere human appearances, estimates ideally, and desires essential novelty, progress, and the thus far unattained as such; while the descriptive or explanatory point of view conceives its purely phenomenal world as if it were known to contain no novelties whatever, and nothing ideal.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

GEORG VON GIZYCKI AND THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS.

[NOTE.—Just after the last number went to press, we learned with deep regret of the death of the Berlin member of our Editorial Committee, Professor Georg von Gizycki, who has been an active supporter of this JOURNAL from the first, and a frequent contributor to its pages. We had hoped to have an account of Professor Gizycki's life and work for this number from one of his colleagues in the University of Berlin, but are obliged to go to press without it. Our own acquaintance with Professor Gizycki, which was mainly through correspondence, dates back to the winter of 1881–82. Though he was then quite young, we were impressed with his vigor of thought and moral earnestness, and his frank and genial nature attracted us to him personally. This was emphasized all the more by the fact that he was a cripple for life, and had to be wheeled in a chair each day to the University, and carried bodily by his attendant to the lecture-room. There was a striking contrast between his unfortunate physical condition and his hopeful rationalistic philosophy of life. His lectures were not largely attended at that time ('81–'82), but he had already gained some distinction as a writer on ethics. His work on Shaftesbury we heard highly praised by Professor Zeller in a lecture on modern ethics before several hundred students.

Besides publishing several ethical works and giving regularly his University lectures, Professor Gizycki had been editing for two or three years a weekly paper, *Ethische Kultur*, devoted to the interests of the recently-organized Ethical Movement in Germany, of which he was one of the foremost promoters and leaders. His untimely death at the age of forty-four is to be lamented, and the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, to which he gave much faithful service, offers a grateful tribute to his memory.

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At our request, Professor Jodl has given his estimate of Professor Gizycki's standing as an ethical thinker, which we are glad to publish in this number. We regret that we cannot publish with it a personal tribute from some one who knew him intimately.

Since our last issue, we have also learned of the death of Professor Luigi Ferri, the Dean of the Philosophical Faculty in the University of Rome, whose article on "National Character and Classicism in Italian Ethics" was published in our April number. Professor Ferri was one of the oldest and most distinguished of the philosophical writers of Italy, and edited the leading Italian philosophical review, *Rivista Italiana di Filosofia*, published bi-monthly in Rome. The May–June number, which has just appeared, contains a portrait of Professor Ferri and an appreciative notice of him by Carlo Cantoni. A brief extract from this notice, prepared for this JOURNAL, comes to us just as we are going to press. We regret that it is too late for insertion.—MANAGING EDITOR.]

To properly estimate the scientific position of the late Professor Gizycki in recent ethics, we must call to mind the stationary condition of ethical science in Germany twenty-five years ago. The various forms of the old speculative and idealistic ethics had reached their term; what still survived of them waged a hopeless battle against the fast-advancing Darwinian and Evolutionism, which on its side sometimes looked upon ethics as scarcely more than an atavistic survival from the primitive period of the race. French and English Positivism, with which there was insufficient acquaintance, was looked upon with mistrust, and there was a kind of horror at its rejection of everything metaphysical, and also a failure to appreciate the significant way in which it was laying an anthropological and sociological foundation for ethics. Beneke—who had to atone for saving Eudemonism in his "Grundlegung zu einer Physik der Sitten" by losing the privilege of teaching at the University of Berlin; who revised Bentham's "Introduction" and ethically deepened it, and who in his "System der praktischen Philosophie" anticipated all the essential results of the recent analysis of moral phenomena (apart from the question as to how they have historically developed), though expressing himself in a clumsy and pedantic manner—was almost forgotten.

In the midst of this situation it was Gizycki's merit to have sought consciously and energetically to establish a connection with the great contributions of English empirical ethics. After I had myself, in my "Leben und Philosophie David Hume's" (1872), endeavored to give an unprejudiced estimate of Hume as an ethical thinker, and

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had referred to Beneke, there came Gizycki's works, "Ueber die Philosophie Shaftesbury's" (1876) and "Die Ethik Hume's in ihrer geschichtlichen Stellung" (1878), supplementing one another as the two thinkers had themselves supplemented one another. The second work was particularly important, as it traced the influence of Hume's ideas in the nineteenth century on Bentham, Mill, Bain, Spencer, and Darwin. At the close of the book there is a dissertation on universal happiness as the highest principle of morals, containing the first attempt of Gizycki's to give a connected statement of his ethical views. It is one of the first and most energetic defences of the Greatest-Happiness principle in the German ethics of the present time. It seeks to establish the validity of the principle, in part indirectly, by showing that it is, as a rule, implicitly contained even in those theories that depart from it, and in part directly, by defending it against attacks and misunderstandings. The dissertation contains a large number of keen observations, and shows an open eye for all sides of the moral life, thereby acquiring an abiding value. The ethical view, here sketched, is elaborated and stated in popular form in his "Grundzüge der Moral" (1884). His essays, "Darwinismus und Ethik" (*Deutsche Rundschau*, 1885), "Ueber den Utilitarismus," and "Ueber moralische Beurtheilung" (these both in the *Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, viii. and ix. Band), prepared the way for the revision, in more exact and still popularly intelligible form, of the "Grundzüge," which appeared as "Moralphilosophie" in 1888,—Gizycki's ripest and most important work.

The value of the theory advocated by Gizycki lies in the fact, that on the one hand it asserts the principle of universal happiness with the greatest emphasis as the criterion for the worth of human actions, and on the other strictly insists that ethical judgment always relates not merely to the consequences of actions, but to their sources in the individual, to his character,—in other words, in its uniting the Social or Utility-principle with the Conscience-principle. This fundamentally important distinction Gizycki did not discover, but he, so to speak, re-discovered it, and was the first to fully appreciate it in its great theoretic significance. The insight throws a clear light on many dark and difficult problems of ethics, as the essay "Ueber moralische Beurtheilung," in particular, plainly shows.

Gizycki's other great service is, that he zealously strove to spread the view that there was no discrepancy between founding ethics on a social basis and the ideality of ethical rules; that the noblest

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imperatives of to-day are the result of a process of development, and become intelligible when taken as the conditions of life for a social community; that the natural course of progress in the civilized world has as its consequence a steady clarification and elevation of the moral conceptions. This certainty became the sheet-anchor of his ethical convictions in the measure that the last traces of the theological view of the world vanished from his mind, and he saw humanity, in the midst of a nature without God and ruled by immanent laws, thrown back upon itself. As for his general view of the world and his attitude to religion, the impressions were decisive which he received through Hume, Mill, Bentham, and among German thinkers, through Dühring especially, whom he highly esteemed. And so the "Moralphilosophie" attempted to furnish what his work on Hume set forth as a need,—not merely an ethical doctrine, but a view of the world and of life. With this end in view, he subjected the three conceptions which serve as the principal pillars of the ordinary theological ethics—God, the Freedom of the Will, and Immortality—to a searching examination. More interesting than this critique—the negative results of which could naturally contain nothing surprising to science—is the attempt to show that the needs of the emotional nature, which religious faith seeks to satisfy, remain by no means wholly unsatisfied on the basis of a purely naturalistic and ethical (*rein diesseitigen, nur von ethischen Idealen beseelten*) view of the world; and, on the other hand, that a changed way of thinking must necessarily lead to changes in our mode of feeling. In this exposition, which endeavors to put into popular language grave thoughts, full of the spirit of renunciation, Gizycki—to whom brilliancy of style and the pathos of the orator were quite denied—says many a homely but penetrating word, the like of which has seldom been heard in German speech.

When "Moralphilosophie" appeared, the new stream of ethical science in Germany—of which the first works of Gizycki may be regarded as foretokens—was in full motion. Ihering had published his spirited book "Der Zweck im Rechte," Wundt his "Ethik," Laas the second volume of his "Idealismus und Positivismus," which contains the sharpest sort of criticism on all transcendental ethics. On the history of the development of moral phenomena, their dependence on definite conditions of society and definite component elements in culture,—all of which Gizycki rather divined than demonstrated in detail,—clear light fell. The

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history of ethics was newly investigated in the works of Th. Ziegler and Fr. Jodl, and the results were made serviceable to the systematic undertakings of the present. Henry Sidgwick's "Methods of Ethics," which in so masterly a way knows how to reconcile dialectically the principal tendencies of ethical thought, had an influence on the earliest shaping of Gizycki's views. Then came the significant works, Martineau's "Types of Ethical Theory" and Leslie Stephen's "Science of Ethics." Even France was not without influence upon him. Comprehensive and acute examinations of the condition of scientific ethics were undertaken by A. Fouillée ("Critique des Systèmes de Morale contemporaine") and Guyau ("La Morale anglaise contemporaine"); and Guyau's systematic treatises, particularly the last one, "L'Irréligion de l'Avenir," had the closest spiritual likeness to what Gizycki strove for in his "Moralphilosophie." Almost contemporaneously with the latter appeared, too, Fr. Paulsen's "System der Ethik," and the German edition of Höffding's "Ethik," which has all the effect of an original work.

I have allowed myself to present these data to make known the intellectual and literary environment in which we have to place Gizycki's scientific activity, and that we may get the right standpoint for properly estimating him. The improvement in the theory of moral judgment to which reference has been made above, and the consistent cleaving to the thought of a purely human, non-religious ethics, we must designate as his most essential services. His death prevented a systematic application of his fundamental conceptions to the questions of practical life, such as we find in Paulsen and Höffding. As I have learned, he had undertaken a comprehensive collection of material for a complete doctrine of duties, and intended to work upon it in the near future. Only "Vorlesungen ueber Sociale Ethik," edited by his widow from his literary remains, has appeared—soon after his death. It allows us to see in what way Gizycki was led to derive, from his fundamental ethical principle of the greatest possible increase of happiness for the greatest number, a socialistic order as a demand of social-ethical righteousness. Along with the thoughts of Marxism, which regards the socialistic order as a product of the decomposition of Capitalism and Competition coming about by natural necessity, the ideas of Bellamy and the Nationalists exercised the greatest influence upon him.

The seductive power which this social utopia exercised upon him

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is explained not only by his qualities as a man, his extraordinary goodness, friendliness, and unselfishness—in a sense it follows logically from a certain one-sidedness or exaggeration in his fundamental views. I may indicate what I mean by saying that Gizycki wished to have the Greatest-Happiness principle regarded not only as the supreme criterion of all moral judgment and valuation, but also as the only true and proper motive of moral volition and conduct. To speak more plainly: not alone when we are morally judging our fellow-men or ourselves, have we to ask what relation the action (or the state of mind expressed by it) sustains to the welfare of the community; but also every moral undertaking of ours has only so far worth as it springs out of the striving for social welfare, and as the furthering of this welfare is the determining aim of our action. It is a view which completely subordinates Individual-Eudemonism to Social-Eudemonism.

This was not always Gizycki's opinion. "Moralphilosophie" appears in this particular to have been influenced by the views of a young friend, Stanton Coit, who, in his Berlin dissertation, and in an article in *Mind* (July, 1886) on "The Final Aim of Moral Action," arrived at the following imperative: "Seek peace of conscience in devoting thyself to the welfare of mankind." This is an imperative in which the endeavor to mingle the individual and social moments is unmistakable. But afterwards Gizycki expressly gave up this view. His first contribution to this JOURNAL, "The Right Final Aim of Life" (Vol. I., No. 3), stated openly that in this "important question of moral philosophy" a change had taken place in his theory, and endeavored to demonstrate that pure altruism was the only sufficient motive of moral conduct. And I find a passage in his letters of that time in which he speaks with joyful satisfaction of the fact that, no longer confused by any side thoughts, he had become entirely a utilitarian again.

I do not regard it as accidental that this turning to pure social-eudemonism took place at almost exactly the same time with this increasing enthusiasm for Socialism and Nationalism: they are related thoughts, which mutually support and further one another. And there was another thing which was hardly less significant for the man's way of thinking. I believe it can be demonstrated on historico-philosophical grounds that the Greatest-Happiness principle alone is not sufficient as the supreme ethical criterion, that it needs to be supplemented by the Greatest-Progress principle. Gizycki was of the opinion that this in reality gave only one

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standard, since all real progress would signify a furtherance of welfare. From the highest historical stand-point this may be true; but when the question is of testing some single decision, or some single far-reaching rule, the two ends of welfare and progress may well be in contradiction to one another. Not only are sacrifices of their personal welfare demanded from single individuals for the sake of higher ends, but the community must not give up possibilities which the future may hold out of regard for the comfort of a generation, or of several generations, and those who are conscious of being able to further these possibilities may with right demand certain sacrifices from the living.

There was a certain weakness of the scientific superstructure with Gizycki on account of the strength of his humanitarian enthusiasm. The original evolutionary foundations of his thinking were more and more given up in favor of a purely rationalistic way of looking at things. Benthamism at last won the victory with him over Darwinism. But, happily, there are not wanting in the ethical science of our time the needful counter-balancing elements. I must content myself with a suggestion of this sort; to elaborate it would be going beyond the narrow limits of this sketch.

FR. JODL.

UNIVERSITY OF PRAGUE.

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF BELIEF, being Notes Introductory to the Study of Theology. By the Right Hon. Arthur James Balfour. London: Longman, Green & Co., 1895. Pp. viii., 356.

In considering this remarkable work, let us try to conceive the situation correctly, otherwise we shall lay blame on the wrong shoulders. The author is against Naturalism; that is to say, he demands a larger interpretation of experience than natural science by itself, in an aggressive and exclusive mood, would be able to furnish. So far I presume we are all with Mr. Balfour and against "Naturalism." But when we look again, another feature emerges. This Naturalism, whose is it? The author says it is his opponents' attitude; an author always says this of his ugliest bogey; that is a matter of course. But always, to some extent, he is himself its immediate creator; and it is not unfrequently to be observed that the creation expresses a large proportion of his true mind. That

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this is so here I think there can be no doubt whatever. The conviction which animates the treatment of Naturalism is more than the conclusion from an opponent's premises, and the whole strain of the argument confirms the impression of the energetic opening chapters, which deal with Ethic, Æsthetic, and Reason, on the basis of Naturalism. Thus, then, it is Mr. Balfour's Naturalism that we are dealing with; and here we are at once arrayed against him. We are against him not because he wants to go beyond Naturalism, not even because he wants to go beyond Natural Science, but because his procedure within their borders shows us at once that he cannot get beyond them by fair means. His imagination has been taken captive by the categories of quantity, succession, and externality, and he has lost all power of appreciating experience on its own merits. He has lost it, that is to say, for controversial purposes; for I cannot imagine that one of the most cultivated men in Europe really feels that any conceivable philosophy allows us to draw no important distinction between the beauties of a sauce and the beauties of a symphony (p. 78). I suppose that if we experience a distinction, we shall draw it; but if we do not experience it, what possible use or truth can there be in drawing it? Philosophy has to explain experience, not to create it. It will be observed that his imputation against Naturalism, which is only "consistent Rationalism" (p. 172), rests wholly on something which it is supposed to affirm about the spatial size or temporal origin or external independent existence of elements in our world. What morality sprang from, is the fact; what it is, is a delusion (p. 80). And while none of these considerations have really any power to interfere with our complete and systematic experience,—of morality, say, or of beauty, or of rational necessity,—it is plain that the real root of bitterness in Mr. Balfour's mind is that he believes the reverse, following in this belief some possible narrowest sect of Naturalism, which I have never had the ill-fortune to encounter. Often as I may have protested against Mr. Huxley's genial aggressiveness, I never remember to have known him say that beauty was not beauty, nor morality morality, because something else was before them in time or outside their manifestation in space. In Mr. Balfour's argument, the terms "insignificant" and "unimportant" recur so constantly, applied with something like ill-temper to all that is most precious in human life, as almost to constitute a defect of style.

In saying, then, that Mr. Balfour's procedure within the limits

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of Naturalism shows him incapable of getting beyond it by fair means, I allude to his absolute refusal to take anything simply for what it is; I mean, for what it is experienced as being. And this lames the very spring of logical progress. It is impossible to proceed even a step towards the unification of experience by reason unless all that is experienced is critically and completely examined, and its lesson carried forward to our attempted unification.

I should like to press the point that by reasoning like the author's nothing can be gained, following an argument of Lotze about the existence of an external world. If morality, say, or beauty, or reason, has no valuable content as given in experience, what help can be afforded by any theism or ontology? If moral conduct does not differentiate itself from the procedure which helps a parasite to survive, how is the matter helped by referring it—both, surely, in an equal degree—to the goodness and wisdom of God? How can the value of beauty be affected by calling it eternal and objective, unless the predicates point to some characteristics which are present in the enjoyment of the beautiful? On all this the criticism was spoken long ago. "If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead."

I can well understand that, having felt the impulse of knowledge and the solidity of the moral will and the value of beauty, we should be urged to go on from this healthy naturalism and link them together in a whole of reality, which, though not discontinuous with phenomena, will be more than phenomenal, by the same rational process by which each of them was constructed. But I cannot understand how, if we feel that each of them in itself is insignificant or wholly unreal, we should expect to remedy this inherent defect by decorations and appendages which after all must leave our apprehension of actual content much what it was before. In spite of Mr. Balfour's protest, his theory—for it is called a theory, though it is not to be supported by reason—is merely one of those attempts to burn the ships and force a desperate venture which more than anything else have been in this century the popular propaganda of infidelity. Those who attempt to discredit reason convict themselves more and more clearly of not knowing what reason means. Rational necessity must somehow be supplemented (p. 242). Theism is a principle which science requires for its own completion (p. 302); morality requires a moral God (p. 324), and æsthetic demands a divine beauty (p. 326). In all this, of course,

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we are following either rational necessity or mere caprice; and when we find that a future life is to be an ethical need (p. 341), we see that caprice, as usual, is self-contradictory.

B. BOSANQUET.

LONDON.

A STUDY OF ETHICAL PRINCIPLES. By James Seth, M.A., Professor of Philosophy in Brown University, U.S.A. William Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh and London, 1894. Pp. 460.

It seems to me that the title of Professor Seth's book is to some extent unfortunate. In many respects the treatment is less appropriate to the investigation of fundamental ethical truth than to a popular introduction to ethical study or an earnest exhortation to practical virtue. The function of such an introduction might very well be performed by this book, in spite of certain faults which I find in it; for a beginning must be made somehow, and perhaps for a beginning the principal point is to arouse interest. This Professor Seth's book does: it is decidedly readable; and that which, looked at from the point of view of system and of a coherent study of principles, is a defect—namely, a perhaps excessive sympathy with any ethical view which he happens at the time to be setting forth—certainly tends to awaken interest, and is calculated to rouse the reader's attention in regard to certain inconsistencies of statement and incoherencies of theory which Mr. Seth leaves us to overcome as best we may. Not that it is not of real and great importance that a text-book or introduction to any science should be as thorough and consistent as it is possible to make it, and no doubt a text-book might have these qualities and yet be full of stimulus and interest for the beginner; but, if one has to choose between accuracy and stimulus in an introductory ethics book, I should be inclined to pronounce in favor of stimulus. Mr. Seth's work is not one which is likely to leave a reader in the lethargy of a "dogmatic slumber," for his final theories, his "reconciliations" of opposing doctrines, and his solutions of difficult problems are not calculated to satisfy either the thinking reader or one who cares for nothing but definite, clear-cut conclusions,—one who wishes not so much to know the thought of Plato or Aristotle or Butler or Kant, as to be told definitely and briefly "what really is the real truth."

Professor Seth's book is divided into an Introduction (containing chapters on the Ethical Problem, the Method of Ethics, and

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the Psychological Basis) and three *Parts*, which treat respectively of the Moral Ideal, the Moral Life, and the Metaphysical Implications of Morality (*i.e.*, the three problems of the Metaphysic of Ethics,—Freedom, God, and Immortality).

In Chapter I. of the Introduction he explains that the business of ethics is to define the Good, or the Moral Ideal, by scrutiny of the various interpretations of it; and having compared the Ancient Ideal (which he describes as political) with the Modern (which he regards as individualistic), he comes to the conclusion that each is inadequate, but that both are reconciled in "Personality"—whence results the definition of ethics as "the investigation of the unifying principle of human life."

The value of this conclusion remains somewhat uncertain until we know a little more nearly what is meant by *personality;* to this topic Mr. Seth returns in Chapter III. of Part I. ("Eudæmonism, or the Ethics of Personality").

In the chapter on the Method of Ethics, it is explained that this method is properly not "scientific" but "philosophical;" but the antithesis intended is not quite clear. We are told (p. 21) that ethics is not "scientific" merely, because not merely an observation and generalization of the "phenomena" of existing or past conduct and character; and it is said (p. 29) that the ethical problem is not "What are the facts or phenomena of morality? but, How are we to interpret the facts?"

But, as Mr. Seth seems to admit (p. 30), this is so in all science. "It is never mere facts which we seek: it is always the meaning of the facts." And several different accounts of the ethical problem or ethical question are given in this chapter on Method. *E.g.*, on p. 22, it is said to be "whether there is any unique element in the nature and life of man;" on p. 24, we are told, "In particular, ethics must investigate the objective validity of the grand moral distinction between the ideal and the actual, the Ought-to-be and the Is." On p. 26, however, we read that the business of ethics "is the discovery of the moral ideal or criterion, etc." (*cf.* also § 4 of ch. I.); and, p. 35, it is asserted that ethics, "the philosophy of conduct and character, must be based upon psychology, or the science of the moral life." (This is quite a novel definition of psychology, and it is not the one really adopted as a working definition by Mr. Seth himself.)

Throughout, indeed, the author's view of the relation between psychology and ethics, and generally between what is and what

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ought to be, is difficult to arrive at. The really important and fruitful questions of method in ethics seem to be of a different complexion from those here discussed; the distinction between Ought-to-be and Is seems to be a presupposition of *ethical* science (or philosophy); and as regards the relation between ethics and psychology, a preliminary discussion (as full as required) of all psychological topics of ethical importance would have been a great improvement on the course actually adopted, of taking up psychological discussions at every stage of the work.

Professor Seth goes to "Human Nature" for ethical guidance, and the natural result—by which I mean the ordinary and to-be-expected result—is some want of clearness and definiteness. *E.g.*, he never seems to get clear the difference between Psychological Hedonism and Ethical Hedonism, and, on p. 65, groups together "Aristotle, Butler, Sidgwick, and Green" as moralists who hold that pleasure is "the concomitant and result, but not the end or object, of pursuit" (*cf.* also pp. 111, 115, 119, etc.).

In Part I., again, his distinction between different lines of ethical thought is rather psychological than ethical. In this part (which is concerned with the Moral Ideal) he considers, first, "Hedonism, or the Ethics of Sensibility;" second, "Rigorism, or the Ethics of Reason;" and third, "Eudæmonism, or the Ethics of Personality." In psychology such abstraction and isolation of faculty may have its place and use; but in ethics it seems to be neither historically justified nor logically illuminative. It hardly needs pointing out that for the elaboration or reception of any scheme of ethics whatever some exercise of reason is required, and it is surely no more than the truth to say that in all the "modern" systems of so-called Rigorism pleasure has been considered and assigned a place. It cannot for a moment be maintained that, *e.g.*, Clarke or Kant or Butler (whom Mr. Seth mentions as modern Rigorists) ignore or despise pleasure (or happiness).

The great struggle in systematic ethics has more and more defined itself as a struggle between the happiness of self and the happiness of others, between altruism and egoism, between "virtue" (in the ordinary acceptation) and self-love; a theoretical struggle to which there corresponds that which is (mostly) the real struggle and difficulty of practical life,—a struggle between the individual and the universal points of view, a struggle founded perhaps (at least for reasoning men) on a doubt as to whether "honesty" towards others is really "the best policy" for ourselves. To any

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one who thinks it unreasonable to accept the optimistic conclusion here, while he receives without doubt or hesitation the "truths" of "science," I should like to recommend a perusal of Mr. Arthur Balfour's "Defence of Philosophic Doubt," which seems to me finally convincing as to the dependence of science on philosophy, of physics on metaphysics.

That our generation has not failed to produce work in systematic ethics which is truly reconciliatory or eclectic, which explains and transcends previous conflict, is, I think, not among the least of its merits from a philosophical point of view; but I must affirm that Mr. Seth's book does not seem to come under that head. In his reconciliatory chapter on Eudæmonism, the sum of the ethical guidance which we receive is contained in the precept "Be a person" (as contrasted with the previous "one-sided" precepts of Hedonism and Rigorism). As, however, personality is taken to mean no more nor less than self-consciousness, it would seem that we *are* already what we are *required* to be: for good or ill we are and remain self-conscious creatures. But the attempt in this chapter is really to reconcile the conflicting claims *not* of bare Hedonism with bare Rigorism, but of self with others; and the author tries to show that to *be a person* one needs both to *realize self* and *to realize self in self-sacrifice*. But what the criterion of self-realization is, and at what point of self-sacrifice the line is to be drawn, we do not seem to be told; and it is here that the real difficulty lurks, for all would admit that self-realization in *some* sense and self-sacrifice to *some* extent are to be commended.

As regards the name *Eudæmonism*, Professor Seth observes that he uses it "in its original or Aristotelian sense." He chooses to accept *happiness* as the English equivalent of εὐδαιμονία; and gets over the difficulty that Aristotle's was not a Hedonistic ethics by denying that happiness is constituted by pleasure.

As regards Part II. and Part III. I will only remark (1) that there seems no very cogent reason for separating the former from a consideration of the moral ideal, and (2) that the difficulty which besets the problem of freedom is not removed by the considerations that "If man is an 'imperium' he is only an 'imperium *in imperio*.' If God has, in a sense, 'vacated' the sphere of human activity, he still rules man's destiny and can turn his evil into good. The classical conception of Fate and the Christian thought of a divine Providence have high metaphysical warrant. All human experience

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'should teach us,
There's a divinity that shapes our ends,
Rough-hew them how we will.'

Yet man cannot regard himself as a mere instrument in the divine hands, a passive vehicle of the energy of God. . . He must regard himself as a fellow-worker even with God. This is his high human birthright, which he may not sell" (p. 388).

I think there are traces of hasty thought in Mr. Seth's book, and that hence, considering his enthusiasm, sincerity, and genuine interest in his subject, it is not unreasonable to hope that he will one day give us something far more valuable ethically, while not less readable and attractive, than his present work.

The Table of Contents (which consists of the headings of chapters and marginal notes collected together) is useful as far as it goes, but it is not adequate. The absence of any index is a serious drawback in studying the book.

E. E. C. Jones.

Girton College, Cambridge.

Darwinism and Race Progress. By John Berry Haycraft, M.D., D.Sc., Professor of Physiology, University College, Cardiff. Swan Sonnenschein & Co., London, 1895. 8vo. Pp. xii., 180.

As a biologist's contribution to the lasting problem of human progress, Professor Haycraft's book deserves a warm welcome. For though the application of biological results to the guidance of conduct is part of the biologist's duty to society, the experts have hitherto, with some notable exceptions, held aloof from the task. They are inhibited by a sense of the insecurity of their own generalizations; they are preoccupied with the delights of their craft, and they are disgusted with the fatuous attempts of the incompetent; hence their reserve. But Dr. Haycraft has overcome these obstacles, and we listen to him gratefully.

Professor Haycraft begins by correcting the popular impression that racial degeneration is inevitable,—an error due to confusing the disruption of a particular political organization with a deterioration in the vital qualities of the race. For though the organization is surely in part determined by the vital qualities, we must agree that a state may cease to exist as such, without there being any failure in the type. The Jews, though not without their share of degeneracy, are cited in evidence.

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We may therefore consider hopefully how we may ensure our own racial progress. At first sight, we might even be inclined to be optimistic, so much has been done within half a century in the way of bettering the individual life. The *first cloud* is our doubt as to the inheritance of acquired characters. Is there any entail of the gains which we owe to improved function and environment, or must our children begin as we did? After a lucid discussion of this familiar problem, the author comes to the conclusion that while selection is an evident and a powerful factor in the production (we should rather say *direction*) of racial change, there is but slight, and in many cases questionable evidence that acquired characters are ever transmitted.

Though we cannot argue the matter here, we must express our unwillingness to abandon belief in the transmissibility of acquired characters so thoroughly as Dr. Haycraft does; but, if Weismann be right, it must be remembered in connection with progress, (1) that if our acquired gains are not transmitted, neither are our acquired losses, which may be something to be thankful for; (2) that Galton's fact of filial regression has the same two sides; (3) that man has, more than any animals, a social tradition, which by a series of conventions and institutions may secure the continuance of acquired characters almost as effectively as if they were materially transmitted. As to selection, we may be allowed to doubt whether Dr. Haycraft has sufficiently appreciated the primary or originative factors of evolution,—those, little known, conditions which *produce* variations, as distinguished from the secondary factors, such as selection and isolation, which *direct* evolution by determining elimination or persistence.

The *second cloud* is that in our very progress we are removing the agents who have selected us,—namely, the microbes! For, throughout the ages, these minions of death have been persistently weeding out the weak. Thus leprosy, though some strong men have fallen before it, is notably an exterminator of the unhealthy; and germs of phthisis and scrofula are our "racial friends." The healthier types may escape infectious disease altogether, or, if attacked they are most likely to recover. In the latter case, the race is none the worse, for Dr. Haycraft assures us that the results of bacterial diseases are not usually transmissible, the case of syphilis excepted. Now the obvious tendency of preventive medicine is to exterminate the microbes, and because of this the optimist is most sanguine, forgetting that if one selective agency goes there should be

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another to take its place, forgetting that a decrease in the death-rate does not necessarily mean an increase of healthfulness, forgetting that as we stamp out infectious diseases we tend to perpetuate poor types. According to the author, the Registrar-General's returns show that the race deterioration has already begun.

But we venture to think that Dr. Haycraft has somewhat overstated his case. (1) Venomous snakes eliminate careless natives, but we must not give them too much credit for evolving the wisdom of the East. Snakes and microbes are only eliminative, not originative. (2) Admitting the selective value of certain Bacteria, we would set against this, more emphatically than the author does, the indiscriminating elimination which others effect. (3) Admitting that the vigorous who survive an infectious disease are often none the worse, we know that this is not so always. (4) While dubious as to the transmissibility of results, we submit that *cæteris paribus* it is better for the race that the bearer of a child should be exempt, even more than she is, from even a successful struggle with microbes. (5) While allowing to some extent the beneficence of Bacteria in sustaining the racial standard, must we not grant that a more or less accidental weakness, which a few years might remove, will render a growing youth—possibly of most progressive diathesis—liable to succumb to phthisis? (6) Is it not remarked that the physically weak often get through infectious diseases more easily and more unscathed than those of strong constitution? (7) Is not the selective agency of the microbes almost wholly irrespective of what many would call the finer qualities of the race, and are not many of those who fade away from among us the unstable pioneers of new and promiseful variations? for there is some truth in the optimism of pathology. (8) Lastly, in appreciating the Registrar-General's returns, has the author taken due account of the increased accuracy in these returns and in medical diagnosis? But all this is better known to Dr. Haycraft than to us, we only venture to suggest that he might have indicated the other side more fully.

Professor Haycraft goes on to consider some of the pathological variations which frequently occur among us. Thus there is the "neurotic temperament," certainly hereditary; it must be eliminated by educating public feeling, which is already strongly against the marriage of those who have a tendency to insanity; and if we should speak of *the culture of genius*, the author would answer: Better lose an occasional possibility of genius than have a maudlin race.

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As to that instability which ends in alcoholism, the author's conviction is that the education of public habit and conscience are more likely than prohibition to work permanent good. Thus alcohol eliminated the worst convicts in Australia, who, had excess been impossible, would have left a fatal inheritance; and there is a seamy side to prohibition in Maine. We do not see, however, what is proved by stating, without a ratio to the population and due allowance for increased carefulness, that the statistics of the Insane Hospital in Maine show a great and progressive increase of patients, from seventy-five in 1850–51 to six hundred and eighty-five in 1891–92. And while we would agree that the habit of overdrinking has a certain eliminative value, and even doubt that the tendency to alcoholism is as such transmitted, though we think the evidence is stronger than Dr. Haycraft suggests, we cannot forget how many drunkards reproduce before they are eliminated, and leave at any rate, as the author allows, debilitated offspring.

Crime is often an acquired habit, but often it is an expression of some organic defect: the innate criminal must be segregated. We can only hope that by the time public opinion has been educated to demand the segregation of the innate criminal, the science of criminology may be sufficiently developed to discriminate him. It would be better still if the race were sufficiently evolved not to produce him.

The poor who are vicious should not be helped; the poor who are physically incapable should be segregated and treated as patients; the poor through hardship of special circumstances beyond their control should have a brother's hand instinctively outstretched to their aid. The present system fails to discriminate between these different kinds of poverty, and in relieving the idle and vicious poor often succeeds only in multiplying them. The vagrant, also, is an anachronism, and must be eliminated; we can but hope that the "scholar-gipsy" will escape. Perhaps he may become a professor.

While agreeing with Dr. Haycraft's criticism of our present poor-law system, we must in justice note, what the experience of the past hard winter has emphasized, that in many cases a most painstaking effort is made to distinguish the vicious from the deserving. But the starving children, in which category are they, vicious, incapable, or unfortunate? and how is one to discriminate them from their parents? Is the social surgeon sufficient for these things?

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Professor Haycraft thinks that there has been an abeyance of brain development since neolithic times, but we think his own book contradicts this. Moreover, he says that "the human animal," surely under domestication, "varies as much or more than the dog or pigeon;" and we submit that evidence as to abeyance of brain-development drawn from skulls is somewhat rough. But the author maintains that we have only been accumulating intellectual property, amassing material wealth (and of course multiplying our social relations), without adding to the complexity of our cerebral mechanism. Frankly, we do not believe it.

Moreover, the author tells us that while in the animal world "competition is to the death, without compromise," man is bound socially, and his altruism interferes with the sublime course of natural selection. But we should like some evidence for this libel on the animal world, and Dr. Haycraft will remember that Darwin was not strong in his facts as to the internecine struggle for existence among members of the same species. The fact is that the socially-bound animals succeed best. Professor Haycraft shares Professor Huxley's misunderstanding of the facts of nature.

Property, he goes on to tell us, acts as a handicap, and prevents a true selection of the fit, though modern democratic movements are tending to equalize the struggle. But the conditions still favor the survival of the individualistic. Here, the author appears to ignore the rapidity with which, in many departments, those who are able to co-operate well are rising to the crest of the wave. Among men, as among animals, there is competition in co-operation, and co-operation in competition, as Mr. Bosanquet puts it.

The *third cloud* is the relative sterility of the capables. But again we are more hopeful than our author. It is true that the more ambitious and careful are less prolific, but in so far as they express a selfishly celibate, family-ignoring, "non-mammalian" type, we are not sorry. In so far as they are thoughtfully self-restrained, and express highly individuated types, there is matter for regret. We must admit that there is some force in the author's argument that prudence and artificial restrictions tend at present to be disastrous, for they favor the swamping of the capables by the incapables. On the other hand, the statistical evidence is not very conclusive; the greater infant mortality among the more prolific is granted; the advantages of a small family—*e.g.*, greater maternal vigor, and more efficient education of the children—are obvious. After all, the prolific are always the less individuated,

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and the power will remain for long in the hands of the few strong men who hold the city.

Professor Haycraft is not what he calls "a social philosopher," discussing what might in ideal circumstances be done; he is rather "a social reformer," considering what is immediately practicable. And amid the histolysis of this period of social decadence, we see clearly that one line of hopeful effort is to educate,—to teach the main facts of evolution and heredity, to raise the ideals of marriage and parentage, of individual healthfulness and racial fitness, and thus gradually to replace the selective agency of the microbe by a more rational and discriminating social control. The highest praise that we can give Professor Haycraft's book is that it makes for this end.

J. ARTHUR THOMSON.

EDINBURGH.

ASPECTS OF PESSIMISM. By R. M. Wenley, M.A., D.Sc., Lecturer on Philosophy in Queen Margaret College, Glasgow; formerly Examiner in Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1894. Pp. 337.

There are six essays in this book, four mainly of historical and literary interest, and two dealing with problems of speculative philosophy. The former discuss Jewish Pessimism, Mediæval Mysticism, Hamlet, the pessimistic element in Goethe; the latter deal with the tendencies and results of the philosophizing of Berkeley, Kant, Schopenhauer, and Hartmann.

When it is noted that about half of the contents of the volume has already appeared in the pages of divers periodicals, and that the two longest essays are declared to contain only "preparatory inquiries," it is not easy to find a justification for the collective publication. The more popular essays do not shed as much novel light on their themes as their author seems to imagine, while the "strictly technical" disquisitions will only in part open up hitherto unregarded points of view to the student of modern speculation. It would scarcely be in the power of an *übermenschlicher* Gigadibs, indeed, to "see points in Hamlet's soul unseized by the Germans yet;" while the circumstance that "the pessimistic element" in Goethe has almost eluded the microscopic vision of that omniscient people may suggest a doubt in respect of the importance of the observation itself.

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The opening paper on Jewish pessimism is mainly a consideration, with present-day reference, of the attempted solution or evasion of life's enigma contained in those least Hebraic books of Jewish literature, *Job* and *Ecclesiastes*. The concluding pages form an excellent sermon, and the article throughout is marked by fine moral discrimination and spiritual insight. The like may be said of the essay on mediæval mysticism. The depth and beauty of this expression of the religious consciousness are fully acknowledged; but its perils, either on the speculative (Eckhart) or on the practical (à Kempis) side, are forcibly depicted, and the more sober creed of historical Christianity fervidly commended.

The two specially philosophical papers occupy one-half the book. Berkeley is taken as a starting-point, the nominalism of "The Principles of Knowledge" and the realism of "Siris" being elucidated, as containing problems for the resolution of subsequent German speculation. Kant is expounded in relation to the metaphysics of Schopenhauer; and then the coryphæi of modern systematic pessimism are treated at greater length. In this latest section of the book the account of Von Hartmann will, perhaps, possess most novelty for the English reader, for the works of that voluminous writer have apparently attracted but little notice in Great Britain. Schopenhauer, on the other hand, is already a familiar figure; and his central thoughts, as his numerous inconsistencies, have been abundantly expounded and criticised.

The summary of Hartmann's philosophy is in the main accurate and just, but of the interspersed commentary as much cannot be said. Dr. Wenley cannot be called a fair-minded *critic:* he is too convinced of his own philosophical righteousness for that; though he might not unbecomingly have left it to greater saints and savants to assume the tone of offended piety and intellectual disdain. His subject's errors culminate in an "inability to understand what an ethical question is," and in "a callous and unrelieved atheism," or religion whose "God is the devil!"

It is not my purpose to vindicate Von Hartmann in particular, or to examine the indictment of pessimism in general. In respect of the former all I will say is that the sufficiency of the details of a thinker's philosophizing must be judged by the end he sets before him. As concrete constructive thinker it lay in Hartmann's plan to subordinate introspective psychology to historical survey, and, despite the alleged prevailing "intellectualism," Dr. Wenley himself, in an all-important point, summarizes his author candidly

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thus: "Faith is the purely human function in religion. In it idea, feeling, and will find union, and the various 'lop-sided' religious manifestations—like intellectualism, mystic exaltation, and moralism—are thus avoided. Religion consists neither in morality touched with emotion, nor in simple admiration, nor yet in mere aspiration. It is a phenomenon of man's consciousness, and therefore implies certain psychological powers. In especial, the element of feeling, which some philosophers have implicitly eliminated, ought to have its rightful prominence." But need our shocked theologian be reminded that the gods of one religion not infrequently become the no-gods or devils of another?

I fear I am too immature a student of metaphysics to understand many of the essayist's dogmatic assertions and reasonings in regard to Ethics and Pessimism. The following is the definition offered of the latter: "Viewed rather as a reasonable conclusion from ascertained facts than as a vague opinion, the word signifies that philosophical scheme which explains the universe by 'proving' its badness; or, more strictly still, the systematized view of human nature which ends in the elimination of moral value,—goods there may be, good on the whole there emphatically is not." The second part of this passage, at least, requires much elucidation. Again: "To assume that moral life is imbued with a principle of advance, and at the same time to deny the absolute value of that life and of its end, is a contradiction in terms." To common understanding the contradiction would seem the other way about,—that the value could not be "absolute" if there is "advance;" not to add the "wooden-iron" suggestiveness of the term "absolute value" itself.

Our dogmatic essayist confidently asserts: "Morality is essentially optimistic," * and "any moral theory which recognizes the principle of development must be optimistic." These assertions cannot be dealt with until the precise significance attached to the word "optimistic" be assigned. Dr. Wenley is not sufficiently explicit. Hedonism is an abomination to him; but what "good on the whole" or ultimate good may be when feeling is extruded

* Compare with this Rudolf Lehmann's statement: "Every moralizing drift of thought tends naturally to Pessimism, because it will find its claims satisfied in the world and life; and the more exclusively morality commands the whole field of view, the more decided and explicit does this tendency become." (Schopenhauer, "Ein Beitrag zur Psychologie der Metaphysik," p. 97.)

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from its content he forbears to inform us. I can find, however, nothing in his description of a noble and progressive nature that is not compatible alike with an optimistic and a pessimistic theory. To any one who is conscious of a constraining impulse to realize the best of which he is capable, and perceives that that is alone possible in a world of like-minded strivers, there is at once spring of strenuous action and well-defined obligation. The "ethical man," just because he is man, with a man's interests, affections, and aspirations, may be moulded with either heaven or Nirvana as super-terrestrial goal. When Dr. Wenley has come to see that, he may write a more broadly philosophical, and not less edifying book.

W. C. COUPLAND.

LONDON.

NATURAL RIGHTS. By David G. Ritchie, M.A. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1895. Pp. xvi., 304.

There is so much that is interesting in this book, that we cannot help wishing that it had been more completely worked out, especially in those parts in which Mr. Ritchie applies his criticisms to the solution of current social problems. The earlier chapters of the book are occupied mainly with an able sketch of the origin of Natural Rights in the appeal to Nature against a *merely* external authority. This involves reference, not only to the American and French Declarations of Rights, but also to the Sophists, to Aristotle, to the Cynics and Stoics, to Cicero and the Roman Law, to Thomas Aquinas and his successors, down to Rousseau, who, with his own particular doctrine and its consequences, occupies a chapter to himself. As the whole of this historical survey occupies only seventy pages of large print, and is moreover freely interspersed with anecdotes and digressions into the nineteenth century, the student finds himself at the end of it in a somewhat breathless condition, which is perhaps an inevitable consequence of being taken so rapidly through so many centuries. But it is always open to the student, when he has once been shown the way, to retrace his footsteps and extend his knowledge; and it is no little service to have shown so clearly how the doctrine of Natural Rights is but one among many social theories.

In criticising the practical application of this doctrine, Mr. Ritchie again covers a large ground. In chapter v. he considers the question, "What determines rights?" and concludes, as against

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authority, nature, and egoistic utilitarianism, that rights depend upon the social organization. He then proceeds, in Part II., to discuss "Particular Natural Rights," and shows that they all of them lead more or less to contradiction which can only be solved by reference to the social welfare. It is more especially in some of these chapters that we wish Mr. Ritchie could have carried his criticism further, and have dealt more completely with the problems which he raises. In the chapter on the Rights of Property, for instance, he deals with a subject than which none is of more interest at the present moment, and in which it is of the utmost importance to weigh carefully the conceptions and the social interests involved. We are told in the preface that this chapter is a reprint, which may account for its brevity of treatment; but in a book of which the aim is to criticise the doctrine of Natural Rights, we should have expected to find a more weighty discussion of the problem which is mainly disturbing society to-day. Perhaps Mr. Ritchie will at some future time help us further in this direction. Meanwhile, we do not think his own description of his discussions (p. 275) as "tedious and intricate," a happy one; they are certainly not tedious, nor are they intricate in any marked degree. Indeed, we think that if Mr. Ritchie had followed the clue of his own criticism a little further he would have come to different conclusions, at any rate on one or two points. For instance, on p. 63, *apropos* of the question of cooking, which is so curiously a stumbling-block to many of our Socialist friends, a picturesque and pathetic description is given of the model British householder and his wife, who have so much to do that they have no time to "possess their souls before they die." The former has to be "king, high priest, finance minister, foreign secretary, minister of war, besides earning his own income," . . . while the latter is "queen, minister of the interior, diplomatist, master of ceremonies, minister of fine art, minister of education, besides being mother of some of her subjects, nurse of some of them, and foreman in a domestic factory." But is not this wide and varied life (which, we confess, inspires us with admiration rather than pity) the very fulfilment of the theory that the individual life is most fully realized in the performance of social functions? and is not Mr. Ritchie, in deprecating it, the victim of an insidious little "natural right" which suggests that the individual must assert himself against the duties involved in his position as a responsible member of society? He has a "natural right" to "possess his

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soul;" and this is to be done, not by enlarging his life, but by contracting it! as if the individual were a sort of moral sea-anemone which "possesses its soul" when it has folded up all its feelers and tentacles round its dinner, and refuses communication with the world about it.

Of course Mr. Ritchie would not accept this interpretation, but to us it seems the logical outcome of the attempt to find salvation in a merely external organization of kitchens and workshops. We find the same tendency to a superficial view of the relation between society and its members in his treatment of the family. "No real or positive equality in social conditions can be secured so long as individuals are looked at in any respect as members of families, and not in every respect as members of the State alone." This extraordinarily dogmatic statement is based on the argument that if two workmen have equal wages, while one has no children and the other has six, there is no equality in their social conditions; and Mr. Ritchie goes on to the still more startling assertions that the State can only secure the real well-being of its citizens by taking over the functions of which it deprives the family and performing them in a higher and better way, and that all modern States are moving in this direction. To critics of the Socialist position, again, there is something a little quaint in the claim for Socialists that to them is the credit of pointing out the errors of those who wish to strike at the symptoms of the disease without removing the causes.

But Mr. Ritchie's aim is "to set people thinking;" and though he has been unable in his concluding pages to refrain from proclaiming his Socialist beliefs, he maintains for the most part the impartial attitude of the critic who is engaged in testing the real values of things. His book should serve its purpose, for it raises many questions upon which the thoughtful reader will be stimulated to meditation.

H. Dendy.

London.

Wealth and Moral Law. The Carew Lectures for 1894. Hartford Theological Seminary. By E. Benjamin Andrews, D.D., LL.D., President of Brown University. Hartford, Conn.: Hartford Seminary Press, 1894. Pp. 135.

Though this little book hardly bears out the promise of its title and is nowise a systematic exposition, it discusses a variety of economic questions in an unusually large-minded and discriminating way. It is made up of lectures given before a theological

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seminary, and is a gratifying proof that the ethical and social aspect of religion is coming to be recognized afresh. The author says, "Neither the secular nor the religious press canvasses the finer questions of Applied Ethics with much delicacy or depth. Even the pulpit has not in recent years duly discharged this part of its office." He adds, "Indeed, I fear that, since the Reformation, at any rate, the pulpit has at no time done this." There are, of course, many in the religious world and many in the business world who think that the pulpit should let social questions and politics alone; happily, Dr. Andrews does not belong to their number.

He defends wealth as a prime necessity to any social state above savagery. The question of its distribution is important, but it is still more important that there be wealth in the first place. Even millionaires are desirable under present conditions. The author's philosophical temper is shown by a remark like this:

> "Grant that society is less well off than it would be if the more even distribution had come; it is yet certain that society is infinitely better off than it would be during the delay of that better time were those great heaps of wealth away."

One man's wealth does not necessarily mean another man's poverty. At the same time Dr. Andrews hopes for the time when "many of the immense and indispensable undertakings for which we now have to rely on massed capital will be assumed by the State."

In discussing "Trusts," Dr. Andrews remarks that the competitive system of industry is fast passing away,—though in agriculture, in some simple forms of manufacturing, and in retail trade, it may last indefinitely. The striking thing is that the competitive order itself gives rise to combinations. Most "trusts," it is pointed out, are little affected by tariffs or legislation of any kind; they are a natural product. The advantages connected with these capitalistic combinations are recognized, and the disadvantages. For instance, they tend to stop haphazard production. "They forecast the demand and regulate supply accordingly, much as would occur under socialism." At the same time, much as would also happen under socialism, the absence of competition tends to deprive them of a keen spur to the betterment in methods of production. Moreover, to the extent they are perfected, cost no longer regulates prices, but rather men's need; if the articles a trust produces are necessaries of life, it may "bleed people to death." Hence State action

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of some sort becomes necessary,—not socialism, "which is not to be thought of except as a fate," but regulation. There must also be moral betterment, leading men to invent improved processes and machinery for love instead of for money.

Certain economic evils, however, are directly traceable to legislation, according to our author; for example, "bad taxation, bad land laws, and the vices of our monetary system." Dr. Andrews would put the main tax upon land. He believes that Mr. George has unveiled a flagrant wrong. He does not think all the wonders of social improvement which Mr. George expects would come from the rent tax; but it none the less strikes him as fair and just and "extraordinarily desirable." But he would not have this the only tax, and thinks there would be danger to liberty if a government had resources of this sort at its command which would not have to be "voted to it item by item after debate and reflection." As to the monetary question, the author's position as an international bimetallist is well known.

Chapter iv. contains a discussion of gambling and speculation which any one contemplating to deliver himself on that puzzlesome subject would do well to read. The criminal manipulation of corporations is also considered, and, in closing, the general question is raised as to how far the present system of industry works out justice between man and man. Dr. Andrews is not optimistic on this point, and sees no hope of great improvement for the laboring man under present economic conditions. Socialism is treated in an admirably candid and discriminating way in Chapter v. Instead of deriding it, misrepresenting it, and dismissing it with a few generalities after the common fashion, he tries sympathetically to imagine what its practical working would be, and none the less discovers and points out what he believes to be grave defects in the scheme. The difficulties he raises are of a kind which every thoughtful socialist must weigh and consider. The sixth and concluding chapter shows the part which moral causes play in social wrongs and abuses, and demonstrates the insufficiency of mere mechanical changes. Altogether, the book is not one which will please conservatives, and it is too well balanced to please radicals; but it is calculated to be of service to all those who wish to "look before and after" in fashioning a path for themselves in these troublous times.

WILLIAM M. SALTER.

PHILADELPHIA.

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SOCIALISM. By Robert Flint, Professor in the University of Edinburgh. London: Isbister & Co., 1895. Pp. vi., 512.

Professor Flint understands by Socialism "any theory of social organization which sacrifices the legitimate liberties of individuals to the will and interests of the community." (We may well ask for some definition of "the legitimate liberties of individuals" which are "sacrificed" and of "the will and interests of the community," which is somehow outside its members; but this is just what we are never given, and it is clear that it would take us beyond the unanalyzed conceptions in which the argument of the book moves throughout.) It is also a theory, we are told, which rests upon a materialistic conception of life; that is, "an atheistic view of the universe" and an "individualistic equalitarian Hedonistic" theory of ethics. When you have defined Socialism in terms which make it a direct antithesis of "legitimate liberty," of ethics, and of religion, it seems comparatively superfluous to devote some five hundred pages to a criticism of it from the point of view of liberty, ethics, and religion. At any rate, it deprives the discussion of much interest: and after he has admitted all that Professor Flint has to urge on behalf of a foregone conclusion, the Socialist will still be in a position to claim that he is aiming at a completer liberty, a higher ethics, and a deeper religion than is contained in the philosophy of his critic. And he will certainly have reason: for the professor has made no distinction between the idea of Socialism and the accidents or distortions of it; while the ethics and economics with which he confronts it belong to a somewhat eighteenth century type of individualism. To such a philosophy the social life appears an irreconcilable dualism, and it is difficult to say which falls most short in Professor Flint's treatment,—economics or ethics. The author admits that "Socialism" and "Individualism" are, in their popular conception, equally vicious abstractions; but he has certainly failed to suggest the conception which would adjust them in a higher unity: mainly, because he cannot himself get beyond the mechanical abstraction of "society" *versus* "the individual." In the same way: competition is regarded as the antithesis of co-operation, social regulation as the antithesis of individual liberty; clearly, neither term of the antithesis has any value, if it is not a different aspect of the other. In short, there is too much of the defect of "abstract thinking" about this book to make its reasonings really instructive.

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But apart from the author's *apparatus criticus*, is his statement of Socialism strictly relevant? His criticism clearly stands or falls with his conception of Socialism: and the defect of his conception is that it is at once too wide and too narrow. It is taken to include Communism, Positivism, and Mr. Henry George (whose scheme of land nationalization—or, more properly, public confiscation of economic rent—Marx regarded as the "last ditch of capitalism"); but it is habitually treated under the form of State-Socialism, of a strictly Marxian type,—in fact, of German Social Democracy; while many of the criticisms are only applicable to Fourier and S. Simon. A "mosaic" conception of this kind makes criticism easier, but if it is the function of criticism "to see a thing in itself as it really is," Professor Flint's criticism has hardly attained its object. Has Socialism any underlying idea? What is the dominant or typical application of the idea at the present time? If the critic had put the question in this way, he would not have confounded the "separable accidents" of Socialism with its essence: and he would not have left out of consideration just that type of Socialism which is characteristic of modern English politics, and which finds its expression in a gradual and tentative movement towards the collective control of industry for the common good. Socialism, as a working force, is not so much a dogma as a tendency; but a tendency which may be, and has been, formulated in a way which comprehends all that is distinctive in the best ideas, moral and religious, of the time: so that, if it were divorced from these ideas, it would cease to have any significance at all. Neither Helvetius nor Stirner are necessarily its prophets. Carlyle, Ruskin, Morris, and Mazzini cannot be omitted from the history of Socialism, in England at least. This note of Socialism is entirely absent from Professor Flint's conception of it: he completely misses the criticism of competitive industry from the side of ethics,—of the demand for a freer, fuller, finer life,—and, therefore, the true inwardness of the movement, which really rests upon a consideration of the kind of life and character "competition" (which is not a competition of positive social qualities) produces or suppresses.

If the author does scant justice to the moral idea of the movement,—that is, to Socialism as a principle of life,—his account of it as a practical policy is for the most part irrelevant. It rests partly on the idea of Socialism as "a theory of complete social organization," mainly on the conception of a logically realized "collec-

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tivization" of land and capital. Socialism, it may be replied, is only a theory of certain parts of society, what one may call its "necessary industry." The Socialist demands the greatest possible organization of the material basis of life that he may leave the greatest possible freedom to "the life of the spirit," and maintains that the absence of freedom and "variation" in the one direction follows from the absence of organization in the other. And further, collectivism is not conceived as a principle directly applicable to any industry at any moment and under any conditions, but as a principle which only admits of tentative and experimental application, and which may take any form short of State Socialism. From this point of view it is simply an extension, upon a rather more articulate method, of a principle already admitted in factory legislation, municipal industry, state monopolies, and the co-operative movement generally. It is, of course, more than an extension: for the endeavor of Socialists is to make this machinery the conscious and visible embodiment of the higher idea of industry: to use the state and municipality as object lessons in the model employment of labor: as initiators, for instance, of a definite system of determining the conditions and remuneration of laborers by the moral sense of the community. What Socialists of this type are trying to capture is not so much land and capital as seats on the local council, the school board, and the vestry. It is this work-a-day or administrative Socialism—represented in a recent novel ("Transition") as Gas and Water Socialism—that Professor Flint leaves out of account. It is true that Socialists of whatever type contemplate the co-operative organization of many industries which are now competitive; but they contend that the competitive system is itself working in the same direction. Competition is a process of selection: the "fittest survives" in a completed monopoly; the characteristic of industry in America, for instance, is not "free competition," but "monopoly," and the question is not between free competition and collectivism, but between collectivism and monopoly: or, between monopolies controlled by the community and monopolies controlled by combinations of capitalists,—it may be, of capitalists and laborers. Whatever may be the truth of this particular deduction, there can be little doubt as to the co-operative tendency of industrial evolution.

Professor Flint's "economics," whether of Individualism or of Socialism, are, in fact, hardly up to date. His criticisms of Marx's

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theory of value and of "the right to labor" are effective, but their interest is mainly historical. Socialism is independent of any particular theory of value (it has formally repudiated the "iron law of wages"), and it is concerned with the rights of laborers rather than the right to labor: more especially, with the problem of the displacement of labor, which is the significant part of the "unemployed problem." For the rest, Professor Flint continually countenances the popular confusion between an "economic law" and a "law of nature:" and he "cannot see" that wages can be "justly" determined by any other consideration than "the law of supply and demand" (which he compares to the law of gravitation). He even goes so far as to ask "what more injustice is there in purchasing labor-power than in purchasing commodities at market value?" Is "sweating" just, we may ask; and if not, why not? And where would the laboring class now be if trade unionism and factory legislation—and indeed public opinion—had not made the distinction between "the exchange of services" and the "exchange of commodities" that the professor "fails to see"? Does he admit the conception of a "living" or a "minimum" wage? If he does admit it, then he must admit that it is a non-competitive wage, not determined by the higgling of the market, but by the consideration of the possibility of living. Apart from justice, the policy of a minimum wage (above "the market rate of labor") adopted by public bodies has a much higher economic justification than "the law" of supply and demand. It interferes with competition in one sense, it promotes it in another and a higher sense: it raises competition from the plane of mere cheapness to that of efficiency. If, however, the professor denies the justice and the expediency of a standard wage, what becomes of his contention that industrial wage-earners are exactly in the same position as professional wage-earners? Or would he contend that the appointment of professors should be determined by the law of supply and demand? The truth is that it is only in what are relatively "arrested" or undeveloped industries that any such "law" has play. Professor Flint, it may be added, hardly notices the Socialistic criticism of the failure of (ordinary) competition on its economic side,—its wastefulness, and its precariousness for all concerned.

On the whole, it is not surprising that Professor Flint, with all his erudition and with all his desire to be open-minded, tends to miss the point of Socialism, whether in theory or practice. After

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all he has said, the main issue raised by Socialism still remains: and to that issue the materialism or the "Marxianism" of certain Socialists is clearly irrelevant. But perhaps Socialism more than any other "faith" has need of being saved from its friends: and to that desirable consummation Professor Flint's book may be considered a powerful and timely contribution.

SIDNEY BALL.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

PRACTICABLE SOCIALISM. Essays on Social Reform. By Samuel and Henrietta Barnett. Second edition, revised and enlarged. London: Longmans, Green & Co.; New York, 15 East Sixteenth Street, 1894.

In 1888, Mr. and Mrs. Barnett (Mr. Barnett was then rector of St. Jude's, Whitechapel, East London) issued a volume of essays "written at different intervals during fifteen years' residence in East London." The present volume is a reissue of these, together with several additional essays printed or spoken since then. There is also a most interesting introduction to the second edition by Mr. Barnett, containing a retrospect of twenty years' work among the East London poor.

All the essays deal with the problem of Social Reform. Some are for the most part descriptive of the lives of the poor among whom Mr. and Mrs. Barnett live, others "suggest some means by which such poverty may be met . . . with some of the dangers to which charitable effort seems to be liable." Mr. and Mrs. Barnett write with the knowledge and sympathy of those who have spent their lives working for the people about whom they write. Their criticisms of the poor and of those who seek to help them are often painful reading; but—faithful are the wounds of friends.

Dark and bright intermingle in the twenty years' retrospect. Of the latter we read, "The standard of comfort . . . has risen. The people are better housed, better fed, better clad; they take more pleasure, and take it in more wholesome ways; there is less rowdyism in the streets, and there is now some interest in public affairs." Of the former we are told, "there has been a decrease of old-fashioned honesty; an increase of impertinence and of the habit of gambling." Mr. Barnett reminds us that "the standard reached is not sufficiently high; that wages of twenty-five or even forty shillings a week are not sufficient, and there are thousands who cannot count even on this wage." He recommends "increased

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organization of labor, further demolition of unhealthy houses, a great increase to the number of free libraries, open spaces, and baths, and a better administration of the Poor Law. The old formula that the State should provide 'needs and not wants' seems best, and the aim of reformers should be the nationalization of luxury. As may be learnt by the example of America, the strength of a nation depends on the strength of the individuality of its members."

The book is animated throughout by a wide and free religious spirit.

"Those who believe in God must commend this belief," says Mr. Barnett, "by showing that it bears on all the relations of life; that it is the groundwork of their politics, their business, their pleasure, and their home relations. . . . They must, as Ivan Ivanovitch, say by all their actions, 'How otherwise?' and show themselves to be servants humble as those who do another's will, strong as those who have Almightiness behind them, and glad as those who have learnt that Almightiness is All-Love."

M. S. GILLILAND.

LONDON.

THE AGED POOR IN ENGLAND AND WALES. By Charles Booth. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1894. 8vo. Pp. 527.

We saw a review of this work in a periodical which should have known better than to assert that Mr. Booth was here defending pensions for the aged poor. Such a judgment wholly misrepresents the work and tends to depreciate its value. It must have been read into the book either from the imagination of the writer or from a confusion of the book with an earlier work on "Pauperism and the Endowment of Old Age," in which old age pensions were favorably considered. It is true that the author inclines to that policy, and that the material here collected might be used in its favor; but, besides a distinct statement (p. 419) that he does not intend to propose any remedies in the present work, Mr. Booth presents throughout the volume little more than facts and statistics bearing upon the condition of the aged poor. In fact, on the title-page he limits his undertaking in this volume to that object. Hence it is a mistaken view to suppose that it is a partisan work, and very greatly misrepresents the superior value of it to the student of social problems. The book is only second in value to the first work by the same author, namely, "The Life and Labor of the People in the

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City of London." It is simply limited to one general class extending over a larger area than London, and a class in which a great interest is developing throughout England, as shown both in its politics and in its philanthropy. It deserves the same attention and study.

J. H. HYSLOP.

COLUMBIA COLLEGE.

ANIMAL RIGHTS, CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO SOCIAL PROGRESS. By Henry S. Salt; also an Essay on Vivisection in America, by Albert Leffingwell, M.D. 12mo, pp. 176. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1894.

This little book does not pretend to be a theoretical discussion of animal rights, but only a statement of practical reasons for modifying both our treatment of animals and our habits of using them for food. From the title, one would expect either a theoretical examination of the question whether animals had any rights, or, assuming that in some sense they had them, a practical treatise on methods of preventing cruelty to them. But this does not seem to be the object of the book, even in the essay on vivisection, where their use for scientific purposes under the scalpel and knife, even under anæsthetics, is wholly condemned. Hence higher ground is taken than the mere prevention of needless pain and cruelty. Consequently, the whole problem of using animal food is brought into discussion and vegetarianism seen to be the sequel of it. For this latter purpose, the whole argument in the first chapter pretending to prove animal rights is inadequate, being nothing more than a criticism of the argument against them. No fundamental position, philosophical or theological, is taken as a ground of such rights, and hence we have only an exposure of certain logical weaknesses in the defence of existing practice towards animal life.

In fact, the book confuses three distinct problems which ought to be kept distinct from each other. (1) The abstract question of animal rights of any kind; (2) The question of their treatment as sensible beings, whether we accord them the same rights as man or not; and (3) The question of vegetarianism. The last problem virtually assumes that they have equal rights with man. On the other hand, some can defend animal rights of a certain kind without including a prohibition of animal food. Then, independently of all questions of rights, others may insist on human conduct to-

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wards animals upon the ground of man's duty to moral law in general, including good will towards all harmless sentient life. It is noticeable, also, that the force of the authors' argument for the first and third of these problems is obtained almost wholly from the public sympathy already enlisted for the second, but not recognized in any way to be efficient; and at the same time those who do not go the length of vegetarianism may lose interest in the importance of the other matters, because one does not like premises which include such distinct conclusions, when one of them is repugnant to him. Hence we must deplore the discussion of these questions side by side, since it is evidently the purpose to move public sentiment generally. This is not to say that the book is not a valuable one: for we think it is calculated to make many persons think. But whether vegetarianism be correct or not, there is great importance in limiting the wholesale cruelty to animals going on in productive and distributive commerce, in gaming and sport, and in vivisection. Public opinion can best be influenced by stimulating its humanitarianism or sympathies in that direction, and not by recommending consequences which it does not see are the logical outcome of the humane attitude towards animals.

Apart from these considerations, we can commend the book very highly to every one who feels for the dumb brute the regard which a noble man must feel if he makes any pretensions to being moral. The chapter on sport is a good one, and others hardly less so. If the work did not attempt to prove too much, it might be advisedly placed in the hands of every one, for its spirit shows the finest feelings a moral being can possess.

J. H. Hyslop.

Columbia College.

Edinburgh Summer Meeting. Ninth Session, August 5–31, 1895.

Readers of this Journal may be interested to hear of the continuation of this course, organized by Professor Patrick Geddes. Its aim seems to be that of giving what may be called a concrete education in the subjects of human interest, *i.e.*, an education in which the various subjects are treated in organic relation to one another and not as abstract and independent branches of study. The courses are grouped in the following departments: Social Science and Philosophy; Civics and Hygiene; History, Literature, and Language; Psychology and Education; Biology; Geography and Geology; Chemistry; Sloyd; Fine Art; Musical Recitals; Ex-

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cursions. Among the special subjects of lecture this winter may be mentioned the following: Life and Thought, by Professor Geddes; Life and Art, by Mr. William Sharp; L'Evolution Sociale en France et en Angleterre, by M. Demolins; First Steps in Synthesis, by Dr. R. M. Wenley; Evolution Ethics, by Principal Lloyd Morgan; Aspects of Citizenship, by Dr. Henry Dyer; Woman's Work in the World, by Miss Jane Hay; Some Greek Ideals of Civic Education, by Mrs. Herbertson; The Savage Mind, by Professor Haddon; Some Laws of Thought, by Mrs. Boole; The Biology of the Seasons, by Mr. J. Arthur Thomson; The Evolution of Cities, by various lecturers. Most of these are in courses of about ten lectures. How far they succeed in their aim, and how far they are merely of the nature of popular entertainment, I am not in a position to judge.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

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Books to be reviewed should be sent to one of the following addresses:
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